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Forum: Military Reform and Defense Planning

Military Reform in Historical Perspective — Michael E. Vlahos — 245
Defense Organization and Management — Paul Bracken — 253
The Dynamics of Doctrinal Change — Gordon H. McCormick — 266
On the Appropriate Use of Technology — Kevin N. Lewis — 274
The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment — John J. Mearsheimer — 285

Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR? — Ronald D. Azmus — 301

Surviving the Missiles: The GDR and the Future of Inter-German Relations — A. James McAdams — 343

Prospects for Indo-U.S. Security Ties — Raju G. C. Thomas — 371

Political Culture, Intellectual Dissent, and Intellectual Consent: The Case of Romania — Michael Shafir — 393

Turkey and NATO: Past, Present, and Future — Bruce R. Kuniholm — 421

The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey — Michael M. Gunter — 447

Review Essays

The Decline of British Sea Power — John H. Maurer — 479

Selected Publications Received — 495

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forum

MILITARY REFORM AND DEFENSE PLANNING

The subject of military reform has become an important issue in the ongoing debate over the proper direction of U.S. defense planning. The contributors to this "ORBIS Forum" examine the historical antecedents of the current U.S. reform movement and its perspectives on the issues of military organization, doctrine, and technology. The concluding essay provides a critical assessment of the recommendations advanced by the reform movement. The contributors are: **MICHAEL E. VLAHOS,** *Reseach Professor and Director of National Security Studies at The Johns Hopkins University;* **PAUL BRACKEN,** *Assistant Professor of Political Science and Organization and Management at Yale University;* **GORDON H. MCCORMICK,** *Managing Editor of* ORBIS *and Coordinator of Military Studies at FPRI;* **KEVIN N. LEWIS,** a member of the professional staff of the Washington office of the Rand Corporation; and **JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER,** *Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.*

MILITARY REFORM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

by MICHAEL E. VLAHOS

An increasing number of the individuals involved in the making of defense policy are identifying themselves with the notion of reform. In their relationships and their contributions to the U.S. armed services, these self-styled reformers are imbued with a sense of both righteousness and newness: as though their approach were not only above criticism, but somehow unique in the experience of civil-military relations.

They are, of course, neither above reproach nor new. Their self-assurance flows from the legacy of reform in the American and West European ethos of parliamentary democracy. It is part of the heritage of Western socio-political behavior. The reformers of today are simply the most recent incarnation of the peculiar sociology of the West in its political approach to security. They are representatives of an extended heritage, inseparable, in fact, from the origins of the parliamentary system itself. If they wish to function more effectively in the contemporary scene, they should look to their historical kin. From them, they might discern not

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merely their actual role in the culture of defense policy; they might sense, as well, the consequences of their behavior.

"Reform" is an illuminating choice of an identifying—and legitimizing—rubric for this emerging group. In the context of a military capability short of what society desires, it would seem that improvement would be the mandate. In an evolving world, dominated by our own science and its technological instruments, military establishments must continually innovate in order to keep pace with competing adversaries. "Innovation," then, would seem a more appropriate term to apply to this group than "reform."

"Reform" has special connotations in Western democratic societies. Perhaps this is an ineluctable outgrowth of the Protestant tradition, however secular our thought has become. "Reform," as used by the movement's spokesmen, is usually taken from these dictionary definitions: "to amend or improve by removal of faults or abuses," "to put a stop or end to an abuse, malpractice," "to correct, put right an error or mistake." These are obviously secular meanings of reform, linked to the pervasive and unimpeachable goal of "progress," another driving concept at the heart of our ethos.

On a more passionate and perhaps subconscious level, however, are the truer definitions: "to convert into another and better form," "to bring, lead, or force to abandon a wrong or evil course," "to cut down or back to a desired length; to trim, prune."[1] Reform, then, implies more than an urge to improve the capabilities of our armed forces to discharge their obligations to the nation and to its policies; it is a basic expression of ideology in the national political spectrum.

"Reform," when used to describe social struggles in modern history, has regenerative, quasi-religious aspects. It implies a struggle between good and evil. In this sense, any reform movement in Western culture seeks change on two levels. At the level of specific, published policy, it may call for improvement through change. At its heart, however, it seeks revision or transformation of the very nature of the system. This is true of military reform as well. Any call for innovation in or change of defense posture that employs the word reform insinuates far more than improvements in efficiency or capability. Reform movements envisage more fundamental shifts in public and national policy, whether expansive or contractive, liberal or conservative, radical or reactionary. The historical experience of reform must, therefore, be contrasted explicitly with

[1] William Little, H. W. Fowler, and J. Coulson, *The Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1933).

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the efforts of those who would improve through innovation, and individual innovators should be distinguished from the political movements they may incite.

There are three essential aspects of military establishments. One involves organization: how forces are raised, trained, and identified. A second is related to doctrine: how forces will fight, and how to conceive of war itself. The last is the nature of the instrument, as it is driven by changing technology: the weapons and the supporting systems of war. None of these parts can be separated and discussed in isolation. Innovators and reformers, however, usually focus their public efforts and proclamations on one of these areas, or are remembered for such focus.

Innovation also has three essential parts: its tempo (the rate of change), its direction (the way change tugs and pulls), and its consequences (the often unpredictable product of the choice for innovation). These aspects of innovation, through the paths they take, have a direct impact on national policy and even national goals, which goes far beyond the improvement of existing capabilities. The pure—or less ideological—innovators consider only the immediate consequences within terms of increased efficiency and fail to examine the larger implications of their innovations. Reformers, however, seek to use military change to assist or make inevitable changes in policy, strategy, and goals, through limiting or expanding national military capabilities. In that such change must reflect convictions concerning national values as well, military reformers are almost always ideologically rooted. These political roots can have straightforward connections with revisions in national strategy, if not national values. Various groups within society have identified themselves as "reformist." They range from intracorporate clubs within a military service to competing services, to political parties, to lobbies, to caucuses.

Competing services, or even intra-service groups, often make alliances with prominent individuals, groups, and parties that comprise the political spectrum in democratic society, even if at ideological odds, simply to further their own objectives. Political groups can, if they choose, more sincerely express ideological motivation. When addressing the issue of military reform, however, this connection is usually muddied or denied. In democracies, it is considered bad form, if not political suicide, to be too partisan in the national security debate: after all, "we all believe in a strong defense." Economic lobbies and political action groups can be more blunt. All groups play a role in the process of political choice in military policy and, ultimately, national strategy. In military reform movements, it seems, only the most radical lobbies are honest about the linkage of reform objectives to changes in policy, and beyond policy, to changes in national values.

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Organization

When an army is badly trained and organized for its mission, it should, logically, be reorganized. When does reorganization of a military service edge into "reform"?

In 1870, Edward Cardwell, Liberal secretary of state for war, "reformed" the British army, making it capable of sustaining both imperial and European interests. Recruitment expansion, depot "localization," and "linked battalions" all helped to make management of a globe-spanning empire and a combustible European peace practical.

In contrast are the efforts of General Michel, vice-president of the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre (CSG) in 1910-11, to revise the organization of the French army. Faced by superior German forces, France, he reasoned, had no choice but to throw every man into the coming fray, even if that included reserves. Reserve formations were excluded in war plans from the first echelon out of prejudice. The corporate ethos of the officer corps, still simmeringly royalist, denied the combat equality of nonprofessionals. In attempting to erase class distinction in favor of presumptive increases in capability, was Michel a "reformer"?

Far more clearly reformist were the actions of the military reformers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Yorck, and Clausewitz, who transformed Prussia's military system during the Napoleonic era. To throw off the yoke of Napoleon during the war months of 1812-13 Yorck raised a national *Landwehr*, a popular army voted by the East Prussian Estates—a proto-parliament—without the prior permission of the king. By linking state and people through the agent of the "nation in arms," Yorck not only liberated his country, he laid the way for its transformation from absolutist order to parliamentary pluralism.

Which of the above, if not all, were the reformers? Cardwell sought to extend the status quo through limited and undisruptive innovation in organization, but left strategic policy and national goals untouched. Michel sought to give the nation strategic leverage against an apparently unbeatable German army to even the odds. His revisions, however, had potentially radical implications for French society. Was this his intent? Michel climbed the career ladder on democratic rungs, identifying himself with proletarian origins and republican virtues. Did the Dreyfus-bruised officers in the CSG sense a hidden agenda, the product of a careerist sell-out? Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Yorck, and Clausewitz, in contrast, must stand out as pure reformers. Their goal was frankly revolutionary, and their vision was discussed and shared by the Prussian people. The Prussian reformers' conceptual transformation of army, state, and nation is an example of true military reform.

Since the organization of a nation's army reflects not only the parameters of foreign policy but also the nature of its polity, the army is

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first and foremost the upholder of national values, and only second, and in corollary, the instrument of external defense. For Western democracies, a conscript army has direct republican goals. The nation in arms, the army as "school of the nation," the militia ethos: all are images of national identity.

The United States has also sought uncompromising military reform. Such Americans as Emory Upton and Leonard Wood must be regarded as our authentic reformers. They sought to revitalize the then decadent militia ethos, and to build a U.S. army expressive of both its people and its government. Yet the image of a large citizen army seemed to imply a preparation for war and a society that was less freewheeling and self-oriented. Upton and Wood were bucking the spirit of the age. Today, those who would urge even limited conscription should remember that only for a single generation, roughly from 1945 to 1970, has their vision been shared by most citizens of the United States in peacetime.

Doctrine

Doctrine — how to fight — is linked to the weapon and to its incessant technological metamorphosis. Reformers who have focused on revising national military doctrine have often opportunistically tied their proposals to timely shifts in weapons technology. Doctrinal reformers, however, should be sifted from the more specific "technocratists" by the breadth of their world view. They base their examination on the conviction that the way to fight, and the kind of wars that might be fought, should be changed. The debut of new, improved weapons, like a deus ex machina, can give their theories decisive force. The technocratists, by contrast, begin with the weapon. They are bedazzled and often so driven by their "divine" revelation as to lunge at doctrinal justification.

In the 1890s, a reformist school of thought, led by Ferdinand Foch, seized French military doctrine. As a consequence, the prudent defensive plans developed after the defeat of the French in 1870-71 were discarded, and an offensive ethos predicated on the racial vitality of the French was enshrined. In a future war with Germany, attack would be met by attack, and the storm unleashed by an enraged nation would throw back the Hun in defeat. This was reform at its most primitive and most distilled, for it connected in a compelling way the idea of France and its core values to the operational movements dictated by a doctrine of battle. The army became the instrument of French national regeneration, and military reform the regeneration of that instrument.

A war later, a British lounger-strategist, Basil Liddell Hart, made an analogous, if opposite connection for Britain. Surveying the cost of the Great War, and contrasting British style in that war with that preceding it, he argued in the early 1930s for a revision of British military

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doctrine. Like the Foch doctrine, his was tied to the British national ethos. Britain had not the resources in manpower to engage successfully in combat on the "Central Front" of the European continent. If it hoped to continue its strategic position as keeper of the balance of power, it would have to do so through indirect military applications: peripheral operations he called "the British Way in Warfare." Liddell Hart, like Foch, sought the regeneration of national values in war, only his formulation involved separation and limited liability, where Foch's required direct and victorious assault through force majeure.

Both Liddell Hart and Foch were archetypal doctrinal reformers in that they linked both national strategic goals and policies and deeper national values to their reformist visions. Their U.S. counterpart, Alfred Thayer Mahan, had a vision that succeeded in transforming not only military force posture but the U.S. mission in the world as well. Mahan showed how war at sea was won through superior concentrations of capital ships. While the lessons he drew were all derived from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their relevance for his era seemed obvious. He demonstrated that U.S. national policy could no longer be tied to coastal defense. If the United States, already possessing global economic interests, wished to continue to grow, it must have a capital-ship navy. Technology was less important than the concept and use of the instrument itself.

Doctrinal reformers often have a clearer sense of the importance of military power for the making of national strategy and, ultimately, of national goals. In fact, they begin with national goals, and then proceed to develop a strategic conception to guide the use of force to maximize these goals. The technocratists, whose arguments hinge on the arcane and esoteric, have agendas in the political realm that their glittering systems may obscure, even in their own minds.

Technology

Reformers who advocate under the mantle of technology, whether for innovation or transformation, are of two species. One is the true technocratist. Obsessed by the glowing potential of nascent technology, he always promises the imminence of greater efficiency at lower cost. This tantalizes politicians by seeming to resolve the conundrum of military procurement. The second tends to be a politician rather than a military professional, one who sees in emerging technology an instrument that will serve his larger political agenda. He may use the same imagery, couched in the same promissory language, but with a divergent design.

The great technocratists of recent Western tradition have all been of the first variety: professionals who have sought to improve the combat capabilities of their services through technology. It must be

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remembered, however, that once a military panacea was unveiled, cast in a new-tech mold, it was quickly embraced by those in the political arena who saw opportunity in such innovation.

Theophile Aube and Gabriel Charmes, of the French navy, sought to introduce what they saw as a panacea weapon, the torpedo boat, as the basis for French seapower. By giving the torpedo boat primacy, they substituted it for the capital ship: the ironclad, the *cuirasse*. For them, this was not dogma, but simply revealed truth. The battleship could not endure much longer against the more "efficient" torpedo boat. It had to go. Costs would be lowered, without a loss of naval power. French foreign policy goals would be uncompromised. Many on the left took up the idea and saw in it the promise of a republic freed from evil battleships. Battleships, after all, emblemized the French robber-baron industrial policy, which promoted a monopolistic control of the steel industry. Discarding them would be a blow for social and economic, as well as military, reform. Unhappily for the Left, and for Aube and Charmes, the torpedo boat failed in operational maneuvers. And the British continued to build battleships.

For the United States in the interwar era, Billy Mitchell played the same role. For him, the bomber was the weapon of the future, and the future had arrived. The new wonder weapon not only rendered all surface ships obsolete, if not wholly irrelevant, it was cheaper as well. Unlike the French, however, the U.S. electorate did not view battleships as capitalist tools, but as the "guardians of liberty." Nonetheless, they were expensive and were limited to fifteen in number by treaty. If they were indeed obsolete, as Mitchell claimed, then they would be a wasted investment. Mitchell's early publicity worked well, but its impact was muted by the fact that only anchored ironclads were sunk during his bombing experiments. Later, when Curtis LeMay intercepted the *Rex* well out to sea with some B-17s in 1935, the dominance of the sea by the air seemed imminent. The United States, however, had ocean-spanning commitments, especially in the Pacific, and even very long-range aircraft could not project power at great distance or defend far-flung ocean archipelagos alone.

The British technological reformer Jackie Fisher was something of an exception. Fisher also sought to save the Exchequer money while achieving greater combat efficiency. His solution, the dreadnought battleship, appears today to have had quite the opposite effect, driving up costs and fueling a worldwide naval arms race. Yet, the dreadnought did save imperial capital because the British were able to replace both ironclads and equally expensive armored cruisers with ships that could effectively perform both missions.

The great difference between Fisher on the one hand and Mitchell, Charmes, and Aube on the other lies in the sophistication of their

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world views. Fisher knew that Britain's global commitments were increasingly at odds with its European engagement, and that competing domestic and military expenditures were forcing a choice in national priorities. He was further aware that traditional applications of technology were becoming more expensive as traditional ship types became more and more complex. The only solution was to recast the nature of the fleet in order to exploit breakthroughs in naval technology. Paradoxically, his solution led to more expensive and larger individual ships. Concentration of firepower at sea was, in his day, the only means of preserving Britain's global interests and its naval supremacy in home waters. Fisher's use of technology was integrated into larger strategic and political concerns, not conceived in professional isolation.

By contrast, Mitchell, Charmes, and Aube sought to champion their cherished new weapons at the expense of traditional approaches to war, even though they could not provide the same mission profile. They focused on individual weapons-system performance in a limited tactical arena. Only in that carefully arranged context could their system appear to prevail. If a torpedo boat or a bomber could sink a battleship, then the capital-ship concept would be discredited in the public imagination. Substitution by the panacea weapon would soon result. Unfortunately, a narrow technical and tactical world view allowed political lobbies to exploit their findings. Now they could attack not only the capital ship, but the mission that was at the core of a national strategy they found objectionable. Mitchell, Aube, and Charmes were manipulated. They offered, in their eagerness to displace the capital ship, nothing more than coast defense. They offered other groups in society, however, a long-range political weapon.

Of what use are the historical analogues of military reform? First, their consequences. Aube's and Charmes' promotion of the wrong weapon resulted in the utter stagnation of the French navy. When the test of naval capability came in 1898, the decrepitude of their ironclad fleet helped make the shame of Fashoda. Mitchell did not destroy U.S. naval power, but his promise of B-17 air dominance created a reliance on those bombers for the defense of the Philippines and a false sense of security that was rudely stripped away in 1941. In the realm of doctrine, Liddell Hart's pied-piper call for an indirect strategy helped lead Hore-Belisha away from the re-equipment of the British Expeditionary Force and preparation for the ultimate continental commitment. Foch succeeded only in setting his nation up for one of the biggest falls of its life.

These are all examples of reformers who clearly harmed their countries' military means. They changed the conditions for sustaining national policies in time of testing and crisis. What of the reformers who succeeded, who helped win wars in time of peace? Mahan helped the United States throw off its parochial prejudice about the role of force and

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showed those who were seeking a larger role in the world the way such a role could be crafted. Fisher helped to save his country and empire by developing a program to maintain Britain's position in the face of new naval adversaries. When war came, there was little worry about the navy and little fear for the safety of the nation. Britain was free to focus on the European balance. Finally, Yorck helped to transform his country into a nation-state by undermining the power of absolutism. Military reform was the instrument and the symbol of this transformation.

The contrast in consequences leads to an important insight. Military reform can be successful only when its full agenda is publicly presented and debated. Reform is a process, a means toward an end. The military institutions of a democracy are instruments sustaining a free society. Therefore, reform of the military is nearly always linked to an internal debate about the purpose of military force for the society and its elected government, both at home and abroad. The direction of national policy—when and to what extent a nation is willing to employ military force—must be spelled out before any actual "reform" is to occur. The gap between innovation or improvement and reform has never been simply a matter of degree.

Mahan succeeded because he articulated a shift in U.S. public consensus as it was occurring, something that Upton and Wood missed by several generations. Fisher succeeded because his innovations were undertaken when there was a national consensus about imperial strategy. The Prussian reformers were at the cutting edge of the making of a national identity. Military reform, by nature of its origins in Western democratic traditions, cannot occur in monarchical or totalitarian regimes. Such regimes improve, they innovate; they cannot reform. Our armed forces are an extension of ourselves. Those who wish to reform them would also change us.

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

by PAUL BRACKEN

Almost every military reform movement in modern times has used an organizational vehicle to carry through its suggested improvements and amendments. The U.S. Marines in the 1930s based their doctrine of amphibious assault on coordinated air, land, and sea operations, and their combat organization administered this coordination. The development of Panzer attack strategies hinged on the separation of tank warfare from infantry support, and this was achieved through the creation of separate Panzer forces. Even the effort to get maximum effect from air power rested on the creation of an independent air force.

Maxwell Taylor probably said it best in discussing how to

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improve U.S. military strength. He said that organization, not leadership or weapons, was the key to effecting change. This is an important insight indeed, and one that was not forgotten in the early 1960s when major, enduring changes were made in the U.S. defense organization. These changes involved combining U.S. nuclear war plans into a single integrated plan, the fusion of the armed forces' intelligence services into the Defense Intelligence Agency, the creation of the National Military Command System, Defense Communications Agency, and the Defense Nuclear Agency. The McNamara revolution was achieved by organization more than it was by budget or strategy. Many people doubt the desirability of these changes, but few doubt that fundamental changes were made.

Today there is a tendency to underestimate, or even dismiss, the important role of organization in improving performance and forcing change. This is a readily understandable attitude, considering the many pointless (and often counterproductive) reorganizations that have been inflicted on the U.S. security establishment over the past ten years. When political leaders don't know what else to do, they reorganize. The intelligence community has been especially victimized in this way following the exposures and public calls for change of the 1970s. Reorganizing for its own sake is a time-honored Washington tradition, yet, despite the cynicism this causes, the lessons of the early 1960s and earlier periods should be kept in mind.

That organization can be a vehicle for change has not been forgotten by the military reformers of the early 1980s. Most of the proposals for restructuring NATO's defense posture emphasize reorganization of ground units to develop more combat forces, shrinking the overhead and logistic tail. Proposals for the creation of two to three times as many NATO divisions from existing forces and without additional cost have been made. The idea is to offset the higher force levels available to the Warsaw Pact without raising NATO defense budgets excessively.

In another area of reform, the Department of Defense has been restructured, giving greater autonomy to the services at the expense of what was considered overly centralized control. This, of course, is an attempt to counter some of the excesses of the 1960s, with their great tendency toward central control from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and associated civilian assistant secretaries. Finally, many reform proposals have been made for that seemingly unchangeable organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The intention is to give greater authority and flexibility to this institution, either collectively or through the chairman, resulting in more autonomy for the Chiefs to draw up war plans and make major acquisition decisions. Some of the more far-reaching JCS proposals call for the creation of a true general staff, one with power over budgets and, perhaps more important, promotions.

What can be made of the organizational aspects of the reforms

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mentioned above? On the one hand, they might amount to little, since most of the defense and intelligence reorganizations of the past decade have had more of an impact on the headlines than on the groups concerned. Yet, on the other hand, there is our experience of the early 1960s, when organizational variables were manipulated to produce permanent and fundamental changes in how this nation protects its security. It is not easy to predict what the outcome of any of the proposed reforms would be, but it is nonetheless essential to think through the problem as best we can.

Thinking through the proposed reforms sounds like the only sensible course of action. An examination of earlier cases of attempts to do so, however, reveals a subtle danger in such an exercise. Many years ago, when the broad principles of systems analysis were being worked out, people learned that, when they performed an analysis, they concentrated on choosing the best system.[1] In so doing, however, they tended to ignore a more important question. The problem was really one of designing flexible, effective systems for defense, not merely of comparing the proposed systems with what already existed. The problem of organizing for defense is similar. *Design* is often more important than *analysis* in the discussion. The pitfall with regard to the organizational aspects of military reform is that comparing only proposed alternatives will often mask more important questions about what sort of organizations should be designed in the first place. In this paper, I will discuss these two different approaches to the problem.

Organizational Reform

The military reform movement of the 1980s originated as an attempt to restructure U.S. conventional forces in order to increase their front-line combat power, at the expense of overhead, support, and logistic capabilities. Broadly speaking, this objective has been offered as the best way to meet the challenge of superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact numbers. Reformers generally argue that the United States places too much emphasis on heavy divisions and firepower, oversized aircraft-carrier battle groups, and overly complex tactical air forces, which are likely to prove unreliable in combat.[2] The organizational aspects of these arguments are only one part of a larger critique of the art of war as practiced by the United States. Nonetheless, the organizational aspects of the reform of general-purpose forces are important elements in nearly all of the proposals advanced, because they involve an organizational efficiency argu-

[1] The distinction between analysis and design was made repeatedly by Herman Kahn in many briefings. See, also, Albert Wohlstetter, *Systems Analysis versus Systems Design* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, October 1958).

[2] The reform literature is large and getting larger. See James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981) for one overview.

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ment. Force reorganization can yield more combat power, freeing funds for other investments. Similarly, operational reorganizations can do the same by increasing the effectiveness of managing an enemy's attack. The best of these proposals for the defense of the NATO central region involve two closely related arguments for improving the alliance's ability to withstand an attack by numerically superior forces.

Because the Warsaw Pact can mount reinforced attacks using more than ninety divisions, it is argued that NATO must find some means of doubling or tripling the front-line forces that can be rapidly mobilized. Improvements in weapon effectiveness are welcome, but alone cannot offset the numerical superiority of the Pact. In this regard, it must be noted that, whether or not one agrees with the military reformers, they are addressing the strategic implications of a complicated acquisition problem that has remained unsolved for over a decade. The inflation in weapons costs due to complexity and performance improvements has had as a major consequence reducing production runs and increasing readiness budgets. Stated in Pentagon jargon, investment costs are devouring readiness and sustainability.

Proposed ways of getting more NATO divisions without doubling or tripling the defense budget rely on changing NATO's force organization. Instead of relying on large standing forces in peacetime and on reinforcements from the continental United States in a time of crisis (the so-called Reforger units), NATO should make greater use of European reservists. At the same time, it should reduce expensive overhead and logistics costs by decreasing the size of a division and its accompanying supporting units.[3] To give an indication of how this last factor can make a difference, consider that the combat and support personnel for a U.S. division amounts to approximately 24,000 persons. A Soviet division, on the other hand, has about 16,000 persons. In the eyes of many reformers, this disparity indicates that personnel would be better used in constructing a larger number of smaller divisions.

Other suggestions are offered as well, ranging from greater reliance on territorial home-defense forces to reorganizing heavy armored divisions into much lighter special-infantry units. These would exploit the forest, mountain, and urban terrain of West Germany to hold and channel Pact attacks, leaving them vulnerable to rapid counterstrikes by the remaining armored and heliborne units. Part of this idea is to reorganize not only the force structure of NATO units, but also their defensive strategy. Instead of the current reliance on an attrition of enemy units as they penetrate German territory, a mobile defense would be used, with for-

[3] Steven L. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," *International Security Review*, Fall 1982, pp. 245-68.

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ward screening units supported by highly maneuverable reserve groups. These reserve forces would strike at enemy flanks, and at unexpected places, in an effort to destroy the will of the opponent, rather than engaging the main body of his attack in frontal attrition.

The difficulties of accomplishing the objectives of military reform (that is, of doing more with less) are considerable.[4] In the case of NATO especially it is not at all clear that the political and theater-nuclear context of the problem has been sufficiently thought through. Such a revised NATO posture might work against a Pact attack, but would governments have enough confidence in it to draw up elaborate peacetime mobilization plans for home-guard defense? Unless the new posture offered a believable theory of victory, especially against nuclear attack, it is hard to see how it could gain enough support to justify the major intrusion into civilian life needed for a more extensive arming and mobilization of reservists. In this situation, political constraints might prove to be more binding than economic constraints.

The reorganization of NATO defenses along the lines proposed by the reform movement suggests other difficulties as well. Were NATO able to generate a greater number of divisions, each with fewer men, the prospects for a successful defense would still be questionable. More units necessitate greater coordination, and, with an emphasis on mobile defense, the burdens of command and control are greater still. Mobile defense is difficult to undertake because the defender must marshal his reserve forces to the area of deepest penetration. Often, this location is unknown as a result of the thin forward screen used to meet the initial attack. Penetrations can be deep before the defense is fully aware of how precarious its position really is. Extremely effective command and control is needed to direct units to the threatened area. No matter how mobile, swift, or numerous the units in such a defense are, if they are directed to the wrong location, or if they are directed too late, they cannot prevent a breakthrough that will threaten the cohesion of the entire defensive force. Again, this is a defense strategy that might prove successful if the forces were at the right place at the right time, but this is not something one can have confidence in during a war.

In another area of reform, there is an experiment that is not merely proposed, but actually under way. Shortly after taking office, Secretary of Defense Weinberger ordered fundamental changes in the way the department administers itself and in how it acquires the enormously complex and expensive weapons systems that are the hallmark of modern defense. Reversing the trend toward centralization of the past two decades, a shift to decentralized planning and management was under-

[4] See Paul Bracken, "The NATO Defense Problem," ORBIS, Spring 1983, pp. 83-105.

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taken. This was accomplished by expanding the representation on the Defense Resources Board, by increasing the role of the individual service secretaries, and by cutting back on the power of organizations once used to enforce central planning from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As mentioned earlier, in the early 1960s Secretary McNamara instituted organizational changes in an attempt to ensure centralized control of acquisition of weapons systems and general management. For example, the Office of Systems Analysis and its successor organizations combined to become a powerful voice in shaping defense programs, often at the expense of the individual services. A movement to reverse this trend was initiated in 1981, and few outside the defense community seem aware of this interesting experiment.

The immediate rationale for making this change was one of reform. Many people came to believe that the department had over the years become too focused on the problem of resources, at the expense of strategic requirements. This criticism stemmed, in part, from the long-standing objections the military has had to the centralization of civilian control begun by Mr. McNamara.[5] But not all such criticism can be attributed to military complaints about the inadequacies of excessive civilian control. It is inevitable that when decisionmaking becomes more centralized, the basis for it becomes more generalized, and fewer inter-relations can be taken into account. For some of the extremely complex weapons programs the department must manage, like those for the F-15 aircraft, the M-1 tank, and the Los Angeles–class submarine, very detailed centralized control was thought to substantially increase delays and errors while driving up costs.[6] Even more serious, because there are inherent limitations to any single human being's ability to process complicated information, a great many mistakes in coordination and judgment have been made.

There may be other reasons for watching this experiment with great care. It is taken as an article of faith in the United States that the free market is the best means for allocating scarce resources. One of the major problems in defense planning has always been that not only is there no free market, there is no market at all. General Motors decides how many cars to build not by central decisionmaking, but rather by monitoring very closely how many automobiles are sold. Management does not dictate how many cars are to be sold but relates market needs to factory capabilities.

In the absence of a market, defense planning is vulnerable to

[5] For one criticism, see Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow-Down in the Pentagon," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1965, pp. 262-80.

[6] Although not widely known, shifts away from overly centralized planning in the military sphere have been undertaken before for many of the same reasons cited here. The British experience in World War II, for example, is described in Ely Devons, *Planning in Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

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a variety of pressures. There is, for example, pressure from Congress for reasons that have nothing to do with military effectiveness. One of the primary justifications for centralization in the Defense Department has been that it would be a counter to such pressures and would provide a means for allocating resources rationally in the absence of a market. But what the current decentralization may accomplish is to create a market as a result of the competition for resources among the services. While this would not be a free market coordinated by a price system, it is also true that markets do not necessarily have to involve a price system. Introducing some competition for resources into the system as a substitute for central direction might have the beneficial economic consequence of greater efficiency. The increased power given to the services would result in their competing for a limited supply of funds, rather than simply receiving directions from a centralized control unit that is progressively less able to so much as keep up with the information needed to monitor programs.

The sharp increases in defense spending over the next two years will make the experiment especially interesting. The problems that arise are likely to stem from the way the decentralization is organized and how far it is taken. Each of the services may consider only its own needs to the detriment of intraservice cooperation. Excessive duplication might follow, as it often does when centralized control is weakened. Nonetheless, there is always a question of balance in an undertaking of this kind, and it must be remembered that centralized control has its own inefficiencies, as the recent past so clearly demonstrates.

The final area of proposed reform where organizational considerations are relevant is in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs were defined in the 1947 National Security Act and include preparing strategic plans and advising the president and the secretary of defense. While in the 1940s and 1950s the Joint Chiefs seem to have functioned effectively, since the early 1960s their effectiveness has steadily declined. This is partially the result of the increase in authority given to civilian-dominated agencies but also reflects the Joint Chiefs' inability to provide clear strategic alternatives to the president or secretary of defense.

Most observers attribute the organizational paralysis of the Joint Chiefs to their dual role: they should be unaffected by interservice rivalry, but, at the same time, they are the highest ranking officers of the services whose interests they supposedly transcend.[7] The path to promotion in the military is controlled by one's service, not by the Joint Chiefs. Moreover, competition over strategic missions and requirements so

[7] See John M. Collins, *U. S. Defense Planning, A Critique* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 49-72.

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directly affects the destiny of the services that it is hard to eliminate such considerations from the Joint Chiefs' decisionmaking. Compromises and tacit understandings develop. For example, an army program is accepted by the air force on condition that the army accept an air force program. The result is that bureaucratic politics is carried to lengths unsurpassed in any other organization, civilian or military.

Proposals to reform this system have frequently emerged from within the military itself.[8] Such plans reflect a desire to increase the power of the Joint Chiefs either by giving the chairman greater authority or by separating the JCS from the services. Giving the chairman more power is seen as but one step in the process of establishing greater distance between the services and the JCS. The more far-reaching proposal—to create a true general staff divorced from the individual services—is what the debate over the JCS is actually about. This is a sensitive political issue, and for this reason there is a tendency to take an incremental approach in public, while more extensive changes are advocated in private.

Creation of a separate general staff whose members have greater loyalty to the staff than to their respective services would be a major organizational change. Such a staff would control promotions and would have more freedom and authority for developing war plans and for training its members for long-term (perhaps permanent) assignments with the joint staff. These changes would satisfy a number of critics, including those who insist that turnover of assigments in today's military is too frequent for any institutional memory or expertise to be developed. More fundamental, it is believed that only a general staff can override parochial concerns (of the services, Congress, and even civilian administrators) and develop the plans the United States must have in the nuclear age.

There are merits in some of the proposals for restructuring the JCS, especially the incremental ones. Any increase in organizational efficiency for an institution that is so caught up in bureaucratic politics is to be welcomed. However, the more far-reaching proposals for giving the Joint Chiefs greater power overlook a number of serious problems. In the United States there is an acute absence of geopolitical thinking, that is, thinking that integrates military, economic, and political factors. The current attempts to re-create a powerful position for a general staff may accentuate this difficulty by placing an additional emphasis on military factors at the expense of economics and politics. The United States' problems in Central America, Southwest Asia, and even the Soviet Union are not exclusively military in character. They require creative thinking

[8] See David C. Jones, *Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change* (Washington: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1982).

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that brings many factors to bear, a kind of thinking that, quite frankly, the JCS has not been noted for. The political instabilities arising from the world debt crisis and the prospect that Haiti will become another Nicaragua present subtle problems of a type we have been unable to deal with effectively. It is difficult to see how increasing the military's role in formulating security policy will do anything but narrow our abilities even further.

Organizational Design

The three areas of organizational reform described above are not the only ones that could be examined; they are, however, the most important proposals to have been offered by advocates of change. But a more fundamental question remains. Debating alternative proposals, although essential, ignores the question of whether these alternatives are the only ones that should be considered. Instead of merely analyzing reform proposals, we should ask questions related to design, such as, what structural changes are needed in the first place?

There is a widespread sense among those in the security establishment that the system's rigidity and narrowness of focus has reached dangerous proportions. The ideas generated in the defense community about the most important security issues have an air of staleness about them. Almost regardless of the concept, people in the defense community think that they have seen it all before. As a result, *another* briefing on warfighting or *another* paper on reform of the JCS gives them a sense of déjà vu. Hearing yet another briefing on ICBM vulnerability, to mention another example, prompts more yawns than fresh insights. This may be inevitable. After all, it is hard to sustain serious discussion so long after a major war. Indeed, experience seems to justify complacency, for deterrence appears to have been successful in preventing war with the Soviet Union.

But there are dangers in this point of view. At the most fundamental level, it makes us ask whether the Defense Department has lost the capacity for recognizing a new idea. As the once-young bureaucracy of the 1950s and 1960s has aged, it is not surprising that a narrowing of perspective should have occurred. Nuclear weapons and the organizations created to plan, acquire, and use them were once new but are now accepted and established. The U.S. defense establishment is no longer new, as it was in the 1950s and early 1960s, but has moved into what can only be described as advanced middle age.

Clearly, young organizations are different from old ones. They have more enthusiasm, fewer institutionalized practices, and are more creative, responsive, and informal. One can see this in almost any large

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industry in the United States today, and the defense industry is no exception. Older organizations tend to be characterized by an adherence to established patterns in delegating authority; conservative, risk-averse management styles; rigid goals; extensive reliance on "legitimized" facts (such as officially sanctioned data sets and quantitative models); short-term problem solving; and highly specialized areas of expertise. Such organizations tend to be successful when handling routine problems but less so with unexpected ones. They have many specialists, but few generalists with a grasp of the way the system as a whole functions.[9]

Examples of the consequences of the maturing of the defense establishment are not difficult to find. Consider how long it takes to get anything done. When President Eisenhower recognized the importance in the nuclear age of surprise first-strike attacks, he ordered the construction of an early-warning radar network (the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System). Thirty-one months after the site was selected, the system—at the time the most complex man-machine system ever conceived—was sending information to the United States. Compare this to the current MX missile debacle. After ten years of organizational infighting, there is still no coherent deployment plan. The question arises, however one feels about the MX, what if it had really been needed, as Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan each believed? In thinking about the government's handling of important security issues and the national paralysis that now seems more evident, we should remember that it was not always thus. What we see is not lack of will or obstacles imposed by evil people, but rather the inevitable effects of an aging defense organization.

Redesigning a mature organization to be more responsive is not a simple matter. We are all familiar with the defeat of Germany in World War I leading to a search for new strategies, ideas, and equipment that resulted in the highly effective Panzer forces of World War II. But there must be other ways to increase responsiveness, since this is accomplished regularly by the business community. Many corporations included in the Fortune 500 list of 1913 are on the list of 1983. Although organizations mature, they can also remain responsive to a changing environment.

I do not believe that the U.S. defense establishment can be improved by any sort of "debureaucratization" process, by any decentralization for its own sake, or by any shift to training "leaders" instead of

[9] The characteristics and crisis behavior of mature complex defense organizations is a major topic of research at a faculty seminar at Yale, and I am indebted to many of my colleagues for some of the ideas presented here. See Garry D. Brewer and Paul Bracken, *Strategic Studies at Yale* (New Haven: Concilium on International and Area Studies & Institution for Social and Policy Studies, 1983).

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managers.[10] All of these ideas are currently popular. Bureaucracy has few friends, and "management" has become a dirty word. Yet no organization the size of the U.S. defense establishment can be run without the coordination that is the essense of bureaucracy. Nor is charisma a sufficient qualification for making multibillion-dollar procurement decisions. Reforms *can* make a difference, when they effect better organization and procedures.

If the methods discussed above hold out little promise of increasing effectiveness, there are other areas where changes would be more beneficial. One of them that is likely to receive more attention in the future involves making the distinction between programed and nonprogramed problem solving, and the ways that the latter can be improved. Programed decisions are those that are routine and repetitive, where definite procedures have been developed so that problems are not treated as new every time they come up. Although they solve routine problems, programed decisions can sometimes be exceedingly complicated, in which case they are divided into many smaller decisions. The most complicated programed decisions in the country are conducted in the Department of Defense, under the five-year development plan of the PPBS (planning, programming, and budgeting system). Since there is an annual budgeting cycle, there is an obvious need for a system to handle it, one that can be applied in more or less the same way every year. Other programed decisions include the reinforcement plans for Reforger, the detailed production plans for major weapons systems, and the single integrated operational plan (SIOP) for nuclear war.

Nonprogramed decisions are those that require new, usually unavailable information.[11] There is no established way of handling such problems, for the simple reason that they have not occurred before. The Department of Defense faces many problems of this type. What course should the United States take in El Salvador? How should it fight a nuclear war? When should it send in the Rapid Deployment Force?

There are three reasons for making the distinction between programed and nonprogramed decisions in defense organization. First, it represents a more valuable distinction than the more widely used distinction between strategy and tactics. Second, it focuses attention on the maturing process, because it includes a recognition that what has occurred over the past twenty years is a shift in the way programed decisions

[10] I might as well add an emphasis on the study of military history to the list. Military reformers invariably emphasize a need for a study of military history to improve performance. I am baffled by this, because all of the service colleges I visit already include a great deal of military history in their programs.

[11] The distinction between these two kinds of decisionmaking is drawn from Herbert A. Simon, *The New Science of Management Decision* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977). My discussion is influenced by Simon.

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are made. Finally, it suggests that in the future there will be a great deal of attention, experimentation, and, it is hoped, progress in improving nonprogramed decisionmaking and organization.

Beginning in the early 1960s, electronic data processing, operations research, systems analysis, and computer simulation models became more popular in the Department of Defense than anywhere else. Despite the criticism directed at them, they remain in use today. The reason for this is that they replaced the older, more traditional methods for solving programed problems. Habit, clerical routine, and the use of standard operating procedures were all proving incapable of handling large peacetime defense budgets, expensive research and development, and weapons acquisition levels running into the billions of dollars. It is easy to forget the concern in the late 1950s that the Department of Defense was being run like a country store. It was responsive, but it was so spectacularly wasteful that no reasonable level of defense spending could sustain it. In response, the McNamara revolution institutionalized a system for managing routine programed decisions by centralizing control and by introducing modern management methods. That is why computers and systems analysis became so popular.

The imposition of such controls over a period of twenty years was not without its costs. The defense organization matured in the process, and many of the reforms were excessive. Some of these faults can be corrected. For example, certain programed decisions can actually be made better without centralized control. The most important changes that should be made, however, involve improvements in the management and organization for nonprogramed decisions. Making these changes will be the task of future Defense Department leaders.

One pitfall to be avoided is not recognizing the distinction between the two different kinds of decisions. In many ways it seems as if the Vietnam War was fought as if it were a problem in budgeting. There was, and is, a view holding that methods and organizations that result in good programed decisions can be expected to make good nonprogramed decisions. An example of this is planning for nuclear war. For twenty years, academic and governmental strategists have tried to inject inflexibility into nonprogramed decisions about nuclear war by dividing war plans into smaller and smaller units. The many revisions of the SIOP to include limited nuclear options, selected attack options, and demonstration bursts, amount to little more than reorganizing the same targets. If one thinks about the prospects for preserving control in such a situation, or if one observes even a quasi-realistic war game, one sees that the options that have been developed rarely make any sense. The enemy too often shoots back, sometimes with everything he has. The idea that we can work out all of the options in advance for a situation that has never

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occurred is preposterous. The point is not that revising the SIOP is unwise, but rather that doing so would give little real flexibility in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Those who develop elaborate targeting variations treat nuclear war as if it were a programing decision comparable to running a production line or preparing a budget.

The next great revolution in defense organization and management is likely to recognize such pitfalls and to concentrate directly on improving nonprogramed decisionmaking. The methods for dealing with such decisions are only barely perceived today, but the outlines for some useful directions can be established. First, there is likely to be extensive training for decisionmakers that take into account all of the surprises and uncertainties of the real world. War games are a good example of this, especially if they incorporate automatic assessment methods and command-and-control simulations, and if they bring the fog of war into the game. Such games are hardly new. Although they were used extensively in the early 1960s, in the late 1960s and through the 1970s free-form war games of the kind referred to here were eclipsed when a greater reliance was placed on mathematical models and tightly controlled command-post exercises.[12] Only quite recently have there been signs that this will change.

Another method for improving nonprogramed decisionmaking is to bring greater diversity and fresh insights into the defense planning process. Rather than insulating the military from the outside world, as some JCS reform proposals would seem to intend, more information about economic and political trends should be brought directly into the decisionmaking process. New coordination methods are needed to achieve this integration. Because of this need, the deep divide between the universities and the defense community will probably be closed eventually.

Closely related to bringing fresh perspectives to bear on defense problems is the slightly different problem of shifting job assignments so that people can get a better overview of how the entire system functions. What Pareto called the "circulation of elites" is a time-honored method for improving the quality of nonprogramed decisions. Instead of moving people about haphazardly, far more attention will be given to training them quickly so that their experiences on the job will be genuinely meaningful.

Finally, there is a very exciting, but as yet largely unproven means of improving nonprogramed decisionmaking. That is the use of artificial intelligence research, heuristic programing, expert systems re-

[12] See Gary D. Brewer and Martin Shubik, *The War Game* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). See, also, Paul Bracken and Martin Shubik, "Strategic War: What Are the Questions and Who Should Ask Them?" *Technology in Society*, Winter 1982, pp. 155-79.

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search, and other methods that have been developed only in the recent past. There are grounds for skepticism here, but so too are there reasons for excitement. One can readily imagine successfully using some of these methods for improving the handling of the glut of satellite imagery or managing the alerting process so that a desired signal is sent to an opponent. Certainly, the widespread use of microprocessors in weapons and the development of less expensive computers reinforce the appeal of such activities.

In conclusion, it appears that, although there may be cynicism and deep skepticism about the prospects for meaningful change in the defense organization, many factors seem to indicate that more fundamental change will occur and that organizational reform is only a small part of a much larger and more exciting problem. The decade of the 1980s may see U.S. defense organizations fundamentally remodeled, as they were during early 1960s. This prospect offers opportunities that must not be ignored.

THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE

by GORDON H. McCORMICK

Increasing attention in recent years has been devoted to the issue of military reform. What began as the musings of a small and scattered collection of professional defense analysts has evolved to encompass a large group of military commentators, opinion leaders, and members of Congress. Even within the Department of Defense and the individual services, the institutional targets of the reform movement, an increasing number of individuals have answered the call and joined the ranks of the intellectual opposition. As the ranks and prominence of the movement have grown, so too has its influence. In certain cases, such as the 1982 revision of the army's field manual on operations, FM 100-5, the concepts advanced by the reform movement have had a direct impact on planning. In other areas, such as naval development, the reformers have not managed to influence planning directly but have created such a climate of opposition to current policy that they may yet succeed in doing so. No matter what one thinks of the specific recommendations of individual reformers, however, as a group they have served to focus attention on a number of neglected areas of military planning and organization. Important among these is the issue of doctrinal innovation. While many of the doctrinal proposals advanced by the reform movement are unlikely to survive close examination, they have stimulated a useful debate on the role of doctrine in military operations, the alternative doctrinal paradigms

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available to U.S. military planners, and the manner in which doctrine changes over time. This last issue, the subject of doctrinal change, is the focus of the present essay.

Doctrine has an important influence on the preparation and conduct of war. The reasons for this are several. First, doctrine serves as an essential guide to the weapons acquisition process. The design, development, and procurement of armaments is determined, in large measure, by the battlefield requirements set forth by service doctrine.[1] Second, doctrine serves an important organizing function, determining how forces are to relate to one another, and how they will be structured and controlled. While armies everywhere, for example, are divided into some set of traditional formations—corps, divisions, brigades, and so forth—the way these forces will interact and the key decisionmaking points within and between formations are frequently quite distinct, a fact that can have great bearing on their performance in the field. Finally, doctrine guides the actual employment of forces in battle. A preoccupation with the material dimension of war has often obscured the fact that doctrinal advantages achieved through the calculated exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities can be as instrumental in achieving victory as a decisive advantage in numbers or technology.

Embodied in doctrine are certain assumptions about the character of enemy planning and the nature of the strategic environment in which military forces will operate in time of war. If the purpose of doctrine is to guide military procurement, organization, and operations, it can only do so on the basis of certain assumptions regarding the nature of the threat that is likely to be faced on the battlefield. Armed forces cannot be equally trained and equipped for every conceivable scenario without severely circumscribing their prospects for success in any particular set of circumstances.[2] Intelligent planning, therefore, demands that an effort be made to narrow the range of contingencies against which a military establishment must prepare to those that are either most likely to occur or those deemed to be most threatening to the national interest. In the process, estimates must be made concerning such variables as the effectiveness and impact of new battlefield technologies, the probable duration of a future conflict, the direction of enemy doctrine and planning, and the manner in which enemy operations are likely to develop. Taken together,

[1] This is of course not always the case. The weapons acquisition process is driven, in part, by its own momentum with the result that any particular weapon system may or may not reflect doctrinal requirements. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see W. Harriet Critchley, "Does Doctrine Precede Weaponry?" *International Journal*, Summer 1978, pp. 524-56.

[2] The problems associated with building real flexibility into a military force are discussed in Kevin N. Lewis, "Dealing With the Unexpected," ORBIS, Winter 1983, 839-47. See, also, William W. Kaufmann, *Planning Conventional Forces, 1950–1980* (Washington: Brookings, 1982).

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these assessments form the basis, or assumptions, underlying doctrinal development.

Ideally, the assumptions upon which doctrine is based should be subject to frequent re-examination. In the end, doctrine, whether it serves as a precept for action or as a guide to weapons development, can be no more effective than the assumptions that underlie it are accurate. Given the pervasive influence of doctrine on military planning and performance, it is therefore essential that it be based on a sound appraisal of the operational problems that will face U.S. forces in a future war. Unfortunately, however, doctrine is not often as open to innovation and reform as one would like. Having once been established, doctrine tends to take on a life of its own, frequently hanging on long past the time when its strategic and operational assumptions have become passé. In many instances it seems that doctrine is simply passed along from one generation of soldier to the next with little thought or inquiry as to the validity of its operating assumptions in the face of changing circumstances. One has only to recall the remarkable survival of the oared galley, the coast artillery, the horse cavalry, and the concept of the saber charge to appreciate the capacity of a doctrine and associated "weapon system" to survive in the face of what should have been obvious obsolescence.[3]

This tendency is due, in part, to the authority of tradition, which exercises an important influence over the way armed forces perceive and prepare to respond to future battlefield problems. Military organizations are very much products of their past, and they often continue to do things as they do for no other reason than that they have always done them that way. Once established, traditional patterns of thought and action become comfortable and, hence, difficult to abandon, even when their continued utility has been called into question. As often as not, however, traditional formulas simply go unchallenged in the first place. What was once a successful way of doing things becomes, at some point, part of the conventional wisdom. The problem with such "conventions" is that they are not regularly subjected to re-evaluation. Continuing with the old ways becomes an article of faith, and faith, as someone once pointed out, breeds a distrust of change.

Related to this is the fact that doctrines, much like certain weapon systems, develop institutional constituencies that can serve as active opponents to innovation and reform. This of course explains the amazing longevity of the horse cavalry, which boasted a vocal, and, in retrospect, very successful group of supporters within the U.S. Army. In the face of service concern over their "galloping" obsolescence, sup-

[3] Bernard Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrine, and Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), pp. 263-306.

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porters of the cavalry proved quite persuasive in arguing that the special characteristics of the horse—its amphibious capability, the fact that it did not require spare parts, and its ability to operate in all terrain—ensured it a continuing role on the modern battlefield. While not everyone was convinced, the result was that the concept of cavalry operations for scouting, raiding, and attacking the enemy's cavalry survived in some form into the early years of World War II.[4] While the efforts of military equestrians to find a role for the horse in modern warfare raise a smile, the larger problem it represents is neither isolated nor humorous. Loyalty to established doctrine remains a persistent and potentially serious obstacle to innovation.

Reinforcing this tendency is the natural uncertainty surrounding the character of future wars. Even under the best of circumstances, our ability to forecast which battlefield methods will prove most successful and which will fail is imperfect. Although there is clearly room for improvement, there are nevertheless obvious limits to our capacity to look into the future and predict the final implications of even ongoing military developments. The sources of strategic uncertainty are quite numerous and, indeed, have only increased with the steady advance of (largely unproven) military technologies. Confronted with the need to make concrete decisions, it is not surprising that the military has traditionally looked to the lessons of the past in an effort to establish tangible guidelines for future planning. This fact creates an unfortunate bias against innovation and reform. Change in the face of uncertainty implies risk, and military organizations, particularly when it comes to matters of planning, tend to be risk-averse.

The failure to appreciate the need for doctrinal innovation in response to changing circumstances has led to some very unpleasant and unnecessary surprises when the time finally came to put doctrine to the test. A graphic example of such a failure was the doctrine of the tactical offensive held by French planners prior to World War I. Smarting from their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, which was widely ascribed to excessive timidity and a failure to pursue the offensive vigorously, French military theorists between 1871 and 1914 gradually adopted a doctrine of "attack at all costs."[5] The essence of this formula lay in an excessive reliance on the moral dimension of war, and an unlimited confidence in French élan. French doctrine during this period was an expression of Ardant du Picq's dictum "he will win who has the resolution to ad-

[4] For a good discussion of this issue, see Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response," *Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration*, vol. 8 (Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, 1958), pp. 120-49.

[5] See Joel A. Setzen, "The Doctrine of the Offensive in the French Army on the Eve of World War I" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1972).

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vance."[6] The prevailing interpretation of this axiom in 1914 was that what really counted in war was the will to achieve victory. Such resolve would be manifested in an unyielding series of offensives against the enemy, who, in the face of these onslaughts, could do no other than break and run. In the words of Marshal Foch, the infantry would "march straight to the objective, increasing their speed as they draw nearer, preceded by violent fire, in order to assault the enemy bodily and close the argument with cold steel by greater courage and determination."[7]

When the time came to put doctrine into practice, the results were nothing short of disastrous. *La baionette* and the *furia francese* proved to be no match for the weapons of modern war. The problem did not lie with the French soldier, who could indeed be given high marks for "courage and determination," but with the French high command, which, in adopting a doctrine of frontal assault, showed no appreciation for the battlefield changes wrought by recent advances in military technology. The period between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the beginning of World War I saw the introduction of clip-fed magazine rifles, high explosive shells, quick-firing artillery, and the fully automatic machine gun. Collectively, these and other inventions had a dramatic impact on the lethality of combat, making the frontal assault a futile and costly undertaking. As demonstrated by the early engagements in the war, no attempt was made to modify French doctrine in light of these developments. The results should have been predictable. Between July and October 1914 alone, French losses amounted to some 854,000 men killed, wounded, or captured.

A similar debacle occurred in 1940 with the German attack through the Ardennes. As in 1914, French doctrine on the eve of World War II proved to be insensitive to the battlefield implications of recent advances in military technology—most notably interwar advances in tank development. In particular, it proved to be incapable of responding adequately to German efforts to exploit the speed and shock value of the tank through blitzkrieg operations emphasizing concentration of force, rapid action, and deep maneuver. This failure can be considered at two levels. At the operational level, the French chose to adopt a linear defense, dispersing their forces across the front in the hope of stopping the Germans at each and every point of attack. This problem was compounded at the tactical level, where tank doctrine dictated that armored forces be deployed in "penny packets," for infantry support, rather than brought together in armored spearheads to counter similar German concentra-

[6] Charles Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle*, trans. John N. Greeley and Robert C. Cotton (New York: MacMillan, 1921), p. 124.
[7] Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War*, trans. J. de Morinni (New York: H. K. Fly, 1918), p. 366.

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tions. In attempting to be strong everywhere, however, the French proved not to be capable anywhere. When the Germans struck, the attenuated French defense was easily penetrated by massed, fast-moving German forces. French armor, which was largely committed to battle in a piecemeal fashion, was either by-passed or defeated piecemeal.[8]

As Michael Howard has noted, the German blitzkrieg need not have been as effective as it was.[9] The French and German armies of 1940 were in many ways similarly structured. Each army depended on foot infantry, towed artillery, and a relatively small core of armored forces. Indeed, in certain respects, the French entered the war with some clear advantages. As a number of recent studies have revealed, the combined allied forces available for the defense of France, Belgium, and Holland were numerically superior to the German armies that attacked them.[10] This was true not only in manpower, but in terms of available armor and artillery pieces as well. While French tanks tended to be overly specialized, it is generally agreed that French armor was superior to that employed by the Wehrmacht. The problem, in short, was not material but conceptual—it did not lie in the type, quantity, or quality of French forces, but in the doctrinal scheme under which these forces were deployed. German operational innovations simply outpaced the ability and willingness of French planners to adjust.[11]

As evidenced by French experience, rigidity in doctrinal planning can lead directly to battlefield failure, including, as in 1940, prompt and complete defeat. It is perhaps true, as some have suggested, that over time doctrine will gradually accommodate to alterations in the strategic environment. It is also true, however, that wars can be lost in the interim. History suggests that the principal catalyst of doctrinal change is military disaster. The defeat of the Austrian army at Marengo in 1800 led directly to the reforms of Archduke Charles. The same was true of the well-known Prussian reforms initiated by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Stein, which followed the Prussian defeat at the battle of Jena in 1806. Similarly Haldane's reforms after the Boer War and the reorganizations of the Russian army following the Crimean and Russo-Japanese conflicts

[8] See Larry H. Addington, *The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971), p. 101.

[9] *War in European History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 132.

[10] See, for example, Jeffrey Record, "France 1940 and the NATO Center 1980: A Disquieting Comparison," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1980, pp. 67-74.

[11] The medieval historian Marc Bloch, who died in 1944 fighting with the partisans, summed up the problem very nicely, noting that "our leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable of thinking in terms of a *new* war. . . . The ruling idea of the Germans in the conduct of this war was speed. We, on the other hand, did our thinking in terms of yesterday or the day before. Worse still: faced by the undisputed evidence of Germany's new tactics, we ignored, or wholly failed to understand, the quickened rhythm of the times." *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*, trans. Gerard Hopkins (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), pp. 36-37.

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were each attempts to breathe new life into military establishments that had proven themselves to be otherwise impervious to change.

If we are to avoid such failures in the future, doctrinal innovation must become a natural part of planning. This is even more important today than in the past, given the rapid pace of technological development. Traditionally, the technological parameters of war have been slow to change. Change, when it came, was typically dependent on advances in such basic sciences as metallurgy, chemistry, or engineering, developments that were sufficiently infrequent to be of only periodic concern to military planners. Since the industrial revolution, however, scientific achievement has become an increasingly important factor in warfare. This has become particularly evident since the end of World War II, where there has been a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technical development and the application of such advances to the military area. What this means in terms of the present paper is that the environmental assumptions underlying doctrinal planning are likely to be subject to more frequent change than we have typically seen in the past. If doctrine is to keep abreast of these changes, it must be open to innovation as circumstances require.

Unfortunately, however, innovation is neither easy nor risk-free. The problem of strategic uncertainty is a very real one. While we might accept the fact that as a result of rapid technological innovation, the assumptions underlying doctrine are changing rapidly, it is not always easy to identify fundamental changes when they occur, or to decide how such changes should be reflected in prevailing military planning. We can never know with certainty short of war. Peacetime simulation and gaming can be useful tools for suggesting how a future conflict might be fought, but the numerous imponderables associated with such exercises will always stand in the way of our making high-confidence judgments. This problem creates a tension between the requirements of planning, on the one hand, and our ability to evaluate the assumptions upon which planning proceeds, on the other. While military planning must be conducted on a continuing basis, we can only test our operating assumptions intermittently, in times of war. The result is that, *ceteris paribus*, innovation can be as potentially dangerous as doing nothing. There is always the chance that matters might be worse after reform than before.

Insensitivity to the risks frequently associated with military innovations in the face of an uncertain future is one of the most important limitations of the current military reform movement. While we can sympathize with the notion that U.S. military planning should be less resistant to change than has been the case until now, it is evident that many of the so-called reforms proposed by defense critics are not so much solutions to immediate problems as they are reflections of a dissatisfaction with

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certain aspects of current policy. While there are indeed problems in the way we conceive of and prepare for future conflicts that need to be addressed, much of the reform movement's discussion of these issues is superficial and illusory. Rather than presenting detailed programs for innovation assessing the probable costs, risks, and benefits of implementing specific changes in doctrine, force structure, or organization, we are treated to broad abstractions imploring us to bring greater creativity, agility, and ingenuity to the battlefield. The reader is left with the problem of trying to determine how such indisputably useful characteristics might be operationalized.[12]

Such proposals are of little utility as guides to military innovation and reform. To merit serious consideration, any program for change must be set forth in sufficient detail that it can be seriously compared to its alternatives, as well as to the conventional wisdom that it would replace. Only in this manner can the likely consequences of proposed innovations be adequately evaluated—as imperfect as our ability to make such evaluations might be. The reformers, who are so fond of appealing to the lessons of history, would do well to remember that ill-conceived reforms have, themselves, frequently been the source of military failure. While certain critics, for example, make much of the French defeat in 1940 to the German blitzkrieg, they generally overlook the fact that French defense planning at this time was the product of reforms instituted in the aftermath of the horrible losses suffered during World War I. The same was true of French doctrine in 1914, which was an honest if ill-conceived attempt to apply the "lessons" of their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. The problem in each case was not the absence of reform per se, but the fact that the reforms that were finally initiated were based on erroneous assumptions concerning the character of enemy planning and the evolving strategic environment.

As I noted at the outset of this essay, the reform movement has performed a valuable service in focusing attention on a number of neglected areas of military planning and organization. It is correct, in particular, in emphasizing the importance of innovation in doctrinal development. If doctrine is to be more than hypothetical it cannot be allowed to exist in a vacuum, but must be grounded in an accurate appraisal of the conditions under which military forces are likely to be operating in a future conflict. These conditions do not remain constant, and doctrine must be allowed to develop accordingly. If the reform movement is to serve as more than a simple catalyst for action by others, however, the critics will have to give far greater attention to the ways in

[12] For an elaboration of this critique, see Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices," *International Security*, Spring 1983, pp. 140-62. See, also, Jeffrey S. McKitrick "A Military Look at Military Reform," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 51-64.

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which their proposed reforms might be made operational. The very importance of innovation, as well as its attendant risks, requires that any proposed change in doctrine be presented in a practical manner and that close attention be given to the problems and uncertainties that will be encountered when applying these changes on the battlefield. The military reform movement, unfortunately, has a long way to go. To borrow an apt metaphor from John Keegan: at present, too much of the reform literature sounds like something from a military *Kama Sutra* — exciting and intriguing in theory, but likely to prove difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish in practice.

ON THE APPROPRIATE USE OF TECHNOLOGY*

by KEVIN N. LEWIS

Technological developments have always exerted a powerful influence on the way that military organizations have gone about their business. In this regard, the two global wars of this century have been an important historical watershed. We are led to believe that in the old days peacetime military organizations often failed to take advantage of new technological opportunities (and in some instances actively worked to suppress technological advances that threatened the status quo). But the twentieth century has seen the evolution of a quite different approach to the development and application of new technology for military purposes. Most military exprets now agree that the development of new technology must be encouraged, and occasionally forced along, in the interests of national security.[1]

In the United States, military investment (spending on research and development, modernization, and force structure expansion) typically represents half of our defense budget—and the lion's share goes toward the development or procurement of systems that can be characterized as technologically advanced. In addition, civilian and private-sector research and development enterprises often yield crucial military spin-offs. By contrast, the Soviets are believed to spend perhaps twice what we do to modernize and expand their forces and to create additional options for the future.

Given the large sums involved, the fact that technological advances can have important organizational and strategic ramifications,

* The views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the Rand Corporation or any of its sponsors.

[1] Even if we conclude that the pursuit of a certain technology will pay no dividends, we may still be obliged to explore such possibilities for a number of reasons — in particular so that we can assess the military implications of that technology should the enemy choose to exploit it.

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and the consequences for deterrence should we fail to maintain a technologically competitive position vis-à-vis determined adversaries, it is not surprising that raising questions related to the military use of technology should frequently lead to intense debate. Many issues have been discussed, including technology's alleged tendency to spawn wasteful arms races, the adverse economic effects of diverting personnel and resources from civilian to military efforts, and the degree to which technological advance stimulates changes in existing strategy, tactics, and doctrine. Over the past few years, however, a new topic has arisen that is now of particular importance: namely, whether we are using technology (in our weapons and in the force structure as a whole) in an appropriate way. In other words, are we buying and maintaining the appropriate capabilities, and fielding them in the right numbers and dispositions, to support our national aims adequately?

Short of a major conflict, which would put our people, machines, and employment concepts to the acid test, there seems to be no way to "prove" in advance whether or not our design and doctrinal assumptions are correct. Indeed, the fact that the many opposed sides in heated national security debates frequently use the same bits of evidence to support their cases[2] indicates a few disturbing things. First, deliberately manipulating the significance of technological developments is one popular technique for furthering parochial interests. Second, reliable interpretation of the military significance of technological developments is often frustrated by the enormously complex way a number of factors (many of them intangible ones, like morale, quality of leadership and training, and even luck) combine to produce military outcomes. Third, it would seem that our inability to come to some general consensus about how to assess and use technology is explained in part by the existence of very different views about the best way to accomplish military objectives. For these and other reasons, it is quite unlikely that we will ever know with much certainty whether we are spending too much or too little on the development of new capabilities, and whether we can offset potential enemy scientific breakthroughs.

It is against this backdrop that the current military reform debate should be viewed. As the other papers in this Forum show so well, the military reform debate can be described as a virtual grab bag of interests and pursuits, some of which are confused, internally inconsistent, and/or have little to do with national security. Despite oversimplifi-

[2] For example, the alleged "lessons" of such recent conflicts as the Falklands/Malvinas campaign and the Israeli/Syrian engagements in Lebanon have been used in support of categorically opposed arguments in a number of debates addressing, among other things, the role and nature of carrier aviation, the need for more or for fewer surface ships, the relative advantages of training, tactics, and numbers in air combat, and many others.

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cations, dubious analysis, partisan hype, and other irrelevant ideological fulminations,[3] one can discern two lines of argument regarding our historic approach to the technological aspects of weapon and total force posture design.

One side of the debate, the reform argument, contends that weapon and posture design trends have gone awry in recent years. As one author suggests, a misguided "cult of procurement" has sprung up that foolishly chases "magic weapons."[4] The reformers believe that, for a number of reasons, the pursuit of technological innovation as currently practiced results in an increasingly inefficient and incapable military:

(1) Greater sophistication in weapons design drives up the cost of our military hardware; therefore, fewer and fewer weapons are procured over time. Given the current and probable future size and mix of defense budgets, we may in fact field too few weapons to mount an effective defense.[5]

(2) Similarly, the complexity of the systems we do procure makes for RAM (reliability, availability, maintainability) headaches. More complex weapons also may require higher-quality and, therefore, increasingly expensive personnel for their maintenance and operation.

(3) Even if advanced technology weapons do perform as advertised, the irresistible force of sheer numbers can still defeat them. For example, although advanced aircraft might defeat less capable ones in one-on-one combat, superior numbers of aircraft tend to prevail in many vs. many dogfights.

(4) Some kinds of advanced technological capabilities may even be hazardous to the health of those who rely on them. Since surprise is so important in aerial engagements, for instance, searching for or shooting at an enemy with a long-range tracking or target-illumination radar alerts everyone to a fighter's whereabouts and, according to this view, places that aircraft in jeopardy unnecessarily.

(5) In general, the technologies we pursue have already been pushed so far up various curves of diminishing marginal returns that

[3] The extreme nature of many of the allegations helps to eclipse the valid points that are made by both sides. Reports about altimeters designed to run 200 feet underwater and the man in the missile unit whose job it is to "hold the horses" sell newspapers but do little to inform reasonable debate on important national issues.

[4] James Fallows characterized the weapons acquisition process in this way in his *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981), and in "America's High Tech Weaponry," *Atlantic*, May 1981. The expression "More Bucks, Less Bang" is the title of an anthology of weapons "horror stories" compiled by the Project on Military Procurement, *More Bucks, Less Bangs: How The Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons*, ed. Dina Rasor (Washington, 1983). The latter volume conveys the picture of a system in which literally no advanced weapon the United States has recently bought works.

[5] Depending on the specifics of the case in question, classes of weapons have tended to become more expensive on a unit basis over time; a "modernization inflation" rate of some 3-6 per cent a year is commonly cited. There are many reasons for the steady increase in cost over time; among them are deliberate design choices, the incorporation of capabilities for dealing with new kinds of threats, smaller production runs, and the deteriorating health of the defense industrial base.

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relatively large increases in spending will yield only modest increases in performance.

(6) The allure and cost of fancy gadgets perverts the acquisition process itself. Mistaken technological expectations and spiraling costs are said to tempt us to avoid clearly defining requirements, sticking to sound acquisition plans, realistically testing weapons, and training our soldiers, sailors, and airmen in their proper use.

(7) Because of the delays involved in bringing "gee-whiz" systems to maturity, the United States loses a golden opportunity for achieving a technical lead over the qualitatively inferior (but apparently more efficient, at least when it comes to getting deadly hardware in the field) Soviet military apparatus.

The heart of the reform argument, therefore, is that the pursuit of complicated, unreliable, and expensive weapons results in our buying "fewer bangs for more bucks." The other side of this debate, which might be termed the "establishment" view, asserts that an emphasis on technological development is, for many reasons, essential to maintaining an effective defense:

(1) Technology acts as a crucial force multiplier. Because of asymmetrical resource and political constraints, the United States must maintain a qualitative lead if it is to deal with quantitatively superior adversaries. (Because of the low cost of their manpower — Soviet conscripts earn about $10 a month — and the relative stability of their defense planning system from year to year, the Soviets are able to spend twice as much as we do on hardware.) In particular, we might use technology to whittle numerically superior threats down to the point that the enemy cannot overwhelm our forces. Thus, beyond visual-range (BVR) radar guided missiles like SPARROW and its successor (AMRAAM, now in development), would cut Soviet fighter waves down to size before dogfighting could begin, and advanced air- and ground-to-ground munitions (including cruise and ballistic missile concepts such as MRASM and JTACMS) could be used to inflict losses on Soviet follow-on ground-force echelons while NATO's front-line forces blunted the leading formations of a Soviet armored thrust.

(2) The financial costs and political liabilities and uncertainties of overseas bases, highly trained manpower, and so on also force us to pursue qualitative improvements, since even if we had a force structure that included larger numbers of the less complex and costly systems that some reformers have advocated, we could not afford to man, train, or deploy them (except by resorting to conscription, a very low-readiness strategy, and other equally undesirable and infeasible approaches).

(3) Given the broad range of possible scenarios that we might face and the fact that the enemy has the advantage of the initiative in any

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decision to launch an attack, we need a *flexible* posture—and technologically sophisticated weapons are in many cases the proper means to this crucial end.

(4) The nature of the threats before us may also require a greater degree of performance and hence technological sophistication. For example, if the Soviets plan to fight at night or under any weather conditions, we must react accordingly.

(5) The strategic relationship between the United States and some of its allies is such that the United States would often provide most of the technologically advanced materiel support.

(6) It is also possible that some of the Soviet systems we may confront are anything but simple, "throw away," low-mix ones themselves.[6]

(7) Finally, some technologies (particularly semiconductor and other computer- and sensor-related ones) have fantastic growth potential and may lead to higher reliability, reduced manpower and training costs, and so on.[7]

These lists outline the central points raised in the reform debate, at least insofar as technology is concerned. Two factors make it highly unlikely that either side could ever be judged the outright winner. First, *both* sides' claims contain elements of truth—how the different assertions should be weighed will probably be decided on the basis of the specifics of the case in question. Second, both sides of the debate at times address virtually all aspects of the total defense planning problem. The problem of how to use technology is related to such fundamental points as: assumptions about the relative likelihood of particular kinds of wars; an image of how those wars would be fought; the role to be played by allies; the possible timing of a crisis and conflict (and accordingly, assumptions about readiness, mobilization, the need to prepare for simul-

[6] The popular impression that the Soviets build cheap, simple, austere weapons because they either simply cannot match U.S. technology or have come to the conclusion that "simpler is better" is wrong. There is nothing simple or austere about such Soviet systems as the Flogger tactical aircraft, Alpha attack submarine, or the T-72 tank. See William Perry, "Fallows' Fallacies," *International Security*, Spring 1982, pp. 174-82, and Fred Kaplan, "Soviets Adopting U.S. Trend Toward Complex Weaponry," *Boston Globe*, June 26, 1983.

[7] For example, simulators provide excellent flight training at just a fraction of the cost of actual flying (in terms of fuel burned, maintenance hours, and aircraft and crews lost in accidents). Similarly, the installation of modular or "black box" equipment in weapons effectively transfers the burden of complex maintenance from dispersed front-line users to concentrated and more efficient depot-based personnel and equipment, often at a significantly reduced overall cost. It should be noted, however, that with this efficiency come a number of potential wartime problems. For example, F-15 avionics maintenance has been centralized to some degree; this saves money, but makes the destruction of maintenance facilities relatively more catastrophic in wartime. No one would claim that the U.S. Air Force should be run like Eastern Airlines, but at the same time it is very difficult to balance uncertain wartime requirements against a very powerful pressure to save money on a day-to-day basis.

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taneous contingencies, the role to be played by escalatory threats, and so forth); and other very important matters.

It would be interesting to try to address in detail the problem of national security planning "from the top down." Unfortunately, we must make many near-term decisions about the use of technology that cannot be postponed until after a grand philosophical debate. Some of the capabilities in question—like those required for the futuristic strategic defense initiative dubbed "Star Wars" and the new program of "enhanced technologies" (known as "E.T.") for precisely delivered, conventional attacks against Soviet follow-on echelons and other remote targets—place a very heavy emphasis on the use of advanced technologies. Our immediate decisions about these and other programs could have enormous financial and strategic repercussions for decades to come.

Because we are staking so much on advanced defense technologies, it is essential to determine what aspects of our traditional approach to the military use of technology work well and in what areas reforms are needed. It is probable that even quite modest improvements in assessing and applying often uncertain new technologies could pay very valuable dividends. I could suggest many areas of improvement, but will limit my discussion here to three general areas where progress can be made toward the better use of technology: resolution of genuine disagreements about the priority of particular missions; balancing the need for total force flexibility against the efficiency of specialized system design; and coping with the "dynamic aspect" of weapons design.

What missions, what priorities? Defense planners must realize that short of mobilization for general war, we cannot afford the force structure needed to deal simultaneously with all possible threats to our interests with what would pass for high confidence. While we can rely to some degree on strategic flexibility, allied contributions, and so on as a substitute for in-hand force structure, difficult tradeoffs must be made. Many factors (some of them not related to defense at all) influence our determinations about which risks are most grave and what contingencies should be ranked most highly when it comes to the allocation of resources. Although we cannot control all of the pertinent variables, we are well-advised to be as consistent as possible in our planning—for instance, army and air force assumptions about how long a European war would last before becoming nuclear should not vary substantially. In preparing guidance for the planners charged with designing our force structure, it seems clear that the weapons systems that we design should reflect the relative priorities of possible missions as these are stated in our overall military concept. Only in this way will our broad strategic choices shape our force structure, as opposed to allowing the systems we buy to

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determine our employment doctrine. Unfortunately, the reverse process is more often seen than not: important strategic questions are often raised after key development and procurement decisions are made (if they are raised at all).

The need to clarify the issues involved in designing operational requirements is illustrated by the ongoing and quite acrimonious debate that has accompanied the design and production of several generations of U.S. tactical fighters, but particularly the current one. This controversy is based on nothing less than a fundamental difference of opinion concerning the characteristics of a future air war, and on the role of aviation in best supporting U.S. aims in such a war.[8] One school of thought has emphasized air superiority and deep-strike missions. If we are to accomplish difficult combat tasks and survive in an extremely hostile environment, certain technical features should be built into aircraft, including speed (with afterburner) in the Mach 1.5–2.5 range; BVR missile engagement capabilities; sophisticated avionics for navigation and weapons delivery; the electronic countermeasures (ECM), "identification friend or foe" (IFF), and communications gear needed for survival and coordination; possibly a second crew member to handle extra flight duties; and so forth. The result is a large aircraft (empty weight of 30-50,000 pounds).

In contrast to this admittedly oversimplified statement of mission requirements is a philosophy that advocates an altogether different approach: namely, the achievement of air superiority by success in close-in air combat. Here, the capabilities prized by the first group can actually be counterproductive. Since perhaps 80 per cent of the aircraft shot down in air-to-air combat never see the enemy, design characteristics and tactics that minimize the overall signature of the aircraft (i.e., small size, minimal radar or ECM emissions, and so forth) are essential. Moreover, based on such analytic inputs as classical mathematical models of engagement (such as Lanchester equations), the statistical results of tests and simulations (such as the AIMVAL/ACEVAL air-combat tests), and, to the extent that useful parallels can be drawn, wartime experience, a case can be made that aerial victory would go to the side fielding disproportionately more fighters, regardless of the relative one-on-one performance advantage of fancier aircraft. Taking these factors into account, the ideal aircraft would be much smaller (in the 10-15,000-pound class).

[8] Tactical aircraft programs figure prominently in the reform debate primarily because they are so expensive on a unit basis and because when aircraft are designed, making changes in one attribute can force dramatic changes in other features, as well. For instance, to increase the speed of an aircraft to improve its effectiveness in air-to-air combat may also increase the rate at which fuel is burned; for a fixed-range requirement, this means more internal or outboard fuel carriage, which in turn increases the aircraft's size, which has implications for the aircraft's performance in combat, and so on.

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It is not difficult to imagine scenarios or interpret available data in such a way that either side's contentions seem correct. The point, however, is that *many* scenarios are possible, and there is no reason to suppose that the few selected for planning purposes are very much more likely than other possible cases. Indeed, it is also conceivable that the character of an air war could change substantially during the course of fighting and therefore demand different capabilities over time. Given tight budgets and the nature of the threat before us, it would seem prudent to prepare for a broad range of possible contingencies of widely differing character. Thus, a mix of several different types of aircraft (possibly including so-called swing forces)[9] might be required. But how we determine the appropriate mix of system characteristics and total posture capabilities depends on how we resolve debates on the relative priority of different missions. A reasoned assessment of these issues would pay substantial dividends, whereas a continued focus on the merits or liabilities of individual systems will at best accomplish nothing, and will at worst conceal legitimate doctrinal disputes.

In short, we should consider the reasons for adopting certain design features before we start bending metal. The important judgments to make are whether an operational concept is flawed and whether our allocation of resources among many possible missions is out of balance. This must be done *before* resource allocation decisions are made and must reflect the realities of the budget and of the threats we may face.

Most systems must perform several jobs. Despite assertions to the contrary, the United States buys few systems that are truly specialized (in the sense that the weapon is intended only for use in one situation, or in one region at one point in time).[10] Designing weapons with a potential for multiple uses, however, often has significant implications for the use of military technology. Given a fixed budget, we must tolerate—within reasonable limits—the degradation of certain capabilities in favor of accommodating multi-role potential. As with mission priorities, however, some camps in the reform debate try to have it both ways. For instance, systems and the acquisition process are criticized either because weapons are not optimized for all conceivable roles or because we have, as it is usually put, tried to do too much with one piece of hardware. The national security debate would probably be more productive if everyone would keep in mind the tradeoffs involved in a weapon's design.

[9] Swing forces refers to those multimission systems that are assigned to varying tasks depending on the specifics of the scenario; for example, F-16 fighters would initially be assigned an air-defense role. As the overall aerial threat waned, these aircraft would gradually be reassigned to ground-attack missions.

[10] Some systems are obviously more appropriate for certain missions than others, at least in relative terms; moreover, some multimission systems would be so valuable in a particular role that they would not ordinarily be used in other capacities.

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The Perry-class guided-missile frigate, for example, has been criticized as inadequate as a task-force escort. This is hardly surprising, since they were not designed for such a role. Rather, they have been pressed into service as escorts because there are not enough destroyers to do the job. The lesson of this is not that Perry-class ships are somehow useless; it is that we need more destroyers for carrier battle-group operations. Refocusing the debate in this way might help to ensure that the cost of a new class of destroyers remains under control, so that sufficient numbers of battle-group escorts can be bought. (The currently planned guided-missile destroyer, the DDG-51 Burke-class, strikingly resembles the expensive Ticonderoga-class cruiser and may cost at least half again as much as the most recent class of destroyers.)

A second example of the tendency for the reform debate to lose perspective is the much-maligned F/A-18 fighter. To be sure, the Hornet does not, in some scenarios, perform some missions as well as aircraft specifically designed for those purposes—but, again, that is not the point. Rather, one sacrifices some degree of performance in some scenarios for the sake of such hard-to-quantify benefits as having aircraft flexible enough to be reassigned from one role to another as required by the contingency at hand, gaining efficiency from having one, instead of several types of planes aboard a carrier, and satisfying such unique carrier environmental requirements (which could have an adverse effect on performance or cost) as maximizing the number of deck spots, having two engines for safety's sake, and so forth.

Conversely, we can go too far in our attempts to build systems for multiple roles, especially when we are designing systems at the high end of the force inventory. The billion-dollar-a-copy Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser is a good example. This cruiser, with its sophisticated Aegis air-defense system, is intended to defend carrier task forces primarily against bomber and cruise-missile attack. But during the design process, extra capabilities were added to the ship that seem incompatible with the overall design philosophy.[11] Another example is the Los Angeles-class attack submarine; part of the high cost of this system can be attributed to the requirement that this kind of submarine be able to keep up with a carrier task force. Direct support of carriers by nuclear-powered attack submarines is important, of course, but the entire submarine fleet need not have this capability. Given the potential of modern submarine-

[11] For example, the Ticonderoga/Aegis cruisers mount two five-inch guns. Ordinarily, naval gunfire is appropriate for such tasks as the support of amphibious operations or close-in combat against less than all-out threats. It is hard to imagine either that one of these ships would be assigned to such a role (given the much higher priority mission of carrier defense), or that a carrier battle group would find itself in a situation in which gunfire from its chief missile escort would be critical.

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mounted sonars and smart antisubmarine standoff weapons, it may not be necessary to build thirty-plus-knot performance into an unnecessarily large follow-on nuclear attack submarine class.

In short, we have to strike some kind of balance between expecting too much from deliberately constrained systems and trying too hard to build systems that can accomplish several demanding missions equally well. Determining where to draw the line is an inevitably controversial process that requires careful case-by-case analysis. But for the sake of improving the reform debate, more attention should be paid to the underlying reasons for making design tradeoffs.

The dynamic aspects of system acquisition. Debate on the appropriate use of advanced military technology frequently raises questions about *when* capabilities might be incorporated into the force structure. Over the past decade or two, at least five factors have combined to change the environment in which we must view our force design in this respect:

(1) As technological possibilities expand and individual unit costs rise, systems have tended to take more time to design, are produced less quickly over a longer period of time, and remain in the inventory longer.

(2) Technological progress may occur irregularly—for instance, important developments in jet engines will not coincide with avionics, munitions, or air-vehicle advances, and so on. Moreover, when it has come to our ability to predict such developments accurately (or to integrate technology so as to take full advantage of them) our track record is not necessarily something to be very proud of.

(3) The sophistication and character of the threat (and just as important, its vulnerabilities) will change over time, often in unexpected ways. In addition, political and other developments will often change the planning context for a new program (when it comes to basing access and other important issues, for example).

(4) Our long-term force plans are constantly disrupted and even overthrown, affecting our decisions on what capabilities to incorporate into a system, (say, to hedge against adverse funding decisions).[12] In addition, our defense budget process encourages the deferral of certain kinds of costs to a future budget cycle, again with important implications for our design process.

[12] Take, for an example, the task of providing quick-reacting air-to-ground fire support for our front-line troops. Here army helicopter and air force attack aircraft programs could conceivably be planned so that the various attack assets available would play complementary roles. But if for budgetary or other reasons either service failed to deploy the planned force structure, then some kind of ad hoc compensation would be needed.

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(5) For political, budgetary, and other reasons, fewer weapons programs will be started over time.[13]

This changing technical and operational environment forces us to make some important tradeoffs at an early stage in weapons design. On the one hand, there is an understandable tendency to "go for it" when it comes to incorporating sophisticated new technologies into weapons. On the other hand, we have not always been successful when it comes to assessing the risks involved in pushing the frontiers of military technology forward, and we are well advised to freeze a system's design before beginning full-scale production (since changing the specifications of weapons or going ahead with production while concurrently finishing program development often leads to increased costs, less than ideal performance, inadequate weapon RAM, and delays in the fielding of weapons). What is needed, then, are management strategies that can help us develop technologies in a timely, yet at the same time, low-risk fashion.

A number of such approaches have so far been advocated, including prototyping weapons and preplanned product improvement (P^3I), one of the centerpieces of the so-called Carlucci acquisition-reform initiatives.[14] P^3I is particularly interesting, since its emphasis on putting new technologies in the field faster and anticipating modernization of deployed forces at relatively low cost over the extended lifetime of the system presumably would keep us from having to force technology along too fast or forsake althogether promising technological possibilities. Unfortunately, just as we cannot always assess new technologies well as we begin designing a system, so we cannot be sure what kinds of improvements we might want to make in systems in another decade or two. Moreover, there is no guarantee that we would undertake system improvements even if we had correctly planned for them.[15] This does not rule out the possibility for "nonpreplanned" modifications of systems—the air force and navy's F-4 versions and the M-60 tank have done very well over time. However, it is not clear how we can assure in advance such success in new programs or how far we can take program modifications.

One way to guard against failure to develop technology appropriately for combat systems is to pursue several possibilities when we

[13] In this regard, new kinds of restraints are influencing the form that new starts take. Consider tactical aircraft: the need for some manufacturers to balance civilian with military efforts for the sake of corporate stability, the need to collaborate with other nations if not one's sister service on a program, the advantages for one's program of a successful foreign sales program, and other factors may play a very powerful role in shaping our military modernization activities.

[14] The Carlucci initiatives (after the former Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci) was an ambitious, and, if certain obstacles can be overcome, successful attempt to deal with a number of defense procurement problems.

[15] A key example here is the failure, at least so far, to proceed with "preplanned" F-14 engine and avionics modifications.

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decide to modernize a particular part of our force. In this way we retain options—we do not wind up empty-handed if we are forced to cancel programs because certain technology gambles have not panned out. To be sure, this approach may require us to spend more initially, and this might sometimes result in political opposition. But it is possible that multiple options, and in some cases competition between candidate systems would help to deliver higher-quality weapons sooner; moreover, the extra initial costs of multiple or competitive development may not be prohibitive (hedging and competition in some cases may even save money in the long run). This certainly has been the case in such programs as the Lightweight Fighter, the A-X close-air-support aircraft, and the advanced-attack helicopter. By contrast, the absence of options has contributed to some noteworthy acquisition disasters—for instance, two candidate follow-on tanks to the M-60 (the MBT-70 and the XM-803).[16]

In sum, concealed in the rhetoric of the reform debate is an important question: are we using technology in military systems in an appropriate way? Some of the most important determinants of design success—the effect of political pressures on weapons chief among them—have not been discussed here because there is probably little we can do about them.[17] Nonetheless, there are a few steps we can take to improve our ability to get the most from our military technologies. I have listed three possible measures here. What technological capabilities to build into a given system probably has to be decided on a case-by-case basis, but if we can conduct debates on operational concepts and doctrine, keep operational tradeoffs in mind, and introduce more competition into our acquisition planning process, we can expect at least slightly better decisions about what technologies are appropriate for a particular weapon and when to incorporate them.

THE MILITARY REFORM MOVEMENT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT*

by JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER

There is today much interest in the self-styled military reform movement, a loose grouping of defense contractors, policymakers, members of Con-

[16] Note that the relative lack of options or competition in these cases was not the only factor involved.

[17] For instance, the Pershing II has performed less than outstandingly in its test program not because of any design flaw or acquisition failure, but rather because of the need to deploy the missile on a tight schedule determined by political factors.

* I would like to thank Michael E. Brown, Duane L. Knight, Barry R. Posen, and Stephen Van Evera for their most helpful comments.

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gress and congressional staffers.[1] This group includes individuals with a wide variety of political views; liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, who rarely agree on the issues of the day, appear to share similar views on how to improve the fighting power of our armed forces. Although differences certainly exist among the reformers, there is, nevertheless, a common core of ideas concerning the nature of modern warfare and how best to prepare for it. Basically, the reformers' theory of war is concerned with land warfare and, to a lesser extent, air warfare. Although certain reformers have definite views on naval warfare and questions of grand strategy, the movement does not appear to have a common position on these matters. I would like to examine the reformers' ideas about armies and land warfare and assess the advisability of their ideas and the likelihood that they will be adopted.

The Reform Movement's View of Warfare[2]

At heart, the reformers believe that the key to success on the modern battlefield is having the "right" strategy and that such a strategy is discovered by individuals whom students of military affairs call "great captains."[3] The reformers have two bêtes noires: technology and bureaucracy. Their hostility to these two basic elements of modern industrial society is directly related to their views on strategy and the individual. Specifically, they maintain that the U.S. military has come to view technology as a panacea for its problems, thus obscuring the importance of strategy, which is their solution. At the same time, they argue that bureaucracies or large-scale formal organizations stifle individual initiative; without the creative individuals, whose importance is paramount, it is impossible to discover the right strategy. In fact, heavy reliance on tech-

[1] Senator Gary Hart is probably the most well-known politician in the reform movement, and it is clear that he has been greatly influenced by his staff assistant, William Lind, who has written numerous articles on reform. Edward Luttwak, a widely known defense contractor, has also written widely on the subject, as has his business partner, Steven Canby. It is James Fallows, however, who has undoubtedly done the most to popularize the ideas of the reform movement. For a description of the "Congressional Reform Caucus," see Alton K. Marsh, "Military Reform Caucus Seeks Targets," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, March 29, 1982, p. 55. See, also, Morton Kondracke, "Defense Without Mirrors," *The New Republic*, January 24, 1982, pp. 11-13.

[2] In this section, I have attempted to provide an accurate and concise description of the reformers' arguments. It is important to note, however, that the reformers have not provided any studies developing their arguments in a comprehensive or scholarly way. One is forced to rely on a handful of articles presenting arguments that are not developed systematically. Such arguments are frequently vague, a point I will develop at some length when discussing the reformers' views on strategy, but which also applies to their views on bureaucracy and technology. It is possible, nevertheless, to determine the basic outline of their arguments. In presenting *their* views, I have tried to avoid (for purposes of brevity) using quotations from their writings. It would not be difficult to provide documentation to support my description of their views. I cannot, however, provide much more detail about their ideas, since they have not done so in their writings.

[3] For a list of some of the reformers' most important writings, see John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front," *International Security*, Winter 1981-82, p. 104, note 2.

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nology and bureaucracy is almost certain to result in the adoption of the wrong strategy.

For the reformers, the key to unlocking the secret of military success lies in the realm of strategy, or what is sometimes referred to as the operational level of warfare.[4] They maintain that the military, whether on the offense or the defense, is faced with a choice between two basic strategies—attrition and maneuver.[5] Attrition strategy calls for wearing down the opponent's forces in a direct engagement, and places a premium on the efficient application of firepower. The two sides in a conflict match strength against strength in what is ostensibly a protracted slugging match. In the end, success presumably goes to the side with more materiel and the larger number of soldiers. A maneuver strategy, on the other hand, starts with the premise that the opponent has an Achilles' heel, which, when struck, will lead to his collapse. Thus, it is not necessary to defeat the opponent's main forces in a series of bloody engagements. Instead, an army can defeat the enemy by finding his weak points and exploiting them. "The key to victory in maneuver is force disruption rather than destruction."[6] Victory promises to be swift, thus reducing the cost of war.

Not surprisingly, the reformers have undisguised contempt for attrition warfare, which they identify as "the American style of warfare."[7] Conversely, they praise maneuver warfare, which they hope to see the U.S. military adopt. Actually, for the reformers to speak of an attrition strategy is almost a contradiction in terms, since attrition warfare is so abhorent to them and strategy is so sacrosanct. If anything, one would think that for them an attrition strategy, the name notwithstanding, reflects an absence of strategy. It seems clear that when they talk about strategy, the reformers mean a maneuver strategy.

In the reformers' view, two obstacles impede the adoption of a maneuver strategy. One of these is bureaucracy or large-scale organizations.[8] This includes bureaucracy within the services as well as peripheral civilian bureaucracies. There are two related reasons that the reformers believe strategy and large-scale organizations are antithetical. First, such organizations are peopled by "managers" or staff officers whose entire modus operandi is geared to attrition warfare. With its emphasis on mas-

[4] See Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security*, Winter 1980-81, pp. 61-79.

[5] For a lengthy discussion of this matter, see Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front," pp. 104-22.

[6] Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance," *Survival*, March-April 1979, p. 59.

[7] Ibid.

[8] For some examples of the reformers' general views on bureucracy, see James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981), chap. 2, and Edward Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," pp. 62-64. I have not discussed the reformers' attack on systems analysis in this article. For a discussion of this matter, see Richard K. Betts' excellent critique of the reformers, "Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices," *International Security*, Spring 1983, pp. 140-62.

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sive amounts of troops and materiel, attrition warfare is ideally suited to the military bureaucrat. Thus, given the imperatives of organizational politics, these bureaucrats are naturally biased toward attrition warfare.

Second, bureaucracy stifles the individual military leader, the combat warrior, so essential for battlefield success. For the reformers there are two types of military officers: managers and leaders, and one is the enemy of the other. The reformers, of course, have declared war on military managers or staff officers, who, they believe, now control the U.S. armed forces. They hope to return control of the military to traditional leaders.

Another important point is that one cannot have maneuver warfare without a system in which individual combat leaders completely dominate their managerial counterparts. There are two reasons for this. First, it is the individual and not the organization who *discovers* strategy. Since "the Way of Strategy is not given to all," it is necessary to create a system in which the great captain, the military genius, can rise to the top and make his presence felt.[9] Second, it is individual commanders at all levels of the chain of command, acting with great independence, who will *execute* the maneuver strategy. Thus, there is much emphasis in the reformers' writings on decentralization of the command-and-control system and much emphasis on individual initiative. Their goal is clear: to free individual combat leaders at all levels (including the top) from control by a large-scale central organization. In other words, it is essential to decrease the importance of managers, who are identified with attrition warfare, and increase the role of leaders who are synonymous with strategy or maneuver warfare.

The reformers' hostility toward bureaucracy points to a strong element of antirationalism in their argument. Systematic planning for achieving any kind of military efficiency is scorned. Instead, there is much emphasis on concepts like instinct, wisdom, ingenuity, character, and intuition.[10] Edward Luttwak, for example, complains that there is too much "striving to substitute logic and calculation for military instincts and bureaucratic goals."[11] Elsewhere, he writes that "the best of our forces [the marines and certain parts of the army] are precisely those which are most obdurately traditional and least 'intellectual.'"[12]

[9] Edward N. Luttwak, "Why We Need More 'Waste, Fraud and Mismanagement' in the Pentagon," *Commentary*, February 1982, p. 25.

[10] See, for example, ibid., p. 20.

[11] Lutwak, "American Style of Warfare," p. 60. One can only wonder what Luttwak means when he marries "bureaucratic goals" with "military instincts" and then contrasts the two with "logic and calculation."

[12] Luttwak, "Waste, Fraud and Mismanagement," p. 23. He never specifies the criteria he uses to judge these parts of the armed forces to be "the best."

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This line of thought is a direct assault on the notion that war is basically a scientific enterprise and that careful planning with general staffs is the best guarantee of success. The reformers, clearly, consider war to be an art and not a science; it is an endeavor in which individuals naturally endowed with good strategic sense (that is, those with "the Way of Strategy") discover the optimal way of securing success on the battlefield. War, for the reformers, does not lend itself to what Max Weber called "rational-legal" calculation. Moreover, bureaucracy, with its emphasis on this kind of thinking, encumbers the brilliant individual who has an understanding of the art of war. Here, again, we see the importance of the individual for the reformers' theory of war.

Technology is the second major target for the reformers' scorn. Their argument is straightforward. The U.S. military has come to see technology as the principal means of winning wars.[13] Consequently, little attention is paid to strategy. The reformers believe that strategy should dictate in a very strict way the kind of technology the services procure. They believe that technology has instead become the independent variable for the U.S. military and, in fact, has taken on a life of its own. Strategy has become technology's handmaiden.

Furthermore, a heavy reliance on sophisticated technology, with its logistical demands and emphasis on constantly increasing firepower, subverts maneuver and leads directly to the adoption of an attrition strategy. This then reinforces the need for better and more technology. A vicious circle has developed. The reformers also maintain that military bureaucrats are enamored of sophisticated technology, not only for reasons of organizational self-interest, but because it supports the preferred attrition strategy. Thus, technology, large-scale organization, and attrition warfare are inextricably linked in the reformers' logic.

The reformers argue that the U.S. military should end its reliance on highly sophisticated technology and, instead, build greater numbers of simple, inexpensive weapons.[14] Naturally, the reformers believe that such weapons, with their ease of operation, are ideally suited for implementing a maneuver strategy. In short, it is not necessary to rely on technical superiority to gain success because that end is best achieved by superior strategy.

[13] For some examples of the reformers' general views on technology, see Fallows, *National Defense*, chaps. 3-4; Senator Gary Hart, "What's Wrong With the Military?" *New York Times Magazine*, February 14, 1982, pp. 16ff; and William S. Lind, "Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army," *Military Review*, March 1977, pp. 54-65.

[14] It should be emphasized that Edward Luttwak does not appear to share the views of his fellow reformers on the subject of sophisticated technology. See, for example, his "Waste, Fraud and Mismanagement," especially pp. 19-20.

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Assessing the Reformers' Views on War

The reformers have some worthy ideas. Their claim that the U.S. military should place greater emphasis on encouraging initiative among its commanders is a point well taken, and their charge that strategy is *often* neglected by the national security community is true. Such points aside, their views on modern war are vague, and, in part, anachronistic — and thus not likely to serve as a prescription for reform. Specifically, their views on military strategy, the bedrock of their theory, are obscure and not likely to be of much use to military professionals. Furthermore, their views on the nature of the military and the conduct of war are more relevant for the eighteenth than the twentieth century. Theirs is clearly a very romantic view of war.

The root of the problem is that the reformers view military affairs in isolation, failing to take into account the broader economic, social, and political forces that greatly affect the military. Specifically, they have failed to understand the impact that industrialization and democratization have had on the military over the past two centuries. To their credit, the reformers emphasize the importance of studying military history. It is not enough, however, to study only famous battles and great commanders. The military is not an isolated element in society, and changes in society at large invariably have a profound impact on the military.[15] An examination of the military's problems cannot be reduced to a discussion of the operational level of warfare. It is also necessary to consider the nature of industrial democracy and its impact on the military. The reformers' failure to do so is a fatal flaw in their theory.

Maneuver Strategy

Although the reformers' axiom that the sine qua non of success on the battlefield is adoption of a maneuver strategy seems very appealing at first glance, close examination reveals major problems. As I have discussed elsewhere,[16] it is impossible to determine exactly what the reformers mean by a maneuver strategy. The description they provide is highly abstract, and they fail to give any indication of what a manuever strategy would entail for the defense of Western Europe — the most relevant contingency. Reading through the reformers' writings, one gets the impression that they simply label any military success as an example of

[15] For a discussion of this matter, see Felix Gilbert, "From Clausewitz to Delbruck and Hintze: Achievements and Failures of Military History," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1980, pp. 11-20, and Peter Paret, "The History of War," *Daedalus*, Spring 1971, pp. 376-96.

[16] See Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front," pp. 107-8.

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maneuver.[17] The following excerpt from an article by William Lind provides an example of just how wide the boundaries of their definition are: "In the 1950s, the Israelis developed effective tactics against Arab fortified positions. They attacked frontally, got into the trenchworks, and engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. This may not sound like maneuver warfare, but it was."[18] There are numerous other examples that could be used to illustrate the vagueness of the reformers' concept of maneuver warfare.

Vagueness is a particularly egregious sin when one is dealing with strategy because military commanders, who are responsible for designing concrete plans, must be able to discern exactly what maneuver strategy *is* to be able to implement it. As Leon Trotsky, one of the century's most important military thinkers, noted, "military affairs are very empirical, very practical affairs."[19] The difficulty in translating the reformers' maneuver doctrine into practice is highlighted by the U.S. Army's recent attempt to develop a new fighting doctrine, referred to as the "AirLand Battle."[20] The army's revised version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 and a number of associated documents contain numerous passages remarkably similar to various passages in the reformers' writings.[21] In light of this, it seems altogether reasonable to assume that the army has adopted maneuver theory as its doctrine.[22] Edward Luttwak appears to accept this point, yet, paradoxically, his fellow reformer, Steven Canby, is sharply critical of the "AirLand Battle." He argues that "on the rhetoric, I think the Army has bought off on it foursquare. But air-land battle is not maneuver warfare at all."[23] Perhaps it is not; but why this is the case is difficult to comprehend.

Although the reformers have not clearly defined maneuver strategy, certain inferences can be drawn about their views. It is clear, for instance, that they are discussing the classic notion of grand-scale ma-

[17] There are marked similarities between the reformers' views on strategy and B. H. Liddell Hart's "theory of the indirect approach." Not surprisingly, the principal criticism leveled at Liddell Hart's theory is that it is tautological. See Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought* (London: Cassell, 1976), pp. 54-61. See, also, Brian Bond, "Further Reflections on the Indirect Approach, *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, December 1971, p. 70, and R. A. Mason, "Sir Basil Liddell Hart and the Strategy of the Indirect Approach," ibid., June 1970, p. 41.

[18] William S. Lind, "Tactics in Maneuver Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1981, p. 38.

[19] Leon Trotsky, *Military Writings* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971), p. 42.

[20] See *The Airland Battle and Corps 86*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, March 25, 1981), and *FM 100-5: Operations* (Washington: Department of the Army, August 20, 1982).

[21] Edward Luttwak, for example, told the *Wall Street Journal* that he was "startled to see 'whole paragraphs' of his work showing up in the doctrine." John J. Fialka, "Army Shifts Strategy to Give Small Units Room to Maneuver," *Wall Street Journal*, January 22, 1982.

[22] This is clearly implied in ibid. and in Deborah Shapley, "The Army's New Fighting Doctrine," *New York Times Magazine*, November 28, 1982, pp. 37ff.

[23] See Luttwak's comments in his correspondence with Richard K. Betts in the Fall 1983 issue of *International Security*. Canby's comment can be found in Michael R. Gordon, "Many Battles Still to Fight," *National Journal*, July 3, 1982, p. 1182.

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neuver, or what is frequently referred to as strategic maneuver. Basically, the objective is to force an opponent to move into a position where he can be enveloped. The reformers are certainly not advocating small-scale tactical maneuvers. Strategic maneuver, however, is of limited utility on the modern battlefield: contemporary armies, which are large and cumbersome, are difficult to maneuver; and they usually confront each other across wide fronts, where it is often impossible to turn a flank. Consider, for example, the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces located in Europe. It is hard to imagine a commander successfully maneuvering either one of these forces around the battlefield in the fashion described by the reformers.

When discussing the use of maneuver for offensive purposes, the reformers point to the success of the blitzkrieg as executed in the past by the Israelis and the Germans. The blitzkrieg, however, is *not* based on maneuver in the classic sense.[24] It is based, rather, on deep strategic penetrations, which call for the attacker to mass his forces at a specific point, pierce the defender's front, and then drive deeply into his defense. The objective is to destroy the vulnerable lines of communication throughout the defender's rear, thus rendering him incapable of coordinating his forces for a subsequent engagement. No attempt is made to outflank the defender or to lure him around the countryside until he is in a vulnerable position.

Regarding the reformers' position on maneuver and defense, I have argued elsewhere[25] that what they are calling for is, in effect, a classic mobile defense—which is one of the riskiest and most demanding strategies. A mobile defense is not an appropriate strategy for a heterogeneous alliance like NATO. Moreover, it is also a matter of historical fact that few armies have employed a mobile defense. Consider, for example, the Israeli and the German armies, which the reformers most often point to as practitioners of maneuver warfare. After the 1967 war, the Israelis specifically rejected a manuever-oriented strategy, or mobile defense, for defending the Sinai. They chose instead a forward defense, which, of course, has always been the preferred strategy for defending the Golan Heights.[26] Similarly, the Germans did not employ a mobile defense on the Eastern Front in World War II.[27] The reformers' call for a maneuver-

[24] For a detailed discussion of this matter, see John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 35-43.

[25] Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front," p. 110-14.

[26] See Jonathan Alford, *Mobile Defence: The Pervasive Myth* (London: Department of War Studies, King's College, 1977), pp. 239-78. As Alford makes clear, the Egyptians managed to cross the Suez Canal in 1973 because the Israelis failed to employ their forces in accordance with the planned forward defense.

[27] See ibid., pp. 104-45.

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oriented defense, then, is not a practical solution to the strategic problems facing the United States in places like Europe and Korea.

One final point needs to be made about strategy. Let us assume that it is possible to make the concept of maneuver warfare operational; assume that the offensive version is a blitzkrieg like the one described above, and the defensive version is a mobile defense. There is little doubt that a first-rate army might employ either of these strategies to achieve a rapid and decisive victory. Whether or not an army can successfully employ a blitzkrieg or a mobile defense, however, is as much a function of the opponent's capabilities as of its own skills. More specifically, when directed against a formidable opponent, it is highly unlikely that any strategy could effect a quick and decisive victory. For example, if the Israeli army had been matched against the Wehrmacht in 1967, the war would not have been a six-day one. When two evenly matched opponents lock horns on a battlefield, the result will almost invariably be a war of attrition.

The reformers assume that the Soviet army is a large cybernetic machine that can be brought to a grinding halt with a maneuver strategy. They believe that there is an alternative to fighting a war of attrition against the Soviets in Europe. This is wishful thinking, as the Germans learned in World War II. And if the Germans, whom the reformers praise as practitioners of maneuver warfare, could not decisively defeat the Soviets in a major land war, it is hardly likely that NATO could do so. Although the Soviets certainly have major weaknesses in their force structure, they are not so glaring that the entire military structure will collapse after one or two well-delivered blows. Even if NATO were to score some initial victories through the skillful employment of maneuver, the Soviets would learn to parry such blows with the third and fourth echelons of their army. For NATO, there is no alternative to fighting a war of attrition against the Soviets. Thinking strategically, as the reformers implore us to do, does not always provide attractive solutions to one's dilemmas. Strategy, too, has its limits.

Bureaucracy

When the reformers talk about moving armies about the battlefield as if this were as simple as moving pawns on a chessboard, one catches a glimpse of the romantic element in their theory of war. They seem to have forgotten that the military force the modern commander must maneuver is not the army of Frederick the Great, but a mass army. Their romanticism, however, is most pronounced when they are

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denouncing bureaucracy and praising the individual combat leader who understands the art of war. Here, too, their ideas are more relevant for the age of Frederick than for the twentieth century.

Before the Napoleonic wars, the size and needs of an army were, relatively speaking, quite small. There was not, therefore, much bureaucracy within an army, and, to a great extent, individual commanders exercised considerable control over their armies.[28] This was the age of great captains, when war was very much an art.[29] All of this changed radically in the nineteenth century when industrialization and democratization effected a "great transformation" [30] in the military, not to mention in society at large. Armies became too large and, as a result of the application of such developments of the industrial revolution as the railroad, too complex for a single individual to control. The individual commander was not only unable to control an army in battle, but planning for war became so complex that no single individual was capable of devising a comprehensive strategy.[31] The problem was not one of mere scope; it also had much to do with the fact that increasing functional specialization made it necessary to delegate responsibility. In response to these developments, the military evolved into a real profession. A high premium was placed on expertise, and military bureaucracies, often known as general staffs, proliferated. The idea that a state could rely on a military genius who grasped the art of war to lead its armies was no longer relevant. War became much more of a science and it became clear that success in war was dependent on having first-rate managers in command. It is hardly surprising that the two classic American works on

[28] Nevertheless, even in the centuries before Napoleon, armies did have bureaucrats, and they had an important role to play. These forebears of the modern staff officer were established, for the most part, to meet logistical needs—a subject rarely ever mentioned by the reformers. See, for example, Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), and Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), chap. 1.

[29] See R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), chap. 3.

[30] The term is from Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

[31] The reformers' failure to understand this point is underscored by Gary Hart's laudatory comments about Admiral Sir John Fisher, who, before World War I, instituted a number of controversial and very positive administrative reforms in the British navy. See Gary Hart, "What's Wrong with the Military?" p. 43. Nevertheless, historians roundly criticize Fisher, who "resolutely refused to create a Naval Staff to formulate any war plans." Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (Hammondsworth, Eng. Penguin, 1972), p. 42. Fisher, like the reformers, believed that strategy was the responsibility of the great captain alone. Consequently, there were significant shortcomings in British naval strategy before World War I. See Paul Haggie, "The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher Era," *Journal of Contemporary History*, July 1973, pp. 113-31. Also, the British army was plagued with the same problem in the early stages of World War I, when Field Marshal Kitchener, another believer in great captains, ran the War Office. See Peter Simkins, "Kitchener and the Expansion of the Army," in *Politicians and Defense*, ed. Ian Beckett and John Gooch (Manchester, Eng. Manchester University Press, 1981), pp. 87-109.

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military professionalism[32] define officership in terms of the "management of violence."

A cursory examination of the German army reveals the relevance of these developments. Few would dispute the fact that the German army has been one of the most formidable fighting forces of the past 150 years. Although there are certainly a number of factors that account for this, there is no doubt that their general staff system accounts for much of that success.[33] The excellent German staff system contributed greatly to the German victories against Austria (1866) and France (1870). Shortly thereafter, the German general staff became a model for other European states to follow. So highly regarded was the German general staff that the Allies actually tried to outlaw it after World War I. Obviously, they failed, and the general staff system played a key role in World War II.

The German military, therefore, which the reformers respect so much, owes much of its past success to its military bureaucracy. The Germans were the first to recognize that the complexity of modern warfare makes it essential that trained experts with functional specializations play a key role in formulating and executing strategy. Simply put, there is no alternative to heavy reliance on a large bureaucratic structure and technical efficiency. The matter is perhaps better summarized by Max Weber, who wrote: "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production."[34]

Although the days of the great captain endowed with a sixth sense about strategy are long gone, this does not mean that there is no need for combat leaders or battlefield warriors. Obviously, no war is going to be won by an excellent staff system alone. The point is that one needs first-rate military bureaucrats as well as talented battlefield commanders. These are not mutually exclusive categories. On the contrary, they are complementary, as is clearly demonstrated by the history of the German military over the past two centuries.

Two final points are in order regarding bureaucracy. First, the reformers argue that a powerful staff system will create a situation in

[32] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage, 1964), and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960). See, also, Walter Millis, *Arms and Men* (New York: Putnam, 1956), chap. 3.

[33] See, for example, Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), and Dallas D. Irvine, "The French and Prussian Staff Systems Before 1870," *The Journal of the American Military History Foundation*, Winter 1938, pp. 192-203.

[34] *From Max Weber*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 214. Ironically, as Weber points out, it was the "needs . . . of standing armies" that were the chief influence in the growth of the "bureaucratic tendency" in European states. Ibid., p. 212.

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which battlefield commanders are unable to take initiative—that ingredient so important for achieving success. Centralization of control, they feel, stifles initiative, which the reformers believe has been so important for the Germans and the Israelis. They are correct in stressing the importance of initiative; they are wrong, however, when they claim that an efficient and strong staff system is inconsistent with initiative or with what the Germans call *Auftragstaktik*. In fact, the Germans have demonstrated that initiative and a top-notch staff system are fully compatible. This point is made well by Samuel Huntington, who notes that the German system "on the one hand, subordinated the individual to the collective will and intelligence of the whole, and yet guaranteed to the individual wide freedom of action so long as he remained upon his proper level and within his sphere of responsibility."[35]

Finally, putting aside the issue of performance on the battlefield, the United States will always need a large and efficient military bureaucracy because of its geopolitical position. The United States is separated by great distances from the areas of the world where it might be involved in conflict. It is for this reason that we are so interested in power projection, which, by definition, requires a huge logistical apparatus. There is no escaping this requirement, as there is no escaping the fact that in the twentieth century, battlefield success is directly linked with the technical efficiency of the managers who comprise the staffs that Spenser Wilkinson called the "brain of an army."[36] The only choice is whether one will have good or bad managers.

Technology

A sizable segment of the national security community tends to view technology as *the* solution to our major defense problems.[37] To the extent that the reformers provide an antidote to such unbounded technological optimism, their skepticism is welcome. The problem, however, is that they greatly underestimate the importance of technology for success on the battlefield, and they misunderstand the relationship between technology and strategy.

Basically, the reformers are hostile to the notion that technology is an important factor in warfare. They believe that it is possible to rely on relatively unsophisticated weaponry. Given the choice, for example, between a fighter with advanced missiles and advanced avionics and a stripped-down fighter with more primitive systems, they would opt for the

[35] Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, p. 51.

[36] Spenser Wilkinson, *The Brain of an Army* (London: Constable, 1913).

[37] For two examples, see *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe*, report of the European Security Study (London: Macmillan, 1983), and Paul F. Walker, "Precision-Guided Weapons," *Scientific American*, August 1981, pp. 37-45.

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latter. Their argument, in part, is based on the assumption that greater numbers (which are affordable because of the low cost of unsophisticated weaponry) compensate for the qualitative advantages that are given up. More important, however, is their belief that it is the individual and the strategy, not technology, that really matter.

While the reformers are correct in their assessment that technology alone is not a panacea, they fail to recognize that in an age of great technological change, it could be disastrous not to have the latest technology. One only has to look at the developments in naval technology that took place before World War I to ascertain the importance of staying on "the cutting edge" of military technology.[38] A more relevant example is the present action-reaction cycle between tanks and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Since the Egyptians had such success with ATGMs in the 1973 war, tank designers have been working on developing "special armor" that can withstand a direct hit from an ATGM. Concomitantly, ATGMs are being redesigned so that they can pierce this new armor.

It is absolutely essential for the United States to be in the forefront of developing both "special armors" and new ATGMs so that it can secure any advantage that accrues from new developments in these competing systems. We would be in very serious trouble if the Soviets developed an ATGM that could penetrate U.S. armor, while U.S. ATGMs could not pierce Soviet armor. Conversely, the Soviets would be at a marked disadvantage if the situation were reversed. For this reason, the United States has no choice but to stay in the forefront of armor and anti-armor technology.

This logic, of course, applies to other weapons as well. Although it is an uncomfortable fact of life, it is nonetheless true that to some extent we are prisoners of technology. We have no choice but to stay on "the cutting edge" of weapons development and to at least explore all possible avenues of development. This does not mean that every system on the drawing board should be deployed, that the most sophisticated version of a weapon is the one that should be built, or that technology should be allowed to obscure the importance of strategy or how the weaponry is used to achieve success on the battlefield. On the contrary, we should choose the systems we build wisely and pay very careful attention to the relationship between technology and strategy. This intention, of course, is admirable in theory but difficult in practice. Let us consider these matters in greater detail.

The reformers are almost always unequivocal in their enthusiasm or disdain for different weapons. Often, however, it is very difficult

[38] See Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), especially part 3.

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to be sure about the worthiness of a particular weapon. There are basically two reasons for this. First, since the United States has been fortunate enough to have been spared a general conflict with the Soviet Union, most of our weapons have not been tested in the arena for which they were designed. It is therefore difficult to determine what the demands of a U.S.-Soviet conflict would be. In this regard, consider the F-15 aircraft and the M-1 tank, two weapons that the reformers would like to throw on the scrap heap. It is possible that in a war the reformers might be proved correct. It is also possible that the F-15 and the M-1 will prove to be very valuable weapons. For this reason, there will be tremendous pressure on the prudent defense planner to procure both of these systems. Uncertainty is a powerful reason for staying in the forefront of weapons development.

It is also difficult to ascertain the worthiness of a weapon because there is often a lengthy gestation period in the development of new technologies. There is, in other words, usually a gap between invention and full utilization of the invention. Weapons are complex systems, and it frequently takes time to eliminate the problems associated with early development and to add new features. Also, weapons are sometimes not used because their value is not readily apparent. Air-launched guided missiles and ATGMs were in military inventories well before their real value was recognized in the Vietnam War and the 1973 War, respectively. These considerations work to reinforce the prudent planner's proclivity for deploying sophisticated weapons.

Two further points regarding technology are in order. First, the reformers maintain that technology should be completely subordinated to strategy. Technology, for them, should be the dependent variable. Although this may be a desirable situation, the world unfortunately is not so well ordered. Whether we like it or not, technology often evolves in unplanned and unforeseen directions. The idea that the growth of technology can be simply fitted to the demands of strategy is mistaken. Often, but of course not always, strategy must be changed to accommodate technology. The tank, for example, which was developed in World War I, was not developed to facilitate a blitzkrieg; it was to be used in support of the prevailing strategy of broad frontal attacks. It was not until after the war that certain individuals recognized the revolutionary potential of the tank. Here, the technology preceded the strategy. In short, the relationship between technology and strategy is a complex one where neither factor completely dominates the other.[39]

[39] One example of this complexity is provided by Michael Brown in his excellent study of bomber development in the United States. He argues that in this realm, strategy *has* dominated technology, but to the detriment of the bomber programs themselves as well as the nation's overall force posture. See Michael E. Brown, "Flying Blind: Decision-Making in the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1983).

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At a general level, one gets the impression that the reformers, in their efforts to emphasize the importance of strategy over technology, do not understand the importance of economic factors for military strength. This is reflected, for example, in Edward Luttwak's discussion of "the true source of British naval supremacy."[40] Luttwak maintains that "certainly it was not by an economic superiority" that Britain achieved its pre-eminent position. "The true source," he argues, "was the statecraft that kept the major powers of Europe divided. . . . It was the ceaseless effort of diplomacy, the subsidies . . . , the bribes—and the willingness to change sides . . . that made the British so powerful at sea, and not the mere building of ships." In other words, British hegemony at sea was due to an intelligent grand strategy, not superior economic might. This analysis is simply incorrect. The decline of British naval mastery had little to do with the absence of good strategy or smart diplomacy and almost everything to do with the steady erosion of Britain's economic base over the past century.[41] It is hard to imagine a serious historian arguing otherwise.

Strategy is certainly an important variable, and the reformers are correct to insist on that point. Good strategy, however, is not going to make much difference if a state does not have an economy powerful enough to produce the raw military power that the strategist must use to achieve his ends. Luttwak's views notwithstanding, excellent strategy will not make Britain a world power again. The United States, in addition to choosing wise strategies, must remain on "the cutting edge" of the industrial revolution. We need to stay abreast of the latest developments in military technology, and we need new technologies to fuel the growth of our economy—the ultimate source of our military strength. Technology and strategy, like bureaucracy and strategy, are compatible, not mutually exclusive categories.

Conclusion

What can be said about the prospect of the reformers' views being adopted? The answer is quite simple: on other than a rhetorical level their ideas will not have much impact. The reformers' ideas on strategy, the cornerstone of their theory, are vague and, therefore, it is very difficult to see how they will be translated into concrete strategies. As best as one can tell, they are calling for NATO to adopt a mobile defense. From

[40] This discussion can be found in Luttwak, "Waste, Fraud and Mismanagement," p. 24.

[41] This point is made clearly in Paul M. Kennedy's superb study of the British navy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (New York: Scribner's, 1976). It should also be noted that those "subsidies" and "bribes" that Luttwak points to were made possible by a robust British economy. See J. M. Sherwig, *Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

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a military perspective, this strategy is ill-suited to NATO. On the political level, the Germans will never allow NATO to substitute a mobile defense for the present strategy of forward defense.

This is not to deny that the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps have not paid homage to the rhetoric of maneuver warfare. They certainly have, as a perusal of the army's 1982 FM 100-5 and the pages of the *Marine Corps Gazette* make clear.[42] This is hardly surprising, since adopting some of the reformers' rhetoric serves to placate a vocal body of critics.[43] Also, arguing against the abstract concept of maneuver, which promises a quick, almost bloodless victory, is much like arguing against apple pie and motherhood. It is much easier to sing the praises of maneuver. There is no evidence, however, that this change in rhetoric has resulted in any meaningful change in the way the United States would fight a war in Europe or elsewhere.

Regarding the reformers' ideas on bureaucracy and technology, the United States military will continue to be a highly bureaucratized institution that places great emphasis on deploying sophisticated technology. Modern militaries have no choice on these counts. Those ineluctable forces, democratization and industrialization, have made it imperative that a military rely heavily on staff officers and the most up-to-date weapons. The reformers' desire to turn back the clock and return to an age when the brilliant individual and simple weaponry were the keys to success in war is a hopeless cause. Ideas that do not recognize the impact of the broader forces that shape the military institution remain nothing more than ideas.

[42] Over the past few years, the *Marine Corps Gazette* has published many articles extolling the virtues of maneuver warfare, a number of which were written by William Lind. It is clear from the articles and the correspondence in the *Gazette* that the Marine Corps is quite sympathetic to the reformers' views on ground warfare. Thus, it is not surprising that the reformers are favorably disposed toward the marines.

[43] In this regard, the army has gone out of its way to solicit the views of the reformers. For example, the reformers were asked by the army to review a draft version of FM 100-5. See Michael R. Gordon, "Budget Crunch Gives Shot in the Arm to Growing Military Reform Movement," *National Journal*, September 5, 1981, pp. 1572-76.

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IS THERE A PEACE MOVEMENT IN THE GDR?

by Ronald D. Asmus

The phrase "peace movement" has by now become a well-publicized part of the political vocabulary of the West. The term generally refers to a loose, heterogeneous coalition in the West, including pacifists, Christians, leftists, as well as Green, "alternative," and other groups representing an array of ideological viewpoints, yet united in their opposition to what they perceive as an ongoing, uncontrolled escalation of the arms race between East and West.[1] In specific terms, they strongly oppose the December 1979 NATO twin-track decision calling for the deployment of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, combined with the simultaneous offer of arms control negotiations on these missiles with the Soviet Union. Nuclear deterrence and NATO's proclaimed policy of flexible response are rejected in both theory and practice, in favor of "alternative" defense strategies, "social defense," and full multilateral or even unilateral disarmament. Although initially confined to Western Europe, the term "peace movement" has also been expanded by some of its proponents to include the growing "freeze" movement in the United States. Particular attention, however, continues to be focused on the activities of the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Although the "peace movement" did not originate in the FRG, having appeared earlier in other West European countries such as the Netherlands, the key role of the peace movement in West Germany results from the fact that Bonn's support is critical for ensuring the success of NATO's dual-track decision of 1979. This latter fact, of course, has not been lost upon more astute political observers in both East and West. Consequently, West Germany has become the psychological battlefield upon which the fate of the NATO Brussels decision is to be determined.

Parallel to the development of the peace movement in the FRG and Western Europe has been the emergence of unofficial and independent peace activism on the part of a small, diverse group of pacifists, dissident Marxists, Christians, and other political opponents of the regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)—a phenomenon that has

[1] The "peace movement" is the latest of what social scientists have come to refer to as the "new social movements" of the 1970s—e.g., the ecological movement, the women's movement, and so-called citizen initiatives. For a comprehensive analysis of the origins, the development, and the views of various groups within the "peace movement" see Günther Schmid, *Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensbewegung* (Munich: Günther Olzog Verlag, 1982).

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caught the attention of many in the West, especially in West Germany. The public appearance in the GDR of nonsanctioned peace demonstrations, independent peace forums and seminars, petitions calling for alternatives to mandatory military conscription, the right of reservists to perform their obligations in nonmilitary spheres, as well as broader demands, such as the removal of nuclear weapons from both parts of Germany, have combined to create the image of a parallel "peace movement" in the GDR—a movement that some enthusiasts claim is similar both in terms of its genesis and goals to the peace movement in the West.[2] The question of whether there is an unofficial and independent "peace movement" in the GDR has stirred up considerable controversy in both German states. In the FRG, some segments of the peace movement, such as the growing environmental party, the "Greens," have openly proclaimed their support for unofficial peace activism in the GDR, leading to heated debate within the West German peace movement.[3] In the GDR itself, the authorities contend that there are no major differences between Marxist and Christian peace efforts and heatedly deny the existence of an unofficial peace movement. In an interview with a correspondent of the Italian Communist party daily *L'Unita*, Gerhard Lindner, vice-president of the World Peace Council and deputy chairman of the GDR's Liberal Democratic party, replied to the question of whether an independent peace movement exists in the GDR by stating that such a movement only "makes sense in a country whose policy is oriented toward preparations for war, in other words in the Western countries." Although denying the existence of such a movement in the GDR, Lindner went on to say that there were people who either "proceeded from mistaken premises" or who attempted to conceal political opposition behind a pacifist mask. According to Lindner: "No, listen, there cannot be a pacifist movement because the government's policy is pacifism. The entire country is pacifist."[4]

Questions about the peace movement in the GDR have more than a merely academic significance for at least two reasons. First, a number of proponents of the Western peace movement maintain that their

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[2] See the article by Rudolf Bahro in *Der Spiegel*, no. 50, December 13, 1982, where Bahro, one of the leading theorists in the West German peace movement and a former East German party functionary imprisoned following publication in the West of his classic Marxist critique *Die Alternative*, writes: "For the first time since the partition [of Germany] and despite the existence of systemic contradictions which often appear irreconcilable, we now have both on this and that side of the wall opposition movements which are the same in terms of their driving force and goals. They turn against the power structure, against their own power structure, but not at the initiative of the other. Rather, they perceive both establishments in the final analysis as the flip sides of a single antagonistic system which must be overcome in its entirety." For further information on Bahro's views concerning the tactics and goals of the peace movement, see his most recent book, *Wahnsinn mit Methode* (Berlin: Olle & Walter Verlag, 1982).

[3] See *The Guardian*, January 12, 1983, and the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 8, 1982, as well as Rudolf Bahro in *Der Spiegel*, no. 15, April 10, 1982.

[4] See the article by Paulo Soldini in *L'Unita*, April 13, 1983.

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campaign for nuclear disarmament can only achieve its goals if sufficient public pressure for disarmament is exerted on the ruling elites in both East and West. In other words, for some the development of a peace movement in Eastern Europe is an important precondition for the realization of the longer-term goal of nuclear disarmament.[5] Second, the existence of unofficial and independent peace activism in the GDR demonstrates public questioning and dissatisfaction with certain tenets of regime policy of a kind unique in the postwar history of Eastern Europe. Of course, the number of people actively involved in such activities (currently estimated at no more than 2,000-5,000) should not be exaggerated. At the same time, their significance in a society where overt criticism of party scripture entails considerable personal risk should not be underestimated. The origins, the development, and the future prospects of unofficial peace activism in the GDR is a subject about which all too little is known in the West. Conscientious objectors, pacifism, and opposition to regime security policy are in themselves not unprecedented in the GDR. Yet, an astute observer must ask two questions. First, why is there a revival of public interest in such issues at this point in time? And, second, why has this development occurred in the GDR as opposed to other countries in the Soviet bloc?

A "New" Peace Movement

Is there a "peace movement" in the GDR? The obvious answer to this question is yes—indeed, there are two movements, one official and the other unofficial. All of the Warsaw Pact countries, of course, have official peace movements headed by "Peace Councils" that date back to the early postwar period.[6] Such organizations have been engaged in wide-ranging activities including publications, officially sponsored mass demonstrations (usually in conjunction with youth or other party-controlled organizations), as well as the cultivation of contacts with other peace organizations on the international level. Such official peace groups place an extraordinary emphasis on appearing to be voluntary, self-funded, and independent. In reality, they are designed to provide a forum

[5] See, for example, the views of Edward P. Thompson as expressed in his article, "Freedom and the Bomb," *The New Statesman*, April 24, 1981, in *Zero Option* (London: Merlin Press, Ltd., 1982), and *Extremism and the Cold War* (London: Verso Editions, 1982). For a critical review of Thompson's views, see Timothy Garton Ash, "The Myth of Self-Liberation," *The Spectator*, August 21, 1982.

[6] The genesis of most of these organizations dates back to the founding of the World Peace Council (WPC) in Paris in 1949 with the WPC and its successor organizations playing a major role in coordinating the activities of various Soviet peace offensives in the postwar period. In May 1949 a German Committee for Fighters for Peace was established in East Berlin. It has been renamed several times, and its current designation, Peace Council of the GDR, dates back to 1963. The GDR Peace Council has spearheaded East German efforts within the blocwide campaign against the neutron bomb and, more recently, against the 1979 NATO decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

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from which the party can propagate its views on the arms race, the causes of East-West conflict, East-bloc disarmament proposals, et cetera, as well as to serve as institutions through which real or imagined influence can be exerted on "progressive peace forces" in the West and to demonstrate that communist and workers' parties are in the vanguard of the struggle for peace.[7]

More interesting, however, may be the fact that, in addition to official peace efforts, an unofficial or "new" peace movement has also emerged in the GDR as a result both of factors specific to East German society and of broader fears evident in both East and West concerning the possibility of a military confrontation in Europe. A small number of primarily, but not exclusively, young East Germans have, with the guarded support of the East German Evangelical Church, organized a number of initiatives, petitions, peace forums, and seminars intended to draw attention to and articulate demands for further action to help preserve peace. Such demands provide evidence of a grassroots movement, or what the East German author Stefan Heym has called a "ground swell" of popular feeling from below.[8] Such manifestations are particularly unique under "real socialism" because the ruling regimes in these societies not only explicitly reject pluralism and the necessity for independent action, claiming that the Marxist-Leninist party is a superior political institution through which all societal demands can be expressed, but also undertake strenuous efforts through their security apparatus to prevent or limit any such manifestations. That such a development should occur in the GDR is all the more interesting since the GDR is one of the traditional bastions of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in Eastern Europe and is known for its intolerance of any implicit or explicit expressions of dissent. Whether the array of unofficial peace activities under way in the GDR actually constitutes a "movement" is a question of definition. These groups certainly do not constitute a movement in the traditional sense of an organization with a set hierarchy, lines of responsibility, official spokesmen, policy programs, and so forth. At the same time, however, there is a movement in the sense that these groups share broad objectives and goals and have a sense of a common fate.

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[7] For a summary of these efforts, see J. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1982.

[8] See the interview with Heym in *Der Spiegel*, no. 22, May 31, 1982. The size of the unofficial peace movement in the GDR is extremely difficult to estimate for at least three reasons. First, there is no official membership in the strict sense, for obvious reasons. Second, the degree of personal commitment and the number of individuals involved in unofficial peace activities is likely to fluctuate, depending on the level of official harassment and pressure. Third, many peace activists are organized into small groups scattered throughout the country, groups that are often isolated and have limited knowledge of each other's activities. Although there have been attempts to establish closer contact and cooperation among such groups, obvious logistical difficulties remain in view of the watchful eye of the East German security apparatus. In early spring 1982, one source estimated the number of peace group activists throughout the GDR to be between 2,000 and 5,000.

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The emergence of an unofficial or "new" peace movement in the GDR can be attributed to three basic factors. First, such activities are the result of a genuine concern, indeed fear or *Existenzangst*, that has developed within society about the possibility of a military confrontation in Europe. Combined with this fear is the realization that it would be the Germans in both the GDR and the FRG who would first suffer the consequences of such a conflict. Such concerns have been catalyzed in recent years as a result of the visible deterioration in East-West relations and the painful demise of a détente policy for which Germans had so much hope. The fear of both Germanies is becoming involved in an escalating superpower conflict over which they have little or no control. Ironically, these fears have in no small part been fueled by the belligerent propaganda of the Socialist Unity party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland*, or SED) and its constant reference to the possibility of armed conflict in Europe and to the alleged plans by Pentagon and NATO chiefs for a third world war. The role of East German propaganda in fostering such anxieties should not be underestimated. Honecker's allegation that world peace is more threatened now than at any other time in post-World War II history is but one example of the alarmist tenor of statements appearing in the East German press.[9] At the same time it must also be pointed out that imprecise and inopportune statements by high-ranking U.S. officials concerning Western nuclear strategy and the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe—and their exploitation by East-bloc propaganda apparatuses—have also contributed to the development of a very real sense of *Angst*.

Second, the emergence of unofficial peace activism must also be viewed as an emotional reaction to the high level of militarization in East German society, the high concentration of military troops,[10] the parades and the incessant harping upon militaristic values, and the stress placed on hatred of the enemy (*Feindbild*) in the educational system. War toys in kindergarten, obligatory military training (both theory and practice) for older children complete with practice in using hand grenades during sports classes, rifle practice for university students, the draft, and obligatory civil defense exercises for the entire adult population are all examples of the pervasiveness of the military element in East German society. The high visibility of the military element in society, although an old phe-

[9] See, for example, Honecker's closing remarks at the Fourth Central Committee Plenum, published in *Neues Deutschland*, June 25, 1982.

[10] Counting Soviet troops stationed in the GDR (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, or GSFG), the East German National People's Army (*Nationale Volksarmee*, or NVA), East German border guards, police, and the armed militia (*Kampfgruppen*), the total number of men under arms in the GDR is approximately 1,200,000. This figure represents another East German first: eleven soldiers or armed militiamen per square kilometer. See Norman M. Naimark, "Is it True What They're Saying About East Germany?," ORBIS, Fall 1979, p. 569.

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nomenon in the GDR, has increased in recent years as the authorities have placed more emphasis on military indoctrination in the school system, expanded and codified the military obligations of the population at large, and increased the frequency of military and civil defense maneuvers.[11]

The third and perhaps the most important factor that facilitated the emergence of independent peace activism in the GDR has been the active role the East German Evangelical Church has played in fostering and providing a safe forum for debate over such issues.[12] Although the total official membership in the Evangelical Church in the GDR has shrunk from some 14.8 million in 1950 to nearly 8 million in 1978 (out of a total population of nearly 17 million), this church continues to play an important role in East German society. Along with the much smaller Catholic Church, the East German Evangelical Church represents the sole institutional structure in the GDR not subject to party control.[13] As a result, the open debate and successfully functioning democratic procedure of the Evangelical Church stands in stark contrast to the Leninist character of the SED. Moreover, the church is capable of providing facilities for meetings, publications, and even limited employment—resources which no other noncommunist social group in the GDR has at its disposal.

The involvement of the East German Evangelical Church in the growing debate over peace, arms control, and disarmament can be traced back to the mid 1970s. Discussion within the church over such issues was given an initial impetus by the signing of the Helsinki agreements in 1975. The growing debate within the church over human rights and détente, however, soon began to spill over into a more fundamental discussion of the root causes of international conflict and the arms race. This debate was spurred by international events and the effect that the deterioration in East-West relations had on the domestic climate in the GDR. At the same time, however, the attitudes of the church hierarchy were also influenced

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[11] For a summary of the GDR's intensified efforts in this realm, see Karl Wilhelm Fricke, "Forcierte Militärisierung im Erziehungswesen der DDR," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 10, 1982, pp. 1057-62.

[12] The founding members of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) in 1948 included the eight independent territorial Protestant churches of what was to become the GDR. Political pressure from the SED regime eventually led the East German Protestant churches to withdraw from the EKD in 1969 and to form a separate Federation of Evangelical Churches.

[13] According to its present constitution, the Federation is an association of independent territorial churches for the purposes of practical cooperation in the interests of common witness and service. It is strongly federal in character, with decisionmaking powers decentralized. The eight territorial churches consist of the five united churches of Anhalt, Berlin-Brandenburg, Görlitz, Greifswald, and the Church Province of Saxony, as well as the three Lutheran churches of Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. The five united churches also form the Evangelical Churches of the Union (*Evangelische Kirche der Union*, or EKU) and the three Lutheran churches also constitute the United Evangelical Lutheran Church (*Vereinigte Evangelische Lutherische Kirchen*, or VELK). The Federation is estimated to have a total membership of some 8,000,000. In comparison, the Catholic Church in the GDR is estimated to have 1,300,000 members. For further details on church membership in the GDR, see Hans-Jürgen Röder, "Churches and Religious Groups in the GDR: An Overview in Figures," *Kirche im Sozialismus* (West Berlin: Berliner Arbeitgemeinschaft für Kirchliche Publizistik), special English edition, June 1979, pp. 32-38.

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by domestic developments. The regime's decision in September 1978 to introduce compulsory military education in the curriculum for the ninth and tenth grades, for example, appears to have been a major factor resulting in efforts on the part of the church to expand its own educational work in an attempt to counterbalance the SED's socialization efforts.[14]

There is no doubt that the efforts and activities of the East German Evangelical Church helped lay the moral, psychological, and informational foundation for subsequent independent peace initiatives. Yet the echo which such initiatives were to find within broader segments of East German society was perhaps also the result of a fortuitous set of circumstances and their impact upon the East German scene. On the one hand, the crumbling of détente in Europe and the shattering of the hope that many East Germans had come to place in this policy, a reality underlined by the chill in inter-German relations that set in following Honecker's Gera speech in October 1980 and the GDR's arbitrarily raising minimum exchange-rate requirements, led to a sense of pessimism concerning the future.[15] These moves, in conjunction with the Polish crisis and the escalating controversy over the 1979 NATO INF decision, including their exploitation by the East-bloc propaganda apparatus, strengthened very real fears concerning the increased likelihood of a military confrontation in Europe. Two other events, however, gave rise to a modicum of hope. Events in Poland before the declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981, raised the prospect of reform-minded citizens' being able to influence the policies of a communist regime. Moreover, the rapid development of the peace movement in Western Europe, and the sight of some 300,000 people demonstrating in Bonn in October 1981 in conjunction with the visit of President Reagan, strengthened the hope of East German peace activists that public pressure in the West could influence NATO policies, as well as their hope that public opinion could also be brought to bear in the East in order to bring an escalating arms race under control. Ironically, the SED's initially unbounded praise for the Western peace movement led at least some people to wonder whether the questions and demands being raised in the West (and vigorously applauded by

[14] For further details on the September 1978 decision and the ensuing conflict, see J. L. Kerr, "Military Education in the Schools: Church and State Clash in the GDR," RAD Background Report (BR) no. 170 (Eastern Europe), *Radio Free Europe Research* (RFER), August 1, 1978.

[15] On October 9, 1980, the GDR arbitrarily raised the minimum exchange requirement for visitors from "non-socialist countries and West Berlin" to DM 25 — approximately doubling it for West Germans and nearly quadrupling it for West Berliners, a move that soon led to a drastic decline in the number of Westerners traveling to the GDR. On October 13, 1980, SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker delivered a hard-line speech in Gèra where he raised for the first time in years East German demands that the FRG recognize an East German citizenship, upgrade diplomatic missions into full embassies, and resolve the Elbe border dispute — in essence an attempt to qualitatively alter the "special relationship" that has been the basis of German normalization since the signing of the Basic Treaty in December 1972. For Honecker's speech see *Neues Deutschland*, October 14, 1980.

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the SED) might not be appropriate for their own societies and governments as well. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact "Peace Campaign" against NATO and the 1979 Brussels INF decision may have expanded the traditionally narrow limits of regime tolerance in the GDR and, at least for a short period of time, offered a degree of protection for independent—and therefore uncontrolled—peace activists. In sum, it was the milieu created by the interaction of these domestic and international factors that provided the background for the emergence of an embryonic independent East German peace movement.

The Call for a "Social Peace Service"

On May 9, 1981, a small group of Christians in the East German city of Dresden drew up a proposal calling upon the East German *Volkskammer*, or parliament, to pass a "social peace service" (*Sozialer Friedensdienst*, or SofD) as an alternative to mandatory military conscription.[16] In their statement, the authors expressed their concern over the continuing arms race in East and West, the increasing weight of militarism in East German society, and called for a twenty-four-month peace service as an alternative to the mandatory eighteen-month military service. Peace service would involve working in hospitals, old-age homes, kindergartens, and possibly in the area of environmental protection, and was seen as an option similar to that open to young West Germans since the late 1950s. Church officials later confirmed that many members had responded orally to this initiative and stated that the church was prepared to act as an arbitrator on the issue. In late August 1981 Saxon Bishop Johannes Hempel confirmed the church's active role when he stated, "We will obviously open our arms and speak openly with those whose motives originate in their Evangelical beliefs." Hempel qualified his remarks, however, when he stated that the church could only lead such discussions and that it would "stand together with the young people as far as our conscience allows."[17]

To the surprise of some Western observers, the open appeal for Evangelical Church support—and the church's positive response—did not at first cause any official reaction on the part of the authorities. One factor that helps to explain the regime's initially restrained attitude was the fact that the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches (WCC) was scheduled to begin a ten-day conference in Dresden on August 17. The conference, the first held in Eastern Europe in some twenty-five years,

[16] For the text of the initiative, see EPD-Dokumentation, Evangelischer Pressedienst, no. 35 (Frankfurt am Main: Haus der Evangelischer Publizistik, 1981), p. 4.

[17] See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 21, 1981.

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was also likely to focus a great deal of public attention on the status of relations between the Evangelical Church and the state and the plight of Christians in the GDR. The East German authorities were determined to make a positive impression, as was made clear by GDR State Secretary for Church Affairs Klaus Gysi, who addressed the conference, stressing the GDR's positive attitude toward the ecumenical movement and the regime's view that joint efforts for peace on the part of Marxists and Christians were "more necessary than ever before."[18]

In mid September, apparently in response to increasing interest in the question of an alternative peace service, the party took its first public position on the issue. The message was again delivered by Gysi, this time in a speech on September 12 before the theological section of East Berlin's Humboldt University. Gysi, while expressing a modicum of understanding of the emergence of such ideas, nonetheless clearly rejected the proposal:

> Peace marches (for example, between Brussels and Paris) have an alluring effect on young people, and the ideas expressed over there also affect us. Such is the case of the "social peace service" proposal which, in part, has also come from the outside. It is normal — also after the *Kirchentag* in Hamburg — that such proposals should also appear among us. Only, it isn't possible. For an entire array of reasons. . . . Whoever is not in agreement with the clear position of the state on this issue demonstrates that, for him, it is a question of confrontation. The demand for a "social peace service" cannot be justified either theologically or religiously. . . . Moreover, it is not the task of the church to change laws and the Constitution. In addition, there are people in the West who desire to see a confrontation among us. The current regulation with the construction soldier option is one of the most progressive in the world. There is no reason to deviate from it. We need everyone and cannot afford to abolish mandatory conscription.[19]

If the SED hoped to close the book on this sensitive issue with a tough warning, it was to be disappointed. If anything, discussion of the issue increased, both within church circles and in society at large, and it was to play a major role in a series of church synod meetings scheduled in the fall of 1981. In a resolution passed during its meeting of September 18-22, the Synod of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR supported the young people's call for an alternative to military service, noting that the responsibility of the church in this connection arises out of the explicit appeal for church support, and called for further negotiations with the authorities on the issue. Similar positions were taken at the synodal meetings of the other member churches of the Federation as they hailed this as a "legitimate" demand and called for the Executive Committee of the Conference of Evangelical Church Directorates to initiate further

[18] See *Neues Deutschland*, August 18, 1981.
[19] See *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 51, 1981, p. 56.

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talks with the regime "to search again for possibilities of taking into account this desire of young people" and to "seek jointly with them ways toward concrete actions for peace."[20] Evangelical Church officials appear to have based their hopes for future compromise on a slight nuance in Gysi's remarks. Gysi, while rejecting the concept of a "social peace service," had also stated that any and all issues could be discussed in future talks. Church officials therefore pressed for some concessions from the authorities to make the work of the construction soldier brigades more socially oriented, by allowing them, for example, to work in hospitals or to engage in other useful activities while remaining under the auspices of the army. Other proposals included allowing reservists to perform their service in nonmilitary spheres, as well as calls for an end to the educational and professional discrimination against East Germans who chose the construction soldier option. Such proposals, however, were flatly rejected by the regime. At the third SED Central Committee Plenum on November 19-30, 1981, for example, Politburo candidate member and head of the Cottbus party organization Werner Walde sharply attacked the SofD proposal and attributed such ideas to Western intrigue.

> The lies of the imperialists have no effect among our citizens. . . . Even with the use of the phrase concerning the so-called "social peace service" the enemy has no chance of undermining the necessary military strength of socialism, regardless of who summons such antipeace, antisocialist, and anticonstitutional actions. These people forget that our entire republic constitutes one peace service.[21]

The "social peace service" issue soon became one of the most important ones for the emerging unofficial peace movement in the GDR. It was an issue many could relate to, especially young people facing or about to face conscription. In addition, the need for further manpower in the social sphere or in the area of environmental protection was widely known. Most important, it was an issue on which the Evangelical Church had taken a firm and united stance. By late spring 1982 it was estimated that some 4,000 East Germans had expressed their support for the introduction of the "social peace service."[22] The fledgling peace movement, however, was not to be confined to this single issue. Broader themes, such as the causes of East-West conflict, security issues, and various disarmament proposals, were also discussed. The fact that such issues were also important was made clear in October 1981 with the publication in the West of a letter drawn up by the well-known East German Marxist critic Robert Havemann and addressed to Soviet party and state leader Leonid

[20] See Ronald D. Asmus, "Continued Discussion About a Social Peace Service in the GDR," RAD BR no. 287 (German Democratic Republic), *RFER*, October 14, 1981.

[21] See *Neues Deutschland*, November 21-22, 1981.

[22] See Hans-Jürgen Röder, "Signale der Basis," *Kirche im Sozialismus*, no. 1, 1982.

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Brezhnev before Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in fall 1981. Havemann's letter stated:

> Originally, it seemed that through the partition [of Germany] a dangerous aggressor had been deprived of power for good and that peace in Europe was insured. The result, however, has been the opposite. . . . What Germany's partition created was not security but the precondition for the deadliest of threats that has ever existed in Europe. . . . What matters above all is to extricate both partners of Germany from the bloc confrontation. In this connection, it is opportune to recall that up until the 1960s the Soviet Union called for the demilitarization and neutralization of all of Germany. Now, 36 years after the end of the war, it has become an urgent necessity to conclude the peace treaties and to withdraw all occupation troops from both parts of Germany. (It goes without saying that the position of West Berlin must remain secure.) After this, it should be left up to the Germans to determine how we will solve our national problem—and nobody should fear more than they do the possibility of nuclear war.[23]

Havemann remained an enthusiastic supporter of a peace movement in both German states until his death in the spring of 1982. Although not a "spokesman" for the fledgling East German peace movement, a role in which the Western media often cast him, he was clearly a source of moral authority and encouragement. Despite de facto house arrest, he managed to continue to grant interviews with the West German media and to issue statements. Ideas similar to Havemann's also appeared in a statement issued in the spring of 1982 by Havemann's close friend, the East German youth pastor Rainer Eppelmann. Eppelmann's statement, entitled "Berlin Appeal—Create Peace Without Arms," called for negotiations between the two German states for the removal of all nuclear devices from German soil as the first step toward the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe.[24] Eppelmann's appeal also supported the SofD proposal and called upon the East German regime to renounce public military demonstrations, civil defense exercises, the sale of war toys, as well as for the introduction of peace—as opposed to military—instruction in the schools. How closely the ideas of Havemann and Eppelmann correspond to those of other unofficial peace activists is clearly open to debate,[25] but the appearance of their statements—and the fact that some of the ideas won support within leftist circles in the FRG—created some-

[23] For the full text of Havemann's "Open Letter to Leonid Brezhnev," see *Frankfurter Rundschau*, October 7, 1981.

[24] Eppelmann's appeal had been preceded by two letters addressed to SED Secretary-General Honecker that remained unanswered. For the text of Eppelmann's statement, see the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, February 9, 1982. See, also, Ronald D. Asmus, "New Peace Initiative in the GDR," RAD BR no. 39 (German Democratic Republic), *RFER*, February 15, 1982.

[25] Both Havemann and Eppelmann were often cast in the role of spokesmen for the unofficial East German peace movement by the Western press, a portrayal that perhaps overestimated the personal influence of both men and ignored the diversity of views among East German peace activists. Such proposals have, for example, not been supported by the East German Evangelical Church, which counseled against the signing of the Eppelmann appeal.

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thing of a sensation in the West.[26] Yet the real significance of these documents for the unofficial peace movement in the GDR lies in the fact that they demonstrated that at least some elements had started to transcend GDR-specific issues and had commenced a broader discussion over the root causes of the arms race and East-West conflict.

In mid February 1982 signs of public dissatisfaction and discontent with official policy again caught the attention of the Western media, this time in connection with the thirty-seventh anniversary of the Anglo-U.S. bombing of the East German city of Dresden during World War II. The 1945 bombing of Dresden has traditionally been commemorated in the GDR in a solemn manner, although the SED has been known to use the anniversary for political purposes.[27] In addition to the official ceremonies, some 5,000, primarily young people, gathered in Dresden's Church of the Cross to attend a "Peace Forum" sponsored and organized by the East German Evangelical Lutheran Church of Saxony. The event was the first unofficial peace demonstration in the history of the GDR; even more unusual was the fact that it was officially sanctioned by the authorities.[28]

Much of the discussion focused on what had by then become the key issues for East German peace activists: the introduction of a "social peace service," military education in the schools, police harassment of people engaged in peace initiatives, and the contrast between official praise for the Western peace movement and the major difficulties encountered in organizing a similar movement in the GDR.[29] The discussion lasted until late in the evening, until it was time for the traditional ringing of the church bells to commemorate the hour the bombing of Dresden commenced. The Peace Forum was followed by an even more singular event when several thousand people proceeded to walk to the ruins of the Church of Our Lady—a memorial of the bombing—where candles were lit and peace ballads were sung. This rally, however, was not officially sanctioned by the Evangelical Church. Nonetheless, the authorities made no attempt to prevent or hinder people from participating in the first unofficial peace demonstration in the history of the GDR.

[26] Havemann's letter was signed by over 4,000 people in West Germany, including a number of prominent writers, historians, intellectuals, and politicians.

[27] See, for example, the article entitled "Why Dresden, the City of Art, was Bombed," by Olaf Grochler in *Neues Deutschland*, February 13-14, 1982.

[28] Official sanctioning, or at least tolerance, of this event was obtained following the personal intervention of Saxon Bishop Johannes Hempel. Hempel, in the meantime elected to Federation chairman in the fall of 1982 following the retirement of Bishop Werner Krusche, had become aware of the plans of peace activists to organize an unofficial peace march to commemorate the Dresden anniversary. The Saxon bishop managed to persuade the organizers of this event to cancel their plans and instead participate in a church-sponsored peace forum, to which the local party authorities, also apparently interested in avoiding a confrontation, agreed.

[29] A transcript of excerpts of the ensuing discussion in Dresden's Church of the Cross can be found in Klaus Ehring and Martin Dallwitz, *Schwerter zu Pflugsharen* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1982), pp. 68-87.

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The events in Dresden set an important precedent for the future of independent East German peace activism. Additional peace forums were subsequently scheduled, and, at the end of June, a Peace Workshop was conducted on the grounds of the Church of the Redeemer outside of East Berlin, which attracted over 3,000 people. Both events were sponsored and organized by the East German Evangelical Church, underlining the fact that for many of the peace activists involved, not all of whom were either Protestant or even Christian, the church served both as a source of protection and as a body through which wishes and demands could be articulated to the state authorities. The church, however, made it quite clear that it would not support all of the demands presented by independent peace activists, maintaining that it would not allow itself to be forced into a position of open opposition to the state. In general, the Evangelical Church leadership advised caution and restraint, emphasizing that decisions about whether to comply with official military requirements were for the individual to make, based on his own convictions.

The Official Response

The emergence of such independent peace initiatives and the increasing attention they began to receive in the Western, particularly the West German, press were clearly sources of great embarrassment and concern for the SED leadership. An official response—both in words and actions—was not long in coming. Despite their late start, the authorities, it soon became clear, were mobilizing their resources for a major campaign designed to counter the appeal such initiatives might develop and to erase any doubts concerning the correctness of Warsaw Pact policy and/or the sincerity of the Soviet bloc's commitment to the cause of peace. Already, at the Third SED Central Committee Plenum held in mid November 1981, plans had been revealed for a conference sponsored by the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), the official East German youth organization, under the slogan "Peace Must Be Defended—Peace Must Be Armed." In subsequent months it became clear that the FDJ had been selected to spearhead a massive campaign designed to combat any pacifist or antimilitarist tendencies in East German youth. At the beginning of April 1982 FDJ Central Committee Secretary Eberhard Aurich, in an interview with *Neues Deutschland*, announced that over 90,000 meetings with over 2,000,000 participants had been held in February and March under FDJ sponsorship.[30] Intensive efforts were also undertaken to rejuvenate the image of the FDJ among young East Germans by establishing or expanding contacts with various West European youth, leftist, or

[30] See the interview with Aurich, an up-and-coming FDJ functionary in *Neues Deutschland*, April 5, 1982.

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Protestant peace groups and to strengthen the image of the SED, the FDJ, and other official organizations as the true representatives of the East German peace movement.

An equally important role in this official peace offensive has been assigned to the East German Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—the largest of the four front parties officially allied with the SED. The CDU's task has been to enlist support for the regime's policies (and to combat deviationist tendencies) among East German Christians. It has tried to take a particularly active role in the controversy over the "social peace service" and has propagated the regime's view that military service is a legitimate form of Christian peace service and that Marxists and Christians are natural allies in the struggle to preserve peace. At times, the CDU party newspaper *Neue Zeit* has also criticized controversial positions adopted by the East German Evangelical Church.[31] It appears, however, that such attempts have had little effect upon the positions of the church; pro-regime Christians and clergy in the GDR have traditionally had little success in influencing official church policy.[32] Nonetheless, the official media is always able to find sufficient ammunition for defending its assertion that a convergence of interests unites Marxists and Christians in the struggle for peace. "There are differing motivations for our commitment to peace, but there can only be an effective struggle when we work together," according to a "Christian member of the GDR Peace Movement" quoted by *Neues Deutschland*.[33]

The SED has also readjusted its propaganda efforts to take into account the apparent attractiveness of certain neutralist tenets espoused by elements within the Western peace movement. Early praise for the Western peace movement has subsequently been tempered. Although the peace movement in the West is still described as an important force in the international struggle for peace, East German readers are also reminded not to overestimate its effectiveness and to keep in mind that it continues to be characterized by "Christian-pacifist" and "social-reformist" elements, which tend to ignore both the basic nature of "imperialism" as well as the peace policy of the Soviet Union, and to regard both the United States and the Soviet Union as equally responsible for the arms race.[34] Instead, East Germans are urged to make their personal contribution to the preservation of peace and the avoidance of conflict by meeting

[31] The first official criticism of the positions adopted by the East German Evangelical Church during the fall 1982 meeting of its synod, for example, was published in *Neue Zeit*, December 21, 1982.

[32] See Reinhard Henkys, "Kirche-Staat-Gesellschaft," in Reinhard Henkys, ed., *Die Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR* (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1982),. pp. 16-17.

[33] *Neues Deutschland*, June 23, 1982.

[34] See *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, March 22, 1982. For an authoritative presentation of the official East German view of the Western peace movement, see Otto Rheinhold, "Der Reale Sozialismus und die Lebenskraft des Marxismus-Leninismus," *Einheit* (East Berlin), no. 4, 1982, pp. 372-80. Rheinhold strongly rejects the notion "that both sides, the US and the Soviet Union, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, bear

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higher production quotas and by overfulfillment of the plan. The rationale for this logic is summarized in the SED slogan "The stronger Socialism is, the more secure is Peace."[35]

Official efforts to counter the potential appeal of independent peace initiatives have by no means been limited to words. Equally important, and undoubtedly more effective, have been the authorities' actions designed to stifle and to bring under control independent peace activities. Other efforts have been aimed at consolidating the regime's institutional means for ensuring that the requirements of official state "peace doctrine" are fulfilled. Para-military training in the school and vocational system has been strengthened.[36] On March 25, 1982, for example, the East German *Volkskammer* passed a new law on military conscription clearly designed to codify the further militarization of East German society. The law makes it the explicit duty of all state agencies, enterprises, and social and mass organizations "to prepare citizens for military service."[37] The law also makes women between the ages of eighteen and fifty eligible for military service in emergency situations, a stipulation that led some 300 women to address a letter of protest to SED Secretary-General Honecker complaining about the new regulations and demanding the right to be recognized as conscientious objectors.[38] In his speech before the *Volkskammer* justifying the new measures, Politburo member and Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann took the pacifist bull by the horns when he stated:

> The members of our army, our workers, and our women and children know that peace and socialism are inseparably linked. Our soldiers bear their arms for peace, and the better command they have over their weapons, the better peace is assured. As much as we would like to scrap our weapons, we know that one day socialism and peace will need both our plowshares *and* our swords.[39]

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equal responsibility for the arms race" as not only wrong but as dangerous for the cause of peace (p. 373). See, also, Gerhard Lindner, "Zu Einigen Aspekt der Friedensbewegung," *Aussenpolitik* (East Berlin), pp. 5-12.

[35] The conflict between the official and unofficial peace movements in the GDR has also been reflected in an informal competition over slogans and arm patches. Thus, when some young East Germans adopted arm patches bearing the Western pacifist slogan "Create Peace without Arms" (*Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen*), the authorities soon responded with their own counterpart, "Create Peace—Against NATO Weapons" (*Frieden schaffen gegen NATO Waffen*). In addition to the "swords into plowshares" emblem, other unofficial emblems with slogans such as "Live without Armaments" (*Ohne Rüstung Leben*) and "Ready to Help Instead of Ready to Fight" (*Hilfsbereitschaft statt Wehrbereitschaft*) have also been produced.

[36] See, for example, the articles by Werner Meltze and Willy Meinert, "Die Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik vor ihrem VII Kongress," *Einheit* (East Berlin), no. 3, 1982, pp. 289-94, and Major General Heinz Bilan in *Neuer Weg*, the party weekly, no. 3, 1982, pp. 93-95. See, also, Fricke, "Militärisierung im Erziehungswesen," and *Der Tagesspiegel*, December 13, 1982.

[37] For the text of the new law, see *Neues Deutschland*, March 27-28, 1982.

[38] For the text of the letter, see *Der Spiegel*, no. 49, December 6, 1982. A number of the signatories of this letter, which had circulated since late spring but first came to the attention of the Western press in late fall, are subsequently reported to have been harassed by the police and security officials.

[39] *Neues Deutschland*, March 27-28, 1982.

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Hoffmann's remarks were directed against the increasingly popular pacifist emblem bearing the slogan "swords into plowshares." This slogan, adopted in 1981 by the East German Evangelical Church for its Peace Decade of Lutheran Youth, is taken from Isaiah 2:4 and Micah 4:3 in the Old Testament. Ironically, these words also appear on a Soviet memorial that stands in front of the United Nations building in New York. The badge became increasingly popular as a symbol of the unofficial peace movement in the GDR. People wearing it were often questioned and harassed by the police and, in March, the state authorities banned it.[40] In justifying the move, Gysi is reported to have claimed that the emblem was being used to turn young people away from military service and, furthermore, that it was a "demonstration of an attitude hostile to the state and of participation in an illegal political movement."[41] It had become clear that Gysi, who some months earlier had claimed that the regime did not question the motives of young people calling for alternative peace proposals, had delivered a declaration of war against the fledgling East German peace movement. The regime's decision led to a harsh reaction on the part of the Evangelical Church, and threatened to catalyze a new and more serious crisis in church-state relations, a number of church synods meeting in mid spring strongly protesting against banning the emblem and, in a pastoral letter read to the parishes on Easter Sunday, the chairman of the East German Evangelical Church Federation, Bishop Werner Krusche, stated that the church regarded this action as a restriction on the freedom of belief and conscience and accused the authorities of alienating East German youth and thereby creating problems for what he termed the inner peace of society.[42] Moreover, Krusche, in a blunt reaffirmation of the church's independence, stated: "It [the Church] does not exist simply to reinforce the foreign policy of the state."

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[40] Initial reports of police harassment of people wearing the peace badge with the slogan "swords into plowshares" were often attributed to either misunderstandings or the actions of overzealous local police officials. Yet the transparency of such excuses soon became clear to all as reports of the detention and interrogation of young people wearing the badge increased and the authorities eventually banned wearing the emblem entirely. In some cases students are reported to have been forced out of school for wearing the badge. In others, the authorities were known to have confiscated the article of clothing to which the badge was attached, only to return the piece of clothing involved a few days later—with the badge removed and a bill for tailoring charges. Cars bearing the symbol are reported to have had the offending window covered up and the owner directed by the police to remove the sticker before being permitted to drive on. See *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 13, 1982. Ironically, the campaign by the authorities against the symbol only appeared to make its existence known far beyond the original church circle involved.

[41] *Christian Science Monitor*, April 1, 1982. The legal basis for the decision to ban wearing this emblem in public was based on a law of June 11, 1968, enabling the police to take such measures as were deemed necessary to prevent disruptions of public order and safety.

[42] See Ronald D. Asmus, "More Assertive Policy Toward Peace Movement in the GDR," RAD BR no. 83 (German Democratic Republic), *RFER*, April 5, 1982. For the text of Krusche's statement as well as other official statements documenting the position of the East German Evangelical Church in this debate with the regime, see the appropriate sections in *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 19, 1982. This issue is specifically devoted to the controversy over the "swords into plowshares" emblem.

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More subtle methods have been used in dealing with individual peace activists the authorities considered to be a particular nuisance. In the summer of 1982 East German officials apparently started to resort to the time-tested method of deportation to deal with the problem of unofficial peace activism. Deportation, or pressuring East German citizens to emigrate against their will, has periodically been used by the SED in the past to rid itself of troublesome writers, dissidents, and other undesirables. In some cases, emigration applications of individuals in the peace movement were suddenly approved after having been ignored for years. In others, peace activists were advised to apply for emigration, while simultaneously being warned that refusal to do so would result in their being called up for reservist military duty. Refusing military reserve service—which would undoubtedly be the decision of most East German peace activists—carries the probable consequence of a prison term of up to eighteen months, as East German law does not permit the option of satisfying reserve-service obligations by serving in so-called construction soldier units. Deportation has dealt serious blows to some of the small and often isolated peace groups in the GDR, since many of them were dependent on the efforts of single individuals. In any case, the SED must have viewed unofficial peace activists as particularly suitable for deportation, for many of them were likely to become active in the Western peace movement and work against NATO policies. I could provide many other examples of methods used in dealing with peace activists.[43] Suffice it to say that the effect, while not sufficient to stop independent peace activities, has certainly played a role in preventing their appeal from spreading to other segments of society.

Strategy and Tactics: The SED and the Peace Movement

From the outset it has been clear that the SED has adopted a two-pronged approach toward dealing with the phenomenon of independent peace activism in the GDR. On the one hand, it has made it quite clear that it has no intention of acceding to the demands of the independent peace movement and has also demonstrated its willingness to use its power to curtail such activities when they exceed the limits of official tolerance. On the other hand, the SED also finds itself facing a policy dilemma. The regime's strong interest in maintaining the appearance of

[43] For example, there have been scattered reports of some East German officials attempting to demand that young East Germans wanting to choose the construction soldier option provide proof of membership in either the Catholic or Protestant church, although the regulations on conscription contain no such prerequisite. The authorities have also attempted to limit contact between peace activists and the Western press by occasionally denying visas to Western correspondents or by requiring state-issued permits for interviews with priests or other church officials.

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domestic tranquility and internal unity at a time of East-West tension and—from the regime's viewpoint—an unsettling and unstable state of affairs in neighboring Poland has mitigated against too harsh a reaction. A harsh crackdown on the part of the authorities would not only result in a further deterioration in already-troubled church-state relations, but would also make the domestic climate more strained, further alienate East German youth, and, therefore, perhaps be counterproductive in terms of longer-term political stability. The regime apparently does recognize that a large number of East German youths want to do something for the cause of peace and disarmament, and has attempted to steer such desires into channels from which it also could benefit, such as "rock for peace" youth concerts and mass demonstrations. In addition, the upcoming celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther also make a harsh reaction less likely as a breakdown in church-state relations at this point in time would be particularly embarrassing for the SED and might threaten some of the benefits the authorities hope to gain from the celebrations. The party has, therefore, been willing to strike a conciliatory note at times and to display a marked degree of tolerance, particularly vis-à-vis the Evangelical Church, when it has deemed such tolerance to be particularly expedient. In broader terms, it appears that the SED has hoped that with an adroit combination of carrots and sticks it can capitalize on differences within the peace movement and isolate its more radical elements while simultaneously co-opting or integrating as many other elements as possible into the officially sanctioned peace movement.

In this context, it might be useful to distinguish between strategy and tactics. Strategy refers to the party's long-term goals; tactics refers to the various means used to achieve these goals. In reality, however, the variances in tactics often amount to little more than the different approaches between the hard and soft cop in a classic police interrogation. For there can be no question that the long-term strategy of the SED is to destroy any attractiveness—either potential or real—that an organized independent peace movement might have, and to counter the incipient political threat. As is the case in all of the Warsaw Pact countries, the SED has never been prepared to sanction any significant, independent, and organized social group outside of its control, lest that fragile seed of pluralism develop into something more sturdy. This is the basic lesson that must be drawn from the declaration of martial law in Poland. Indeed, in private conversations, East German officials have been known to use the specter of Solidarity in Poland to justify the actions taken against unofficial peace activism. Although a comparison of the small number of largely unorganized peace activists in the GDR with what was a 10,000,000-member, well-organized labor union movement in Poland may appear ludicrous to many Western observers, it does highlight the traditional

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insecurity of a party leadership lacking real legitimacy. Autonomous institutions, such as the Evangelical and the Catholic churches, are tolerated in the GDR, but the authorities have always made it clear that their activities are to be limited to certain prescribed spheres, and the recent strains in Evangelical Church–state relations have resulted from differing interpretations of what one side perceives as tolerable and the other as necessary. Furthermore, one can assume that this Marxist-Leninist party will not hesitate to act if and when it perceives its basic interests to be sufficiently threatened. When, and if, the limits of official tolerance will again be surpassed remains a tantalizing question.

A Soviet Connection?

East German foreign policy efforts are not conducted in isolation, but in conjunction with those of the Soviet Union. For some time now it has been clear that the Soviets have been conducting their own massive and carefully orchestrated peace offensive toward Western Europe. Soviet policy has, on one level, been aimed at foreign governments and designed to draw them into negotiations on specific Soviet proposals. At the same time, a massive publicity campaign has been launched in the West to reassure Western audiences of the Soviet Union's benign intentions. An array of Soviet tactical maneuvers has been launched in an attempt to influence Western public opinion, including unequal proposals, hints of concessions, trial balloons, and the like. The main target of the Soviet peace offensive has been the FRG. As early as October 1979, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, in a speech in East Berlin, offered to withdraw some 20,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks in return for a halt to NATO's plans to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe—an offer obviously designed to influence the position of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democratic Party (SPD) at its upcoming party congress in West Berlin that December, as well as the West German position at the pending NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. Similarly, Brezhnev's offer of a moratorium on the deployment of additional SS-20 missiles in March 1982 was intended to strengthen growing opposition within the SPD to the NATO missile decision at the party congress in April 1982.[44]

Moscow and East Berlin have also attempted to use Bonn's desire to improve relations with the GDR, or at least to preserve the gains of the 1970s, to influence West German policy. Both Moscow and East

[44] For Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin see *Pravda*, October 7, 1979; for the speech announcing the moratorium on SS-20s delivered at the March 1982 Trade Union Congress, see *Pravda*, March 17, 1982.

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Berlin have regularly reminded Bonn of its important stake in détente, as was the case when the joint East German–Soviet communiqué was issued following Honecker's August 1982 visit to Brezhnev in the Crimea.[45] Such reminders have usually been combined with vague offers of certain undefined benefits for the FRG, provided it acts rationally, for example, that it pursue an independent course on such issues as economic sanctions against Poland and the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Honecker, in his famous Gera speech of October 1980, made clear what East Berlin expected of Bonn when he stated:

> For us, there is no question that our policy toward the FRG is part of a common policy of our alliance with the states of the Warsaw Pact in terms of insuring peace. The necessities of our time require that this once again be made clear. Nobody should seriously believe that they can actively represent the policy of the Western alliance, boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow out of solidarity with the US, appear as the initiator and main whip (*Einpeitscher*) of the Brussels missile decision and, at the same time, act as if it were necessary to talk with the GDR about "travel alleviations."[46]

During the Schmidt-Honecker summit meeting of December 1981, the SED secretary-general also explicitly linked progress in inter-German relations with the FRG's attitude toward the INF decision when, in his dinner speech, he stated: "Good-neighbor relations cannot prosper in the shadow of new US nuclear missiles. We cannot detach ourselves from the international situation."[47] Although the SPD is no longer in power in the FRG after the collapse of the SPD-FDP coalition under Schmidt in the fall of 1982 and its replacement by a center-right CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, the Soviet "peace offensive," directed against the West in general and the FRG in particular, has continued and, if anything, has gained momentum with a flurry of initiatives emanating under the aegis of Brezhnev's successor as secretary-general, Yuri V. Andropov. Although the Soviet Union has not yet officially linked the

[45] According to the official East German news agency, ADN, reporting on the Honecker-Brezhnev talks in the Crimea: "Both sides are of the opinion that the FRG can play a tangible role in the solving of problems of European security. Its [the FRG's] good neighbor relations with the socialist countries are dangerously threatened by the plan to install hundreds of new American missiles on West German soil." See *Neues Deutschland*, August 12, 1982. The same claim was reiterated a few days later in the statement by the SED Central Committee Politburo and the GDR Council of Ministers reviewing the results of the Crimean meeting where the reference to inter-German relations is even clearer: "Given a situation in which the most aggressive forms of imperialism, proceeding from a policy of strong-arm tactics, are unleashing a 'crusade' against the socialist community and all progressive forces, and where the warlike policy of the US administration in particular poses an acute danger to world peace, the SED and the CPSU emphasize the particular special responsibility of states on the European continent. . . . The FRG could play a tangible role in solving the problems of European security. Its good neighbor relations with the socialist states, including those with the GDR, are dangerously threatened by the plan to install hundreds of new US nuclear missiles on West German soil." See *Neues Deutschland*, August 17, 1982.

[46] See ibid., October 14, 1980.

[47] Ibid., December 14, 1981.

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future of West German–Soviet relations with the FRG's position on the NATO INF decision, the GDR was quick to remind the new government in Bonn that its position on the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles would have an effect on the future of inter-German ties.[48]

The emergence of an independent peace movement in the GDR during 1981 represented a challenge and a potential internal threat to the SED. But it may also have provided the GDR and the Soviets with a useful lever vis-à-vis the Western peace movement and an opportunity to influence Western security policy. Provided that the activities of the unofficial East German peace movement could be kept carefully under control, and any threat of incipient unrest minimized, the emergence of such a movement could strengthen the appeal of those in the West who have always claimed that such a development is feasible. Moreover, the publicity in the West that would inevitably accompany a harsh crackdown on such activities would also cast further doubt on the true intentions of the Eastern bloc. To a certain degree, the extent of official tolerance thus far exhibited vis-à-vis the independent peace movement in the GDR may be conditioned upon broader Soviet and East German foreign policy objectives and their multifarious attempts to prevent the implementation of the NATO INF decision at all costs.[49]

The Role of the East German Evangelical Church

This is not the first time that issues pertaining to European security have played a prominent role within the Evangelical Church in the GDR, or within the broader realm of church-state relations. The involvement of a number of prominent Evangelical Church members in both German states in the historical debates of the 1950s over the rearmament and integration of the FRG into NATO, as well as the controversy in the GDR after the introduction of conscription in January 1962 and the calls of church leaders for the legal protection of conscientious objectors, provides the historical background for the church's current policy. One major difference between the present situation and that of past decades is that the current debate over peace and disarmament takes place in the

[48] Immediately following the fall of the Schmidt government in Bonn, Honecker, in a dinner toast delivered during the state visit of Laotian Prime Minister Kayson Phomvihan, repeated the threat that inter-German relations would be negatively affected if the FRG were to carry through with plans to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in fall 1983 in accordance with the NATO twin-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces. See *Neues Deutschland*, September 21, 1982. Such veiled threats, however, have been dropped from most subsequent official statements on inter-German relations.

[49] It is in this context, therefore, that one could also interpret official acts such as allowing East German author Stephan Hermlin to stage the Berlin Meeting for the Furthering of Peace as well as official sanctioning of the participation of East German authors — both those critical of as well as those loyal to the regime — at various conferences devoted to peace and disarmament in the West.

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context of a partial church-state rapprochement hammered out between the East German Evangelical Church and the Honecker regime during the 1970s. The factors that contributed to this process are complex and beyond the scope of this paper.[50] Suffice it to say that for the party, the decision of the East German Evangelical Churches to leave the EKD and to form a separate East German federal organization (the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR), the hope of using the East German church's participation in international forums to help overcome the GDR's international isolation, and the desire of the Honecker regime to co-opt or harness the church for its own domestic goals all contributed to the change in party perceptions.[51] Nearly a decade later GDR State Secretary for Church Affairs Klaus Gysi was to summarize the SED's goals by stating: "Our real intention is to make the Church feel at home in our republic and to gradually win over its potential both for the stable internal development of our republic and for our peace policy."[52] For the church, the recognition of the realities of state power and the necessity to accommodate itself to the changed conditions under which the church as an institution had to operate led to a new policy best summarized by the statement of Bishop Albert Schönherr, the first chairman of the new Federation: "We don't want to be a Church against socialism, nor a Church alongside socialism, but a Church in socialism."[53]

The partial détente between the two institutions reached a symbolic high point on March 6, 1978, with the historic meeting between Schönherr and SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker. Although in early 1981 both men were to praise publicly this new course — Honecker at the tenth SED Party Congress in April and Schönherr in a speech delivered in the West German town of Tutzing — it has nonetheless become apparent that barely submerged conflict on an array of issues threatened to cast a dark shadow on the more positive aspects of the Honecker-Schönherr meeting.[54] This is not surprising, given their different goals and interpretations of the church's role in society. The party, while conceding to the church an autonomous role in society, nonetheless hoped to steer its activities into channels from which it too would profit. The church, on the other hand, while having conceded the reality of the party's dominant role

[50] See Reinhard Henkys, "Kirche, Staat, Gesellschaft," p. 17.

[51] See Robert F. Goekel, "10 Jahre Kirchenpolitik unter Honecker," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 9, 1981, pp. 942-46, and Wolfgang Büschner, "Auf dem Weg zum preussischen Sozialismus?" in Reinhard Henkys, ed., *Die Evangelischen Kirchen*, no. 28, 1981.

[52] For the text of Gysi's speech delivered in Genf see *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 28, 1981.

[53] For Schönherr's views, see Albert Schönherr, *Horizont und Mitte* (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1979). For a summary of Schönherr's personal role and importance in East German Evangelical Church politics, see the special edition issued on his seventieth birthday in *Kirche im Sozialismus*, no. 4a, 1981.

[54] See Peter Jochen Winters, "Mehr als Irritationen?," *Kirche im Sozialismus*, no. 1, 1981, pp. 20-25.

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in society, was nonetheless determined to preserve its independence and to expand the scope of its activities, thereby improving the prospects for East German Christians. The issue of peace and disarmament is illustrative in this context. Although the Evangelical Church's "peace policy" has been explicitly praised by party figures on a number of occasions (the statement issued following the Honecker-Schönherr meeting in 1978, a letter sent by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Willi Stoph to Schönherr in August 1980, and, most recently, during talks between Honecker and leading Evangelical Church officials during the opening of the restored Wartburg castle that marked the beginning of the Luther Year celebrations[55]), such words of praise clearly were and are conditional and based primarily on tactical considerations. The Evangelical Church's opposition to the production of the neutron bomb in the West in 1977, for example, was used by the authorities in an attempt to create an impression of total unanimity of views between the two institutions, ignoring the fact that the church's criticism was directed against what it called the escalating dynamic of the arms race in East and West. Furthermore, Honecker's words of thanks for the church's peace policy in April 1983 at the Wartburg were accompanied by an emphasis on "the necessity of the unity of all peace forces."[56]

Thus, the emergence of unofficial peace activism in the GDR in the summer of 1981 presented a dilemma not only for the regime, but also for the East German Evangelical Church. On the one hand, the emergence of such initiatives and the open appeal for the church's support presented an opportunity for the Evangelical Church to enhance its position in society, particularly among young people, upon whom the church is clearly dependent if it is to survive in the long term. The fact that a number of these early initiatives emerged from "base communities" within the church and openly called for church support placed the church hierarchy in a position where its credibility and commitment to the concerns of its members were tested. At the same time, however, active and open support of such initiatives also involved the risk of an open confrontation with the authorities, possibly jeopardizing the institutional prerogatives and concessions painfully acquired over the years. Although clearly welcoming the chance for a dialogue with sectors of East German youth, the church hierarchy was also aware of the needs and varied interests of their traditional members, some of whom were skeptical concerning the

[55] For Honecker's praise of the church's peace efforts following the March 1978 Honecker-Schönherr meeting, see the Pressemitteilung des Staatrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, *Mitteilungsblatt*, September 1978, p. 26; for Stoph's letter see *Evangelische Information*, no. 38, 1980, as cited in Theo Mechtenberg, "Friedensverantwortung der Evangelischen Kirchen," in Reinhard Henkys, ed., *Die Evangelischen Kirchen*, p. 371: for Honecker's comments at the opening of the Wartburg, see *Neues Deutschland*, April 22, 1983.

[56] *Neues Deutschland*, April 22, 1983.

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motives as well as the commitment of these young people to the church as an institution. The situation was also complicated by the fact that the East German Evangelical Church is really a decentralized federation of separate churches, all of which have considerable autonomy.[57] The importance with which these individual churches have viewed such peace initiatives has varied, often reflecting the varying degree of importance that such issues have had in different parts of the country.[58]

In view of the complex internal politics and the broad spectrum of opinions within this institution, it is not surprising that it has been difficult to formulate a coherent policy agreeable to all concerning how far the church can or should go in supporting independent peace activities. The result has been an attempt by the church hierarchy to find a satisfactory balance between both the variety of views within the church, on the one hand, and the prudence dictated by the harsh realities of political life in the GDR on the other. Evangelical Church officials have attempted to assume the role of mediator and to encourage dialogue between the regime and those critical of official policy. While openly supporting and encouraging independent peace activities in a variety of ways, the church has consistently underlined the need for such a dialogue. Church officials have also taken great pains to point out that it has no intention of assuming the role of political opposition. In the words of Thuringian Bishop Werner Leich: "The Church is neither a camouflaged regime party nor a camouflaged opposition party."[59]

While implicitly rejecting the regime's claim to a monopoly over peace policy, church officials also insist that discussion within their ranks is open to everyone, from radical pacifists to those who support official policy. Indeed, this is the essence of church policy—to foster an open discussion among all those concerned with the preservation of peace, with the goal of eliminating prejudice and misunderstanding on all sides. In a similar vein, some church officials have criticized what they view as misleading reporting in the Western press and at times have rejected such formulations as an "independent peace movement," claiming that such phrases do not correspond to reality in the GDR. Instead,

[57] In addition to the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, which includes all eight regional Protestant churches, there also exists an Evangelical Church of the Union (EKU) in the GDR, which includes the five regional United Churches, as well as a United Evangelical Lutheran Church (VELK), composed of the three regional Lutheran churches. Ongoing attempts to create a new United Evangelical Church in the GDR have thus far not been successful, the most recent attempt failing in November 1981, when a resolution designed to achieve this aim failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority of the Synod of the Evangelical Church in Berlin-Brandenburg. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 19, 1981, and Ronald D. Asmus, "The Evangelical Church in the GDR," RAD BR no. 334 (German Democratic Republic), *RFER*, December 3, 1981, pp. 6-8.

[58] It is interesting to note that the independent peace movement appears to have had strong support in Saxony in the area around Dresden, one of the few parts of the country where the residents cannot receive West German television.

[59] See the interview with Leich published in *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 10a, 1983.

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they prefer such phrases as "independent peace work" or "autonomous engagement for peace."[60] Such differences, although rhetorical, are not accidental. Church officials are well aware of the fact that their influence on official policy is limited and that individuals engaged in such activities are undertaking considerable personal risk. There already exists one official peace movement in the GDR, and anyone openly advocating a second unofficial movement immediately runs the risk of being branded as a representative of illegal political opposition.

Despite all these caveats and the diplomatic tact with which Evangelical Church officials approach the issue, the critical role that the church as an institution has played in fostering the emergence of the unofficial peace movement cannot be underestimated. Indeed, such a development is inconceivable without it. The church has been significant in two ways. First, in addition to being a source of moral encouragement and a rallying point, the church has also provided a protective umbrella for independent debate. Church authorities have also been known to intervene to protect individuals who have come into conflict with the state as a result of their peace activities. Equally important, however, is the fact that the church has provided an alternative source of information concerning security questions. Such information has been provided by periodical church statements as well as by various "think tanks" set up by the church to study such issues. Examples of such groups are the ad hoc Group on Disarmament and the ad hoc Group on Peace Education affiliated with the Theological Study Section of the East German Church Federation.

Such groups have produced a variety of position papers to help guide church officials in formulating policy. The ad hoc Group on Disarmament has issued studies on such subjects as the morality of nuclear weapons, "Eurostrategic" weapons, as well as a recent study entitled "Security Partnership and Peace in Europe—The Tasks of the German States and the Responsibility of the German Churches," which called for balanced troop reductions in both the FRG and the GDR with the resources freed to be used to help overcome the economic crisis in Poland.[61] In general, the East German Evangelical Church has attempted to limit its involvement in debates over security and disarmament to

[60] Chairman Eberhard Natho of the Council of the Evangelical Churches of the Union (EKU) in the GDR, for example, in a speech before a meeting of the EKU synod in East Berlin in June 1982, stated, to the surprise of many Western observers of the East German peace movement, that "this independent and self-supporting peace movement does not exist, either in our Church or anywhere else in the GDR." Quoted in "Rundschau am Abend," *RIAS (Radio in American Sector)* (Berlin), June 8, 1982.

[61] For the study on "Eurostrategic" weapons, see *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 17, 1982; for the document on the tasks and responsibilities of the German churches, see ibid., no. 19, and Ronald D. Asmus, "East German Church Issues New Document on Peace and Security," RAD BR no. 117 (German Democratic Republic) *RFER*, May 20, 1983.

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stressing moral principles according to which policy should be made; it has consistently supported gradual bilateral disarmament and spoken out in favor of a "security partnership" between East and West. At times, however, the church hierarchy has also taken a stand on specific issues—for example, its opposition to the neutron bomb and, more recently, the NATO INF decision. In November 1981 another taboo was broken as a resolution passed by the Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Saxony implicitly criticized Warsaw Pact security policy and called upon the regimes of the Warsaw Pact to take the initiative in moving toward defense-oriented military strategies by reducing the number of Soviet SS-20s and Warsaw Pact tank superiority as confidence-building measures between East and West.[62]

A survey of official church statements over the past few years clearly demonstrates a progression in official church attitudes. Earlier statements often confined themselves to criticism of specific aspects of official policy, while later declarations have been more comprehensive. This evolution has undoubtedly been the result of the ongoing debate within the church over peace issues, which has expanded to include a consideration of broader themes. Many of the conclusions drawn thus far are controversial and would undoubtedly be dismissed as unrealistic in both East and West. Nonetheless, a process of rethinking has been initiated, the consequences and end results of which are not easy to predict. How far thinking within the East German Evangelical Church has actually progressed was documented in the report issued following the completion of the annual meeting of the Synod of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR in the city of Halle at the end of September 1982, the first synod meeting in church history to deal only with peace issues.[63]

In its carefully worded statement, the synod took a clear stand on the responsibility of individual Christians to live a life of peace and the determination of the church to continue to support Christian peace efforts. While affirming the church's commitment to working with the state in accordance with past agreements, the report also took note of "unexplained contradictions" in official policy—for example, Honecker's assertion at the Fourth Central Committee Plenum of the SED in June 1982 that "more armaments no longer means more security," and the heavily propagated FDJ slogan "The better armed that Socialism is, the more secure is Peace." Nuclear deterrence was rejected in the synod report as an inappropriate basis for international security. In a bold statement thus far unprecedented in Eastern Europe, the church rejected the "mechanism" of mutual deterrence as having resulted in a reduction in security

[62] See *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 51, 1981.
[63] For the synod's report, see ibid., no. 47, 1982.

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because its very logic has led to upsetting the military balance and has made nuclear war "thinkable and calculable." The church does not advocate total disarmament, however: the document carefully distinguishes between a state's legitimate right to self-defense, which is supported, and the existing security system based on nuclear deterrence, which it rejects. Instead, the report of the synod calls for the creation of a new system of international security based on international trust in the spirit of the Helsinki accords. Concrete steps envisioned to foster this goal include the exchange of military information designed to minimize suspicions concerning the true intentions of the opposing side; confidence-building measures, such as an emphasis on defensive as opposed to offensive weaponry; the renunciation of first-strike options; and, finally, the creation of nuclear-free zones.

The synod report also demonstrated the strength of the church's convictions by addressing those aspects of official policy that directly affect the daily lives of East German citizens, such as military training in the school system, civil defense exercises, selling children's war toys, and the prerequisite of military service for professional and career advancement. The church's position, calling for an alternative to mandatory military conscription and the use of construction soldier units in a socially responsible fashion, as well as a legal option for reservists to satisfy their obligations in a nonmilitary sphere, were also reconfirmed. Finally, the synod commissioned a study on the potentially explosive issue of whether military service performed in direct furtherance of a policy of nuclear deterrence constitutes a *status confessionus*.

This study is scheduled to be undertaken during a follow-up meeting of the Federation's synod in the fall of 1983. Although it is unlikely that the East German Evangelical Church would adopt a clear position in favor of a *status confessionus*, as this would mean that East German Christians would be forbidden to serve in the army, the fact that it is even being discussed indicates how far thinking within church circles has progressed. The same process can be seen in the church's position on pacifism. Bishop Werner Krusche, delivering the synod report, supported the idea that pacifism is the expression of a desire for a world without violence. At the same time, Krusche, in what might be interpreted as guarded criticism of pacifist-oriented groups within the church, also stated that as long as pacifism remained simply the expression of this desire, it was insufficient justification for rethinking past and current concepts of security.[64] A more detailed position was presented in a recent church paper devoted to the subject, and the following conclusion was drawn:

[64] For Krusche's address, see ibid., pp. 20-21.

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It is not pacifism that has called into question the foundation of existing peace and security policy in Europe, but rather the fact that the increasingly destabilizing system used to ensure peace through military means has reached the limits of its political feasibility and has, thereby, raised the issue of a new security policy. . . . Pacifism cannot and does not aspire to be the "answer to all questions" in the current discussion over a responsible peace and disarmament policy. It cannot solve the contradictions of military security policy, but it can indicate the direction in which they can be overcome. It can provide a long-term perspective for a responsible peace policy, a perspective often lost in the concentration on short-term goals. It is therefore a continuing challenge for a change [to be made] in the foundations of current and future peace policy.[65]

The positions adopted by the East German Evangelical Church at the Halle synod, however, did not go as far as some might have wished, as was evident in the discussion over the synod's report and the warning by one priest of "the threatening rift [which exists] between Church base groups and the hierarchy" and his questioning whether diplomatic formulations would be able to bridge this gap.[66] Such criticism is not new. The church's attempt to pursue a dialogue with the authorities, while simultaneously keeping the scope of unofficial peace activities under control, has often been criticized by more radical peace activists who view the church's efforts at moderation as a major obstacle to their efforts to mobilize popular sympathy for disarmament proposals, particularly because the church's approach has thus far not resulted in any significant changes in official policy. The church hierarchy is criticized as being overly concerned with its institutional prerogatives and not sufficiently committed to its role within society. It must be pointed out, however, that such views are held by a small minority of the already small number of peace activists. Furthermore, such individuals are also highly conscious of the protection the church provides and are therefore forced to tolerate positions with which they might disagree. Yet the path between simultaneous accusations of opportunism and opposition is neither easy nor without risks. Whether the East German Evangelical Church will be able to retain the trust of the young people involved, or whether its message of patience and compromise will be undermined by the flat rejection of all church proposals thus far by the regime, leading more and more people to question the utility of a dialogue with the authorities, remains to be seen.

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[65] See ibid., no. 22, 1982, p. 11, as well as the rest of this issue for further details on the discussion over pacifism within the East German Evangelical Church. In contrast, the party defines pacifism in a much more partisan fashion: "Pacifism proceeds from an extremely unscientific position of peace at any price. . . . Imperialism, with the help of anticommunism, attempts to use pacifism against the policy of the socialist states, in particular to prevent young people with religious views from fulfilling their obligations to defend the socialist fatherland. Pacifist views in a socialist society merely serve the interests of reactionary imperialist forces." See *Meyer's Jugendlexicon Philosophie* (Dresden: VEB Bibliographisches Institut, 1979).

[66] As quoted in Peter Winsierski, "Gratwanderung ohne Ende?" *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 11, 1982, p. 1130.

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More recently, there have also been indications that the much smaller Catholic Church in the GDR is also being drawn into the ongoing peace debate. On January 2, 1983, the Berlin Bishops' Conference, the governing body of the Catholic Church in the GDR, issued a pastoral letter delineating its position in the peace debate by openly supporting mutual and verifiable East-West disarmament and strongly criticizing military education in East German schools.[67] This strong statement ended a period of circumspection on the part of the Catholic Church hierarchy, which had previously refrained from getting involved in the peace discussion. Criticism of the church's policy from within the institution had already become evident in May 1982 when a group of priests and laymen in the city of Halle issued a statement harshly critical of the church's peace policy (or lack of one) and calling upon the leadership to end its silence and "to lend its voice to those in the GDR who are not allowed to speak or who remain silent in embitterment."[68] The greater attention that nuclear arms and the arms race have received within the Catholic world as a whole (including personal statements by John Paul II as well as the pastoral statement issued by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in the United States) also appears to have prodded the East German Catholic Church into taking its position. In October 1982 the East German bishops went to Rome, where they had a private audience with the Pope, and John Paul II is reported to have urged them to become more involved in such issues. Although undoubtedly an additional source of moral support,[69] the real impact of the change in the Catholic Church's position will depend upon how energetically it pursues such issues in the future.

The Peace Movement in Context

The emergence of a fledgling peace movement in the GDR in the early 1980s should be seen in relation to three distinct but interrelated contexts. First, there is the domestic or East German situation. The motivations of East Germans, acting either as individuals or in small groups, cannot be understood except against the prevailing socio-political climate in the GDR. Increased para-military training in the schools and in the factories, expanded military indoctrination in the educational system, and

[67] The text of the pastoral letter was reprinted in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 4, 1983. For the Catholic Church's attitude before the appearance of this document, see Klemens Richter, "Katholische Kirche in der DDR und Friedensbewegung," *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 7, 1982, pp. 685-89.

[68] For the text of the position paper drawn up by the Halle Action Group see *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 32a, 1982, pp. 1-9.

[69] *DPA*, October 28, 1982. The official reaction to the pastoral letter was contained in an ADN commentary that accused certain unnamed dignitaries in the GDR seen as "steered from Rome" of contributing to the campaign by elements of the Western press and "enemies of socialism" to discredit socialism. See *Neues Deutschland*, January 7, 1982.

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the general pervasiveness of militarization in nearly all sectors of East German society, combined with the increasingly blatant contradiction between the SED's proclaimed "peace doctrine" and the reality of domestic political practice, eventually combined to provoke a backlash. This reaction may have been influenced by external factors and the effect they had on the domestic climate in the GDR, but the preconditions for such a development lay in the domestic realm. In other words, the unofficial peace movement in the GDR has not been, as the regime has contended, a Western import, but rather a domestic product that has subsequently been encouraged and further influenced by developments in the West. The East German Evangelical Church, in turn, was able to provide a forum for independent discussion, as well as a legitimate channel for the expression of public concern and discontent. For some, Protestantism itself provided an answer to the perplexing questions they faced. For others, the church provided a protective umbrella for independent thinking, and using Evangelical terminology enabled them to speak a different language and to offer an alternative interpretation of reality from that offered by the party. As Saxon Bishop Johannes Hempel put it in a June 1982 speech before the synod of the United Lutheran Churches of the GDR (VELK), the SED should realize that the church-supported peace movement is the sprouting "in Christian fashion . . . of a seed that the regime itself has sown."[70]

Second, there is the East-bloc context. What is noteworthy in this respect is the fact that thus far the unofficial East German peace movement has remained largely an isolated event in Eastern Europe. The themes of pacifism, conscientious objection, and disarmament, and the activities of peace movements in East and West have elicited some discussion in other East European countries. In Czechoslovakia, for example, Charter 77 has issued a number of statements on such themes, stressing the relationship between human rights and peace efforts. An "Open Letter to Peace Movements," dated March 29, 1981, is typical of the views of the Charter when it states that peace and the right to life are among the most fundamental of all human rights and that it therefore supports the "peace efforts of ordinary citizens."[71] At the same time, the statement also stressed what it termed the "indivisibility of peace"—that is, the need to eliminate violence, threats of violence, and violation of human rights not only between nations, but also between the state and society. In attempting to clarify its relationship to the peace movements in East and West, the Charter document points out that one must question the sincerity of peace proposals from states where fundamental civil and human rights are sup-

[70] *DPA*, June 14, 1982.

[71] Charter 77 Document no. 13, March 29, 1982. See, also, Vilem Pecan, "Charter 77 Documents in the First Six Months of 1982," RAD BR no. 185 (Czechoslovakia), *RFER*, September 17, 1982.

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pressed, or where the suppression of such rights is tolerated or tacitly accepted, for in such cases peace efforts may be little more than the "momentary strategy of the powerful." A later Charter document, dated April 21, 1982, consists of a message of greeting and support to the unofficial peace movement in the GDR in which the Charter expresses its sympathy for the development of such activities "in one part of a country which in no small way contributed to the militarization of Europe in the first half of the 20th century."[72] Surprisingly, however, the Charter letter made no reference to the East German Evangelical Church and the important role it has played in supporting such activities.

Discussion of similar issues has also emerged in Hungary. Pacifism and conscientious objection, for example, have long been issues of debate within the so-called base communities of the Hungarian Catholic Church and the followers of Gyorgy Bulyani, a former Piarist priest imprisoned during the Stalinist era. Although Bulyani himself has since become primarily involved in liturgical matters, a number of the base communities—usually numbering eight to thirty people—have been active pacifists and have advocated civilian alternatives to mandatory conscription. According to the Hungarian dissidents Miklos Haraszti and Laszlo Rajk, there are at any one time over a hundred young Hungarians serving prison terms for having refused to perform military service.[73] In addition, the Hungarian church hierarchy, which continues to support the state's right to engage in universal conscription, has also been forced to suspend a number of priests from such base communities in connection with anticonscription sermons.[74]

More spectacular has been the recent appearance in Hungary of a "new" peace movement, the existence of which was brought to Western attention in the fall of 1981 with the publication of a "samizdat" publication entitled "The New Hungarian Peace Movement."[75] The pamphlet, issued simultaneously in Hungarian and English by the Western peace group European Nuclear Disarmament (END), consisted of two

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[72] Charter 77 Document no. 18, April 21, 1982. See, also, Czechoslovakia Situation Report no. 18, *RFER*, September 29, 1982, item 1.

[73] See Hungarian Situation Report no. 17, *RFER*, November 23, 1982, item 5. Although no precise figures are available on the number of base communities in Hungary, in 1972 it was estimated at some 4,000, a number that has since grown significantly. In an interview on Austrian television on May 11, 1982, Hungarian Catholic Bishop Cserhati estimated Bulyani's followers to number some 25,000-30,000.

[74] See the statement by Cardinal Laszlo Lekai, primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church and chairman of the Bench of Catholic Bishops, on the 125th anniversary of the consecration of the Esztergom Cathedral, in which he criticized those priests calling for conscientious objection and supported the state's right for conscription. Hungarian Situation Report no. 16, *RFER*, October 29, 1981, item 4. See, also, Hungarian Situation Report no. 10, *RFER*, June 23, 1982, item 5. The nervousness of the regime over the spread of pacifist views was underlined in a speech by the chairman of the State Office for Religious Affairs, Imre Miklos, in September 1982. See Hungarian Situation Report no. 17, *RFER*, November 23, 1982, item 5.

[75] See Ferenc Köszegi and E. P. Thompson, *The New Hungarian Peace Movement* (London: The Merlin Press, 1982).

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articles by the Hungarian Ferenc Köszegi and a lecture delivered in Budapest by the British historian and peace activist E. P. Thompson. While stating that it would be misleading to apply Western standards to the Hungarian situation, the pamphlet nonetheless noted the existence of small autonomous cell groups among secondary school students, university students, and young artists and workers "who feel themselves responsible for peace." Köszegi himself also heads a peace group called the Peace Group for Dialogue.[76] While not excluding cooperation with the official Hungarian peace movement, the pamphlet also calls for the formation of an independent peace center, the creation of a peace journal to foster debate, and the establishment of a "peace dialogue" between East and West. Other proposals include the creation of a nuclear-free Eastern Europe, as well as voluntary "individual disarmament," which would entail individual members of the military establishments in East and West voluntarily disarming themselves—a process to be supervised by an international task force set up for that purpose. Also of interest are references to contacts with other peace groups in East and West, including the unofficial East German peace movement.

While interesting in their own right, it is nonetheless clear that in both the Czechoslovak and Hungarian cases the number of people involved, as well as the general level of interest that such issues have inspired within society at large, have thus far paled in comparison with the flurry of initiatives and the ongoing debate that has sprung up in the GDR. Nor is there any evidence that the official church in either Hungary or Czechoslovakia has played a significant role in encouraging further debate over these issues. Moreover, the tightening up of the party line vis-à-vis internal critics that has become evident throughout Eastern Europe following the death of Brezhnev and the succession of Yuri V. Andropov gives little cause for optimism concerning the future of unofficial peace activities in either of these countries. In the case of Poland, other issues and problems clearly preoccupy the official as well as the public mind at the moment. Yet, even before the introduction of martial law on December 13, 1981—that is, during the sixteen months of Solidarity's aboveground existence, a period characterized by open and even frenzied debate on any and all questions of significance—one finds little trace of any serious discussion, let alone vocal expressions of support for peace movements in either East or West. Even in the case of the Group for the Establishment of Trust Between the USSR and the US, a small group of courageous Soviet citizens who in early June 1982 announced their intention to form an independent peace movement in the Soviet Union,

[76] For a summary of the various peace groups in Hungary and their relationship with the official Hungarian National Peace Council, see Hungarian Situation Report no. 5, *RFER*, March 22, 1983, item 1.

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it has become evident that what was involved was a small group of isolated Soviet citizens whose proclaimed opposition to nuclear weapons found little immediate support in society at large, and who, in any case, were soon easily silenced by the Soviet security apparatus.[77] Moreover, it is virtually inconceivable that an unofficial peace initiative in the Soviet Union would ever receive the support of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Such differences within the Soviet bloc cannot simply be attributed to relative levels of efficiency among the various security apparatuses, for in this respect the East Germans are second to none. Rather, one must attempt to identify other factors specific to the GDR, factors that distinguish the GDR from its East-bloc neighbors. It is in this context that one should perhaps examine the inter-German connection, for, after more than three decades of socialist transformation, the GDR remains not only an important member of the socialist community, but also a part of Germany. Indeed, neither the phenomenon of a nascent East German peace movement, nor the particular form of the West German peace movement can be fully comprehended except against the background of postwar German history and the unique and unenviable position of a divided and deeply insecure nation situated on the East-West divide in Europe. In the postwar period both German states have often been the focal point of East-West tension. Traditionally, they have been the most affected by changes in East-West relations. Thanks to the services of West German radio and television, East Germans are extremely well informed about new developments in the West and in the FRG.[78] Moreover, the FRG continues to be the standard of comparison for most East Germans in their evaluation of the success or failure of their regime's policies, much to the irritation of the SED.

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[77] See Julie Wishnevsky, "Unofficial Peace Movement in the USSR Under Attack," RL BR no. 256, *Radio Liberty Research*, June 24, 1982. A number of the members of this group are reported to have been subject to police harassment, temporary detention, and, in at least one case, confined to a Moscow psychiatric hospital. An earlier peace initiative had also appeared in October 1981, when some thirty-eight Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians issued an open letter requesting that the Baltic Sea and the Baltic republics be included in Brezhnev's proposed nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe (*Archiv Samizdata*, no. 4570).

[78] West German broadcasts can be received throughout the GDR; it is also estimated that West German television can be received in some 80 per cent of the GDR, the exceptions being small segments in the southeastern corner of the country and a strip in the northeast along the Baltic Sea. Since the early 1970s West German correspondents have also been accredited to the GDR, and their reports have become another valuable source of information for East Germans about their own country. Additional information is also transmitted, of course, through the millions of Westerners, primarily West Germans, who visit the GDR and East Berlin every year. The number of Western visitors, however, has dropped dramatically since October 1980, when the GDR unilaterally raised the minimum currency exchange requirements for visitors from nonsocialist countries. Particularly hard hit have been the residents of West Berlin, whose visits to East Berlin and the GDR are reported to have declined by some 52 per cent in the initial period between October 1980 and August 1981 (*DPA*, August 12, 1981). The total number of West Germans and West Berliners going to East Berlin and the GDR is reported to have decreased by some 31 per cent from 1980 to 1981. See the announcement of the West German Federal Ministry for Inter-German Affairs published in *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 3, 1982, p. 237.

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It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the emergence of independent peace activities in the GDR should have been influenced by the existence of a vocal and growing peace movement in the West, particularly in view of the publicity the Western peace movement has received in the East and West German media and the ongoing peace discussion that continues to dominate the headlines. The pertinent question, however, is how this influence has been exerted. More concretely, in what specific ways have peace activities and demonstrations in the West affected the thinking and/or the actions of peace activists in the GDR? Facile analogies should be avoided. The East German peace movement is not a direct descendant of either the West European or the West German peace movement. The East German peace movement has its own history, as I have attempted to demonstrate earlier in this article. In addition, the unofficial East German peace movement differs from its Western counterpart in at least two important ways. First, it is much more closely linked with the East German Evangelical Church. Second, the focus of peace efforts in the GDR has thus far been primarily concentrated on domestic issues (such as conscription and military indoctrination in the schools) and what is perceived to be necessary preconditions for the achievement of peace within society, whereas the Western peace movement has thus far been preoccupied with interstate relations.

Western precedents have, perhaps, had an important influence on the forms this East German reaction against prevailing conditions has taken. Western pacifist slogans, peace demonstrations, and debates over disarmament have provided a prototype or prescriptive model that East Germans could emulate, particularly since many of the activities of the Western peace movement were simultaneously being applauded by the SED. In tactical terms, it has also been expedient for the East German peace movement to formulate at least some of its demands along Western lines, as this has helped deflect official accusations of "antistate activities." The influence of the Western peace movement has also been manifested in the more concrete form of direct contacts between the East German and the West European peace movements. These have occurred on two levels. First, there have been personal contacts: Western peace activists have gone to the GDR in an attempt to establish ties with the unofficial East German peace movement, efforts that resulted in the arrest of one West German citizen in early 1982.[79] Such contacts appear to have been more frequent in the Berlin area, due to the special regulations

[79] In mid January 1981, a twenty-five-year-old West German student was arrested in the GDR, apparently for having informal contacts with the unofficial peace movement. He was subsequently sentenced to five and one-half years in prison, but was released in early May 1982 following intervention by the West German authorities. *DPA*, May 11, 1982.

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governing travel between East and West Berlin. In May 1983 five members of the West German Green environmental party took advantage of these regulations to stage a minor protest in East Berlin to appeal to the SED authorities to act within the Warsaw Pact on behalf of disarmament.[80]

Second, there have also been institutional contacts and cooperation between the East German Evangelical Church and other West European Protestant churches, particularly in the FRG and Holland. Active cooperation between these churches can be traced back to the 1970s. The East German Evangelical Church has occasionally used these contacts as a vehicle for expressing its views by publishing joint declarations on issues on which it might hesitate to take an individual stand. On September 1, 1979, for example, in commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the German invasion of Poland and the outbreak of World War II, the East and West German Evangelical Churches issued a jointly produced document entitled "Word for Peace," which expressed deep concern over the deterioration in East-West relations and the possibility of another military confrontation in Europe.[81] Since 1980, both churches have also offered a common rogation service for peace with a common liturgy that takes place annually during the Evangelical Church's "Peace Decade," traditionally scheduled for early November. More significant, in August 1982 the two churches issued a joint statement publicly calling for the renunciation of military means as an appropriate method for safeguarding peace.[82] Despite cooperation and consultation at a number of levels, however, it would be difficult to speak of a full unanimity of views between the two church organizations. Indeed, in many ways it has been the East German church that has gone farther than its Western counterpart in rejecting official security doctrine. The East German church, for example, has rejected deterrence as an appropriate basis for international security, has labeled as inadequate the famous "complementary thesis" justifying the church's attitude toward the maintenance of peace through

[80] In a quick move indicative of the increasing sophistication with which the SED is capable of dealing with the peace issue, SED party chief Honecker immediately replied to the Greens' appeal by claiming that he was sorry he hadn't been able to meet them personally "due to other commitments" (the Green representatives were detained by East German security forces shortly after having started their protest) and stated that he certainly shared their view that "both German states should work for arms control within their alliances," referring to his recent talks with Soviet party chief Yuri Andropov as evidence of the GDR's efforts within the Warsaw Pact. (Both the Greens' appeal and Honecker's response were reprinted on the front page of *Neues Deutschland*, May 14-15, 1983). Six members of the Green party—including four members of the West German Bundestag—then sent another letter to Honecker expressing their solidarity with pacifist movements in the GDR and calling upon the SED regime to go beyond mere support for Soviet disarmament proposals and to demand the same type of unilateral steps toward disarmament that the Greens demand from NATO.

[81] For the text of the document, see "Wort zum Frieden. Der Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR und die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland zum 40. Jahrestag des Beginns des 2. Weltkrieges, September 1949," *Mitteilungsblatt des Bundes der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR* (East Berlin), December 1979, p. 65.

[82] For the text of the document, see *EPD-Dokumentation*, no. 38, 1982, pp. 1-4.

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a balance of terror,[83] and has commissioned a study to determine whether a *status confessionus* exists in relation to Christians serving in furtherance of a policy of nuclear deterrence. These views resemble those adopted by the Reformed Alliance, a group within the much larger West German EKD.[84]

Thus far there has been no official reaction on the part of the West German government to the activities or phenomenon of unofficial East German activism. Although it is clear that the West German government sympathizes with the plight of the individuals involved, the reasons for its official silence are self-evident. Not only would any official Western commentary be immediately rejected by the East German authorities as interference in their internal domestic affairs, but any official praise would also open both the individuals involved and the East German Evangelical Church to charges of collaboration with Western "imperialists" and "centers of subversion."

A final caveat, however, should perhaps be added concerning an additional aspect of the relationship between the peace movement in the two German states. The development of the peace movement in the FRG has occurred at a time of reawakened interest and discussion within certain circles in West Germany over the question of national reunification. This debate, on one level, resulted from the controversy stimulated by the remarks of the FRG's former permanent representative to the GDR, Günter Gaus, in an interview with the West German weekly *Die Zeit* in February 1981 in which Gaus questioned some of the basic assumptions and priorities that have governed West German *Deutschlandpolitik* for over a decade.[85] A broader impetus, however, has come from a new generation of primarily leftist West German academics. The "discovery" of the national question by the West German Left is a new phenomenon in West German history, and some advocates of this new, left-wing "nationalism" have come to view the Western peace movement as a possible vehicle for grander national ambitions. A major thesis of this new so-called left-wing German nationalism has been that the partition of Germany has been the primary cause of East-West tension in Europe and

[83] The controversy over the "complementary theses" refers to the 1959 Heidelberg Theses passed by the EKD to clarify its position on questions of war and peace in the nuclear age. Thesis 7 recognized the right to conscientious objection, whereas Thesis 8 recognized "participation in the attempt to secure peace and freedom through the existence of nuclear weapons as a course of action which is currently still possible"; it is precisely this latter point that is involved in the current debate, as critics maintain that such a viewpoint is no longer possible and that the past compromise formula should be revised.

[84] On the differences in positions between the EKD and the East German Evangelical Church, see Detlef Urban, "Verschämte Ausreden?," *Kirche im Sozialismus*, no. 4, 1982, pp. 7-8. For a summary of the views of the Federation of Evangelical Reformed Churches in the FRG, see the article by Hans-Joachim Kraus in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 15, 1982.

[85] See the interview with Gaus, currently adviser to SPD Chairman Willy Brandt on German affairs, in *Die Zeit*, January 30, 1981. For a more in-depth presentation of Gaus's views, see Günter Gaus, *Texte zur Deutschen Frage* (Darmstadt und Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1981).

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that, instead of "solving" the German problem, the partition of Germany has created a permanent lack of peace (*unfrieden*) on the continent. Consequently, the partition of Germany must be rectified if a stable and secure peace is to be established in Europe. The emergence of a new and unofficial peace movement in the GDR has provided a new round of ammunition for such arguments. Visions are conjured up of a pan-German peace movement in both German states stimulating a loosening and the eventual elimination of the bloc system and allowing the establishment of a new, "deideologized" set of security relationships under which the two German states could also restructure their ties—either through reunification, a new unification (*Neuvereinigung*), or through some other form of European confederation.[86]

Although such vistas make for spectacular journalism, it must be clearly stated that they are held by a very small minority within the West German peace movement whose influence should not be exaggerated.[87] Moreover, the peace movement itself represents a vocal yet small segment of West German society, with the vast majority of West Germans aware not only of the risks inherent in such grandiose visions, but also of the deep suspicion that even talk of such changes in the European status quo evokes in neighbors and allies. Public opinion polls continue to demonstrate that the vast majority of West Germans support West German membership in NATO and the continued presence of allied troops on West German soil. Most important, such visions also overlook another fact: although some East German peace activists such as Robert Havemann have advocated similar views, they are not representative, nor have they been the primary motivating force for the East German peace movement. The typical East German peace activist, let alone the East German Evangelical Church, is not motivated by the "national question" or some hope of revising the European status quo, but rather by a quite human desire to contribute to the minimization of the danger of military conflict in Europe and to the creation of a situation where he can more effectively participate in the creation of a more just and tolerant society in the GDR. In the words of one East German Church official: "We are

[86] The phenomenon of a new left German nationalism can be documented in a number of recent West German publications. See Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, *Die Linke und die Nationale Frage* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981); Wolfgang Venohr, *Die Deutsche Einheit Kommt Bestimmt* (Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lübbe Verlag, 1982); and the paper presented by Günter Minnerup, "Systemopposition und National Frage in Beiden Beutschen Staaten," presented at the twenty-fifth annual GDR Research Conference at the European Academy, Bergisch Gladbach, West Germany, on June 1-4, 1982.

[87] For a summary of the various views within the West German peace movement concerning alternative security concepts and the future of Germany, see Schmid, *Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensbewegung*, pp. 48-70. For the critical view of the support that the West German peace movement has thus far provided for the independent peace movement in the GDR, see Klaus Wolschner, "Wir sind nicht untereinander loyal," *Kirche im Sozialismus*, no. 5, 1982, pp. 25-32.

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interested in what we, as Christians, can do in our land under our own circumstances."

Future Prospects

What are the future prospects for unofficial and independent peace activism in the GDR? How is the East German peace movement likely to develop, and what, in turn, is likely to determine official attitudes and actions? Has the "new" East German peace movement become a political reality, an emerging force of great and influential significance, not only for the GDR but also for other socialist countries, as the famous East German dissident and Marxist philosopher Robert Havemann predicted shortly before his death in April 1982?[88] Or will historians describe it as merely a passing phenomenon, another manifestation of latent unrest in East German society whose longevity was contingent upon the provisional tolerance of the ruling SED elite? Although prophecy should remain the province of the soothsayer, one fact is certain: the SED does have the means at its disposal to obliterate any overt signs of an unofficial peace movement if it so chooses. One should not underestimate the power or the efficiency of the East German security apparatus, or that of any of the other Soviet-bloc countries. The number of people involved in unofficial peace activism in the GDR remains quite small, and the activities of many peace groups are linked to the courageous actions of specific individuals, some of whom have apparently already been forced into emigration or resignation in the face of time-honored methods of physical and psychological harassment. The relative ease with which the Polish security forces were able to force a mass social movement such as the independent trade union Solidarity underground and eventually destroy it as a coherent organization should serve as a stern warning in this respect. The "normalization" of the unofficial East German peace movement would be a relatively simple task in comparison.

The tantalizing, and as of yet unanswered questions, therefore, are why the authorities have not chosen the path of coercion, and under what circumstances they might yet choose this option. Domestic considerations are undoubtedly part of the explanation. A harsh crackdown on the church-supported peace movement would create an additional and perhaps fatal burden for Evangelical Church–state relations and perhaps signal an end to the partial rapprochement achieved in the 1970s. Visible conflict between church and state would bring unwelcome publicity on the eve of the extensive celebrations planned to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther in the fall of 1983,

[88] *DPA*, April 15, 1982.

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especially since millions of Western visitors are expected to attend this event. The SED is clearly determined to put as good a face as possible on church-state relations and to present the cooperation between the two institutions in planning the Luther celebrations as indicative of their relations. An official crackdown would also undoubtedly include further alienation of already critical youth. The general level of tension and apathy would also increase at a time when the SED is undertaking serious efforts to mobilize the population to achieve extremely ambitious economic goals in the face of adverse international conditions.

It is difficult to believe, however, that such factors would be sufficient to deter the SED from moving against the unofficial peace movement if it perceived its basic interests as being threatened. One could argue, of course, that the small group of unofficial peace activists does not represent such a threat, and that it is more an irritation blown out of proportion by Western press coverage than a serious challenge to the party's dominant role in society. The latter fact may be true, but the pattern of East German politics over past decades suggests that the SED has never been prepared to tolerate any implicit or explicit criticism of its policies, let alone any manifestations of societal pluralism. On the contrary, the SED has moved swiftly against any sign of incipient dissent or independent thinking. whether it stems from intellectuals, writers, or workers. The SED prides itself on being a party of action; its at times scathing criticism of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) when it was faced with Solidarity resulted from SED's perception of the PUWP's unwillingness or inability to act in the face of a mortal threat.[89]

Instead of viewing the tolerance thus far demonstrated by the authorities as a question of tact, it might be more useful to regard it as a question of tactics. The tactics might involve a sophisticated calculation of the potential or real domestic threat the peace movement might represent versus potential foreign policy gains that might accrue from continued tolerance of a modicum of independent peace activism. In other words, rather than brutally suppressing the fledgling peace movement, the authorities might hope to limit its domestic appeal by isolating its more radical members and attempting to absorb or integrate as many other elements into the official peace movement as possible. Indeed, in at least superficial terms, the SED has already incorporated some of the peace movement's proclaimed goals, such as the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe and the renunciation of the first use of nuclear arms by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact into its own propaganda arsenal. By refrain-

[89] For a summary of the SED's views on the Polish crisis and the role of the PUWP, see Fred Oldenburg, "Die DDR und die polnische Krise," *Osteuropa*, no. 12, 1982, pp. 1004-11. See, also, the series of articles by Peter Jochen Winters on the SED and the Polish crisis published in *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 10, 1980, and nos. 1 and 7, 1982.

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ing from a harsh crackdown, the SED might hope to strengthen or, at a minimum, not weaken the "progressive" peace forces in the West in their campaign against NATO. Such an approach may have been adopted on the advice of that all-important fraternal ally, the Soviet Union. Some Western observers, as well as some East German peace activists, are apparently convinced that the SED's forbearance has been at Soviet behest.[90] The true Soviet role in this aspect of East German policy may never be known. The fact remains that the Soviet Union and East Germany have become two of the most vocal supporters of the West European, and particularly the West German, peace movements and have declared hindering NATO's plans to station Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe one of the major tasks currently facing mankind, as well as their own foreign policies.

There is always the danger, of course, that the peace discussion in the GDR might slip out of the hands of the authorities as alternative concepts of security acquire further appeal. Energetic efforts have already been taken to minimize this possibility, and it is likely that the SED's domestic peace barrage will continue at full strength in the future. The effect of this ongoing campaign to reinforce the party's views on security and its assertion that socialist military strength is virtuous and benevolent, while Western military measures are inherently dangerous and pernicious, is difficult to gauge. To a certain degree, the regime's currency has become debased as the discrepancy between its words and actions becomes increasingly obvious. As East German writer Stefan Heym put it: "When a government strengthens paramilitary drills for its school children instead of examining in good faith opportunities for alternative service in the social realm, it takes away the credibility of its frequent reassurances of its love for peace."[91]

For the time being the SED regime appears to be content to use the instruments at its disposal to keep the scope of unofficial peace activities limited to a small segment of East German society. Official stonewalling on all alternative proposals, selective harassment of particularly

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[90] The East German "peace pastor," Rainer Eppelmann, the publication of whose "Berlin Appeal —Create Peace Without Arms" in early 1982 led to his detention for forty-eight hours by the East German authorities is convinced, for example, that his subsequent release was due to Soviet intervention and that, in addition, the Soviet Union has tolerated the unofficial peace movement in the GDR in order to further stimulate the Western peace movement and to strengthen divisive tendencies within NATO. For a portrait of Eppelmann and his views, see Frank Lipsius, "The Peace Pastor," *The New Republic*, August 16 and 23, 1982, p. 15. There is also the interesting timing of a Radio Moscow broadcast commentary on May 13, 1982, praising the "swords into plowshares" sculpture as "one of the best works of Soviet art" and a work of "great political importance" that represents Soviet foreign political intentions and goals—all at a time when the East German authorities were moving to ban this symbol's being used by the unofficial East German peace movement and alleging that it symbolized an antistate attitude. See Radio Moscow, May 13, 1982, 2100 hours.

[91] As quoted in the West German social-democratic weekly *Vorwärts* (Bonn), no. 17, April 22, 1982.

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active individuals, and the threat of harsher suppression of others have all prevented the appeal of independent peace activities from spreading to other sectors of society. A limited amount of independent activity is still tolerated since the party appears confident that it can be kept under control. Although political reality in the GDR appears to have changed, it remains the same. As one member of the GDR's People's Police put it when he reminded a peace activist en route to a church-sponsored peace forum: "We may condone your pacific attitudes, but we have the power." In the meantime the nature of the independent peace movement itself appears to have changed as well. Much of the initial optimism and youthful excitement that characterized earlier activities has been replaced with the sober realization that the struggle against an all-powerful party-state apparatus is neither easy nor without personal risk. Some activists have been forced to leave the country, and others have become resigned or embittered. Those who have remained, however, are strongly committed to working for what they perceive as a moral issue in the long term.

The activities of these peace groups are therefore likely to continue, at least for the short term. A true test of the regime's intentions may take place after the Luther celebrations and a final decision on the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Although their activities may not receive as much Western press attention as in the past, the activities of these groups will continue to play an important role within the church as well as in society at large. As a result, they will continue to pose a challenge to a regime that views any manifestation of pluralistic behavior as a serious threat. Moreover, the activities of the peace movement have had an impact in at least one respect. Although the vast majority of young East Germans will continue to satisfy their military service obligations in the army, an increasing number of them will do so only after careful consideration of the other options available to them—a change already discernible in the rising number of East Germans who have chosen the construction soldier option or who have refused military service altogether.[92] Despite the apparent sterility of East German society, then, changes are taking place that should not go unnoticed in the West.

[92] Although exact information is difficult to obtain, the average number of individuals choosing the construction soldier option in the 1970s is estimated to have been approximately 300 annually. Some reports indicate that the number rose to about 600 in 1981 ("Rundschau am Abend," *RIAS* (West Berlin), August 25, 1982). According to the West German weekly *Der Spiegel*, some 1,300 East Germans chose this option in 1982, and the authorities limited construction soldier units to specific parts of the country to prevent their appeal from spreading further. See *Der Spiegel*, no. 2, January 10, 1983.

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SURVIVING THE MISSILES: THE GDR AND THE FUTURE OF INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS*

by A. James McAdams

On January 20, 1983, East German party chief Erich Honecker leveled what has already become a familiar note of warning to any Western state that dares to go along with NATO's planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles this coming fall. His government was always prepared to work for the peaceful coexistence of all states, Honecker argued, but any government that put up with "the stationing of the new US missiles" on its soil would have to live with the consequences of "destabilizing the peace and squandering possibilities for many-sided, good neighborly relations."[1] The occasion for Honecker's remarks was a short visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who had just returned from Bonn after lobbying against the NATO deployment initiative. Thus, the East German leader's note of caution was undoubtedly an implied threat to the West Germans: if Bonn should go along with its allies' plans, it would surely pay the price in terms of its relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

To grasp the significance of Honecker's remarks, it is important to recognize just how much relations between the two Germanies have improved in recent years, especially during the later part of Helmut Schmidt's tenure as chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). For while inter-German hostilities at one time provided some of the greatest obstacles to the reduction of tensions on the European continent, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the relations between the two states have seemed—with only occasional lapses—to represent one of the few abiding examples of East-West détente. Honecker's threat, therefore, cannot be taken lightly in the FRG.

But does this mean that if NATO follows through on its missile deployment schedule there will necessarily be a resurgence of serious

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[1] *Neues Deutschland*, January 21, 1983.

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inter-German tensions? What makes one want to take Honecker's warning at something less than its face value is the fact that the East Germans themselves have developed a tremendous vested interest in the maintenance of good relations with Bonn, such that even if this new burden were added to the scales of détente, East Berlin might still fight to preserve a semblance of normality in inter-German contacts. In view of the past record of German-German politics, this is an astonishing development. As a consequence, if we want to speculate about the GDR's future behavior, it is necessary first to grasp how it was that the East Germans acquired this interest in détente and learned to live with the process. This, in turn, can be understood only if we begin with East Berlin's initially hostile response to the prospect of any opening to the West.

Reacting to Détente

Probably no country was more threatened by the improvement in East-West relations in the early 1970s than the GDR.[2] For, while détente offered many states the valued opportunity to resolve outstanding differences and improve political and economic ties with their ideological adversaries, this changed international climate struck the GDR at its most sensitive point—that is, in its troubled relations with the FRG. Effectively, détente brought the two estranged German states closer together without at the same time resolving key differences the East German Communist Party (SED) regarded as fundamental preconditions for an improvement in their relations.[3]

For years, the SED had argued that normal relations with Bonn would be conceivable only when the West Germans had renounced any pretensions to speak for all German interests, had recognized the GDR's total sovereignty in domestic and international affairs, and had abandoned any claims to represent the anomalous city of West Berlin. For the East Germans, these were not only symbolic issues of consequence but also critical domestic concerns, since West German concessions were expected to solidify the SED's internal authority and to defuse any appeal that the FRG enjoyed among the East German population as an alternative, nonsocialist form of German identification.

East Berlin's demands, however, consistently faltered on Bonn's insistence that total recognition of the GDR and of its claims would

[2] See Hartmut Zimmermann, "The GDR in the 1970s," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1978, p. 13.

[3] For useful English-language treatments of the evolution of inter-German relations, see Melvin Croan, *East Germany: The Soviet Connection* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976); William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978); Michael Sodaro, "East Germany and the Dilemmas of Détente" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1978); and Gerhard Wettig, *Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp* (New York: St. Martin's, 1975).

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violate the FRG's Basic Law and preclude hopes for an eventual reunification of Germany. In contrast, the West Germans maintained that relations between the Germanies retained a "special" character that fell short of the norms governing relations between other sovereign countries. Thus, there was little common ground on which the two states could agree to an improvement in their relations, and as a result most contacts between their governments were strained and sporadic in nature.

For these reasons, the great German accords that were reached in the early 1970s were largely viewed as mixed blessings by the East German leadership. The four-power Berlin agreement of 1972 may have pleased the SED by stipulating that West Berlin was not a "constituent" part of the FRG. But at the same time, the accord did not really diminish the West German presence in the city, since it also provided that previously existing ties of a nonpolitical nature between West Berlin and the FRG should be "maintained and developed." The second pillar of inter-German détente, the Basic Treaty, which East Berlin signed with Bonn in late 1972, also fell appreciably short of the GDR's central demands. Although it marked the first time that the FRG had formally affirmed its neighbor's independence in its internal and external affairs, the agreement also stopped short of granting total diplomatic recognition to East Berlin and, even more exasperating to the East Germans, included language suggesting that the national question was still open to debate.

Making these agreements particularly disconcerting to the SED in an immediate sense was the fact that both treaties also formally obliged the GDR to open its borders, virtually for the first time in a decade on a regular basis, to a flood of visitors from the FRG and West Berlin.[4] This heightened level of exposure to the Western world put the fragile East German social and ideological order to an unwanted test, introducing alien values, political norms, and economic expectations that had largely been excluded since the closing of the GDR's borders in 1961.

It was predictable, therefore, that the East German party began to look for ways of surviving its experience with détente that would enable it to take advantage of its new relationship with the FRG while at the same time blunting the disadvantageous consequences. Best-known was the SED's policy of *Abgrenzung*, or "delimitation," under which the regime attempted to accentuate the differences between the two German states even while agreements like the Berlin Accord and the Basic Treaty were bringing them and their citizens closer together. To this end, the SED not only went out of its way to emphasize the irreconcilable nature of East German socialism and West German capitalism but even went so far as

[4] For relevant statistics, see *Zahlenspiegel* (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1982), p. 99.

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to downgrade the two states' common German heritage, often renaming organizations that still bore the word "German." *Abgrenzung* was also accompanied by a variety of practical policies that were designed to insulate the GDR's population from unpredictable Western influences, including heightened political agitation in the workplace, a new emphasis on military instruction in the schools, and upgraded roles for the party and the country's security organs. In a particularly drastic move, thousands of officials, soldiers, and party members were labeled "secrets carriers" and forbidden any kind of contact with Westerners.

Nonetheless, ideological indoctrination alone could not have been expected to counter any remaining cultural or economic appeal that the West might have had among East Germany's citizenry. It was just as important for the GDR's own virtues to be self-recommending. This seems to have been one of the major reasons that Honecker's government immediately raised the production of consumer-related items to the country's chief economic priority. In 1971, the SED unveiled an ambitious program of apartment construction and renovation in the GDR, delivering more than 600,000 units of housing by 1975. During the same period, the regime also endeavored to increase the supply of durable consumer goods and the availability of luxury imports in the country, while holding most prices for basic commodities at steady levels. These programs were matched by significant increases in pensions, which had fallen to extremely low levels during the 1960s, and by improved health insurance benefits as well.[5]

At the same time, changes were also registered in the government's social policy, as the party labored to "co-opt" normally contentious groups to its ways of thinking. Honecker himself surprised most observers in 1971 when he abruptly proclaimed that there could be "no taboos" in the fields of art and literature as long as one proceeded from basic socialist fundamentals.[6] Subsequently, works appeared that might have been suppressed in earlier years, and artists were granted privileges (e.g., travel to the West) that had previously been unthinkable. There were, of course, still significant limits to the range of cultural experimentation that the regime was willing to tolerate, as became apparent in the mid 1970s when the government banished some of its most outspoken critics to the West. But despite the partial hardening in the official cultural line at this time, the party did not return to the rigid standards that had characterized its cultural policies in the 1960s, and to a certain extent even maintained a level of tolerance toward its writers and artists.[7] Demonstrat-

[5] Jochen Bethkenhagen et al., eds., *DDR und Osteuropa* (Opladen: Leske, 1981), p. 356.
[6] Erich Honecker, *Reden und Aufsätze I* (Berlin: Dietz, 1977), p. 150.
[7] Hartmut Zimmermann has made this point in "Zu einigen politischen Aspekten des X. Parteitages der SED," *Deutschland Archiv* Special Edition for the Fourteenth Conference on GDR Research in the FRG, June 9-12, 1981, p. 25.

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ing that this was not merely a random decision on the regime's part, East Berlin also moved to establish a rapport with the GDR's religious institutions, where, despite the continuing existence of church-state tensions, significant improvements in the availability of travel, educational, and employment opportunities were registered.[8]

Profiting from Détente

Part of the irony of inter-German détente, however, was that even with its risks, the process may also have contributed to the internal stabilization of the GDR by underscoring the country's permanence, its sovereignty, and its viability as an international actor. In just the first year after agreement was reached on the Basic Treaty, sixty-eight states extended full diplomatic recognition to East Berlin; many of these were vital West European industrial powers, such as France and Great Britain, which the East German leadership had pursued for years. In September 1973, both Germanies were at last accepted as full members of the United Nations. And finally, the regularization of inter-German relations allowed the East Germans to take full part in the July 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation, the final agreements of which—on the inviolability of borders, the territorial integrity of states, and the principle of noninterference—fit in perfectly with East Berlin's quest to sell others on its sovereignty.

The intricate web of inter-German agreements also provided the East Germans with some very significant economic benefits. Between 1972 and 1975, for example, the GDR received almost 235 million Marks annually from the FRG solely in the form of transit fees resulting from the Berlin Treaty; this amount was raised to 400 million Marks in 1976. Then, too, the GDR profited from various Berlin-related special projects conducted together with Bonn over the decade; in 1978, for example, following agreement between the two countries on the construction of a Berlin-Hamburg Autobahn, East Berlin was slated to receive 1.2 billion Marks.[9]

In addition to such direct payments, the East Germans have benefited from private sources originating in their state's opening to West German traffic and tourism. Federal officials in Bonn have estimated that from 1970 until 1979, East Berlin received between 130 and 230 million Marks a year in hard Western currency as part of its minimum-exchange requirements for entry into the GDR. Visitors to East Germany have also

[8] Cf. Robert Goeckel, "Zehn Jahre Kirchenpolitik unter Honecker," *Deutschland Archiv*, September 1981, pp. 940-47.

[9] Of course, the GDR had to make reciprocal contributions of goods and services as part of these agreements; still, its economic benefits were considerable. See Jochen Bethkenhagen et al., "Die Aussenwirtschaftsbeziehungen der DDR vor dem Hintergrund von Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung," *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung*, April 1980, pp. 59-61.

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been an important source of high-demand luxury items and of goods in short supply, as well as providing a major source of foreign exchange through the country's Intershops and Intertanks. In 1978, East German officials admitted a turnover of 700 million West Marks in Intershops alone.[10]

This is not to say that détente itself has been the sole source of the GDR's economic benefits from the West. Among these gains, some Western observers have also been tempted to include the special trade arrangements East Berlin enjoys as a result of its unique relationship with the FRG—most notably, its privileges of direct, duty-free access to the European Common Market and the so-called swing mechanism, under which the GDR is annually granted an interest-free overdraft credit to finance its trade with West Germany. Neither of these positive aspects of inter-German trade, however, can be counted as a product of détente per se, since both have their origins in agreements reached as far back as the 1950s. In fact, while détente itself may have created a potentially favorable climate for economic relations between the Germanies, the GDR did not rush to upgrade its trade ties with the FRG. Indeed, while inter-German trade had grown markedly in the late 1960s, registering a dramatic increase of almost 37 per cent in 1969 alone, it actually slowed down throughout the 1970s, with yearly increases averaging only a bit over 9 per cent.[11]

But whatever the limitations on inter-German trade, East German authorities still jealously guarded the significant advantages of their special economic ties to the FRG, which remained the GDR's principal Western trading partner. The Basic Treaty conspicuously included a supplementary clause specifying that trade between the two states should proceed "on the basis of previously existing agreements"; and, in a much-publicized interview with the *New York Times,* Honecker himself conceded that there were still "peculiarities" in the relations between the GDR and the FRG, which his country had every intention of exploiting.[12] In this respect, at least, the East Germans were not ready to deny their special relationship with Bonn.

The Détente Experience

Détente was more than just a mixed experience for the GDR, however, a simple exchange of sacrifices involving the state's sense of sovereignty for offsetting political and economic gains. If we want to understand how the East Germans could have developed a vested interest

[10] Ibid., pp. 59, 62.

[11] For statistics on inter-German trade relations, see Horst Lambrecht, "Entwickelung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zur BRD," in H.-A. Jacobsen, et al., eds., *Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1980), pp. 453-472.

[12] *Reden und Aufsätze II* (Berlin: Dietz, 1977), p. 110.

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in the détente process, it is crucial to recognize one further point: that the GDR itself changed as a result of this experience. As a consequence, the essentially defensive thrust of East Germany's policies toward Bonn in the early 1970s has given way to a radically different posture in the 1980s, in which East Berlin has taken on a comparatively aggressive role, not only reacting to but also initiating contacts with its chief adversary.

One immensely important psychological basis for East Berlin's new profile has been the simple fact that the GDR survived its initial experience with détente. Despite the opening of its borders to waves of destabilizing visitors from its capitalist and German adversary, a decade of *Abgrenzung* and compensatory economic and social policies has left the GDR a relatively stable place, indeed, far less frequently marred by social disorders than some of its allies, notably Poland and Romania. This is not to say that the GDR's leaders no longer worry about the influx of these "contaminating" influences from the West—quite the contrary, as we shall see—but only that the government's proven capacity to contain these elements has removed much of the uncertainty that first went along with détente.

A second reason for the GDR's changed behavior has to do with the fact that détente turned out to be a "liberating" experience for the East German leadership. If we remember that the GDR was regarded for many years as little more than an artificial satellite of the Soviet Union, the state's new opportunities to cultivate its international image and make foreign contacts take on an added significance, because they have demonstrated that the GDR is worth taking seriously on its own merits. As a consequence of this new maneuverability, in fact, the GDR's value for the Soviet Union has grown appreciably, for now Moscow can turn to East Berlin for help in matters (especially relations with the FRG) that it is not equipped to handle on its own.

A third factor behind the GDR's changing posture lies in its increasing ability to control the outcomes of its interactions with the FRG. Although East Germany is often pictured as a state that is heavily dependent on Bonn's goodwill (in economic matters, in particular), there is also a sense in which West Germany has become partially dependent on East Berlin, for cooperating in the maintenance of inter-German ties and in making "humanitarian" concessions to further common German interests. While the West Germans, for example, made important gains throughout the 1970s in controversial questions involving citizen contacts between the two states, the East Germans still enjoy considerable leeway in interpreting how these agreements are to be implemented.[13] For these

[13] East Berlin also claims that Bonn has a strong, purely economic interest in détente. Given the more than 6,000 West German firms that are actively tied to inter-German trade, this is probably partially true. Still, for a convincing argument against the existence of such strict dependencies, see "Zur Bedeutung des inner-deutschen Handels für die Beschäftigung in der BRD," Wochenbericht 3/1979, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, pp. 7-11.

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reasons, East Berlin can count on a certain amount of bargaining leverage in its negotiations with the FRG, knowing that Bonn will do little to upset the precarious balance of German-German relations and will presumably be agreeable when it is called upon to reciprocate the GDR's own gestures of goodwill.

Of course, East Berlin too continues to have its own unique dependencies on the FRG, but even these provide it with a reason for maintaining favorable ties with Bonn. This applies not only to the positive political and economic consequences of inter-German détente but, even more so, to larger questions concerning East German sovereignty and national identity. Despite East Berlin's frequent unilateral efforts to rid itself of the problems associated with the national question, only Bonn itself can finally abrogate its remaining special interests in the future of the GDR's 17 million citizens and, in effect, close the "open" German question. For this reason, East Berlin has a steady interest in keeping lines of communication with the FRG open, to emphasize constantly the normality of GDR-FRG relations, and ideally to pursue agreements that will whittle down Bonn's remaining claims to a special inter-German relationship. Naturally, this can take place only with Bonn's full cooperation.

All these factors help to account for the GDR's more aggressive and opportunistic stance toward the FRG in recent years. At a time when East German relations with Bonn might have been expected to deteriorate seriously as a result of rising East-West hostility, East Berlin has turned out to be a frequent advocate of détente, sometimes even arguing that German-German interests should be separated from Great Power squabbles. This has not meant that the East Germans have pursued a policy of détente at any price—this should become clear when we consider the GDR's behavior during the Polish crisis—but only that the SED leadership has recognized the value of pursuing its interests through heightened contacts with the FRG and is ready to take advantage of the strengths that it has acquired over the past decade.

Dividing Détente

By all accounts, relations between the East and the West Germans should have immediately suffered as a result of two precipitous developments in late 1979: NATO's decision on December 12 to deploy the Pershing II and cruise missiles in response to the Soviet Union's stationing of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe; and, two weeks later, the introduction of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. For months before the NATO decision, the East German news media had subjected the West Germans to increasingly bitter criticism for their part in backing the stationing of the West's new land-based missiles, and leading figures in the SED Politburo

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had hinted that a positive NATO decision would almost certainly have "negative consequences for the continuation of the policy of détente" with the FRG.[14]

Thus, it was surprising that when Honecker addressed these issues at a Central Committee meeting on December 13 and 14, he painted a comparatively optimistic picture of inter-German prospects. On the one hand, he warned that relations between the GDR and the FRG would surely deteriorate if the NATO decision were ever carried out. But at the same time, he underscored the importance of a continuing exchange of opinions with Bonn, explicitly mentioning a private telephone conversation that he had recently conducted with Helmut Schmidt and announcing the latter's intention to meet with him in the GDR in early 1980.[15] Because Schmidt had been one of the strongest proponents of the new missile plan, one could not help but be struck by Honecker's openness to further dealings with the FRG.

If the NATO decision by itself were not enough to strain relations between East Berlin and Bonn, one might expect the Soviets' intervention in Afghanistan to have been a crushing blow. Actually, while the East Germans were among the first to welcome Moscow's actions and to throw their support behind the new regime in Kabul,[16] they also left no doubt about their concern that inter-German ties might suffer as a result of the worsening international situation. While blaming the West for current world tensions—"if there had been no Afghanistan, then certain circles in the U.S.A. and NATO would have surely found another pretext"—Honecker openly lamented the growing threats to the "so hopeful" developments between his government and the FRG, and he decried the fact that achievements that had led to "peace and security, cooperation and good neighborliness" in Europe might be so easily jeopardized.[17]

In searching for explanations for Honecker's approving remarks about the nature of relations between East Berlin and Bonn, it is probably not enough to assume that he was simply carrying out orders from Moscow. For one thing, while Honecker was lamenting the rising strains on inter-German ties, it is noteworthy that the Soviet press, in contrast, was attacking Bonn unequivocally for its complicity in the missile decision and the subsequent heightening of world tensions.[18] This

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[14] Joachim Hermann, "Sechs Jahrzehnte unbeirrbarer Weg des Kampfes der Sowjetunion um Frieden," *Neues Deutschland*, November 8, 1979.

[15] *Neues Deutschland*, December 14, 1979.

[16] Ibid., December 29/30, 1979.

[17] Ibid., January 26/27, 1980. See Ilse Spittmann, "Die Angst der Kleinen vor der Eskalation," *Deutschland Archiv*, April 1980, p. 337, and Johannes Kuppe, "Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen im Schatten der Weltpolitik," *Deutschland Archiv*, February 1980, pp. 113-117.

[18] See, for example, the TASS commentary on FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in *Izvestia*, December 27, 1979. On oscillations in Soviet policy toward the FRG at the time, cf. Angela Stent, "The USSR and Germany," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1981, pp. 6-7.

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need not mean that there was any particular divergence of interests between East Berlin and the Soviets—on the surface at least, there was not—but only that the GDR's special regional concerns were exposed by the situation. In the late 1970s, inter-German ties had proved to be especially beneficial for both the East and the West Germans, with a series of practical agreements reached on matters ranging from the construction of highways and the creation of teams for surveying the states' common boundary markings to related accords on the use of transit routes within the GDR. Notably, none of these agreements could be construed as theratening to the GDR's security or sovereignty; quite the opposite, they were exemplary evidence for the contention that ties between East Berlin and Bonn had been reduced to the level of the routine.[19]

Then, too, while East German and Soviet rhetoric about the FRG diverged at this time, East Berlin continued to fulfill an important function for its chief ally. It held channels of communication to Bonn open and kept alive at least the possibility that the West Germans' own regional interests might be used to temper their devotion to the broader goals of NATO.[20] This was probably one aspect of Honecker's persistent reminders to the Bonn government that common German interests might suffer as a result of an all-around deterioration of East-West relations. And apparently Honecker's words did not fall on deaf ears; for while the West Germans did not attempt to conceal their indignation about Afghanistan, they were also quick (as Schmidt was, in his February 1980 meeting with French President Giscard d'Estaing) to stress their abiding commitment to the détente process. Under these circumstances, the Soviets could afford to be as tough as they wanted on the West Germans, but still avoid burning their bridges behind them.

Even inter-German ties, however, suffered some initial setbacks from the repercussions of rising East-West hostility. Because of these tensions, East Berlin was forced to postpone Schmidt's eagerly awaited visit to the GDR. Not long thereafter, similar circumstances (and budget concerns) caused the West Germans to put off negotiations with East Berlin on two lucrative projects, the electrification of train routes into West Berlin and the joint construction of a coal power plant in Leipzig.

However, these disappointments did not hinder either side from attempting to improve the inter-German atmosphere. At the spring

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[19] See GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer's remarks, "Sicherung der günstigsten internationalen Bedingungen für den sozialistischen Aufbau," *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, January 1980, p. 21.

[20] Brezhnev seemed to suggest that this was a desirable task when, on the occasion of the GDR's thirtieth anniversary, he juxtaposed the state's role in East Europe against Bonn's need to make a critical choice between a policy of peace and a policy of escalation. At the same time, Honecker explicitly linked the common interests of "the citizens of the GDR and the citizens of the FRG." *Neues Deutschland*, October 7, 1979.

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trade fair in Leipzig, in mid March, East German representatives went out of their way to emphasize their interest in the continuation of favorable trade ties with the FRG, regardless of the international setting. Evidently, these sentiments were shared by Bonn. Agriculture minister Josef Ertl underscored his government's concern "to preserve normal relations in central Europe,"[21] and at about the same time, Schmidt let it be known that he would welcome discussions on increasing the number of East Germans who were allowed to travel to the West. This partial identity of interests received its first major confirmation on April 17 when Schmidt received the SED Politburo's chief economic expert, Günter Mittag, for a formal visit in Bonn, and both figures discussed the current state of political and economic relations between their two countries. Then, at the end of the month, on April 30, the GDR and the FRG reached their first major agreement (a package of improvements on the Berlin transit routes) since the Afghanistan crisis.

The greatest opportunity for a resuscitation of German-German contacts, however, was provided unexpectedly by the death of Yugoslavia's President Tito in early May. Tito's burial afforded a number of world leaders a rare occasion for an unofficial exchange of views with their counterparts. Notably, while an exchange between Helmut Schmidt and Soviet party chief Brezhnev was intentionally limited to a few passing formalities, both Honecker and the West German chancellor were able to take advantage of the situation to have their first face-to-face encounter since the signing of the Helsinki Final Acts in 1975.

Later, Honecker expressed his personal satisfaction over this meeting, as he casually put it, "between Helmut Schmidt and me," and he specifically emphasized "the responsibility of both of the German states" for preserving European peace at a time in which international conditions had become "more complicated."[22] In this respect, Honecker must have been pleased when Schmidt met with Soviet party leaders in Moscow on June 30 and July 1 to discuss a host of issues related to détente and disarmament. Just a little more than a month later, on August 13, the West German chancellor also announced his intention to visit the GDR within the month to conduct formal talks. For the moment, relations between the Germanies seemed to have been successfully sheltered from the disturbances around them.

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[21] *Der Spiegel*, April 7, 1980, p. 22.

[22] *Neues Deutschland*, May 22, 1980. Honecker suggested that both states had a special role in preserving the peace. Notably, at the same time that he was meeting with Schmidt, Honecker published an article in the Soviet press that stressed the GDR's (but not the FRG's) "special responsibility" for guaranteeing central European stability, "Nash obshchii prazdnik," *Pravda*, May 8, 1980.

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Détente and Poland

In the context of inter-German affairs, the basic difference between the two preceding crises (NATO missiles and Afghanistan) and the advent of the Polish crisis in August 1980 was probably the latter's immediacy. Unlike the missile plan, which at that time was not to be effected for three years, the sudden outbreak of strikes and other disturbances throughout Poland was a dilemma that had to be confronted immediately; and unlike Afghanistan, Poland's problems could not be separated from their European setting. This made it that much more difficult for East Berlin and Bonn to decouple their common concerns from the surrounding escalation of tensions.

At first, the response of the two states to the events in Poland seemed to resemble their actions of early 1980. Despite the fact that, this time, Schmidt was forced to cancel his upcoming meeting with Honecker, the West Germans attempted to contribute their part to calming tensions in the region by urging Western banks to extend further loans to Warsaw. For his part, at the fall trade fair in Leipzig, Honecker again stressed his country's interest in an ongoing improvement of inter-German relations, even anticipating "new horizons" in their level of cooperation.[23] In view of the fact that East Germany was already well on its way, for the first time in many years, to registering a positive balance of trade with the FRG, Honecker had reason to feel confident about the future prospects of economic ties with Bonn.[24]

We know, however, that at the same time the East Germans were applauding their ties with the FRG, they were also nervously watching the course of the growing tide of workers' unrest in neighboring Poland. It is probably fair to say that although the leaders in the SED regarded these events as a clear danger to their own social order, neither they nor anyone else could be certain what effect these disturbances would have if they were to spread beyond the Polish borders. Would East German workers take up the call for nationwide protest strikes, rally to organize independent labor unions, and demand the release of political prisoners as their Polish comrades had already done?

The leadership's anxiety was reflected in the way the East German media handled the crisis. Most early reports from the country were confined to secondhand summaries of Polish reportage, and East German sources conspicuously avoided their own editorial commentary. At first, only Poland's economic difficulties were mentioned, then vague

[23] *Neues Deutschland*, September 1, 1980.

[24] This trade surplus was in goods, but not services. "Innerdeutscher Handel: Eingeengter Expansionsspielraum," Wochenbericht 12/1981, Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.

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references were made to growing labor difficulties in the country, and only on August 20, 1980, did the media first dare to use the word "strike."[25]

In light of this, it was interesting that *Neues Deutschland's* first editorial assessment of these developments, on September 4, was simultaneously a signal for the deterioration of German-German relations. The paper singled out the West Germans for its strongest criticisms yet, accusing "certain forces of FRG imperialism and its media" of taking up "the loudest and harshest tones . . . in the present anti-Polish concert." In addition, the West Germans were castigated for engaging in gross interference in Poland's internal affairs and for ostensibly supporting antisocialist provocations. Given the growing tensions between the blocs, and especially between the Soviets and the United States, over the proper handling of the Polish crisis, GDR-FRG relations were probably bound to suffer at this time. What may have seemed puzzling, however, was that in the same article, *Neues Deutschland* went even further with its criticisms of the FRG, arguing that Bonn was "now relying upon American missiles in order to realize its revanchist goals against the GDR as well as against Poland." Additionally, in an accompanying editorial, the newspaper went on to attack West German politicians for continuing to speak of "greater German" interests, while deliberately refusing to recognize the manifest existence of two separate German states.[26]

This return to polemics about the FRG's ostensibly "revanchist" designs for the GDR and its leaders' confusion on the national question was noteworthy when viewed in the Polish context. For it suggested that there was something more to rising inter-German tensions than a worsening of East-West affairs. The real question was whether the GDR could continue its delicate balancing act of exposing itself to regular contacts with the FRG when at the same time the Poles next door were questioning the fundamental principles of socialist order.

On October 7, Honecker gave his first pointed indication that inter-German ties could no longer proceed as usual when he cast sharp doubt on Bonn's willingness to pursue peaceful relations in Central Europe. For decades, East German leaders had used a familiar refrain in their speeches that encouraged both German states to guarantee that war would never again break out from German soil. But on this occasion, Honecker altered the phrase, merely noting that such a war would not originate with his own country. "Unfortunately," he added, "one cannot

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[25] Peter Jochen Winters, "Zur Reaktion der DDR auf die Ereignisse in Polen," *Deutschland Archiv*, October 1980, pp. 1013-17.

[26] "Antipolnische Wölfe im Schafzpelz," *Neues Deutschland*, September 4, 1980, and "Wahlzirkus in der BRD — und nur dort!," ibid.

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say the same thing about the FRG." As proof for his claim, he cited Bonn's cooperation in the NATO armaments program and its continuing interference in "the internal affairs of the GDR, People's Poland, and the other socialist countries." [27]

Significantly, Honecker's harder stand on inter-German prospects was coupled with East Berlin's announcement, just three days later, of measures that were clearly[28] designed to minimize the threat of active contacts between East and West Germans. As of October 13, the minimum amount of currency that West Germans and West Berliners were required to exchange for East-Marks in order to enter the GDR was doubled for extended stays in East Germany and quadrupled for daylong visits in East Berlin. Whereas children and retired citizens had previously been exempted from these obligations, now they too were required to exchange currency on the borders.

These drastic measures were immediately condemned by Bonn for contravening the spirit of the Basic Treaty and of inter-German détente. But at the same time, they were really a perfect demonstration of East Berlin's leverage over the FRG in determining just how open its borders would be with the West. For while they fell short of forbidding Western rights of access to the GDR, they did make the cost of entry almost prohibitively high. In fact, as Western observers noted at the time, the new rates were high enough that the East German regime could count on cutting back its number of visitors from the West by over 50 per cent—which is exactly what happened in the following months—and still take in more foreign exchange than in previous years.[29] Equally noteworthy, in view of the SED's apparent domestic concerns, was the fact that East Berlin's action came even before a similar decision on October 30 to end nine years of visa-free traffic between the GDR and Poland and to impose strict conditions on those citizens still wishing to travel between the two states.

Provocatively, on the same day that the new minimum exchange rates were enacted, Honecker made one of his toughest speeches ever in his role as party chief on the future of the GDR's relations with the FRG. In essence, he declared that ties between the two states could continue to develop only if Bonn both showed itself willing to modify its alliance politics and simultaneously consented to a full normalization of relations with East Berlin. Whereas Honecker had previously seemed

[27] *Neues Deutschland*, October 8, 1980.

[28] I do not share the official East German position that the exchange rates were raised (1) because of the growing value of the East-Mark against its West German counterpart, or (2) because of Western smuggling of East-Marks into the GDR. Neither of these explanations would account for the drastic increases in the currency exchange requirements.

[29] Hans-Dieter Schulz, "Die Entspannung kann weitergehen," *Deutschland Archiv*, November 1980, pp. 1121-23.

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content, however reluctantly, to search for mutually acceptable grounds for accommodation with the West Germans, even while the two states' respective bloc policies diverged, he now linked these policies directly to inter-German prospects. As he noted, one could hardly take part in NATO's missile decision and then expect ties between the Germanies to be unaffected. Honecker added:

> We too share the view that progress in economic relations is good and right. But with all clarity, one is forced to add that the securing of the peace is above all a political question. It is oriented to those steps that directly lead to the solution of the most important tasks of our time, to the halting of the arms race and to disarmament.[30]

True, Honecker did not go so far as to demand that Bonn abandon its support for the missile decision, but he still seemed to suggest that future inter-German gains would be heavily contingent upon proven flexibility in such "political" concerns.

Honecker's most surprising remark, however, involved his demand that the West Germans immediately enter into normal relations with the GDR. In fact, he stopped just short of making this a precondition for further progress between the two states. Honecker insisted that Bonn: (1) recognize the separate citizenship of the GDR; (2) agree to exchange fully accredited ambassadors with East Berlin; (3) abolish the FRG's monitoring station in Salzgitter, which was used to observe and record human rights violations occurring in the GDR and on its borders; and (4) agree to the division of a disputed stretch of the Elbe River, which ran between the two states. Of these demands, significantly, only the last was open to resolution in the conceivable future; East and West German negotiators were already discussing the intricacies of an Elbe settlement, the difficulties of which lay in Germany's postwar division.

Nevertheless, even if Honecker's main conditions were bound to be unacceptable to Bonn, they were still good indicators of the level of anxiety that the East German leadership felt at this stage of the Polish crisis. Notably, all the demands could be read as attempts to get the East German population to focus on its own unique identity. If Bonn would consent to exchanging ambassadors with East Berlin, finally recognize East German citizenship, abandon all claims to a special interest in the state's population, and recognize partial GDR sovereignty over the Elbe, conceivably the FRG's appeal as an alternative German referent might have been lessened.

Thus, at the same time that Honecker was leveling these demands, his government was taking further steps to shore up the East

[30] *Neues Deutschland*, October 14, 1980.

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German population against the growing threats on its borders, both to the East and to the West. Despite East Berlin's explicit denials,[31] many of these measures bore a strong resemblance to the *Abgrenzung* campaign of the early 1970s. Immediately following the introduction of the new exchange rates, for example, the GDR's minister of state security, Erich Mielke, publicly vowed to increase the activity of security agencies throughout East Germany in order to combat, as he put it, the "inhuman and anti-socialist plans and machinations" of the forces of counterrevolution, the chief representatives of which appeared to be "imperialist forces in the West."[32] In this context, it was noteworthy that steps were also taken to constrict some of the privileges the regime had granted to East German churches during the 1970s,[33] while the Politburo's chief expert on cultural affairs, Kurt Hager, advised the GDR's artistic community that remaining cultural contacts with West Germany could continue only if artistic output was kept within acceptable political bounds: "It would be unrealistic," he pointed out, "if cultural relations with the FRG were in any sense construed to be separable from the larger political picture."[34]

Picking up Détente's Pieces

While these tougher stands may have seemed appropriate at a time of looming crisis within the bloc, however, the East Germans cannot have failed to see that they had temporarily robbed themselves of a measure of flexibility in their dealings with the FRG. Indeed, Honecker's own demands threatened to preclude German-German dialogue entirely. Thus, it was not too surprising that at the first sign of an abatement of bloc tensions over Poland—at the Warsaw alliances summit conference on December 5 in Moscow[35]—East Berlin quickly took steps to assure that old lines of communication with the FRG would at least be retained.[36]

A shift in the East German stance first became noticeable at the party's fourteenth Central Committee plenum on December 11 and 12, when Günter Mittag delivered what was, in comparison with recent statements, a relatively moderate Politburo report on the state of inter-German

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[31] Ibid., December 16, 1980. Significantly, "*Abgrenzung*" was now used as if it were the opposite of détente, providing a major contrast with its favorable connotation in the early 1970s when it was almost a precondition for détente.

[32] Ibid., October 17, 1980.

[33] *Christian Science Monitor*, December 5, 1980.

[34] *Neues Deutschland*, November 18, 1980.

[35] The Pact decided to allow the Poles themselves—at least for the time being—to "overcome their difficulties and assure their country's further development along a socialist course." Ibid., December 6, 1980.

[36] Western diplomats whom I interviewed in East Berlin in 1981 and 1982 stressed that after this conference, the East Germans made an about-face and repeatedly emphasized their interest in revitalizing détente.

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affairs. In a meaningful switch, Mittag returned to the party's old line that war should never again be allowed to break out from German ground—that is, from both the GDR and the FRG. Like Honecker, he too demanded a total normalization of relations from the West Germans and criticized Bonn for promoting policies that were designed to keep the German question "open." Yet, on this occasion, Mittag avoided even the hint of imposing conditions on the FRG, calling instead for the two states merely to "respect" each other and abide by the principles of peaceful coexistence.[37]

Honecker himself began to modify his tone in early 1981. In mid February, in back-to-back interviews with the French Communist magazine, *l'Humanité*, and the English publisher Robert Maxwell, he underscored the contribution that inter-German ties had made to European détente. Furthermore, he openly lamented the fact that "these relations are presently not as good as they could be," citing NATO armaments policies and Bonn's continuing pan-German claims as reasons for these shortcomings.[38]

Notably, although Honecker contended that Bonn's recognition of East German citizenship could go a long way toward overcoming the major roadblocks that lay in the path of better inter-German relations, he steered clear of any conditional language. Just three days after his interviews, in fact, in an apparent attempt to show that his state would remain unaffected by West German efforts to exploit the national question to its benefit, Honecker surprisingly brought up the long-unmentioned (in the GDR) issue of German (re)unification, suggesting that:

> One day, socialism will knock on your door, and when the day comes on which the workers of the Federal Republic undertake the socialist transformation of the FRG, then the question of the unification of both German states will be seen in entirely new light. There should be no doubt how we will then decide.[39]

For the moment at least, Honecker evidently wanted it to be clear to the FRG that his country was well prepared for any future dealings with the West.

Honecker's relatively more open stance toward Bonn was reaffirmed at the Soviet Union's Twenty-sixth Party Congress in late February when he again underlined his interest in enhancing ties with the FRG. What was particularly notable, however, was that this view was seconded by Leonid Brezhnev. In sharp contrast to his attacks on the

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[37] *Neues Deutschland*, December 12, 1980.

[38] Ibid., February 13, 1981, and February 14/15, 1981.

[39] Ibid., February 16, 1981. Honecker was probably responding to a series of articles in the West German press that dealt with the concept of the German nation and national reunification. See the series beginning with the Günter Gaus interview in *Die Zeit*, January 30, 1981.

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United States and the NATO alliance in general, the Soviet party leader actually reserved some approving comments for the West Germans, noting that the record of relations between Moscow and Bonn over the preceding decade had been "basically favorable," while his personal meetings with the FRG's leaders had made "useful contributions to European détente."[40]

It seems probable that Brezhnev's friendly overtures toward Bonn were intended to remind the West Germans of their vested interests in the détente process and to encourage them to rethink their commitment to current NATO policies; it is equally likely that he and Honecker agreed at this time to increase their combined pressures on Bonn to modify its stance on NATO's missile decision. At his own party's Tenth Congress in April, Honecker left no doubt that in his eyes a direct connection would have to be seen between the FRG's alliance politics and his government's ability to continue on the path of inter-German détente. Thus, while he insisted, on the one hand, that his regime had no interest in "loosening the FRG's ties with its alliance partners and especially with the U.S.A.," he also stressed that participation in "NATO heavy armaments" and progress in German affairs were fundamentally incompatible.[41]

In this sense, the prospect of improved inter-German relations was dangled before the eyes of the West Germans, but not without the implicit threat that any wrong move on Bonn's part would undermine everything. Two subsequent developments in the West, however, converged to remove the potential impasse that Honecker's stricter linkage of German politics and bloc politics represented. One development was the U.S. announcement in May that Washington was now ready to enter into negotiations with Moscow on the stationing of all midrange missiles in Europe, including those of the Soviet Union. At the time, this announcement effectively undercut the propaganda monopoly the Soviets had enjoyed on the topic of arms negotiations and put Moscow in the uncomfortable position of having to be reciprocally forthcoming toward the West. But most important, from the GDR's perspective, the West Germans were able to use this proof that the West too was interested in safeguarding European peace as a pretext for calling for a new round of negotiations—the FRG's leaders stressed, for example, their interest in the lowering of the minimum exchange rates for entry into the GDR[42]—between the Germanies. East Berlin rightly interpreted this appeal as a challenge for it to give substance to its rhetoric about the value of inter-German ties.

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[40] *Neues Deutschland*, February 24, 1981, and ibid., February 25, 1981.
[41] Ibid., April 12, 1981.
[42] Dettmar Cramer, "Ein deutsches Signal," *Deutschland Archiv*, June 1981, pp. 561-63.

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Another basis for reviving contacts between the two states, which was undoubtedly viewed more positively by both East Berlin and Moscow, was provided by the gradual emergence of a widespread peace movement in the FRG in the summer of 1981. The size and evident impact of this movement on the West German media and even on certain politicians in the governing Social Democratic party held out the first real prospect that the FRG's citizens themselves might be convinced to abandon their support for the NATO missile decision. Even among some quarters that supported the missile plan, there seemed to be a greater willingness to take Soviet disarmament suggestions seriously, as was evidenced by ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt's unofficial trip to Moscow in early July. Thus, in this respect as well, it was worthwhile for both the Soviets and the GDR to remain open to new levels of interaction with the FRG.[43]

Making the prospect of reinvigorated contacts with Bonn all the more palatable to East Berlin was the fact that the special swing agreement between the two Germanies was slated to expire at the end of 1981 unless the GDR and the FRG could agree to its extension. This would have meant that the annual level of interest-free credits available for the conduct of inter-German trade (i.e., open to the GDR's disposal) would have fallen from a high of 850 million Marks to a base level of 200 million Marks, adding a new burden to the East German economy and potentially undermining the GDR's credit-worthy image in the view of international banking circles. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for East Berlin to make sure that its economic ties with Bonn were unimpaired.

The Polish problem, of course, remained a festering source of discord between the blocs. Still, it seems likely that by mid summer 1981, the SED had fewer reasons to allow the crisis to interfere with its relations with the FRG. If anything, East German workers had shown themselves to be relatively docile in the face of the Polish disturbances, and there were even signs of growing resentment among the population that the GDR should have to make sacrifices—in the form of shipments of scarce commodities and direct financial assistance to Warsaw[44]—just to save the Poles from their domestic misfortunes. Concurrently, the East German economy itself had proved that it was not to be threatened by the afflictions that had beset its neighbors; the GDR's gross domestic product, for example, rose by a healthy 4.2 per cent in 1980.[45] Hence, the regime's

[43] Stent, "The USSR and Germany," pp. 9-10.

[44] Even before August 1980, tensions between Poles and East Germans had been fed by the impression that Polish citizens were taking unfair advantage of the open borders between the two states to purchase heavily subsidized goods and scarce products in the GDR.

[45] *The Economist*, January 24, 1981. Notable from a psychological point of view, the GDR's economy was holding up while both prices and unemployment in the FRG were rising.

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level of anxiety at this time was probably considerably lower than it had been almost a year earlier.

The first concrete sign that a rebirth of inter-German contacts might be conceivable came at the beginning of August when Honecker and Brezhnev concluded a joint meeting on the Crimea with the announcement that present world tensions now made "broad international exchanges as well as regular political contacts between leaders of countries with differing social systems" both valuable and necessary.[46] Honecker demonstrated his own willingness to contribute to this task by responding positively to a recent letter from Schmidt in which the latter had pleaded for a reinvigoration of inter-German ties, and in the following month he received Bonn's permanent representative, Klaus Bölling, on two separate occasions. For their part, the West Germans displayed an eager readiness to take advantage of this changing situation. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher openly expressed his government's interest in arranging a meeting between the leaders of the two states to discuss both common German concerns and broader questions of armaments policy.[47] In early September, the FRG's chief arms control authority, Egon Bahr, actually met with Honecker in East Berlin and shared his views on the two states' differing conceptions of weapons policy and arms limitation. Finally, on September 6, Honecker once again used the platform afforded by the Leipzig trade fair to announce the real breakthrough: that he and Schmidt had agreed to conduct joint talks, on some unspecified future date, on "the securing of the peace and the normalization of relations" between their states.[48]

Restoring Inter-German Détente

Given Honecker's increasingly stricter linkage of inter-German interests and surrounding East-West politics, it was appropriate that when the two leaders did finally meet in the GDR three months later, it was against a political background that the East Germans must have regarded as positive. In early October, a massive peace demonstration in Bonn, in which over 250,000 people had taken part, touched off weeks of protests in major cities throughout Europe, the majority of which were directed against NATO and U.S. weapons policies. These developments were extensively covered in the East German media, and Honecker himself singled them out as proof of the immorality of the West's military buildup.[49] In late November, Brezhnev traveled to Bonn to exchange

[46] *Neues Deutschland*, August 4, 1981.
[47] Dettmar Cramer, "Geduld," *Deutschland Archiv*, September 1981, pp. 897-99.
[48] *Neues Deutschland*, September 7, 1981.
[49] For Honecker's positive reaction to these developments, see ibid., November 20, 1981.

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views on arms limitation strategies with the West German chancellor and to publicize a Soviet proposal for a moratorium on new weapons systems. By reopening East-West contacts at the highest level, this visit effectively set the precedent for an inter-German summit. Finally, on November 30, talks between the Great Powers began in Geneva on the control of mid-range missiles.

Thus, when Honecker and Schmidt at last managed to meet on December 11 to 13 at the Werbellinsee (just north of Berlin), much of their discussion formally centered on the grand "war or peace" issues that separated their respective alliances. This was largely at Honecker's insistence. He expressed his side's views on the dangers of NATO's missile plan and echoed the call for a weapons moratorium, while Schmidt blamed current difficulties between the blocs on the invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet SS-20s and expressed the hope that negotiations in Geneva would make the NATO plan unnecessary.[50]

Notably, this emphasis on discussing differences between the alliances enabled Honecker to play down any impression that these talks were an indication of continuing special interests between the Germanies. Although Honecker evidently did use the encounter to lobby behind the scenes for certain domestic concerns—he was, for example, able to get an extension on the deadline for a new swing settlement until June 1982—he overtly stressed the symbolic significance of the meeting as a demonstration of GDR sovereignty and of the normality of relations with the FRG.[51]

Predictably, Schmidt stopped well short of giving in to Honecker's standard demands for a recognition of East German citizenship. But, presumably to the East German's satisfaction, he did expressly emphasize the GDR's "sovereignty and statehood" and deliberately avoided references to concepts (e.g., the expression "inter-German") that suggested any special relationship between the GDR and the FRG.[52] Evidently, Schmidt's deep interest in making this new instance of inter-German détente work was also reflected in the relatively mild stand he took on the imposition of martial law in Poland. The event fell inconveniently on the second day of his visit to the GDR, and he joined Honecker in calling simply for the Poles to solve their problems without outside interference.

Nonetheless, the West Germans too were able to take advan-

[50] See Wilhelm Bruns, "Nach dem Spitzentreffen Schmidt-Honecker," *Aussenpolitik*, 2. Quartal 1982, p. 117.

[51] Notably, Honecker steered clear of demanding "recognition" of East German citizenship. See his interview in *Neues Deutschland*, December 16, 1981.

[52] In contrast, see the then opposition leader Helmut Kohl's remarks about Schmidt's trip in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 19, 1981.

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tage of the talks with Honecker to press for their own concerns. Of greatest significance was undoubtedly Schmidt's effort to convince the East German leader to roll back the GDR's contested minimum exchange rates. Importantly, while he stopped short of giving East Berlin a direct ultimatum, Schmidt argued that Bonn saw a strong "political-psychological" connection between the GDR's behavior in this regard and the success of negotiations on a new swing agreement. Additionally, Schmidt lobbied for further measures to improve the flow of inter-German contacts: the exemption of retired citizens and children from the minimum exchange requirements, extensions in the time allowed for visits to East Berlin, greater opportunities for journalistic activities in the GDR, and a loosening of the limitations on East German travel privileges to the FRG.

As an indication of the seriousness with which the SED leadership viewed the summit meeting, many of Schmidt's principal concerns were published openly in the East German press, in the joint communiqué he and Honecker issued at the conclusion of their talks. While *Neues Deutschland* praised the meeting for the positive spirit of understanding and dialogue it had fostered, the paper's readers were also informed, with an uncharacteristic clarity, that the two leaders had exchanged views on such controversial subjects as "the bringing together of families, the lessening of hardships, and other humanitarian questions," not to mention the fact that they had expressed differences over "the situation in Afghanistan" and the "raising of the minimum exchange rates."[53]

But concurrently, the limits of the regime's willingness to take risks with the Schmidt visit were also demonstrated when the chancellor used the last day of his stay to make an excursion to the northern town of Güstrow. In 1970, when Willy Brandt had visited the East German city of Erfurt, thousands of residents had filled the streets, chanting their approval of his presence. Hence, this time around, the government was at pains to avoid a similar display of emotion. Güstrow's town center was totally sealed off prior to Schmidt's arrival, police and other security officials lined the streets, and for the most part, only specially screened groups of individuals were allowed to be on hand when the chancellor made his tour.[54]

But no one could doubt the East Germans' commitment to preserving the favorable atmosphere that had emerged from the Honecker-Schmidt meeting. This seemed to be particularly true in the following months as East-West tensions rose again after the imposition of martial law in Poland and the ill-fated trade sanctions the United States imposed on both Poland and the Soviet Union. As a gesture of its desire

[53] *Neues Deutschland*, December 14, 1981.
[54] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 15, 1981.

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to maintain amicable relations with Bonn, East Berlin announced a series of measures on February 11 that increased the travel opportunities for East German citizens to take part in family celebrations, births, deaths, and similar occasions in the FRG. Just days later, Honecker explicitly praised Schmidt for refusing to take part in the U.S. sanctions, and in a pointed aside, Honecker noted that his government had followed "with interest" the FRG's "partner-like attitude" in preserving the peace while it pursued better relations with the GDR.[55]

In contrast, while Bonn expressed its general satisfaction with the East German measures when they were announced, regime spokesmen were quick to add that this kind of progress had been an expected outcome of the Werbellinsee talks, and even greater gains were expected in other humanitarian concerns. Central to Bonn's expectations was, of course, the lowering of the East German border exchange rates, so that the flow of Western visitors into the GDR could return to its pre-1980 levels. Hence, West German officials continued to assert the view that a "political-psychological" connection existed between the exchange rates and the swing talks.[56]

In June 1982, however, when agreement between the two states was finally reached, this perspective was shown to be flawed. Despite Bonn's persistent efforts, the GDR refused to back down on the crucial question of the minimum exchange requirements, clearly unwilling to abandon what was already a successful fait accompli. Then, too, the maintenance of the exchange rates had become something of a prestige question for East Berlin. As the East German news media had editorialized over the preceding year and a half, it was the GDR's sovereign right to decide what kind of standards should be used to govern access to its territory.[57] This made the regime even less inclined to compromise.

What seems to have surprised the West Germans even more, however, was the fact that East Berlin proved to be less dependent on a swing settlement than had previously been anticipated. Rather than pushing for a full extension of the interest-free credit, the SED leadership agreed to a lower 600 million Mark annual limit. At a time in which the Polish crisis had shown the dangers of excessive economic reliance on the West, it may well be that the state's leaders simply decided that a little less dependence on the West was in their interest. In addition, they probably hoped to demonstrate that the GDR was not to be intimidated by economic pressures. But even under these conditions, the new agreement with Bonn was still a victory for the East Germans. After all, they were able

[55] *Neues Deutschland*, February 13/14, 1982.
[56] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 12, 1982.
[57] For example, *Neues Deutschland*, October 27, 1980.

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to keep the credit at a high level—indeed, East Berlin had never been forced to use all 850 million Marks open to its disposal anyway—and to safeguard their international credit image as well.

Equally significant for the East German government was its ability to preserve the climate of détente with the FRG even while giving Bonn less than it had originally hoped for. The East German regime announced its readiness to proclaim a general amnesty for all citizens who had "illegally" left the country before 1981, theoretically permitting them to return to the GDR for family visits.[58] In addition, the duration of day visits for West Berliners into East Berlin was extended by two hours, and new pedestrian border crossings into the city were opened. Finally, the regime also agreed to increase its payments to West German citizens who possessed private bank accounts in East Germany. Of course, Bonn had expected more to come out of the meeting between Schmidt and Honecker, but the East Germans were still able to insist—as Politburo member Paul Verner did at the Central Committee's fourth plenum in June—that the positive spirit of the Werbellinsee talks had been faithfully retained, as the new round of negotiations demonstrated.[59]

And After the Missiles?

It is against this background that future relations between the Germanies must be judged. For if NATO does go ahead with its missile deployment schedule this fall, the GDR's leaders will undoubtedly find themselves faced with some hard choices. It is, after all, one thing for them to issue cryptic warnings about what might happen to inter-German détente should Bonn support the NATO plan, but quite another thing to pay the costs of a serious deterioration in relations with the FRG. And in the GDR's case, apparently, these costs would be considerable.

As we have observed, one major interest the GDR has in preserving inter-German détente is that of maintaining at least a semblance of normality in its economic relations with Bonn. Of course, probably no crisis could undermine the unique character of economic contacts between the Germanies (e.g., the existence of the swing or the GDR's special access to the Common Market). But if East Berlin were drastically to downgrade its relations with the FRG, it would clearly stand to lose out on any further deals that it might strike with Bonn, a fact that could have serious implications for the health of the East German economy. For example, with anywhere from $9 to $13 billion in Western debt

[58] The limitations of this amnesty were shown in the first month after its enactment. Of those newly amnestied persons applying for travel visas to the GDR, two-thirds were rejected. *Der Tagesspiegel*, July 22, 1982.

[59] *Neues Deutschland*, June 24, 1982.

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looming over the state, West German assistance may well be (and probably already is) a key to avoiding a rescheduling or even a default on the GDR's loans.[60] Making this assistance even more desirable from East Berlin's perspective is the fact that the FRG is quite ready to lend such aid in return for relatively minor concesssions on humanitarian questions.

Second, the East German leadership is not oblivious to the immense psychological advantages that it has gained as a result of its interactions with Bonn, especially in demonstrating to its own population its viability as an international actor. At last, the GDR has been able to establish itself as something of a European power, capable of contributing in its own small way to the shape of continental politics. But, were the state to cut itself off from the West, this maneuverability would be immediately jeopardized. Quite likely, in this eventuality few leaders in the SED would be happy to see their state revert to a condition little better than its old satellite status.

Additionally, East Berlin must be aware that only through frequent contacts with its adversaries can it ever hope to whittle down the remaining vestiges of its "special" relationship with the FRG. This has been an all-consuming passion for the GDR's leaders since their state's founding in 1949. While a full exchange of diplomatic ties with Bonn seems unlikely, the East Germans can at least hope that some of the less grandiose differences between the two countries (e.g., the Elbe dispute) might be resolved to their satisfaction.

And finally, the SED has to be aware that the GDR's internal order as well is now tied to the ongoing state of relations between the Germanies. Through the vast array of inter-German agreements of the 1970s, East German citizens have grown accustomed to having regular contacts with their cousins in the FRG and to the possibility that some day they themselves might be able to travel to the West. The raising of the minimum exchange rates alone reportedly met with widespread disgruntlement in the GDR. Thus, any further steps to constrict the level of citizen contacts between the two states may add to the party's domestic concerns.

At the same time, however, it is important to remember that East Berlin's commitment to the maintenance of good relations with its adversaries is also contingent on its leaders' conviction that the aforementioned interests will continue to be met through their state's ties with West Germany. This past fall, in fact, the fragility of this proposition was demonstrated when thirteen years of Social Democratic rule ended with

[60] For an analysis of the East Germans' indebtedness and other economic concerns, see Ronald Francisco, "East German Foreign Policy: An Economic Perspective," paper presented at the Wingspread Conference on the GDR in Comparative Perspective, Racine, Wisconsin, April 14-17, 1983.

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the sudden collapse of Helmut Schmidt's SPD-FDP coalition. For their part, the East Germans left no room for doubt about their dismay at the passing of the Schmidt government and their nevousness about its successor, Helmut Kohl's CDU-FDP coalition. But for all of their apprehensions, the GDR's leaders still must have been pleasantly surprised with the fact that the Kohl regime brought only a somewhat less ebullient tone and few changes of substance to Bonn's relations with East Berlin. Whereas twenty years before, the CDU had opposed all official contacts with the GDR, on October 13, 1982, the new Christian Democratic chancellor explicitly confirmed his government's desire to "improve cooperation between the Germanies in the interest of the German people and of their neighbors."[61] Evidently, inter-German business could go on as usual.

While the fulfillment of the GDR's interests was and remains a vital condition for its leaders' commitment to détente, it is also worth noting that this posture is equally dependent on the SED's assessment that the process does not threaten the state's vital domestic concerns. If there was a lesson to the East Germans' reaction to the Polish crisis, it was probably that the party leadership is prepared to sacrifice anything, even the benefits of close inter-German ties, in order to safeguard its internal authority and to maintain its sovereign image. Most recently, in April 1983, this sensitivity to outside challenges to the SED's authority was exposed when the death of a West German citizen on the East German border (which eventually turned out to have resulted from natural causes) intruded to cast a new cloud over GDR-FRG détente. Some West German newspapers hurriedly speculated that the death had come at the hands of East German border guards, and the Bavarian conservative Franz Josef Strauss lost no time in accusing East Berlin of murder. In response, the GDR's news media unleashed a torrent of attacks on their Western counterparts. Then, most consequentially, Erich Honecker canceled all plans to make his own trip to the FRG in 1983.

How inter-German relations will continue to progress from this point, of course, is anyone's guess. But the new government in Bonn, apparently, was not pleased with the turn for the worse in its ties with the GDR, and in mid May the FRG's minister for inter-German affairs pointedly attempted to patch up the differences between the two states by suggesting that both Germanies' interests could be served by regular summit meetings and by indicating that his government was now eager to reach a settlement on the Elbe dispute. Evidently, the East Germans got the message, for toward the end of the month, in an interview with a Japanese

[61] "Aus der Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Kohl," *Deutschland Archiv*, November 1982, p. 1217.

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newspaper, Honecker noted that he was indeed still interested in visiting the FRG.

Naturally, the future of relations between East Berlin and Bonn must also be viewed in the context of their respective alliances. Neither of the states' superpower patrons can be indifferent to what takes place between the Germanies, and there are undoubtedly limits to the kind of inter-German conciliation that both the United States and the Soviet Union would welcome. For example, although it is unclear what Washington could do if the FRG were to put its interests in good relations with the GDR above its commitment to the NATO missile decision, one can be certain that the United States would vehemently oppose such a move. Fortunately for the Western alliance, this sort of problem seems quite remote under Kohl's leadership. Although the West German chancellor has recently pressed for a successful conclusion of the arms negotiations at Geneva and has come out in favor of stronger economic ties between his state and the Eastern bloc, there can be no doubt about his government's commitment to the NATO deployment initiative.

Just how the Soviet Union will choose to respond to the stationing of missiles on West European soil, however, is a considerably more complex question. On the one hand, it is certain that if Moscow were to decide that East Berlin should break off most of its ties with the FRG, the East Germans would hardly have any other choice than to comply. On May 3, in fact, Yuri Andropov hinted ominously at just such a possibility when, in Honecker's company, he warned that NATO's action would force the "USSR, the GDR, and other countries" into taking countermeasures.[62] But this scenario assumes that the Soviets would necessarily be interested in severing one of their strongest links to the West. Actually, if the NATO missiles are deployed, the leaders in the Kremlin may find such a communication channel as that availed by the GDR even more vital than it has been in the past. The escalation of East-West tensions, after all, as in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, could make ongoing contacts between the blocs all the more essential from the Soviet point of view. In addition, Moscow may be eager to use its ties to the West as a way of exploiting any dissenting voices that might emerge on the continent in response to the strategic policy choices of the NATO alliance.

Of course, in the final analysis, no one can predict with certainty what will happen to relations between the Germanies until the NATO missiles are actually installed, if indeed that should come to pass.

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[62] *Pravda*, May 4, 1983. Interestingly, in his response to Andropov, Honecker avoided such warnings to the West, and merely expressed regrets that the positive achievements of the 1970s between the blocs were now in jeopardy. *Pravda*, May 4, 1983.

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There are unquestionably strong forces that would pressure both states, and especially the GDR, into a retreat from their current relations. Nonetheless, if the past is any guide to future behavior, one suspects that equally convincing reasons can be found to shield inter-German ties from the hostilities around them.

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Author's Postscript

In the summer months of 1983, after this article was written, a number of events confirmed that both Germanies would continue to struggle to separate their special relations from the escalation of Great Power tensions. In late June, Kohl's government surprised most observers with the announcement that it was cooperating with a consortium of private banks to guarantee one billion Marks in loans to East Berlin, apparently with no political strings attached. Then, in July, Franz Josef Strauss himself traveled to the GDR and later met with Honecker for an exchange of views. While the visit was originally portrayed as private in nature, it has recently been revealed (*Wall Street Journal*, September 16, 1983) that when Strauss returned to the West he carried with him two secret notes from the East German party head. In the first, Honecker reportedly outlined the areas in which his government planned to continue cooperating with the FRG, including the ransom of political prisoners to Bonn, the improvement of common roadways and postal services, and the renewal of talks on cultural exchange. The second document was a copy of a letter that Honecker had sent to East German border officials earlier in the summer, instructing them to conduct their business more carefully and more politely in the future. As West German authorities interpreted the note, this was practically a tacit admission that East German border guards had been a little too heavy-handed in the past.

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PROSPECTS FOR INDO-U.S. SECURITY TIES*

by Raju G. C. Thomas

Indian defense policies over the past two decades have pivoted largely around Indo-Soviet military cooperation. While not all of India's military capabilities were drawn from the Soviet Union — much came from Western Europe and from indigenous sources — the core weapons systems of the armed services were generally provided by Moscow. These included the purchases of T-54 and PT-76 tanks for the Indian army; the licensed manufacture in India of the MiG-21 interceptor and the purchase of the Sukhoi-7B fighter-bombers for the Indian air force; and the purchase of Osa-class missile boats, F-class submarines, Petya-class frigates, and Kashin-class destroyers for the Indian navy.

There was an underlying strategic rationale for such Indo-Soviet military cooperation; correspondingly, there were certain strategic conditions that precluded Indo-American military collaboration. However, newer global and regional political conditions in the 1980s point to the desirability of reducing India's military ties with the Soviet Union and increasing such ties with the United States.[1] This observation may seem far-reaching, especially in view of the somewhat brittle relations that have prevailed in the past between Washington and New Delhi and of the cordial relations between New Delhi and Moscow. Nevertheless, the possibility does arise for a number of reasons.

First, certain fundamental changes have occurred in the nature of the relationship among India, Pakistan, and China at the regional level and among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union at the global level. India's relations with its traditional adversaries have considerably improved since the turn of this decade. Meanwhile, earlier expectations

*I wish to thank the Institute for the Study of World Politics in New York and the Center for International and Strategic Affairs at U.C.L.A. for grants and research facilities in writing this article.

[1] This observation constitutes a substantial change from my earlier assessments of various aspects of Indian defense policy. See, in particular, my "Security Relationships in Southern Asia: Differences in the Indian and American Perspectives," *Asian Survey*, July 1981, pp. 689-709, and "Indian Defense Policy: Continuity and Change under the Janata Government," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1980, pp. 223-44.

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of military cooperation between the United States and China have receded, mainly because of various differences over Taiwan and the United States' unwillingness to transfer sensitive military technology to China. Whether it is for this reason or not, Beijing has sought to de-emphasize its ties with Washington and improve them with Moscow.

Second, economic ties between India and the United States have been growing rapidly over the past two to three years. A record number of joint industrial ventures are being established in India between Indian and U.S. companies. This new trend has been facilitated by the government of India's present policy of providing greater incentives for the private sector. The growing economic ties may be expected to bring about a higher level of economic interdependence between the two countries. Such interdependence generally leads to the perception of mutual security interests, not unlike the security relationships among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

Third, India's weapons procurement strategy now places greater emphasis on the licensed manufacture of sophisticated weapons in India in collaboration with overseas manufacturers. Given the proliferation of joint civilian-industrial ventures in India between the two countries, opportunities now exist for the extension of such activities to defense production as well. The co-production of sophisticated weapons in India, which implies the absorption of advanced military technology from abroad, has become feasible in recent years because India has established a viable economic, technological, and managerial infrastructure. Indo-U.S. military co-production could prove economically beneficial to both countries and could advance the security interests of both states in the region.

Finally, the improved prospects for establishing closer Indo-U.S. security ties arise from the significant shift in India's concept of security. The military approach to security that came to the fore following the 1962 Sino-Indian war appears to be less important in the light of various economic and internal security problems that have occurred since the mid 1970s. Security is now perceived to mean the establishment of domestic as well as regional economic, political, and military stability. This change is inherent in the composition and mandate of the newer security policymaking bodies, which are now concerned with a variety of problems stretching from industrial unrest and regional separatist movements to problems of defense and military strategy. This change in the concept of security provides the most relevant basis for pursuing security ties between India and the United States, for it implies that security relationships may be established not only on the basis of mutual perceptions of a common enemy but on common economic interests and political values.

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Clearly, if closer Indo-U.S. security ties are to come about, the relationship will differ from some of the military links between the United States and other countries. Disagreements between the two countries still persist on such questions as the nature of global and regional threats and the appropriate political and military responses to them. My analysis, therefore, suggests a basis for long-term security ties without postulating the existence of commonly perceived direct or immediate threats to the region. There is certainly a greater disillusionment and anger in India about the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which differs sharply from the more sympathetic response of Indira Gandhi's government in early 1980. However, there is still less concern in India regarding the Soviet threat to Southwest Asia.

From the Indian standpoint, these differences imply, first, that the U.S. doctrine of "containment," whether of communism in general or of the Soviet Union in particular, must be shelved in seeking ties with India. Instead, the common objectives of India and the United States must be defined less in terms of East-West confrontations and more in the context of North-South cooperation.

Second, Indo-U.S. security ties must develop gradually from Indo-U.S. economic ties. This would be quite unlike the origins of U.S. ties with other Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, or Thailand, where economic ties have tended to be an offshoot of military ties that were established to deal with commonly perceived threats to the region. Especially since no common enemy or enemies can be postulated for establishing a military alliance between India and the United States, the relationship will have to be built on the concept of security as presently emphasized by India. In terms of this concept, the ultimate purpose of the proposed U.S. policy in the region would be the promotion of regional economic cooperation mainly through U.S. participation and, with it, the prospect of fostering regional political stability and security.

Past Failures in Establishing Indo-U.S. Security Ties

The basis for Indo-Soviet military collaboration was already being established in the late 1950s, as Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations began to deteriorate almost simultaneously. These two trends culminated in the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962 and the open ideological rift between Moscow and Beijing in July 1963. While the 1962 Sino-Indian war eventually proved to be a turning point in the relationship between Moscow and New Delhi, there were prospects for Indo-U.S. military cooperation during and immediately after that war.

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After a decade of professing the virtues of peaceful coexistence with the communist states and alleging that U.S.-sponsored military alliances in the 1950s were the prime cause of global and regional tensions, disillusionment grew in New Delhi about continuing these close relations. If the slogan "Hindi Chini Bhai! Bhai!" (Indians and Chinese are brothers!) could suddenly result in war between India and China, could there not be a similar end to India's cordial relations with the Soviet Union?[2] Besides, the intensity of the Sino-Soviet rift was not yet clear, and if a second showdown were to take place with China, ideological affinity and commitment between the two communist giants might lead to a quick resolution of their differences. Communist solidarity might take precedence over cordial Indo-Soviet relations that carried no similar ideological commitment. In retrospect, then, India's refusal to join U.S.-sponsored defense pacts in the 1950s appeared to be a case of poor judgment on the part of Indian decisionmakers. In 1962 the time seemed ripe to rectify the situation.

No significant military collaboration, however, took place between India and the United States. With the Sino-Indian war still in progress, there was a brief rush of nonlethal British and U.S. military equipment to India.[3] But when India attempted to obtain the F-104 Starfighter, an aircraft supplied to Pakistan under the SEATO and CENTO pacts, the request was denied. After the war ended, the United States offered to set up two ordnance factories in India but withdrew from the collaborative venture following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, when a general U.S. arms embargo was imposed on both belligerent states. In order to minimize further bloodshed between two noncommunist states, neither of which was then perceived to be vital to U.S. global security plans, the Johnson administration expressed its unwillingness to supply

[2] For detailed discussion of the origins and causes of the Sino-Indian war, see George N. Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi* (London: Faber and Faber, 1963); Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970); and Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1975). For an interpretation of the war by the head of Intelligence Bureau at the time, who was partly blamed for the Indian military defeat, see B. N. Mullik, *The Chinese Betrayal* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971). As the title of Mullik's book indicates, the Chinese attack was a betrayal of India's trust in the Sino-Indian declaration of peaceful coexistence that was embodied in the 1954 Sino-Indian treaty on the status of Tibet. This treaty ended the dispute over Tibet's autonomous or independent status. India acknowledged the sovereignty of China over the region, but with considerable misgivings. Against Mullik's position, Maxwell argued that it was India's "forward policy" after 1959 that led to the conflict in 1962. (This policy involved military incursions by poorly equipped Indian troops into disputed border areas on orders from New Delhi. The orders were given by Nehru in the belief that the Chinese would not retaliate massively to such provocations.) Whiting's analysis may provide the most objective interpretation: "Chinese warnings were erroneously dismissed by India as either without serious basis or consequence while Indian statements designed for domestic purposes were taken in Peking as proof of belligerent intent. This phenomenon did not cause the final clash but it contributed to the escalatory process."

[3] For a discussion of these issues, see Raju G. C. Thomas, *The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics* (New Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India, 1978; Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1978), pp. 153, 186-191.

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further arms unless the Kashmir dispute was peacefully resolved. In particular, the United States viewed arming India to meet the Chinese threat as posing a threat to the security of Pakistan, a state that had allied itself with the United States in the anticommunist SEATO and CENTO defense pacts.

Thus, despite the opportunity presented after the 1962 Sino-Indian war, no security ties were established between India and the United States because of the impasse in Indo-Pakistani relations over the Kashmir issue, and the possibility of such ties vanished with the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 over the disputed territory of Kashmir. In this war, U.S. arms supplied to Pakistan to contain potential communist advances into the region were used against India, thus confirming Indian Prime Minister Nehru's claim in the 1950s that Pakistan's motive for joining SEATO and CENTO had more to do with India than the Soviet Union or China.

It is interesting to note that despite the poor relations between India and the United States after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war (which were aggravated further first by Indian condemnations of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and later by the Nixon-Kissinger tilt toward Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis and Indo-Pakistani war of 1971), *there was never any direct conflict of interest between the two countries*.[4] What prevented Indo-U.S. military collaboration was, first, India's refusal to accept the U.S. claim that there was a global communist menace and consequently to join the Western-sponsored military alliances; and, second, India's perception of the vital role of Indo-Soviet military collaboration to ensure its security against the then allied states of Pakistan and China.

The Sino-Pakistani threat and Indian dependence on the Soviet Union was further accentuated when Nixon and Kissinger sought rapprochement with China at the height of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, especially since using military force appeared to be the best way to foster the Bangladesh independence movement. At this point the Indira Gandhi government perceived an urgent need to forestall any diversionary Chinese attack in the sensitive and disputed Northeast Frontier Agency (now renamed the state of Arunachel Pradesh within the Indian Union), an area that lay between the Chinese Tibetan and (then) East Pakistani borders. Indian military plans for the liberation of Bangladesh had envisaged the diversion of at least three Indian mountain divisions from India's northeast frontier with China, where the Chinese just a decade before had

[4] For a study of this issue, see Baldev Raj Nayar, "Treat India Seriously," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1975, pp. 133-54; Raju G. C. Thomas, "Security Relationships in Southern Asia," pp. 689-709; and Francine R. Frankel, "India's Promise," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1980, pp. 51-66. For the Pakistani perspective, see Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Proxies and Allies: The Case of Iran and Pakistan," ORBIS, Summer 1980, pp. 339-52.

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inflicted a crushing military defeat on the Indian army. Of even greater relevance during the crisis of 1971 was the potential threat of Chinese nuclear blackmail. A nuclear threat appeared all the more credible because of the perceived loss of the earlier tacit U.S. guarantee against a nuclear-armed China. These newer crisis circumstances emphasized the need for even closer ties with the Soviet Union, especially in view of India's decision in 1971 to resolve the Bangladesh issue by force. The immediate result of this unexpected set of circumstances was the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship in August 1971.

While India may have gained most of its immediate objectives in the December war of 1971 against Pakistan, the longer-term implications of its global strategic alignments had yet to be resolved. The 1971 war elicited threats of intervention by China and the appearance of the nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier *Enterprise* in the vicinity of the Bay of Bengal in a show of gunboat diplomacy. These experiences may have led to the Indian decision in early 1972 to proceed with the testing of a nuclear device, which was eventually detonated in May 1974. Indo-Soviet military cooperation alone may have appeared insufficient in the long run, considering the prospect of a combination of Washington, Beijing, and Islamabad, even if there continued to be no *direct* conflict of interests between India and the United States. The need to develop an independent nuclear deterrent may, therefore, have seemed imperative.

The Changing Strategic Environment

On the regional level, there are increasing conciliation and cooperation between India and Pakistan. This trend is not necessarily the result of the prospect of Sino-Soviet reconciliation or of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Indo-Pakistani reconciliation began before either of these events and appears to have arisen from a Pakistani willingness to recognize the futility of continued confrontation with India over Kashmir and its acceptance of India's growing military pre-eminence on the subcontinent.

While the shift in Sino-Soviet relations may suggest a partial return to cooperation between the two communist giants in the future, the change in Indo-Pakistani relations is unprecedented. Until now, continued hostility between India and Pakistan has prevented either of the two superpowers from drawing one or the other into its global strategy. U.S. efforts in the 1950s to draw in both India and Pakistan to meet the perceived communist threat failed, and Soviet efforts to act as the honest broker following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war—and, later, to draw both states into its collective security pact against China—also failed. On the other hand, efforts to arm only one of the two states as part of a global

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strategy merely provoked the other state to seek arms from the opposing superpower, thereby increasing the tempo of the arms race on the subcontinent but making no ostensible military contribution to either superpower's global strategy.

The significance of the present global and regional situation is that closer Indo-U.S. security ties may be attempted in the context of a coordinated policy toward all the states of South Asia. It is no longer possible for Pakistan to attempt to maintain a military balance with India, although it will continue to maintain sufficient defense capability to raise the cost of—and hence deter—a possible Indian attack on its territory. In future, however, Indian military preponderance may be viewed as less threatening to the security and stability of all countries in the region. This tendency was manifested recently in the resolution of some of the basic territorial, political, and economic issues between India and Bangladesh and in the continued efforts by both India and Pakistan to enter into a "no-war" pact.

Especially noteworthy is the increasing willingness of all the states of South Asia to step up the pace of economic cooperation among themselves.[5] Undoubtedly, there are still obstacles in the way of such economic cooperation, not the least of which is Indian economic preponderance in the region, which may lead the smaller states to fear economic domination and eventual absorption into a greater India. Perhaps the role of Indonesia in promoting economic cooperation among states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could become a model for India and South Asia. Under President Suharto, Indonesia has deliberately sought to maintain a low profile within ASEAN to reduce fears among the smaller states within this regional system of economic cooperation. Economic efforts in Southeast Asia, in turn, have led to efforts to promote ZOPFAN—the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality. A similar approach by India could lead to economic advantages and political stability in South Asia as well. A variety of consumer and capital goods imported by Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are available more cheaply from India because of lower labor, freight, and transportation costs. India could import some of its neighbors' raw materials and serve as a larger market for their finished products.

A greater exchange of goods and services within South Asia will be facilitated by the domestic economic policies now being pursued

[5] In December 1981, India and Pakistan established a joint commission to promote cooperation between their governments in a number of fields. See *New York Times*, December 24, 1982. See also T. K. Jayaraman, *Economic Cooperation in the Subcontinent: A Customs Union Approach* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1978); Ashok Vyas, "Good Augury for Regional Cooperation," *Overseas Hindustan Times*, November 19, 1981; and Stephen P. Cohen, "Prospects in South Asia: How to Promote Cooperation," *Times of India*, December 18, 1982.

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by all states in the region. After three decades of socialist experiments of varying types, these states are now giving more encouragement to the private sector. A more liberal international trade policy is also being pursued which contrasts sharply with the past heavy emphasis on protectionism, especially by India. All this augurs well for a common U.S. economic policy toward the South Asian states. Such successful economic collaboration would further improve conditions for military collaboration in the region.

Two questions need to be resolved: (1) Given the condition that no common enemy is perceived, what would be the purpose of seeking closer Indo-U.S. ties, especially security ties? (2) To what extent may such ties be promoted without upsetting India's traditional foreign policy of nonalignment, without aggravating Pakistan's sense of security, and while meeting Indian criteria for the transfer of military technology?

The Economic and Political Basis for Indo-U.S. Security Ties

Within limits, there would be several advantages for both countries in closer economic, political, and, eventually, military ties between the United States and India. Although the point has been made before, and although the benefits may continue to appear intangible and obscure, there is some truth to the observation that these two countries are the world's most powerful and most populous democracies. Until recently, this commonality of political values meant little in the conduct of their respective foreign policies, which generally ran at cross purposes at the height of the Cold War. For both states, national security objectives overrode the active promotion of democratic values abroad. As a consequence, the United States often found itself allied with or supporting various dictatorships in the Third World whose allegiances were largely based on their anticommunist foreign policies. Likewise, India found itself apologizing for, supporting, or colluding with communist policies in Europe and Asia—the Soviet Union in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan; China in Tibet; and Vietnam in Kampuchea.

Today, however, the promotion of common domestic political values abroad may tend to coincide with the promotion of their national security policies. As noted earlier, strategic alignments within the global Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangle and within the regional Islamabad-Beijing-New Delhi triangle are being transformed so as to make Indo-U.S. security ties possible, if not essential. But there could be incentives from the political and economic standpoints. With no direct or indirect conflict of strategic interests at present, both states may find a vested interest in promoting democratic governments—globally for the United States and regionally for India. In the long run, the success of the U.S. and Indian

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democratic systems would at least strengthen the cause of these values in the communist and Third worlds: witness the Solidarity movement in Poland and similar latent aspirations in other parts of communist Eastern Europe, and the repeated domestic pressures in Bangladesh and Pakistan to establish democracies.

There is also an economic basis for security ties. Unlike the past, when the United States mainly "gave" (foreign aid) and India mainly "received," leading to accusations of "ingratitude" or "exploitation" on either side, today there are prospects for economic cooperation for mutual benefit.

India's past socialist and restrictive trade practices are now being substantially curtailed, opening up a greater potential for profitable foreign and especially U.S. investments. For instance, in one year, from 1981 to 1982, the number of new manufacturing licenses granted to the private sector in India grew by five times over the previous year.[6] Although there may be fewer branches of foreign firms in India than there were a decade ago, the total assets of such firms have more than doubled. One reason for the decline in the number of branches of foreign firms in India has been mainly a result of the government of India's policy of encouraging joint investment ventures between Indian and overseas manufacturers that enables about half the profits to be retained in India and provides for the transfer of technology from abroad.

Over nine hundred new joint industrial enterprises were established between 1980 and 1982. Compared to the negligible U.S. participation in the past, when the British, the French, the Germans, and the Japanese provided most of the collaboration, U.S. companies have taken the lead in such joint ventures established over the last two years, providing 210 of the 915 joint ventures established between 1980 and 1982, with the British providing the second highest participation (189 joint ventures). U.S. investments in India now constitute 20 per cent of the total foreign investments in India, almost all having occurred within a period of two years. Although the United States has been India's foremost import and export trading partner over the last thirty years (the Soviet Union has during a couple of years served as India's main export market), the present growth of U.S. investments in India adds considerably to the mutual economic dependencies of the two countries.

Internal political conditions in India also suggest possibilities for a more stable Indo-U.S. relationship, as compared to many other Third World countries. The pursuit of common strategic objectives and the promotion of military ties are feasible only if there is some degree of

[6] *Christian Science Monitor* (special supplement on India), July 30, 1982.

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domestic political stability and continuity in foreign policy among the states involved. Periodic internal political upheavals because of coups and countercoups, revolutions and civil wars, or constant changes in governments, each demanding a radical change in foreign policy, have been endemic in the Third World. Even where these events have not occurred, the prevalence of conditions that are likely to lead to them would be enough to discourage the formulation of more long-term U.S. policies toward these states. The United States' experience in Iran and fears of similar upheavals occurring in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt indicate the tenuous basis of U.S. policy in the region.

In contrast, there has been a comparatively smooth continuity in foreign policy in the case of India. Except for the brief phase of Indira Gandhi's "emergency" and the suppression of the Indian democratic constitution between 1975 and 1977, India has experienced relative internal political stability, especially in the functioning of the central government. Periodic instabilities in some of the Indian states have not as yet threatened to upset the overall stability of the national political system. India's present approach to security management that deals with problems of both internal and external security through the enlarged composition and broader mandate of the newer security policymaking bodies augurs well for the future stability of the Indian democratic polity. Indeed, even the invocation of the national "emergency" by Mrs. Gandhi between 1975 and 1977 is interpreted by many analysts as having been carried out constitutionally (in the letter if not the spirit).[7] The emergency restored political order and economic growth following a year of severe crisis in 1975. In any case, following the Indian experience with the emergency, there is considerable wariness in both ruling and opposition political circles of this extreme constitutional measure's being used again at the national level. The possibility of a future breakdown of the Indian democratic process appears remote.

This belief is reinforced by the firm control held by civilian political authorities over the military, which in India is genuinely apolitical and has no ambitions to seize political power. There may be some misgivings at military headquarters about military inputs into defense decisionmaking (especially following the merging of the internal and external security policymaking bodies), about resources allocated to the defense effort, and about the distribution of resources among the armed services. But this is not unlike conditions found in the Western democracies, where there is little threat of a military takeover. Thus, at the

[7] For studies of the emergency, see Henry C. Hart, ed., *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), and Mary C. Carras, *Indira Gandhi in the Crucible of Leadership: A Political Biography* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).

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economic, political, military, and strategic levels, conditions are conducive to a relatively smooth and effective relationship between India and the United States.

In spite of these encouraging conditions and trends, there has been no collaboration between India and the United States in defense matters. Almost all of India's arms imports are from the Soviet Union and from West European states, as are almost all of the arrangements entered into for the licensed production of arms in India in collaboration with overseas manufacturers. There are several reasons that no such defense collaboration has occurred between India and the United States. These reasons, as well as the policies that may be adopted to overcome obstacles to collaboration, now need to be discussed.

Constraints on Indo-U.S. Security Ties

In the past, there were three main obstacles to Indo-American security ties: (1) India's nonalignment policy and consequent refusal to join in formal military pacts or even to acknowledge the communist states as a global military threat; (2) Pakistani objections that the U.S. arming of India would prove detrimental to its own security, together with the U.S. willingness to sustain such objections; and (3) the political, financial, and technical terms offered by Washington for the sale of U.S. arms or the transfer of military technology to India.

Indian Nonalignment. As regards the first obstacle, India's foreign policy and security perceptions have not changed fundamentally. However, this position is less of an obstacle today than in the past.[8] Informal and flexible military cooperation with external powers—as against formal defense pacts—is no longer perceived by New Delhi to violate its traditional policy of nonalignment. For instance, the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship contained clauses of a quasi-military nature: mutual consultations during times of grave threats to each other's security and an agreement not to enter into military arrangements that would prove harmful to the other nation's security. The timing of the treaty (August 1971) suggested that it was intended to forestall any form of Chinese or U.S. military intervention during the Indo-Pakistani war over Bangladesh in December 1971. While Indian arms purchases from Western Europe were usually on a straightforward commercial basis, arms purchases from the Soviet Union have usually been on concessional

[8] See P. R. Chari, "Nonalignment and International Security," in *Role of Nonalignment in a Changing World*. Proceedings of a seminar held at the India International Center, April 28-29, 1976 (New Delhi: India International Center Publications, 1976), pp. 68-81, and Raju G. C. Thomas, "Nonalignment and Indian Security: Nehru's Rationale and Legacy," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, September 1979, pp. 153-71.

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credit terms that involved rupee payments or low interest rates on rouble credit provided by Moscow.

India's continued objections to participation in formal military alliances must also be seen in the context of the growing obsolescence of such security arrangements. Of all the major alliances that developed in the post-World War II era, only NATO and the Warsaw Pact have remained in approximately original form. Both SEATO and CENTO are now defunct, while the purpose and effectiveness of ANZUS is unclear. The hemispheric military objectives of the Rio Pact appear to exist only on paper, especially after the 1982 Anglo-Argentine war over the Falkland Islands. Similarly, U.S. security treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are under considerable pressure for radical revision or even termination. Even the purpose and effectiveness of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in their present forms are questionable. The withdrawal of France, "internal" strife between Greece and Turkey, the ability of neutral states such as Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia to maintain their security without participation in military alliances, and the constant dissension within NATO about force deployments all suggest the weakness of NATO. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, the virtually forced participation of the East European countries suggests that Moscow's "allies" may prove to be its worst enemies during times of conflict. Finally, two past members of SEATO and CENTO—Pakistan and Iran—now profess nonalignment, while Thailand and the Philippines may feel peer pressure in Asia to do the same.

In contrast to the breakdown or weaknesses of the old alliance arrangements that arose after World War II, almost all the more recent military arrangements between the United States and other countries tend to be of an informal nature. These include arms transfers to and defense arrangements with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, the last country being still a part of the nonaligned group of nations. More pertinently, Pakistan, which recently joined the nonaligned group, has continued its military links with the United States. A recent agreement stipulates that Pakistan is to receive $2.5 billion worth of arms including F-16 fighters, TOW antitank missiles, and M-48A tanks, almost all of which are to be paid for by Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Pakistan remains within the nonaligned group of nations, although it continues to argue that it is a front-line state in Washington's regional strategy following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

What is noteworthy about the newer military arrangements is the tacit acknowledgment of common strategic interests among nations, usually along bilateral lines without the existence of formal military alliances. Such strategic alignments without formal military commitments on either side enable the recipient state to maintain and project an in-

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dependent foreign policy. This arrangement is important to Third World nations, who are the recipients of the arms or other forms of military support needed to maintain their political credibility at home and abroad. Adverse political reaction to formal participation in military pacts with the major powers may lead to allegations of political subservience by other Third World countries and to adverse domestic political reactions that may lead to the government's violent overthrow.

There are advantages to the arms suppliers or the major power with whom informal military ties are established. For the arms suppliers, the lack of formal commitments enables them to avoid regional military entanglements that do not serve their global strategic objectives. High expectations about military manpower, weapons, and financial contributions often lead to bickerings and misunderstandings that may be avoided under these informal arrangements. Yet another problem likely to be minimized involves the less publicized relationship between the military personnel of either side. Formal and rigid military ties have often meant junior military personnel from the major power (colonels, captains, and wing commanders) providing instructions and orders to senior ranking military personnel in the weaker military state (generals, admirals, and air marshals). Such unsatisfactory military relationships partly contributed to the collapse of Soviet-Egyptian military ties; conversely, it was the minimization or avoidance of such a potentially harmful relationship among Soviet and Indian military personnel that ensured the survival of Indo-Soviet military ties.

Undoubtedly, excessive military flexibility and independence of action on both sides may mean some loss in the synchronization of common military strategies, and the lack of formal and explicit military commitments may make military planning more difficult during times of peace. However, when war does occur and the security objectives of the collaborating states are involved, consultations and the synchronization of military plans may be quickly established. More specifically, there may be several pressures involved in promoting formal or informal Indo-American military ties, given the free press in both countries and the often tactless rhetoric in and outside the U.S. Congress and the Indian parliament. On the other hand, it is because such conditions exist that more flexible military arrangements become necessary between India and the United States.

Pakistani Objections. Any U.S. attempt to sell arms to India or engage in the co-production of arms for India would probably still provoke protests from Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan are conditioned to protest any U.S. arms transfers to the other state. However, such objections are likely to be more short-term and less vociferous than in the past. For example, the initial Indian reaction to the U.S. decision to sell $2.5

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billion worth of arms to Pakistan drew strong Indian protests.[9] India immediately called off the Indo-Pakistani negotiations for a "no-war" pact on the grounds that the new Pakistani acquisitions did not suggest the desire to resolve disputes peacefully. Official protests sent to the U.S. government were soon followed by steps to offset the U.S. arms sale to Pakistan. This mainly involved a quick Franco-Indian agreement for the initial purchase of 40 Mirage-2000 fighters and the possible later assembly and manufacture of another 110 of the aircraft. The current estimated cost of the deal is about $3.3 billion.[10] Subsequently, as initial Indian fear of the American arms transfer to Pakistan was allayed, India re-entered the negotiations for a "no-war" pact with Pakistan. Indo-Pakistani ties as well as Indo-American ties have continued to improve since then.

These reactions indicate genuine fears in both India and Pakistan about any major U.S. arms transfers to the other state. The problem will continue to challenge the decisionmakers on all sides. The current optimism that such problems may be resolved arises from the fact that war over Kashmir seems less likely and the level of Indo-Pakistani hostility is considerably lower than a decade ago. As pointed out earlier, economic, social, and cultural cooperation is on the increase, and these trends in turn point to the growing viability of fostering defense cooperation as well on the subcontinent.

The advantages of the new opportunity may be seen in a quick comparison of the pre- and post-independence defense strategies. Unlike the case of British India, one of the paradoxes of the post-independence era in South Asia was that the defense capabilities of India and Pakistan—the two states created out of British India—were mainly directed against each other. In contrast, the earlier British Indian defense policy was a basically outward-looking one that sought to defend the frontiers of the subcontinent. This made considerable sense because, historically,

[9] The transfer of U.S. arms to Pakistan has been a burning issue since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A series of reports and discussions has appeared in Indian and Pakistani newspapers since 1980. For some analyses dealing with arms transfers to Pakistan as part of a U.S. response to the Afghan crisis, see Francis Fukuyama, "The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report," Rand Note N-1584-RC, September 1980; Larry A. Niksch, "Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response," Issue Brief no. 1B8006, Congressional Research Service, December 12, 1980; and Selig Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1981-82, pp. 84-102. For three studies of the Pakistani-U.S. relationship, see Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Thomas Perry Thornton, "Between the Stools: United States Policy Towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration," *Asian Survey*, October 1982, pp. 959-977; and Christopher Van Hollen, "Leaning on Pakistan," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1980, pp. 35-50.

[10] These preliminary figures were reported in the *Times of India*, October 27, 1981. So far, only the purchase of 40 Mirage-2000s has been agreed upon, and deliveries are likely to begin from 1984 onward. The later assembly and licensed manufacture of another 110 Mirage-2000s have yet to be finalized. See *Times of India*, October 10, 1982. For an analysis of this agreement, see Inder Malhotra, "Beyond the Mirage Deal: Future Needs of Air Defense," *Times of India*, February 18, 1982. For my analysis of another recent aircraft decision, see "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force: The Context and Implications of the Jaguar Decision," ORBIS, Spring 1980, pp. 85-101.

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internal confrontations and conflicts within the subcontinent invariably resulted in invasions and conquests by external forces. The ability of the British to consolidate their Indian empire, to establish the buffer states of Persia (Iran), Afghanistan, Tibet, and Siam (Thailand), and to set up an Indian defense apparatus under a unified British command enabled them to stop the Japanese military advance on the Burma-India border and may have been instrumental in deterring a Russian advance through Afghanistan.

No doubt, present strategic conditions and the weapons systems available do not suggest the adoption of similar historical British military strategies by the successor states of India and Pakistan. But the need for a unified subcontinental defense against external threats remains. What is probably more important is the fact that the subcontinent cannot be defended against external threats without India's cooperation. To pursue a strategy of regional defense of South Asia by drawing in only Pakistan—as the United States did under SEATO and CENTO to contain a perceived communist threat or, more recently, to contain the Soviet threat following the invasion of Afghanistan—would prove less than successful. As in the past, such a policy would only aggravate the internal confrontation and escalate the arms race within the subcontinent. It would compel India to seek arms elsewhere, especially from the Soviet Union, thereby defeating U.S. strategy in the region. This sequence of events has already occurred twice. In the 1950s, following the U.S. supply of F-104 Starfighters, F-86 Sabres and B-57B Canberra aircraft, and M-47/48 Patton tanks, India entered the West European arms market and purchased British and French Hunter, Mystere, and Canberra aircraft and the Centurion and AMX-13 tanks. In the 1980s, following the proposed supply of F-16 fighters, M-48A tanks, and TOW antitank missiles, India has concluded a purchase agreement for the French Mirage-2000 aircraft and sought to co-produce the MiG-27 Flogger-D aircraft and the T-72 tank in India.

In the present situation, India does not fully share Pakistan's fears of a major Soviet threat to the subcontinent, any more than Pakistan shared India's perceptions of a major Chinese threat to the subcontinent following the occupation of Tibet and the 1962 Sino-Indian war.[11] Instead, India officially continues to perceive in the Soviet invasion of

[11] Explanations for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and proposals for appropriate responses continue to vary. For a sample of perspectives, see Lord Saint Brides, "Afghanistan: The Empire Plays to Win," ORBIS, Fall 1980, pp. 533-40; "Epilogue" in Louis Dupree's *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Lawrence Ziring, "Afghanistan: The Contemporary Pivot of Great Power Relations," in Raju G. C. Thomas, *The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 22-45; Raju G. C. Thomas, "The Afghan Crisis and South Asian Security," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1981, pp. 415-34; and Jagat Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1982, pp. 139-53.

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Afghanistan a similarity to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which, according to Indian assessments, was characterized by misinterpretation of Ho Chi Minh's war of nationalism as well as by an exaggerated perception of a monolithic communist threat to Asia. Likewise, the Soviet military invasion is perceived to have arisen from an initial Soviet political involvement with the new Marxist regime—which seized power through a series of accidental events and the opportunism of Khalq leader Hafizullah Amin—rather than from any planned Soviet design. Subsequently, there were fears in Moscow that Amin was about to do an "Anwar Sadat" act by expelling the Soviets and turning to the United States to ensure Afghan independence. The result would have been the loss of a country that Moscow had considered to be under its sphere of influence since the British left India in 1947, as well as an increase in the Kremlin's feeling of encirclement.

Although the immediate Indian reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to accept the Soviet explanation of events and consequences, the continued Soviet occupation and the escalating war in Afghanistan have begun to produce a less sympathetic attitude in New Delhi. Both India and Pakistan have always agreed that Soviet troops should be withdrawn, although their views differ on the timing and the political conditions to be established for Soviet withdrawal. However, as the Soviet occupation continues, there may be a greater convergence of views as both India and Pakistan perceive the essential need for coordinated plans to defend the subcontinent against external forces. The lessons of history will become increasingly apparent. Even without common perceptions of external threats, the need for defense cooperation may become a desirable outgrowth of ongoing Indo-Pakistani economic cooperation. There would be sufficient economic reasons for defense collaboration among the nations of the subcontinent so as to ease the defense burden and channel such released resources for the urgent tasks of development.

The Terms of U.S. Arms Transfers. The third obstacle to Indo-U.S. military cooperation may be found in the U.S. terms for the transfer of arms and military technology to India. The problem may be best understood by examining three basic arms procurement strategies adopted by India in the past: indigenous production, licensed production in collaboration with an overseas manufacturer, and overseas purchases.[12] Of the three strategies, indigenous production of the needed weapons was the first preference from the political standpoint, since this promised the ability to conduct an independent foreign policy without external pres-

[12] A detailed study of the applications of these options may also be found in my chapters on the army, air force, and navy in *The Defence of India* (New Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India, 1978).

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sures. On the other hand, direct overseas purchases in the international arms market tended to be the first preference from the military standpoint, since this promised access to the most advanced weapons that might be available to India's adversaries. In the ultimate analysis, the importance of avoiding external pressures by establishing an indigenous weapons production base as well as the importance of acquiring weapons of advanced technology led to the compromise third strategy whereby India would seek collaborative arrangements for the manufacture of advanced foreign weapons in India. The compromise strategy usually implied an initial purchase of the desired weapon, followed by part assembly and production of the weapon in India, finally leading to the acquisition of the complete technology of the weapon and the manufacture of all or most of the components and parts within India. Consequently, negotiations for the procurement of weapons from abroad invariably raised the question of whether the manufacturing concern and its government were willing to transfer the technology and help set up production facilities in India for profitable but reasonable royalty fees.

The U.S. terms for the transfer of arms and military technology have not conformed to this set of Indian policy requirements. The most obvious example of such divergent policies may be the 1980 Indian negotiations for the purchase of the TOW antitank missiles and tube launchers for the Indian armored divisions and the M-198 howitzers for the mountain divisions. These two items on the Indian shopping list were valued at about $350 million and were expected to set in motion greater Indo-U.S. military collaboration in the future.[13] However, according to Indian reports, Washington insisted on immediate cash payments with deliveries to be made over a period of four years. The U.S. government also claimed the right to cancel the contract in future if political circumstances in the region warranted such a move or if, subsequently, the U.S. Congress authorized its cancellation. From the U.S. standpoint, however, the terms of arms transfers to India are claimed to be the same as to all friendly nations, including those of NATO. Instead, India is believed to be demanding special terms that conform to its policies adopted at home regarding the supply of spares and technology transfers. Note that these differences at present appear to be on the brink of resolution, as both sides are reported to be close to an agreement on the sale of $1 billion worth of machine guns, mobile howitzers, and C-130 aircraft. Indo-U.S. negotiations have also included the possibility of importing Northrup's F-20

[13] See *International Herald Tribune*, October 11-12, 1980; *Hindustan Times*, January 1, 1981; and *Statesman*, January 20, 1981. The reasons that the Indo-U.S. arms negotiations failed were discussed in a report distributed by the Press Trust of India by P. K. S. Namboodiri, "Constraints on Buying U.S. Arms," January 11, 1981.

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Tiger Shark jet fighters[14] and later manufacturing them under license in India. (The F-20 is an upgraded version of the earlier F-5G.)

Another example is the Indian experience with the Indo-U.S. agreement to supply enriched uranium fuel for the U.S.-supplied Tarapur nuclear power reactor.[15] Despite the existence of an international contract between the two countries, the passage of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act by the U.S. Congress some fifteen years later suddenly produced a refusal to supply enriched uranium unless India adhered to the new terms set by Congress.

The second problem faced by Indian negotiators has been the U.S. unwillingness to enter into co-production arrangements in overseas countries, except with NATO countries. This applies especially to the type of modern high-technology weapons that India now seeks, weapons that Washington considers to be sensitive technology that may fall into the wrong hands. In contrast, the Indian experience with the Soviet Union and Western Europe has been different. Although initially the Soviets only agreed to co-produce or even sell weapons that were at least one generation behind the first-line weapons deployed by their own armed forces (e.g., the licensed production of the MiG-21 interceptor in India and the sale of the Sukhoi-7B and T-54/55 tanks), today they are prepared to co-produce in India some of their best weapons, including the MiG-27 aircraft and the T-72 tank. No doubt there have been reports that Washington may be willing to allow the co-production of Northrup's F-5G/F-20 interceptor in India, especially following the reported breakdown of Northrup's efforts to co-produce this plane in Taiwan because of Beijing's objections. But Indian ambitions and expectations for the co-production of weapons have greatly escalated in qualitative terms, and the F-20 may be no longer considered useful in India's future defense plans.

Finally, India insists on easier financial terms both for direct purchases and for the licensed manufacture of weapons in India. It is here that the Soviets have been most generous by offering liberal rouble credit at nominal interest rates. Soviet credit is spread over fifteen years at around 2 per cent, with the possibility of an additional five-year grace period. Even Britain, France, Sweden, and West Germany have become inclined to provide some concessional terms through more liberal finan-

[14] See "India Said to be on the Verge of $1 Billion Arms Deal with U.S.," *New York Times*, May 20, 1983.

[15] See *Times of India*, January 14 and May 18, 1980; *Hindu*, November 27 and 28, 1981; *Wall Street Journal*, July 30, 1982. See, also, Nani A. Palkhivala, "U.S. Defeating Own Purpose: Impact of Non-Proliferation Act," *Times of India*, February 25, 1980; Manohar Trakoo, "Fuel for Tarapur," *Indian and Foreign Review*, July 15, 1981; and N. C. Menon, "Tarapur and All That," *Overseas Hindustan Times*, April 20, 1981.

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cial credit and buy-back arrangements of components and spares that are made in India. This has become possible as co-production arrangements involve the manufacture of the first-line weapons of the West European states. The West European anxiety to push weapons sales for commercial profit and the Indian need to alleviate the foreign exchange burden of the joint production venture are both thereby resolved.

Would there be a loss or serious compromise of U.S. security policy if it sought to emulate the Soviet or, at least, the West European arms transfer policies toward India? It is important to note that, unlike the almost purely commercial objectives of arms sales by West European states, both superpowers tend to emphasize the political and security rationales underlying such arms transfers. However, from both the Indian and U.S. standpoints, military co-production arrangements would appear to be the logical extension of the growth of joint commercial industrial ventures between India and the United States. If the overall strategic, political, and economic arguments have been convincingly made, then should not the United States proceed to match the terms offered by the Soviet Union and eventually displace it as India's main military partner?

Qualifications and Conclusions

The analysis presented here — which admittedly is one particular Indian perspective of events and issues — suggests there may be mutual advantages for both the United States and India in establishing security ties short of a formal military alliance. Such security cooperation must be attempted in the broader context of Indo-U.S. economic cooperation and the promotion of regional economic development. Favorable economic trends are already evident and should provide the basis for promoting regional security and stability. There are, however, several caveats and qualifications to be noted in conclusion.

First, much of the discussion here may appear to be prognostic. The Indian strategic environment and the Indian domestic political scene are both currently in a period of transition, and whether Indo-U.S. security ties will develop or not depends on how relations evolve in the future among Moscow, Beijing, and Washington at the global level and New Delhi, Islamabad, and Beijing at the regional level. The key to the projected transformation revolves around the relationship between India and Pakistan at the regional level and the Soviet Union and China at the global level. Reconciliation at both levels would point to the feasibility, if not the necessity, of closer Indo-U.S. security ties. Whether such ties develop at this point will also depend on the nature of India's domestic politics. The brief emergence of the Janata government between 1977 and 1980 has set in motion vigorous and more enlightened debates on the

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basis and direction of India's foreign and defense policies. Much of this has involved a shift, albeit marginal as yet, away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States.

Second, the problem still remains that despite all the changes in the strategic relationships at the regional and global levels, there appears to be no overt common enemy faced by India and the United States—usually the main reason for an alliance relationship to develop. This is not necessarily a critical condition, especially since the arguments advanced here are based on a long-term perspective of common interests and values. Besides, security relationships have been developed in many cases without the projection of a common enemy. In the case of the U.S.-Pakistani alliance forged in the mid 1950s, no common enemy existed. The United States was concerned with containing communism; Pakistan was concerned with containing India, even by allowing the United States military bases on its territory. Clearly, what Pakistan sought to obtain through the SEATO and CENTO defense pacts was a quid pro quo to counter the Indian threat.

A similar problem may be seen in the case of security ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have on several occasions made it abundantly clear that they perceive Israel to be the major threat in the region. The Soviet threat is perceived to stem indirectly from Israeli policies that provoke Arab states to seek arms from Moscow to resolve the Palestinian issue by force. There were also fears of the threat from Iran, both under the pro-U.S. shah and under the present anti-American and anti-Soviet Khomeini government. Instead of commonly perceived enemies, the economic need to offset the high cost of importing Saudi oil was surely one of the primary reasons for the United States to sell massive amounts of arms to Saudi Arabia. Other profitable civilian contracts that have increased the economic interdependence between the two countries have also set the basis for developing closer security ties—not unlike the arguments advanced here for closer security ties with India.

Third, it should be noted that there are limits to which India's new economic policy emphasizing a greater role for private investments in the "mixed" economy can be pushed. The optimism expressed earlier does not necessarily imply the end of all socialist planning. Political and social arguments will continue to color economic policy in India so long as the party in power wishes to survive or retain its credibility with the masses in the long run. In a country that is still characterized by mass poverty, and where the poor constitute the overwhelming electoral majority, indiscriminate espousal of the capitalist ethic and support for the wealthy business class can mean political suicide for the party concerned. The elimination of the pro-capitalist Swatantra party in the 1971 Indian

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general elections illustrates the political risks of completely abandoning the socialist ethic in India.

The problem in India is particularly aggravated by the fact that the most powerful and experienced business conglomerates—such as Tatas, Birlas, Mafatlals, Dalmia-Jains—are controlled by relatively small minority communities. Consequently, private-sector growth would imply increasing maldistribution of economic wealth between these minorities and the masses of the Indian population. Conceivably, then, economic power would be held by one class of Indians from the minority communities while political power would be held by another class of Indians elected by the masses. To avoid this situation, public-sector industrial ventures must continue to be the dominating force in India for some time to come even if the private sector is better able to provide these goods and services.

In particular, this implies that the prospect of transferring much defense production from the public to the private sector is still some way off. What is likely to occur is the increasing participation of the private sector in defense production through subcontracts for components and parts and perhaps even in the manufacture of nonlethal items such as transportation vehicles, earth-moving and bridge-building equipment, and clothing and tents. The ultimate implication of this condition is that, should Indo-U.S. military ties develop, U.S. arms manufacturers would have to negotiate with Indian government officials, satisfy the Indian Armed Services headquarters, and co-exist with the managerial and technical personnel of the public sector corporations under the Ministry of Defense. This calls for some sensitivity to the social and political ethos that prevails in India.

Fourth, questions arise regarding the degree to which India is able to absorb advanced U.S. defense technology, of the risks that such technology may fall into the hands of the adversaries of the United States, and of the overall economic benefits that would accrue through military co-production. As regards the first question, India now possesses a sophisticated economic, technological, and managerial infrastructure able to undertake the manufacture of advanced weapons, provided some external assistance is forthcoming. As regards the second, the danger that India might transfer U.S.-assisted arms production to nations constituting a possible threat to U.S. security is remote. India's scrupulous adherence to Soviet terms regarding the re-export of Indian-manufactured MiG-21 parts was demonstrated in the mid 1970s when India denied Egyptian requests for MiG-21 spares. However, re-export of Indian-produced U.S. weapon systems should be seriously considered where this advances U.S. security interests and where this alleviates the Indian economic burden. As regards the third issue, U.S. buy-back arrangements should enable the

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arms industry to enjoy the benefits of cheaper labor costs in India while also reducing the drain on India's foreign exchange resources.

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the basis for the development of Indo-U.S. security ties will rest to a considerable degree on the growth of Indo-U.S. economic ties leading to common security interests in the region. In turn, the growth of Indo-U.S. economic and defense cooperation should be pursued in the context of promoting regional economic cooperation and political stability on the Indian subcontinent with the ultimate prospect of establishing regional defense arrangements. From a long-term perspective, the United States should have a vital stake in an economically prosperous South Asia where more than half the population of the Third World lives. Much of this will depend on strengthening and advancing the Indian democratic and economic systems and in the long-term cooperation between India and the United States, that have long shared certain domestic political values but until now have been unable to reconcile their strategic perceptions and regional security policies.

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POLITICAL CULTURE, INTELLECTUAL DISSENT, AND INTELLECTUAL CONSENT: THE CASE OF ROMANIA*

by Michael Shafir

The role played by intellectuals in the four main political earthquakes that shook postwar Eastern Europe (Poland and Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in the 1960s and, again, Poland in the late 1970s and early 1980s) is widely acknowledged. The Polish *Solidarnośc* would probably have fared differently had it not been for the alliance between workers and intellectuals, the birth certificate of which was the September 1976 manifest of solidarity with striking workers, basically the founding charter of the intellectual KOR (Workers' Defense Committee). In neighboring Czechoslovakia, Hussak's regime seems incapable of quelling the dissent manifested by that phoenix of the 1960s, "Charter 77." Intellectual dissent since Stalin, however, has proceeded at an uneven pace in Eastern Europe. In Albania, for example, the Stalinist legacy remains strong, as it does to a lesser degree in Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany. The other states of Eastern Europe—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia—have moved furthest in the direction of de-Stalinization.

Compared with such countries, the story of Romanian intellectual dissent is unimpressive, to say the least. In this article I will examine the main factors that keep the Romanian intelligentsia from pursuing a self-assertive course in its relationship with the Communist party, and, by implication, from acting as a catalyst in bringing about state-society confrontations. With this purpose in mind, I will provide an analysis of the Romanian intellectual-political subculture. This examination proceeds from the "macro" to the "micro" level rather than vice versa, since the latter direction would necessitate reliable "hard data" that, in the Romanian case, is not available. The examination is pursued through several "developmental" phases of the regime, demonstrating that the main fea-

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tures of intellectual subculture (nationalism, passivity, leftover imprints of corrupting Oriental mentalities and dissimulation), while not always complementary, combine to reduce the intellectuals to acquiescence.

Political Culture and Intellectuals in Communist Systems

"Political culture," as the concept is employed in this paper, refers to "the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups."[1] This definition—originally developed by Archie Brown—is, to be sure, but one of numerous attempts[2] to define a term that, ever since introduced by Gabriel Almond,[3] has often been either too easily embraced or too hastily dismissed.[4] These different definitions, however, need not preoccupy us, since most of the disputes are related less to what political culture is about than to the methodology to be employed when studying it.[5]

Studies of political culture seldom contain more than one or two passing references to intellectuals,[6] although the process of political socialization has been discussed extensively. It is precisely the emphasis

[1] A. Brown, "Introduction," in A. Brown and J. Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 1.

[2] See, for instance, R. Dahl, *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 352-55; D. Kavanagh, *Political Culture* (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 10; K. Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 68, no. 3, 1974, p. 1173: D. W. Paul, "Political Culture and the Socialist Purpose," in J. P. Shapiro an P. J. Potichnyi, eds., *Change and Adaptation in East European Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 4-7; and *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 1-13.

[3] As originally developed, the concept referred to "the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among members of a political system." Such orientations, it was held, have "a significant influence on the ways in which the political system works." See G. Almond and B. G. Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 50.

[4] For a discussion on the advantages and the pitfalls of "political culture" and its critics see A. Brown, "Introduction," pp. 2-10.

[5] The problem of methodology when studying political cultures of populations not accessible to the researcher is a complex one. My own approach is very much similar to that adopted by A. H. Brown and D. W. Paul. See A. H. Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 89-104, and "Introduction," pp. 10-20; D. W. Paul, "Empirical Note on Communist Political Culture," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, vol. 6, no. 4, 1973, pp. 6-11. Basically, this approach contends that using "hard data" and "survey analysis" are not the only methods for examining political cultures, and that such instruments as literature, history, and political speeches may be just as relevant. This approach is supported by one of the pioneers of the study of political culture, Lucian Pye. See his "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evolution of the Concept of Political Culture," in L. Schneider and Ch. Bonjean, eds., *The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 65-76. On the other hand, such an approach by definition allows for no explanation in terms of cause and effect; it holds that political culture, itself the product of subjective orientations, should be analysed in terms of multiple causation.

[6] For a partial exception see D. W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics*, pp. 67-68, 157-58, and passim.

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put on this process, however, that should make the intelligentsia a central element in the study of continuity and change in political systems in general, and in Communist systems in particular.

In an article dedicated to the study of Romanian political culture published in 1974, Kenneth Jowitt argues that Leninist political elites tend to neglect, during the first phase of their rule, the problem of transforming political culture, adopting a strategy of "commanding heights."[7] Alfred G. Meyer, on the other hand, implicitly refutes such arguments by pointing out that "revolutions can be defined as conflicts between modes of consciousness (cultures), with a revolutionary elite seeking to break down the existing culture and replacing it with a new one."[8] Such efforts, I believe with Meyer, are not postponed for a later phase of development, but rather are part of the initial effort to change the face of societies in which Communist elites rule. Indeed, Jowitt himself, in an earlier book on Romania, argued that upon assuming power Leninist regimes embark upon the process of "breaking through," by which he means the "decisive alteration or destruction of values, structures and behaviors which are perceived by a revolutionary elite as comprising or contributing to the actual or potential existence of alternative centres of power."[9] The "decisive alteration of values" surely could not mean that the process of political socialization is neglected. On the contrary, what we are faced with are the seeds of an almost unavoidable conflict between the "official" and the "dominant" political cultures[10] and their respective articulators. The first question one should ask, therefore, pertains to the identity of "structures and behaviors" said to be perceived by the new elites as "comprising or contributing to the actual or potential existence of alternative centres of power."

If, upon assuming power, Leninist elites engage not only in a process of political and industrial breakthrough, but also in one of cultural breakthrough, or (to put it in Gramscian terms), if they are determined to alter to a considerable degree the prerevolutionary societal system of values or "hegemony," it becomes obvious that considerable efforts will be made to ensure that both the formal and the informal structures of political socialization will be imbued with the "right" values. The agents of political socialization, however, are in fact the first that must be socialized. It is strange that, whenever the socialization process and the problem of continuity and change in East European political cultures is

[7] See K. Jowitt, "Political Culture," p. 1184.

[8] A. G. Meyer, "Communist Revolutions and Cultural Change," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1972, p. 360.

[9] K. Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania 1944-65* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 8.

[10] See A. Brown, "Introduction," pp. 7-8, 18.

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discussed, those who may be said to be the main agents of political socialization are, for all practical purposes, ignored. The volume edited by Ivan Volgyes on the subject in 1975 is a good example of this tendency. We learn from the editor's own introductory article[11] that a distinction should be made between the formal and the informal structures of political socialization, and that the process is carried out, at least in part, through the use of such means as television, radio, newspapers, journals, books, films, and theater. Books, however, do not write themselves, nor do films make themselves, and so forth. These are but the *instruments* of intellectual articulation, while the *agents* of political socialization behind them are the writers, the authors of scripts, the playwrights. The process of political socialization in the context of an induced change of political culture, therefore, necessitates, first of all, a process of "socialization of the socializer."[12] For one should not forget that political socialization is not only a process by which values are changed, but also one by which they are maintained.

Such a process is all the more warranted since Communist regimes, like all other regimes, are not unaware of the connection between the socialization process and legitimacy or of the legitimizing function that intellectuals serve in political systems.[13] When they assumed power in Eastern Europe, therefore, Communist regimes faced a dilemma: on the one hand, the "cultural breakthrough" necessitated a radical transformation of societal values, a task that, as Meyer remarks, was made even more difficult in such countries as Hungary or Romania, where the new ruling elites were associated with national defeat and the level of their legitimacy "lowered even more by the predominance in their leadership of people alien to the dominant culture."[14] For both ideological and circumstantial reasons, therefore, legitimacy at this "transformative" stage[15] of political culture had to be built on what has been termed as

[11] See I. Volgyes, "Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Conceptual Framework," in I. Volgyes, ed., *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 1-37.

[12] The term "socialization of the socializers" was first employed by J. R. Fiszman in his analysis of education and socialization in contemporary Poland. See J. R. Fiszman, *Revolution and Tradition in People's Poland: Education and Socialization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 184-248.

[13] See R. L. Tőkés "Dissent: The Politics for Change in the USSR," in H. W. Morton and R. L. Tőkés, eds., *Soviet Politics and Soviet Society in the 1970s* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 3-5.

[14] A. G. Meyer, "Legitimacy and Power in East Central Europe," in S. Sinanian, I. Deak, P.C. Ludz, eds., *Eastern Europe in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 56.

[15] The delineation of the stages in this process I use in this article follows roughly that in K. Jowitt's "Political Culture," but not his later version of this political development scheme, which appeared in "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," *World Politics*, vol. 28, no. 1, 1975, pp. 69-96. For my views of Jowitt's original stages of "transformation," "consolidation," and "modernization," see M. Shafir, "The Socialist Republic of Romania," in B. Szajkowski, ed., *Marxist Governments: A World Survey*, vol. 3 (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 589-639. A partial criticism of Jowitt's stage of "inclusion" is developed in my "Autonomy and Conformity in Romania," in G. Schöpflin, ed., *State, Society and Autonomy in Eastern Europe* (forthcoming).

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"primitive accumulation of legitimacy,"[16] by which is meant precisely the attempt to destroy the patterns upon which the hegemony of the adversary counterelites had been based. At this stage, legitimacy may be said to have been largely extrasystemic, exogenous, and derivative, that is, emanating from Moscow, and suprasystemic or supranational, that is, emanating from a doctrine taken to be universally applicable.

Acute awareness of their own lack of legitimacy and of the need to imbue society with new hegemonic values, on the other hand, made the process of socializing the socializer an absolute necessity. This process may be described as consisting of two distinctive, though largely parallel, subprocesses: that of de-socialization and that of re-socialization. These two terms were originally employed by S. N. Eisenstadt in 1954 in a study of the socialization of new immigrants to Israel.[17] It seems to me, however, that they are also suitable for the analysis of intellectuals in "transformative" East European Communist societies. In such polities, the intellectual's view of his status and his set of values, insofar as his participation in what Coser termed the "definition of the core values of the society"[18] is concerned, must change into acceptance of the role of "transmission belt." The intellectual, in other words, is supposed to accept a definition of values in the making of which he is not allowed to participate. Furthermore, he is expected to "learn how to perform" his new role as defined by the regime, including the renunciation of any aspirations to political independence that he may have cherished. Last but not least, he has to acquire new skills, including the employment of a new "language," that of Marxist terminology, and to develop an awareness of the changed set of "technical opportunities" now available for personal advancement and a new "ecological orientation" both insofar as his own career aspirations and insofar as the new national, pro-Soviet orientations are concerned.

The attitude of Communist regimes toward the problem of continuity and change of political culture, should not, however, be regarded as immutable. Just as the stagnant, totalitarian "model" no longer seems adequate for an accurate comprehension of Communist systems, it is reasonable to assume that different developmental phases require different socialization accents. Moreover, such change may be warranted by alterations in the political environment, as a result of either circumstantial or more permanent change. In such situations, any regime has to give

[16] See A. G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," in F. J. Fleron Jr., ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory* (Chicago: Rand MacNally, 1969), p. 192.

[17] S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants: A Comparative Study Based Mainly on the Jewish Community in Palestine and the State of Israel* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1954), pp. 5-6.

[18] See L. A. Coser, *Men of Ideas: A Sociologist's View* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. viii.

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priority to the "operative" versus the "fundamental" elements of its ideology, and implement necessary changes meant to secure the system's maintenance.[19]

The classic example is the famous appeal launched by Stalin at the beginning of the German attack on the Soviet Union, imbued with such traditional values as "mother Russia." There is, to be sure, a limit to acceptable alterations in the fundamental ideology, which in Leninist systems seems to be "the leading role of the party." Apart from this, however, East European Communist elites are apparently not unwilling to consider alternative socialization paths. What yesterday may have been regarded as utterly unacceptable and "dysfunctional" for the system may today become "functional" in response to exogenous and/or indigenous systemic stress.

In this context, Communist systems in the postmobilization phase have sometimes been described as victims of their own success.[20] I shall contend, however, that insofar as the process of "socializing the socializer" is concerned, this is not necessarily so, and, indeed, that these regimes may well become beneficiaries of their own failures.

Political Culture and the Romanian Intellectuals in the Transformative Period

Upon consolidating power in 1948, the new Romanian political elite embarked upon a process of de-socialization and re-socialization of the population in general and of the creative intelligentsia in particular. The transformation of the socializer's political culture was deemed imperative for several reasons. First, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Romania was no exception to a general pattern discernible in rising new nations—a pattern very much valid in today's Third World—where intellectuals play important political roles. As a result, both their image and their self-image were to no little extent those of "counterelites." It is sufficient to mention the names of such outstanding intellectuals as Alecsandri, Kogălniceanu, Maiorescu, Goga, or Iorga (all of whom had played important political roles ranging from ambassador to foreign minister and premier) to realize to what extent such figures and their heirs were considered by the new elite responsible for the creation of the previous "hegemony." Second, the Romanian intelligentsia also

[19] On the distinction between "fundamental" and "operative" elements in ideologies see M. Seliger, *Ideology and Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976), pp. 108-17, 175-208.

[20] See, for instance, Ch. Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Ch. Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 14, and S. B. Huntington, Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in S.B. Huntington, C. H. Moore, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 32.

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followed a pattern in which intellectuals may be said to have been not only the children of a relatively recently discovered sense of national identity and pride, but also, to an equal extent, the parents of an intensive nationalism, occasionally verging on chauvinism. Finally, for reasons that had to do more with the nature of the Cold War and the Zhdanovist two-camp theory than with historical accuracy, the Romanian intellectuals were regarded by the new regime as prone to pro-Western attitudes.

The antinationalistic postures of the new Gheorghiu-Dej regime[21] were at one and the same time the result of its total self-identification with an "external referent" generally perceived as one of Greater Romania's "traditional enemies" and of its identification as such by the bulk of the Romanian intelligentsia. The first and foremost element to be considered when analyzing Romanian intellectual political subculture is, therefore, that of intensive nationalism.

The beginnings of modern Romanian nationalism may be traced to the times of the Phanariotes, the Greek princes who ruled in the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Valachia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[22] Under their influence, the Enlightenment ideas spread to the principalities. Young Romanian boyars who traveled to the West, and particularly to France, discovered there the ideas of liberalism. In the immediate geopolitical context of a "transitional" Romanian society experiencing, on the one hand, its first exposure to modernization, and, on the other hand, the struggle for power and influence between the superpowers of the region (Russia, Turkey, and Austria), liberalism, in the eyes of the young boyars of that time, meant largely only the right to self-determination. From the very beginning, Western influence on Romanian social and political thought was, therefore, highly selective. This suggests, also, that an interesting parallel could be drawn between contemporary and earlier societies under the impact of Western influence. "Underdeveloped countries," Herbert Passin writes in an article devoted to the influence of the modernization process on intellectuals in developing societies, "are not *tabulae rasae* waiting virginally for Western

[21] I am inclined to accept K. Jowitt's point of view concerning Dej's identification with the pro-Soviet antinationalistic model of breaking through. The Jowitt interpretation differs radically from that of Stephen Fischer-Galati in this aspect. See K. Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs*, pp. 125-30, 154-55, 160-61, 166-67, and passim; S. Fischer-Galati, *The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. vii, 17-43, and passim; *Twentieth Century* Rumania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 96-108 and passim; and "Rumania and the Sino-Soviet Split," in K. London, ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 261-65.

[22] See V. Georgescu, *Political Enlightenment in the Rumanian Principalities (1750-1831)* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); S. Fischer-Galati, "The Origins of Modern Rumanian Nationalism," in P. F. Sugar and I. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 373-97; P. Griffin, "Fathers and Sons in Nineteenth Century Romania: A Study in Generational Thinking" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1969), pp. 13-78.

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ideas to be inscribed. Each has a long history, a set of predispositions which select out under specific historical conditions the particular Western influence to which they will respond."[23] As Sidney Verba also observes, "political ideologies are affected by the cultural environment into which they are introduced."[24]

Although Western influence was to become, particularly after the 1848 revolutions, a constant element in Romanian social and cultural life, it should not be considered identical with pro-Western political postures. Against tendencies manifested by the generation of 1848 and its followers to emulate Western political institutions and ideas, there arose, toward the end of the century, the so-called Junimist school led by the literary critic and politician Titu Maiorescu. Maiorescu denied the necessity and short-term feasibility of introducing Western patterns in Romania. Such attempts, he thought, were bound to fail, since they stressed "form" (i.e., Western form), and disregarded "essence" (i.e., the national Romanian specific). It would be inaccurate to attribute to Maiorescu personal responsibility for the ideas propagated by his political and cultural epigones. Nevertheless, ever since Maiorescu, the main division between literary and political currents in Romania has been that between "evolutionists," who continued to follow the 1848 credo, and "traditionalists," who continued to follow the Junimist school. The latter stream, to which such figures as Romania's greatest poet, Mihai Eminescu, or the historian and literary critic Nicolae Iorga belonged, may be said to have gained the upper hand by the end of the century. Eventually, it was to give birth to such "extreme-traditionalist" currents as that of "Gândirism" (Thoughtism) and "Trăirism" (Lifeism).

Whatever the differences between these two main schools of thought, traditionalists and evolutionists had one common ground: an intense hatred for the historical enemies of the Romanian unitary state, Russia and Hungary. For it was against the background of this historical enmity that the very idea of Romanian national identity, based on recently rediscovered Latin origins, had gained roots. National identities are not established in terms of positive reference only—"what we are"—but also in terms of negative reference—"what we are not." The latter is just as important, and perhaps indivisible from the former. As Karl Deutsch observes in an article devoted to nation building, the "choice of national alignments and national identity is related to the decision to choose a common enemy. This is indeed a decision, even if it has been made

[23] H. Passin, "Writer and Journalist in Transitional Society," in L. Pye, ed., *Communication and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 82.

[24] S. Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in L. Pye and S. Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 517.

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unconsciously."[25] Eminescu's[26] or Goga's overtly chauvinist and xenophobic works are too widely known to warrant any extensive quotation. Less widely known, perhaps, are such openly anti-Russian utterances as that of the early evolutionist historian and leader of the 1848 movement, Nicolae Bălcescu, who in 1850 wrote in the Parisian émigré journal *România viitoare:*

Today, when all of Europe sees itself menaced by a new invasion of Nordic barbarians . . . realizing that the choice is between either being all free or all Russians, the European peoples hold each other's hand in order to begin this crusade of liberty and civilization against barbarians; today the hour has struck for the Romanian nation to stand up too, waiting for its unification.[27]

Eighty years later, Eugen Lovinescu, perhaps Romania's most outstanding literary critic and foremost among the evolutionists, attacked those traditionalists who claimed the orthodox religion embodied the Romanian national specific in these terms:

Orthodoxism . . . threw us in the danger of disappearing in the great mass of Slavs. . . . Behind the cross, Cervantes used to say, hides the Devil; behind the Byzantine cross hid the Russian. Binding us spiritually to an obscurantist religion, stiffened by typicality and formalism, orthodoxism imposed on us a liturgical language and a foreign alphabet (Latin thought expressed by embellished scribbling) without helping us create a national art and culture.[28]

Lovinescu was fortunate enough to die before the new regime embarked on a process of re-Slavicization of Romanian culture, as part of the endeavor to transform political culture. For the only hope the Romanian nation could cherish, according to him, was emulation of the West: "In our century, and in this place, light comes from the West: *Ex Occidente Lux*."[29]

Mihail Sadoveanu, the doyen of Romanian literary life till his death in 1961, however, expressed a totally different view soon after the Communist takeover. "It is very significant," he declared in Moscow on December 25, 1951, "that the distribution of the International Stalin prize . . . is taking place here, in Moscow, a city looking higher, more beautiful, more irradiant, closer to Communism, every time one sees it again. From here spreads the light of peace in the entire world."[30] Yet the author of the first Romanian novel written in the spirit of socialist realism,

[25] K. W. Deutsch, "Nation Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research," in K. W. Deutsch and W. J. Foltz, eds., *Nation Building* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), pp. 10-11.

[26] On Eminescu, see D. Murărașu, *Nationalismul lui Eminescu* (Madrid: Carpati, 1955).

[27] Quoted in V. Ierunca, "M. Hubert Juin, Parisien du Danube," *Preuves* (Paris), vol. 11, no. 123, 1961, p. 78.

[28] Eugen Lovinescu, *Istoria civilizației române moderne*, vol. 1 (București: Ancora, 1924), pp. 8-9.

[29] Ibid., p. 22.

[30] *Scânteia*, December 26, 1951.

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Mitrea Cocor, had warned his fellow academicians in a speech in 1942 against the danger of "the hordes of the steppe."[31] Such a *volte-face* enabled the distinguished writer to keep much of the same honorary political positions under the new regime that he had held under the previous one, except that while formerly he had been president of the Senate, he became vice-president of the Grand National Assembly, the Romanian parliament.

Sadoveanu's was but one of many other cases of such metamorphosis. The brilliant literary critic and writer George Călinescu, to mention just one more example, had described King Carol II as "the Sun-King of Modern Romania" in an article published in 1939 under the title "Nihil Sine Deo—Nihil Sine Rege"; it was the king's prerogative, as an enlightened patron of the arts, to establish what should be published and what not because "one does not build cathedrals using the number of believers as yardstick."[32] A few years later, Călinescu was to advocate the same prerogative for the new rulers, in the name of party-mindedness. In his history of Romanian literature, published in 1941, he had dismissed the founder of Romanian socialist thought, Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, because like "many Jews," he was "incapable of contemplating ideas" and hence unable to "overcome his foreignness" and grasp that "Doina," Eminescu's xenophobic poem, "symbolizes the very ideal of the [Romanian] nation."[33] Yet he was soon to become the vociferous advocate of the ideas of art *engagé* propagated by Gherea.

With very few exceptions, the Romanian creative intelligentsia was remarkably willing to comply with the new ruling elite in the "transformative" period. Such compliance is not to be easily accounted for. Romanian émigré sources suggest,[34] as one possible explanation, the scarcity of Communist intellectuals in prewar Romania. This situation, it is sometimes contended, was in itself the outcome of the party's unquestioning identification with the anti-Romanian, Soviet claim to Bessarabia. Not without relevance, some of these sources point out that in Hungary, Poland, or Czechoslovakia the leaders of intellectual dissent, known for left-wing inclinations, could subsequently argue with the regime on Marxist terms. There were very few such intellectuals in Romania, perhaps the most outstanding exception being the poet Miron Radu Paraschivescu, who remained the same heretic he had been under the

[31] Quoted in H. Prost, *Destin de la Roumanie* (Paris: Editions Berger Levrault, 1954), pp. 212-13.

[32] Quoted in V. Ierunca, "Zece ani dela moartea lui G. Călinescu," *Limite* (Paris), no. 21, 1976, p. 11.

[33] G. Călinescu, *Istoria literaturii române dela origini până în prezent* (Bucureşti: Fundaţia regală pentru literatură şi artă, 1941), pp. 485-86.

[34] See, for instance, P. Dumitriu, "Social Structure and Tensions in Romania," *The Review*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1962; G. Haupt, "La genèse du conflict sovieto-roumain," *Revue Française de science politique*, vol. 18, no. 4, 1968, p. 674: and V. Ierunca, "Postface. Le phénomène concentrationaire en Roumanie," in P. Goma, *Gherla*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 191.

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previous regime. Pushed into oblivion by the country's new rulers,[35] Paraschivescu, who had once left the party in protest against the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, later took on the role of father figure for a new generation of writers, who, he hoped, would not give in to compromise. Most of his colleagues, on the other hand, were too stained by past nationalist and anti-Communist positions to have any choice but either to compromise and collaborate, or to fade into oblivion and even be imprisoned.

At best, such an explanation is partial and builds on what may be the consequence rather than the cause of what is to be explained. For a more accurate explanation, consideration of other factors might be relevant. Among those, the more obvious appear to be the very tradition of independence in the political culture in general and in the intellectual subculture in particular; a related factor is that of traditional attitudes toward power and authority, their being viewed as either "friendly" or "hostile," and the behavioral implications deriving therefrom.

In a study of Czech political culture, David W. Paul discovered that "the tendency of Czechs to respond to military and political suppression by resorting to tactics of passive resistance is in stark contrast to the tendency of Poles or Hungarians to rebel violently under roughly analogous circumstances."[36] One could advance the hypothesis that historical experience may account for such behavioral differences, for while the Hungarian and Polish traditions of independence are older and therefore more difficult to obliterate, the Czech tradition is of more recent a vintage. Historical experience may teach people the tactics of survival. Attitudes toward power perceived as "unfriendly" or "foreign," however, may vary not only from straightforward rejection to the cunning, seemingly submissive Czech Schweikism,[37] but also from passive resistance to fatalistic inactivism. Indeed, the tactics of Schweikism may have been appropriate under a liberalizing and modernizing enlightened despotism, but hardly so under Turkish or Imperial Russian rule. Moreover, the political culture of the dominant foreign ruler may well leave its mark deeply imprinted on the political culture of the ruled well after independence. How deep that imprint will be may well depend on a whole range of other factors, such as length of domination, success of penetration, and the nature of the political culture at the receiving end.

Those East European countries that had been subjected to long Turkish and/or Russian influence were, at the same time, the least de-

[35] Paraschivescu's gradual disappointment with Communism as implemented in Romania was already obvious at a very early stage of the "transformative" period. See his diary, part of which was published in his *Journal d'un heretique* (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1976), pp. 165ff.

[36] D. W. Paul, "Nationalism, Pluralism and Schweikism in Czechoslovakia's Political Culture," (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1973), as quoted in D. W. Paul, "Empirical Note," p. 10.

[37] See D. W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics*, pp. 252-81.

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veloped economically. The bulk of their populations lived in isolated villages, where contact with individualist, liberal, Western-imported values was, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. In 1937 Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, one of the very early Romanian sociologists and later an exponent of extreme "traditionalism," made these remarks on the peasant mentality of his countrymen, which, he thought, embodied Romanian "individualism":

> The Romanian kind of individualism includes no spirit of initiative in business and very little feeling for social and political independence which are characteristic of the Western bourgeois individualism. From their midst very seldom arise enterprising persons willing to risk their tranquility and their assets in order to become rich by yet untried means. On the contrary, more often than not they are ruled by the tradition of collective effort. *Each villager does what he thinks the others would do. . . . For the Romanian peasant, to step out of the prescribed order-line is not merely a risk, it is sheer insanity*. [Emphasis added.] [38]

The Romanian peasant, as Rădulescu-Motru put it in a book published one year before, "believes that what the rest of the [surrounding] world does is the only rule for a sane person to abide by." [39] This tendency to conformism, or, as he called it, "collectivism," was supposed to be accompanied by a "pronounced mystical character," which Rădulescu-Motru, rather mistakenly, took for a national, specifically Romanian singularity.

Conformism and mystic tendencies have been proven characteristic of many other peasant societies. Not only do they seem to go hand in hand, but a degree of consonance appears to exist between such traits and fatalistic orientations toward life; such orientations, however, bear heavily also on the behavioral reactions towards authority perceived as "unfriendly." In a study devoted to the impact of the modernization process on peasants, Everett M. Rogers discovered that fatalism, defined as "the degree to which an individual perceives his lack of ability to control his future," was a widespread attitude among members of peasant societies. Such individuals "believe that the events of their lives are preordinated and determined by fate or supernatural forces. Their attitudes toward self-control of future events involve passivity, pessimism, acceptance, endurance, pliancy and evasion." [40] Among the reasons accounting for such attitudes, according to Rogers, is a hostile social and natural environment:

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[38] C. Rădulescu-Motru, "Psychology of the Romanian People," *Revista de Filozofie*, vol. 22, no. 2, reprinted in *Romanian Sources*, vol. 2, part 1, 1976, pp. 5-6.

[39] C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Românismul: Catehismul unei noi spiritualităţi* (Bucureşti: Fundaţia pentru literatură şi artă "Regele Carol II", 1936), p. 113.

[40] E. M. Rogers, *Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication* (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1969), pp. 273-74.

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Peasants have a relatively low degree of mastery over their natural and social environment. . . . A fatalistic outlook, the assumption that whatever happens is the will of God or Allah, is perhaps the best adjustment the individual can make to an apparently hopeless situation. Indeed, fatalistic attitudes may have been highly efficient and functional in the past as means of psychological adaptation to a harsh environment.[41]

The East European peasant in "transitional" societies, subject to the same natural calamities, as well as to indirect exploitation by foreign rulers and direct exploitation by autonomous elements, may well have developed similar fatalistic attitudes. Such attitudes bear on political behavior. "In a culture in which men's orientation toward nature is essentially one of fatalism and resignation," Sidney Verba remarked, "their orientation toward government is likely to be much the same."[42]

Fatalistic attitudes are discernible in many Romanian literary creations, indeed even in folklore. The most famous Romanian folk ballad is "Mioriţa," or "The Lamb." It is the moving, beautiful story of a Moldavian shepherd whose fellow shepherds plot to kill him and steal his flock. Learning of the plan from his "wonder lamb," the young shepherd makes no move to keep it from being carried out. He serenely accepts his fate, comforted by the thought that he will be reunited with nature. He describes his own death in terms of a wedding to a beautiful queen, where moon and sun are bridesmaid and best man, the mountains are priests, and the birds, fiddlers. This *homo comtemplativus,* as this character was defined by a literary critic,[43] for a long time figured importantly in Romanian philosophy and literary life.[44] Under obvious Spenglerian influence, Lucian Blaga, a Transylvanian philosopher and poet of large popularity, even conceived the notion of the "mioritic space"—from the word "Mioriţa"—which, according to him, exercises an important influence on the Romanian concept of existence.[45] According to Blaga, the Romanian's is a mystical existence of reunion with nature and its contemplation, which involves disregarding or ignoring history's temporal dimensions, but remaining conscious of one's own spiritual eternity. Widely quoted Romanian proverbs, such as "the river flows, the stones remain," express a very similar perception of historical events as meaningless and of the futility of opposing them: since the spiritual eternity of the national

[41] Ibid., p. 274.

[42] S. Verba, "Conclusions," in L. Pye and S. Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development,* p. 522.

[43] See L. Rusu, *Viziunea lumii în poezia noastră populară* (Bucureşti: Editura pentru literatură, 1967), pp. 11-111.

[44] See, on this point, M. Eliade, *Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God: Comparative Studies in the Religions and Folklore of Dacia and Eastern Europe* (Chicago: Chicago University press, 1972), pp. 228-36, and passim. Professor Eliade would not entirely agree, however, with my interpretation of "Mioriţa."

[45] See L. Blaga, *Trilogia culturii: Orizont şi stil. Spaţiul mioritic. Geneza metamorfozei şi sensul culturii* (Bucureşti: Editura pentru literatură universală, 1969), pp. 119-31.

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soul is ensured by its existential dimension, there is no point in opposing hostile powers, whose rule is but temporal. There is much in this philosophy to remind one of the fatalistic rationalizations uttered in a hostile environment as described by Rogers. The political-behavioral implications of such *Weltanschauung*, however, is expressed by another Romanian proverb, also widely quoted: "The sword won't chop off bowed heads." A Romanian dissident writer, whom I met in the early 1970s, perceived quite accurately the implications of the "mioritic space" philosophy. He told me a few years ago: "It might be true that history by-passes Romanian eternity. But since we, Romanians, choose to ignore history, history may have revenged itself by ignoring us."

Another possibly relevant element to be considered is that of the dominant religion.[46] Is it only accidental that the three East European states where intellectual dissent built up to a direct confrontation with the party were all countries where the dominant religion was Catholic?[47] One wonders whether, paradoxically enough, the idea of papal infallibility may not have brought about, in practice, a sense of universal fallibility, or legitimacy of doubt. Indeed, does not the very competition of two authorities, God and Caesar, bring into question the very legitimacy of the existence of one, undisputed source of monopolistic value allocation? And is it not precisely such monopolistic authority that Communist parties claim for themselves? Moreover, the organization of the Catholic Church was based on a supranational hierarchy, which entailed an orientation toward values exogenous in origin. Orthodox churches, on the other hand, ever since the fall of Constantinople, tended to concentrate their activity within a hierarchically independent or autonomous national organizational framework, to serve the interests of the local "Caesar," and were, indeed, often instrumental in the process of nation and state building, helping to create a sense of self-identity, the base of which was national.[48] The Romanian Orthodox Church, C. Rădulescu-Motru wrote: "let itself be dominated by the interests of the state. Her great glorious title has always been to have served the unification ['întregire'] of the Romanian nation."[49] Nichifor Crainic, the leader of the extreme "traditionalist" school of "Gândirea" was similarly (in 1940 in Germany) drawing an analogy between the Romanian Church and that of Luther, who had "nationalized German Christianity." The Romanian Church, he observed,

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[46] I am indebted to Professor George Schöpflin of the London School of Economics for drawing my attention to this point. Responsibility for its interpretation and any errors, of course, is entirely my own.

[47] While the influence of the Catholic Church in the Czech lands may be of a different nature from that in Poland or Hungary, this difference does not necessarily obliterate all relevancy. For a discussion of Church influence in Czechoslovakia see O. Ulč, "Czechoslovakia: From the Winter of Discontent to the Despair of Hussák's Autumn," in I. Volgyes, ed., *Political Socialization*, pp. 42-44.

[48] See L. Blaga, *Trilogia culturii*, pp. 141-43.

[49] C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Românismul*, p. 130.

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"has practically almost nothing in common with the other national Orthodox churches." Four years later, in a discussion with students, he remarked that the Church has no politics of its own, but only followed that of the state.[50]

While the sense of national identity that the Church had helped create might have added to its other "sins" in the eyes of the antinationalistic Communist political elite, the tradition of deference to political authority as such might have played a "functional" role in quelling discontent. Of possibly equal relevance for political culture is Church ritual.[51] Rădulescu-Motru draws attention to the fact that the Eastern, as opposed to Western, churches place more emphasis on ritual, on the externalization of values than on their internalization.[52] As early as 1907, the Romanian ethnologist D. Drăghicescu remarked that the intellectual, "metaphysical aspect of Christianity" was unknown to the local peasant, for whom "the cornerstone of religious practice rests in the cult of the ritual, that is to say, the fulfillment of all forms and formulations."[53] According to Sadoveanu, the Romanian people's religion was "limited to ritual and to custom," while the literary historian Al. Dima wrote that the use of Slavonic in church ceremony till the eighteenth century had hindered the "penetration of orthodoxy's spiritual structure" into the masses. Unable to understand the language in which services were conducted, most believers had to make do with "respecting the cult ritual [that remained] fatally exterior."[54] Interesting as it may sound, Dima's hypothesis is hardly plausible, for it is doubtful that Polish, Hungarian, Czech, or Slovak peasants mastered Latin better than their Romanian counterparts understood Church Slavonic. Moreover, Adolph Harnak has observed that in all orthodox churches (including the Russian church) "doctrines came to be administered in stereotyped formulas accompanied by symbolic acts. . . . For ninety-nine per cent of these Christians religion exists only as a ceremonious ritual, in which it is externalized."[55] One may, I think, wonder to what extent such emphasis on externalization, that is to say on public pose, bears upon dissimulation, which, as

[50] Quoted in D. Micu, *Cîndirea şi Cîndirismul* (Bucureşti: Minerva, 1975), pp. 226-27.

[51] This is also discussed in K. Jowitt, "Political Culture," p. 1185.

[52] C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Cultura română şi politicianismul*, 2nd ed. (Bucureşti: Librăria Soccecu & Co., 1904), p. 107.

[53] D. Drăghicescu, *Din psihologia poporului român*, n.p., 1907, p. 359.

[54] C. Săteanu, "Dl. M. Sadoveanu despre actuala stare a ţărănimii," *Cuvântul liber*, vol. 1, no. 37, January 8, 1920, p. 3, and Al. Dima, "Problema mişcării ortodoxiste," *Datina*, vol. 7, no. 11-12, pp. 138-49, as quoted in Z. Ornea, *Tradiţionalism şi modernitate în deceniul al treilea* (Bucureşti: Editura Eminescu, 1980), pp. 432 and 445, respectively.

[55] A. Harnack, "On Eastern and Western Christianity," in T. Parsons *et al.*, *Theories of Society*, vol. 2, as quoted in K. Jowitt, "Political Culture," p. 1185. See, also, G. Golan, "Elements of Russian Traditions in Soviet Socialism," in N. S. Eisenstadt and Y. Azmon, eds., *Socialism and Tradition* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1975), p. 24.

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Jowitt has observed, seems to be deeply rooted in Romanian political culture.[56]

Dissimulation may be closely connected with another aspect of Romanian political culture mentioned above, namely with the historical imprint left by the political culture of foreign rulers. Indeed, the "Ketman," that strange behavioral pattern so vividly described by Czeslav Milosz,[57] in which one poses as "believer" although neither actor nor audience really expect internalization of values, originated in the Near East. The "Ketman" also establishes a relationship of patronage, whereupon significant material advantages are bestowed on the "new believer" who has agreed to pose as supporter of the powers that be. The Romanian language has, in fact, an idiomatic expression of its own for the same phenomenon: "*a se turci*" (to become a Turk). This expression has two different, but related, meanings: to become a convert to Islam, and to sell oneself.

Corruption, nepotism, and bribery were widespread in "transitional" Romania. A classic Romanian novel by Mateiu Caragiale, describing the atmosphere of such Turkish delights, carried the motto "Que voulez-vous, nous sommes ici aux portes de l'Orient."[58] The phrase had been uttered, apparently, by Raymond Poincaré, the future French president, who appeared as defense counsel in one of the more famous corruption trials in Bucharest. Before Romania decided to join the Triple Alliance in World War I, diplomats of the two opposing camps in Bucharest were competing over bribing newspapers, for, as the Russian ambassador remarked in a dispatch to St. Petersburg, "representatives of the local press are accustomed to receiving gratuities and . . . do not . . . work for nothing."[59] The Romanian intellectuals in general, and the creative intelligentsia in particular, were by no means immune to these traditions. Dissimulation, Ketman, and patronage were already established behavioral patterns by the beginning of the century, when Rădulescu-Motru wrote:

> Justice! Public institutions! . . . 'Do you have *somebody* at the Court of Justice?' 'Do you have *somebody* at the prefecture?' . . . This eternal somebody! He does and undoes all and everything! . . . This *somebody* may sanctify you scientist and even artist. He has his own newspaper, where his scribes might bark at you or glorify you. . . . He has his own [literary] circle and his own Academy. . . . This is how one becomes a scientist or an artist. [Emphasis in original.][60]

"The poet's odyssey," he added, "will be a sad one," but not if he were

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[56] K. Jowitt, "Political Culture," pp. 1182-85.

[57] See C. Milosz, *The Captive Mind* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1953), pp. 54-81.

[58] M. L. Caragiale, *Craii de curte veche* (Bucureşti, 1970).

[59] Quoted in F. Conte, *Christian Rakovski (1873-1941): Essai de biographie politique*, vol. 1 (Lille: Université de Lille, 1975), p. 131.

[60] C. Rădulescu-Motru, *Cultura română*, pp. 137-38.

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ready to "sing the politician's glory." Although a "beaten path," such willingness was sure remedy, leading straight to "triumphal arches."[61]

It was a recipe that such established literary figures as Sadoveanu and Călinescu had little difficulty in following, once a new political elite came to power. The incentive to "*a se turci*" was not to be easily dismissed either. The customarily employed "positive sanctions" bestowed on the politically submissive in Eastern Europe were apparently higher in Romania than elsewhere. A group of Polish writers who visited Bucharest, Professor Ionescu was told by a writer who defected in 1960, remarked to their Romanian hosts that while the Dej regime "fed writers better, the Communists in Poland allowed their writers to bark freely."[62]

Political Culture and the Politics of Culture in the Post-Transformative Period

While these, and possibly other elements in the Romanian political culture, may account for intellectual acquiescence in the transformative period, it is partially to the same elements that we turn for a discussion of Romanian intellectual dissent—or, rather, consent—in the post-Stalinist period. The de-Stalinization of Romanian intellectual life, as well as that of other social spheres, was introduced in the first half of the 1960s by a regime that found itself in an uncomfortable situation that necessitated the search for a new political formula[63] capable of enlarging the party's popularity and support, while at the same time jealously rejecting any infringement upon the party's leading role. In view of the developing conflict with the Soviet Union, the Dej regime undertook a number of measures aimed at improving its image both at home and abroad, among which were political amnesty and opening the ranks of the party to segments of the population hitherto perceived as ideologically harmful. Among those granted amnesty and those who now joined the elite were a significant number of intellectuals. Never before had the Romanian intelligentsia been perceived as so "functional" by the party.[64] For it is one of the main functions of intellectuals in any regime to legitimize—or de-legitimize—power. As long as the Romanian party had identified with the Soviet external referent, it had no choice but to pursue the course of

[61] Ibid., p. 143.

[62] G. Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania, 1944-1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 180.

[63] The gradual and by no means unilinear process, the elite's hesitations and its dilemmas, are very accurately and incisively covered in K. Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs*, pp. 182-232.

[64] This is analyzed in detail in my "The Intellectual and the Party: The Rumanian Communist Party and the Creative Intelligentsia in the Ceauşescu Period 1965-1972" (Ph.D. diss., The Hebrew University, 1981), pp. 123-60.

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"primitive accumulation of legitimacy." That course, we may recall, had imposed de-socialization and re-socialization as the long-term strategy for creating a new political culture, which would be imbued, it was hoped, with values that would legitimize Communist rule. The core of the new political formula, on the other hand, consisted in the elite's efforts to replace its previous, derivative image with one that based its claim to power on historic intrasystemic continuity. Extrasystemic and suprasystemic legitimacy could no longer be functional in the new environmental situation. From now on, the party was to become not only the embodiment of the struggle for social justice, but also that of national aspirations to independence.

The response of the intellectual community was largely enthusiastic, and for the first time since its establishment in 1921, the Communist party and the Romanian intellectuals could establish a relationship based, at least partially, on shared values. Such enthusiasm, on the other hand, in itself attested to the ineffectiveness of previous efforts to transform political culture. Dej and his successor, Ceauşescu, became the beneficiaries of their own failure.

De-Stalinization, however, is not to be confused with liberalization. While the new Romanian political formula raised, for all practical purposes, "national form" to the level of "socialist content," it did not, and never intended to, renounce its monopolistic ethos. The so-called liberalization of the mid 1960s was not meant to become anything but "guided liberalization" at best. It gave vent to hitherto suppressed nationalistic feelings, aimed at the "traditional enemy," the Soviet Union, but also at Hungary,[65] thereby channeling possible dissent and demands for the implementation of reforms from the internal to the external course. The same technique had been employed with equal success by other pre-Communist regimes. Very few Romanian intellectuals resisted the temptation. Those who did were to become the outcasts of the regime, and, perhaps more relevant, rejected by their own colleagues. This group of young writers—of whom more will be said below—included the so-called oneirists and Paul Goma, who was closely associated with them.[66] In a book published in Paris, Goma comments on the consequences of the Romanian "independent" line for the intellectual:

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[65] The best concise account of this process is to be found in G. Schöpflin, "Rumanian Nationalism," *Survey*, vol. 20, no. 2/3, 1974, pp. 77-104.

[66] This association pertains more to the basic political implications of their writing than to the aesthetic credo, to which Goma did not—and does not—adhere. For a discussion of the Romanian oneiric current and its political implications, see D. Ţepeneag, "Quelques idées fixes et autant de variables," *Cahiers de l'Est* (Paris), no. 4, 1975, pp. 64-75; "Şotron," *Ethos* (Paris), no. 2, 1975, pp. 310-13; G. de Bosschere, "Le Groupe de Six á Bucharest," *Preuves*, vol. 19, no. 217, 1969, pp. 68-72; D. Schlesak, "Politische Schule der Träume," *Merkur* (München), vol. 26, no. 9, 1972, pp. 902-5; and M. Shafir, "The Intellectual and the Party," pp. 258-72.

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I am no visionary, but I *see* this . . . manifestation of independence a bit in the following manner: take Peter or John, handcuff him, chain his feet as well, muzzle him, then pick up a club and tell him: "Be independent, Peter, or y'er dead. Be free, or I'll, I'll, I'll . . . I don't know what I'll do to you if y'er not." . . . A thousand, ten thousand times I told myself and my fellow prisoners: blind submission does not ease the chains. They replied sagely: "Why stir them up?" "Let's not provoke them!" "If we leave them in peace they will leave us in peace." [Emphasis in original.][67]

Unlike the liberalization process in Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, the two main features of the beginning of Romanian "guided liberalization" appear to be its largely exogenous origins, that is, its having been induced by external rather than by internal motives (the conflict with the Soviet Union) and the fact that it was not initiated by intellectual pressure "from below," but by the party's own initiative "from above." Rather than initiating the process, the Romanian intellectuals responded to it; rather than winning concessions, they were benignly awarded a very definite measure of increased freedom. Since neither traditional passivity nor submission to authority were to any great extent disturbed, the party faced little difficulty in its attempts to prevent the process from assuming a character different from that originally designed.

To these differences one must add a third element: unlike the cases of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where intellectuals won concessions at a time when factional struggles for power were weakening the party's capabilities to control and pre-empt, the Romanian process began at a moment when Dej and his group were the unchallenged leaders, having eliminated all opposition. It was only after Dej's death, during the first stage of his successor's rule, that a factional struggle developed between Ceauşescu and the "old guard," whose main, though not only, contender for power was the chief of the security forces, Alexandru Drăghici. As a result of this struggle, and seeking to enlarge the base of his appeal both within and outside the party, Ceauşescu at first adopted the posture of champion of creative and scientific freedom.[68] Consequently, "socialist realism," a concept already under some attack in the last years of Dej's life, was replaced by "socialist humanism," the advantage of which consisted in its diffuseness. Since nobody ever bothered to define "socialist humanism," each side could, for the time being, interpret it as it wished.

The number of writers and other members of the intelligentsia in the party's Central Committee rose substantially after 1965. Some, such

[67] P. Goma, *Gherla*, pp. 79-80.

[68] See, for instance, his speech at the first Party Congress he chaired in July 1965, in N. Ceauşescu, *România pe drumul desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialiste*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1968), p. 93, and his address to the March 1968 Central Committee Plenum in ibid., vol. 3 (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1969), p. 96.

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as Eugen Barbu and Titus Popovici, had, at one stage or another, been counted among the "Young Turks" of Romanian letters. They were soon to prove only too eager to be tamed and began acting as watchdogs over their more unorthodox colleagues. Others, such as Dumitru Radu Popescu or Nicolae Breban proved to be more stubborn and unwilling to fall into the trap of co-optation. To this day, Popescu, who was elected chairman of the Writers Union in 1981, remains one of the more courageous writers, quite unwilling to submit to the control of a party in which he is nevertheless a Central Committee member. His rather eclectic prose, on the other hand, while not to the party's taste, is rather difficult to understand for the average reader and therefore only potentially explosive.[69] Works of more explicitly critical substance, such as his plays *These Sad Angels* and *Cat on New Year's Eve,*[70] were temporarily banned after the "mini-cultural revolution" of 1971, Popescu's high party position notwithstanding.

While less outspoken in his literary productions, Nicolae Breban[71] protested openly, while he was in the West, against the 1971 "Theses" of the "cultural revolution," whereupon he was dropped from membership in the Central Committee. In 1977 he acted as an intermediary between Paul Goma and the party leadership during the uproar created by the group of dissidents that Goma led.[72] Nonetheless, Breban somehow managed to combine dissent with compromise, and even attempted to push Goma toward a similar position.

The limits of "guided liberalization" were, to some extent, relaxed between 1965 and 1968, though by no means as much as Ceauşescu's statements might have implied. This was itself a by-product, rather than the objective, of the de-Dejification process, which aimed at both the political annihilation or neutralization of Ceauşescu's adversaries and at assuming unilateral credit for the obviously popular nationalistic line introduced by Dej. The mechanism followed a classical pattern, with Ceauşescu himself the only remarkable absentee from the list of Dej's associates, the criticism and indictment of whom ranged from accusations of "mistakes" to, in Drăghici's case, "crimes."

Dej's "guided liberalization" had necessitated the rehabilita-

[69] See, for example, his novels, *F* (Bucureşti: Editura tineretului, 1968), *Vînătoarea regală* (Bucureşti, 1973), *Ploile de dincolo de vreme* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1976), and *Iepurele şchiop* (Bucureşti: Editura Cartea românească, 1980).

[70] See D. R. Popescu, *Aceşti îngeri trişti* (Bucureşti: Editura Eminescu, 1976), and "Pisica în noaptea Anului Nou," *Teatru*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1971.

[71] His more outstanding and potentially explosive works are *In absenţa stăpînilor* (Bucureşti: Editura pentru literatură, 1967), *Animale bolnave* (Bucureşti: Editura pentru literatură, 1968). See, also, *Bunavestire* (Iaşi: Junimea, 1977).

[72] See Goma's memoirs, *Le tremblement des hommes* (Paris: Seuil, 1979), pp. 29-31, 65-70, 324. On the details of the "Goma affair" see my "Who is Paul Goma?," *Index on Censorship*, no. 1, 1978, pp. 29-39.

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tion of past historical, political, and literary figures within the framework of the endeavor to base legitimacy on historic continuity; between 1962 and 1965 these figures were restored to the national patrimonium, as part of what was—and still is—called "revalorification of the national heritage."[73] Ceauşescu's "guided liberalization," on the other hand, while continuing and even increasing the salience of nationalist exaltation, allowed, in addition, for the rehabilitation of many of those who had fallen victim to Dej's reign of terror. Foremost among them was Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, rehabilitated in 1968. Consequently, the writers were, during and after this period, "free to criticize" the immediate past.

What at the time may have appeared to be courageous dissent in the eyes of Western observers was therefore nothing but evidence of consent. Criticized then were such "distortions of socialist legality" as forced collectivization and even sending innocent victims to prison, provided that responsibility for such actions was clearly that of Dej and his henchmen or their proxies, and that an unambiguous message of optimism and justice—embodied by a regenerated party—was clearly established. Eugen Barbu's historical allegory *The Prince* and Alexandru Ivasiuc's *The Birds* are examples of such apparently courageous literary works.[74]

Their epitome, perhaps, was the play *The Power and the Truth* by Titus Popovici, published in 1973[75] after having initially served as a script for a film. The play is in fact almost a re-creation of the "Pătrăşcanu affair"—seen through a glass, but not too darkly. The four main characters represent Dej, Ceauşescu, Pătrăşcanu, and Drăghici. On stage, Pătrăşcanu is, however, more fortunate than he had been in real life. He is the engineer Petrescu, who survives the concentration camp to which he had been sent by former friends. He had "objectively" allied himself with the class enemy by expressing doubts about the feasibility of building, under the prevailing conditions, a power station he himself had planned since his youth. The power station represents socialism, and the "prevailing conditions" are the exogenously inspired antinationalist Soviet emulation. Petrescu's closest friend is the party secretary of the region, Pavel Stoian, that is, Dej himself (note the slavicized implications of the name), who sent the promising intellectual to the camp without consulting the party committee. For such unbecoming conduct he is severely—though not publicly—criticized by the young party activist

[73] The same formula, incidentally, had, during the "transformative" period, served as justification for "indexing" or distorting beyond recognition the national cultural heritage. Whatever purpose the formula served, it was always Lenin's concept of "two cultures in one culture" that the party referred to in order to justify its conjectural policies.

[74] See E. Barbu, *Principele* (Bucureşti: Editura tineretului, 1969), and A. Ivasiuc, *Păsările* (Bucureşti: Editura Cartea românească, 1971).

[75] Titus Popovici, "Puterea şi adevărul," *Teatru*, vol. 18, no. 1, 1973.

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Mihai Duma, representing Ceauşescu himself, who, in addition to Petrescu, is the "positive hero" of the play. "You know you used to be an idol in my eyes," Duma, the personification of Communist justice, tells Stoian at one point, lest the audience miss the message. By the end of the play Petrescu is fully rehabilitated, while Stoian is fatally ill (Dej died of cancer) and full of Communist remorse. The audience, however, must clearly understand that, no matter what "mistakes" have been made in the past, the essence of the ideal has not been affected. The bright future is Duma, whose dream is the realization of what he calls "the synthesis of power, truth and happiness." The play ends in the following manner: Marta, Stoian's wife, calls him to step inside their apartment: "Come in," she says. "It is late." At which point, a dying but wiser Stoian replies: "Mind your own business. It is very early."

Works that expressed doubt on the subject of the final victory of justice or that failed to make clear that all was well and different in Ceauşescu's Romania, were not approved for publication. Paul Goma's novel *Ostinato,* for example, was rejected by the censor and eventually published in the West in 1971.[76] A second novel, *The Door,*[77] was rejected because Goma's best friend and cellmate in the 1950s, Alexandru Ivasiuc, alerted the authorities that one of its characters, the party activist Florica Iosub, had been modeled after Mrs. Ceauşescu.

Despite the limited nature of the original intention, expanding the definition of "guided liberalization" under Ceauşescu had opened a Pandora's box, and by 1967-68, the results were becoming clear. A new generation of Romanian writers, who had not had to make the constant compromises that had been imposed on the previous generation, and with little patience or empathy for the circumstantial conditions of such compromise,[78] began to make its mark in Romania. At the same time, however, this generation also demonstrated what seemed to be a suspicious desire to replace the older generation in the official positions that bestowed substantial material advantages. This new generation began questioning several hitherto accepted party taboos. A typical, though by no means unique, example was the young writer Adrian Păunescu, who, in a series of interviews with Romanian cultural, social, and political personalities, asked remarkably bold questions and printed the no less remarkably bold answers.[79]

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[76] The novel was first published in West Germany, then in France. See P. Goma, *La cellule des libérables* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).

[77] *The Door* was also published first in West Germany and subsequently in Paris. See P. Goma, *Elles étaient quatre* (Paris: Gallimard, 1974).

[78] For a discussion of several aspects of this generational problem see Mircea Bărbulescu, "Die literarische Bewältigung des Stalinismus in Rumänien," *Osteuropa*, vol. 20, no. 7, 1970, pp. 437-53.

[79] See A. Păunescu, *Sub semnul întrebării*, ediţia a doua adăugită (Bucureşti: Editura Cartea românească, 1979).

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The mentor of this generation was the perpetual heretic Miron Radu Paraschivescu. Typical of the poet who had once proposed the creation of an "Internationale of Losers" based on the criteria of self-sacrifice in the name of justice instead of class criteria,[80] was a poem that he dedicated in 1965 to his many young followers, the message of which was "never compromise":

Here I am once more
(Even if once again I am to be offender)
Pulling the alarm-signal which says
"Strictly forbidden."

Do not forget:
Conscious voluptuousness is the severest asceticism.
Offer yourselves as much as possible
Naught but the necessary, yet, accept.

Count on me.
You should not worry.
Never shall I betray you but
Where you will be betraying yourselves
Through routine, pose, clichés and affectations
And, above all, that greatest of all sins
Being untrue to yourselves.[81]

How appropriate that "Naught but the necessary, yet, accept" the very near future was to demonstrate. In another instance, the old poet, addressing himself to the powers that be, expressed the hope that his struggle would be carried on by the new generation:

Oh, no, I haven't finished yet.
I still have something left to tell this nation.
I recollect myself, just as an army
Regrouping before the great offensive.

I still must teach my soldiers
The struggle for liberty.

I am inconvenient, I know,
Because in life myself chose but the inconvenient.
However, I shall never follow Maiakowski
(Whom often I preceded without knowledge).

For all I care, die with spite: I shall remain the inconvenient.
Miron Radu Paraschivescu will never commit suicide.

I have to leave my nation severe laws, more severe than those of Moses.

A son from me it will inherit, like Abraham,
A son the world will point its finger at
As to a prince

[80] See M. R. Paraschivescu, "Balada păguboşilor," in *Scrieri*, vol. 1, (Bucureşti: Editura pentru literatură, 1969), pp. 487-89.

[81] M. R. Paraschievscu, "Poeţilor tineri," in ibid., pp. 456-59.

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Or a scoundrel
Saying, "There goes Miron Radu Praschivescu's boy."[82]

The son Paraschivescu dreamed of, however, never lived up to his father's image. By the end of 1968, the party decided to make clearer the limits of "socialist humanism." Several factors accounted for that decision. Not only the new generation, but also several older writers, such as D. R. Popescu and Marin Preda, had produced novels and plays that clearly went beyond the intended limits of "guided liberalization." Preda, who in 1956 had published the first volume of an autobiographical novel, *The Morometes,* which described village life in pre-Communist Romania without once mentioning the party, produced a second volume dealing with the collectivization period. What struck a highly unusual note were not the "excesses" described—it was then permissible to criticize them—but rather the fact that the countercollectivist, individualist point of view of the hero, Ilie Moromete, (modeled on Preda's own father) clearly prevailed.[83] Preda's 1968 novel *The Intruder* was a Camusean description of a young outsider who suffers injustice and whose naive belief in his fellow man and socialism finds no place in contemporary society. At the end of the novel, the disappointed hero voices his opinion of the new, "purified" generation, which, as it turns out, is no better than the older one of Dej's time:

Bye-bye, lads! Live and work in your new town, until you give it the elders it misses, and then the dead listening from the silence of their tombs to the lives of their offspring. And make up whatever legends are convenient to you. As for myself, you chased me away and, for all you care, I cannot forgive it. You hunger for life, not for happiness, and your only chance is your mortality and the fact that others, perhaps your betters, will take your place. Do not cherish the hope they will spare you![84]

An even greater challenge to the party's leading role had come from a very small group of young writers, the "oneirists," whose political leader was the now exiled Dumitru Ţepeneag. Sensing that the party had no intention of implementing the principles it was enunciating, they decided to employ what Ţepeneag termed as "kamikaze tactics," that is, to commit political suicide and suffer the consequences, by demanding the implementation of obviously unacceptable reforms, such as the complete abolition of censorship. Extremist demands, it was quite accurately perceived, would force the party to pursue a middle course, thereby hindering—or at least postponing—a return to the dogmatic atmosphere. At a meeting of young writers with the Central Committee's secretary and

[82] M. R. Paraschivescu, "Un neisprăvit," *ibid.*, pp. 431-32.
[83] See M. Preda, *Morometii*, 2. vols. (Bucureşti: Editura Cartea românească, 1972).
[84] M. Preda, *Intrusul* (Bucureşti: Editura pentru literatură, 1968), p. 303.

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minister for youth questions in 1968, for instance, the participants demanded that Eugen Barbu, who had turned from self-styled mentor into supervisor of the young generation, be replaced as editor in chief of the young writers' journal *Luceafărul* by Paraschivescu. Ţepeneag, on the other hand, bluntly stated that censorship was the fundamental problem. Although Paraschivescu was not made editor in chief, Barbu was indeed replaced by the more acceptable Ştefan Bănulescu.[85]

As a result of these developments, by the end of 1968 a clear change of tone could be discerned in Ceauşescu's pronouncements. Addressing the general meeting of Romanian writers in November, the party leader reminded his listeners that "the Marxist-Leninist concept of liberty means understanding necessity" and that, consequently:

> In socialism man becomes free not because he is exempted from the influence of social laws, but rather because, understanding their imperative necessity, he acts, in their spirit, for the conscious building of society. Therefore, individual liberty does not contradict society's general interests, but, on the contrary, serves these interests. Therefore, whenever activities disregarding the general interest are registered . . . society is entitled to take the necessary measures . . . to prevent harming the collective's interests.[86]

In the arts, too, it soon became obvious that the regime was more or less advocating a return to "socialist realism," with all its implications. Privately, such measures were presented to the writers as imposed not by the party's monopolistic ethos, but rather by a desire to avoid the fate of Czechoslovakia. It was a cunning argument, since in the Romanian intellectual's value system, national, anti-Russian sentiments probably take priority over all other considerations. "We have become so preoccupied by the danger of Soviet occupation," Ţepeneag declared at a meeting late in 1968, "that, for all practical purposes we have preoccupied ourselves."[87] The same argument was made public by Ţepeneag's fellow dissident, Goma. In a letter of support addressed to the signatories of "Charter 77," Goma wrote: "We Romanians live under Romanian occupation—ultimately more painful, more efficient than a foreign occupation."[88]

One can hardly question the efficiency of such occupation, judging by the results. It is doubtful, however, whether for most Romanian

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[85] I learned these, as well as many other details, from several meetings with D. Ţepeneag in Paris in August 1973. I recall these meetings with gratitude and unbounded admiration. The incident of *Luceafărul* is also described in A. U. Gabanyi, *Partei und Literatur in Rumänien seit 1945* (München: Oldenbourg, 1975), pp. 152-55.

[86] N. Ceauşescu, *România*, vol. 3, pp. 677-78.

[87] See note 85.

[88] See *Dossier Paul Goma. L'écrivain face au socialisme du silence*, présenté par V. Tănase (Paris: Albatros, 1977), p. 88.

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writers, it is also as painful an occupation as Goma considers it to be. Indeed, Goma and Ţepeneag were the leaders of an exceptionally small —though by no means insignificant—group of writers who consistently refused to trade their full identification with the values of creative intellectual and political independence for nationalistic surrogates. Such intransigence (as well as professional envy stirred by the success enjoyed by their works published in the West), soon isolated Goma and the "oneiric" group, who became outsiders rejected not only by the regime, but also by most of their fellow writers. In the eyes of the former, they embodied values that the process of "breaking through" had failed to obliterate and that, unlike nationalistic values, were perceived as "dysfunctional" in the post-transformative period as well; in the eyes of the latter, they combine the vestiges of ideals too easily betrayed with a disavowal of nationalistic values perceived as of primary importance.

Indeed, for a period of two years after the Romanian leader's speech quoted above, the leadership was confronted by a minority of Romanian writers still attempting to expand the limits of "guided liberalization." The notorious July 1971 "Theses" of the Romanian mini-cultural revolution marked the end of this effort. Despite an initial, short-lived resistance, Romanian writers came to accept the new limits with remarkable passivity. Some gave in without even attempting to resist. Others adopted the tactics of "one article–one book," that is, they published books in which the constraints of "guided liberalization" were pushed to the limit, but also published articles expressing orthodox adherence to the strictest party tenets in the daily or weekly press. These tactics rapidly proved to be self-defeating, for the party was quick to demand that their literary works embody the credo they were supporting in the press. Only a handful of writers—the "oneiric" core of intellectual dissent and resistance—refused to go along with such self-defeating policies. The more stubborn among them, such as Ţepeneag and, later, his fellow "oneiric" Virgil Tănase, were exiled, more or less by force.[89] Indeed, Ţepeneag's was one of the first East European writers to be stripped of his citizenship, as a series of new tactics, later publicized by the Solzhenitzyn case, were developed.

The majority of Romanian writers, including the former *enfant terrible* Păunescu, soon proved content with the spiritual *Lebensraum* provided by Ceauşescu's "guided liberalism," the more so since nationalistic tones were more in vogue than ever. Even Preda, who had seemed a hard nut to crack and had followed the tactics of the lonely runner, had,

[89] Tănase, who continued to be politically active in the West, was the "hero" of a rather puzzling incident resulting from the defection of a secret service agent dispatched to Paris with orders to kill him and Goma. See P. Goma, *Chassé Croisé* (Paris: Hachette, 1983).

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by 1975, published a novel[90] remarkable for two reasons: it partially rehabilitated General Antonescu and his Bessarabian policies and it included a passage—totally unrelated to the plot itself—in which a young Communist brought to trial figures prominently. The only young Communist militant prosecuted during the period covered by the novel had been—not unexpectedly—Ceauşescu himself. In the "orchestra" of nationalism playing variations on the theme of the personality cult,[91] Păunescu soon began playing first violin—by no means a mean achievement, considering the strength of the competition. On Ceauşescu's birthday in 1973, the Romanian party organ carried the following poem by Păunescu:

If in today's Romania there's no room for privilege
And one may dream the dream of better life
It is because he was the first to lend his ear
To mother-country's sighs and humble woes.
. . . . . .
This is Romania, celebrating
Her first and most valiant of sons
Who, as a good Romanian, knows
To lead means to be with the masses.
. . . . . .
I sing his praise, because he is. I sing because he burns
Of patriotic love, embodying the Party,
Because, though he respects the banners' forest
No flag for him is like Romania's own.

He's our rhythm, our power, our pride.
Whatever blood, in one voice we shall join.
By saying Ceauşescu, Romania we have said
And communism, humans, and a righteous way.[92]

There were, to be sure, important payoffs for such performances. While still in his early thirties, Păunescu became not only the editor in chief of

[90] M. Preda, *Delirul* (Bucureşti: Editura Cartea românească, 1975). I cannot share the enthusiasm that greeted Preda's last novel in Romania (as well as in the West), although the tragic circumstances of his premature death partly explain such responses. See M. Preda, *Cel mai iubit dintre pământeni*, 3 vols. (Bucuresti: Editura Cartea românească, 1980). As is the case with many other Romanian writers, Preda avoids extending his critical review of Romanian society beyond the Dej period, and the few glimpses of that period are provided (the Stalin-Dej encounter, the life of the "New Class") hardly justify the effort of going through over twelve hundred pages of what remains a poorly written piece of love fiction. As a political document, the novel is disappointing; as a spiritual testament, it only proves that compromise cannot be easily wiped off. For it appears that Preda, too, had fallen victim to the temptations of "positive sanctions" once he had been nominated as director of the Writers' Union publishing house in 1970.

[91] See the "leviathanic" volume *Omagiu tovarăşului Ceauşescu* (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1973). For a more recent review of such "intellectual output" see A. Maier, "Ceauşescu Deified on his 62nd Birthday," Radio Free Europe, RAD Background Report no. 34(Romania), February 11, 1980, and "Ceauşescu's Birthday Extravaganza," ibid, February 19, 1983. The political implications of this cult are discussed in M. E. Fischer, "Idol or Leader? The Origins and Future of the Ceauşescu Cult," in D. N. Nelson, ed., *Romania in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview), pp. 117-141.

[92] A. Păunescu, "Un cîntec," *Scînteia*, January 26, 1973.

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a literary publication, but also the privileged possessor of such fringe benefits as a villa with a swimming pool, two cars, and other marks of honor. Like most of his generation of writers, he had quite forgotten Paraschivescu's testament. But he could march under "trimumphal arches," beating the sure path mentioned by Rădulescu-Motru almost three-quarters of a century before.

With the exception of the forced exile of Goma and Ţepeneag, very little has happened in Romanian literary life in the past decade to deserve more than a passing glance, let alone to refute the main arguments of this article. In the early 1980s, however, the conflict between traditionalists and evolutionists seems to have burst out once more. Not surprisingly, the former identify themselves with national values combined with party orthodoxy and attempt to monopolize all "patriotism." The latter, on the other hand, must wonder to what extent the concessions they have made in the past decade are worth their while, for it is of "lack of national pride" that their adversaries accuse them, probably not without tacit party approval. One should not expect such clashes to develop into systemic confrontation. For while the "evolutionists" may indeed reflect upon their politics, it seems unlikely that they contemplate taking any concrete action. Unofficial reports reaching the West spoke of some turmoil at the last (July 1980) National Conference of Romanian Writers, and the election of Dumitru Radu Popescu as chairman of the Writers' Union may indicate a regime concession aimed at preventing the formation of Polish-inspired alliances between unsatisfied segments of the population.[93] Judging by precedent, however, the Romanian party should not fear the diffusion of political innovation from Polish to Romanian intellectuals, just as the Romanian elite's anxieties concerning the undesirable influence of Czechoslovak intellectuals on their Romanian peers in 1968[94] proved to have been greatly exaggerated. For, as Amalrik once put it, "no oppression can be effective without those who are prepared to submit to it." [95]

[93] Ever since the 1977 events in the Jiul Valley, unrest among workers has occasionally been reported from Romania. On the significance and the limited prospects of organized labor protest see my "Autonomy and Conformity in Romania."

[94] For a discussion of this aspect see my forthcoming article, "Political Stagnation and Marxist Critique: 1968 and Beyond in Comparative East European Perspective."

[95] A. Amalrik, "An Open Letter to Kuznetzov", *Survey*, no. 74/75, 1970, p. 97.

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TURKEY AND NATO: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE*

by Bruce R. Kuniholm

Thirty years after Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, many of the geopolitical realities that provided the context for its accession still hold. Shifts in the international balance of power and crises of confidence and trust have created strains in the alliance, but the bonds between Turkey and its allies are nonetheless secure. New developments, meanwhile, have given Turkey added geopolitical importance. Strategic parity between East and West and a changed strategic environment in the Near East together make Soviet adventurism somewhat more threatening than it was earlier; greatly increased Soviet naval and air power makes the Soviet Union a much more important player in the eastern Mediterranean; and the increased importance and vulnerability of Persian Gulf oil (which in 1952 provided approximately one-tenth and now provides over half of Europe's oil) have made the Persian Gulf region vital to the security of NATO. As a result, while Turkey's role in the defense of Europe (and Asia Minor) continues to be the focal point of its security concerns, its potential role in the security of the Middle East and Persian Gulf has become increasingly significant. This essay will explore the range of geopolitical and other factors that have contributed to these developments and examine their implications for the future of Turkey's relationship with NATO.

The Early Years

When NATO deliberated over Turkey's accession to its ranks in 1950-51, there were differences between those U.S. officials who gave priority to the balance of power in Western Europe and those who argued

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that the balance of power in the Near East was almost if not equally important. With the advent of the Korean War, however, and implementation in the United States government of a policy that seemed to show that distinctions between peripheral and vital interests were unnecessary, categorical geographical conceptions about Turkey were altered. Turkey's unique strategic position, enhanced by the changed face of postwar geopolitical realities, gave it an important role to play in the defense of both regions.[1]

A prerequisite for Turkey's accession to NATO, however, was a sense of reciprocity; only a conviction that there was a mutuality of benefits could make credible and, therefore, possible, a mutuality of obligations. By late 1951, this requirement had been met. Support for the balance of power in the Near East interlocked with support for the balance of power in Europe. Geographic distinctions between the two regions were dismissed as artificial, and the two came to be regarded as interconnected, with Turkey serving as the linchpin.

The rationale behind NATO's decision was interesting for what it revealed about U.S. perceptions of Turkey and how they had changed since Soviet activities in the Near East in 1946 had forced the United States to focus on Turkey. In what President Truman regarded as his most important decision since the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the president decided in August of 1946 that the United States would resist with all means at its disposal, including the force of U.S. arms, any Soviet aggression against Turkey, and it was this decision that had laid the groundwork for the Truman Doctrine in 1947.

In 1950-51, Turkey was still seen as the strongest anti-Communist country on the periphery of the Soviet Union, the only country in the eastern Mediterranean capable of substantial resistance to the Soviets; it constituted a deterrent to Soviet aggression and provided something of a protective screen for the region. Loss of Turkey to the Soviet Union would give the Soviets a valuable strategic position in the region. If the Soviets attacked Iran, and Turkey remained neutral, the Soviet right flank would be protected. If Bulgaria attacked Greece, Turkey would not oppose Bulgaria unless intervention were dictated by the requirements of a larger security framework that included the United States. Oil interests in the Persian Gulf, meanwhile, would be vulnerable, and European economic viability would be threatened. None of this was new.

[1] For a detailed examination and documentation of the argument put forward in the first part of this essay, see Bruce Kuniholm, "The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe," a paper delivered at a symposium on U.S.-European Relations, 1945-1952, at the Institut für Geschichte, University of Salzburg, Austria, April 17, 1983.

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What was new in the early 1950s was the conviction of a mutuality of benefits: Turkey and Greece on the one hand, and Europe and the United States on the other, all stood to benefit. Turkey was already linked by a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France; the treaty had last been reaffirmed in 1949, although no one was sure how much emphasis to place on it. Since the United States believed that the Soviets would attack Turkey only if they were prepared to face the likelihood of global war, and since the United States had important political and strategic interests in Turkey, as well as profound moral commitment to it, many officials believed that the United States would assist the Turks whether or not it had a reciprocal treaty arrangement with them. The United States was, in effect, already committed to support for the security of Turkey. For the United States to obtain Turkey's full cooperation—to "maximize its contribution"—in international security issues, on the other hand, or to assure its cobelligerency in the event of an attack on Europe, a U.S. security commitment was required. A security commitment was also necessary to secure access to its valuable bases and to close the straits.

Without a security commitment to Turkey, the United States was concerned that the government would drift toward neutrality, as Turkey had in World War II and as Iran appeared to be doing at the time under Premier Mossadeq. If this happened, officials reasoned, the United States would lose the assistance of a powerful ally. Greece and Iran, if they were to be protected, required mutual defense arrangements with Turkey; this was only possible under a broader security arrangement of which the United States was a part.

As members of NATO, Turkey and Greece would be important to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe)—both as a deterrent to a Soviet attack and as a threat to the Soviets' southern flank. If the region's military potential were integrated in a security framework, the Soviet Union would have to commit significant forces to protect its southern flank and vitally important oil fields around Baku. A security commitment to Turkey, therefore, would constitute a far more effective deterrent than previous arrangements for resisting a Soviet attack, not only along the Middle East's entire northern tier—which provided a buffer for European and U.S. oil interests in the Persian Gulf—but in Europe as well.

The Turks felt that they badly needed this commitment. Experience had taught them the value of a credible deterrent. They had, moreover, something to contribute. As President Celal Bayar told Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, Turkey "wants to give a guarantee, and it would like to receive a guarantee." Stalin, Ankara knew, harbored little love for the Turks. That there was substance to Turkish concerns is

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evident not only in Stalin's attempts to acquire portions of eastern Turkey and the straits in 1945-46, but in his successors' mea culpa less than three months after his demise. In a May 30, 1953 note, the Soviets informed the Turks that the governments of Armenia and Georgia had renounced their territorial claims against Turkey; they also stated that, after reconsidering the question of the straits, they believed Soviet security could be assured by conditions acceptable to Turkey—an unusual public retraction and tacit admission of Stalin's past sins. By then, however, Turkey and Greece were members of NATO, and Soviet attempts to alter Turkey's alliance relationship fell on deaf ears.

The Middle Years

The golden era of Turkey's association with NATO in the 1950s gave way in the 1960s and 1970s to a more complicated relationship. Strains between the NATO allies were precipitated by gradual shifts in the international balance of power, represented by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and by crises of confidence and trust, represented by differences between the United States and Turkey over Cyprus.

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the Kennedy administration's abandonment of a strategy of "massive retaliation" for one of "flexible response" together constituted a watershed in the Cold War.[2] In Turkey, however, these developments contributed to a concern that, in the event of Soviet aggression, Turkish territory might be traded for time—that NATO would favor the Central Front over its flanks, defending the former at its perimeter and the latter only in depth or not at all.[3] The announcement in January 1963 that Jupiter missiles would be removed from Turkey (they were out by mid April) followed too closely not to have a significant effect on the Turks.[4] Along with subsequent revelations that a bargain had been struck, the Cuban missile crisis emphasized Turkey's vulnerability to decisions by the United States.[5]

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[2] Alvin Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 15-19.

[3] Ferenc Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971), pp. 120-21; George Harris, *The Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1971), pp. 93-95; Ihsan Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective," Agenda Paper no. 11 (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), pp. 52-53. For more recent expression of these concerns stemming from the allocation of AWACS within NATO, see Gürkan, pp. 36-37.

[4] Donald Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics and 'Those Frigging Missiles': JFK, Cuba, and US Missiles in Turkey," ORBIS, Summer 1977, p. 319: Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosporus*, p. 132; Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, p. 19; George Harris, "The View from Ankara," *The Wilson Quarterly*, special issue, 1982, p. 132.

[5] Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," Adelphi Paper no. 164, Spring 1981, pp. 26-27; Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosporus*, p. 132; and Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 108-9.

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Turkey's vulnerability was further emphasized during the Cyprus crisis of 1963-64, when President Johnson warned Prime Minister İnönü that Turkey should not use any U.S.-supplied military equipment to invade Cyprus; in a letter on June 5, 1964, the president informed İnönü that if the Turks took a step that resulted in Soviet intervention, Turkey's NATO allies had not had a chance to consider whether they were obliged to protect Turkey against a Soviet attack. By calling into question U.S. obligations under NATO, the Johnson letter raised serious doubts among the Turks about the reliability of the United States as an ally. These doubts, in turn, produced a more realistic assessment of Turkey's problems and a more independent, multifaceted conception of Turkey's options than that which had been possible in the early Cold War years. Such a conception was encouraged by Soviet President Podgorny, whose visit to Turkey in January 1965 developed a theme sounded earlier by Stalin's successors; this time, Soviet apologies found a far more receptive audience.[6]

On January 5, 1965, Podgorny told the Turkish Grand National Assembly that a shadow had been cast over Turkish-Soviet relations for some time after World War II and acknowledged that inappropriate and incorrect statements made in the Soviet Union had played a role. The Soviet Union, he noted, stated openly that those statements were not correct; such events should be a thing of the past. Podgorny's comments came during the first visit to Turkey by a Soviet parliamentary delegation in more than twenty-five years. They were seen in Turkey as an indirect admission of Soviet responsibility for strains in relations with Turkey in the late 1940s and 1950s, and they paved the way for better relations between the two countries.[7]

Improvement in Turco-Soviet relations was marked by visits, principled agreements, and economic assistance, and complemented a diminishing level of grant assistance from the United States, which was increasingly mired in the war in Vietnam. Revenues were also supplemented by remittances from Turkish workers in Germany. Freedom from the ideological straitjacket that had bound early postwar policies resulted in a somewhat more independent international posture, as is indicated, for example, by the decision in 1965 not to participate in the U.S.-sponsored proposal for a multilateral nuclear force in Europe.[8]

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[6] Francis P. Butler, "Reassuring Turkey: A Faithful Ally Disillusioned and in Trouble," *Parameters*, March 1980, pp. 24-32; Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, p. 20; Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 105-23, 125-28, and "The View from Ankara, p. 135; Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosporus*, pp. 128-34, 176-81; Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," pp. 23-24, 30; and Andrew Mango, *Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally*, The Washington Papers, vol. 3, no. 28 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975), p. 34.

[7] See also the statement by Podgorny in Izmir on January 11, 1965. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report*, no. 3, January 6, 1965, pp. M1-3, no. 4, January 7, 1965, pp. M1-5, and no. 6, January 11, 1965, pp. M1-4.

[8] Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," pp. 23-24, 32; Harris, "The View from Ankara," pp. 133-34.

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While the Turks continued to distrust the Soviets, their policies clearly were more flexible and less structured by the earlier assumptions of a bipolar world. The new balance that was evident in Turkish policy could be seen by comparison with earlier events. During the war in Lebanon in 1958, for example, the United States had used Turkish bases to support its intervention. Following events of the early 1960s, the Turks were more guarded about the use of Turkish facilities for non-NATO contingencies. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey, but was not allowed to use Turkish bases for refueling or supply activities. In the course of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States was not allowed to use Turkish bases for direct combat or logistical support, although it was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey during the resupply effort. The United States was also allowed to use Turkish bases for the evacuation of U.S. citizens during the Jordanian civil war in 1970 and the Iranian revolution in 1979.[9]

The Recent Past: Turkey in Crisis

The Cyprus crisis in 1974 again tested mutual obligations and responsibilities. In July, Turkey occupied the island to protect the Turkish minority from the "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus"—led by an international terrorist, installed by a coup, backed by the military dictatorship in Athens, and bent on union with Greece. A second Turkish action in August—to consolidate vulnerable positions, according to the Turks, to expand their base, according to the Greeks—precipitated the U.S. congressional embargo on transfers of military equipment to Turkey (effective February 5, 1975) and resulted in a subsequent decision in Ankara to suspend U.S. operations at the military installations in Turkey (as of July 26, 1975). These developments made explicit what had been implicit until then: access to facilities was directly related to decisions on military assistance. Blunt assessments of the problem called into question fundamental assumptions on both sides and forced discussion over the merits of continuing the special relationship.[10]

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[9] *Turkey's Problems and Prospects: Implications for U.S. Interests*, a report prepared for the U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, by the Congressional Research Service (Washington: GPO, 1980), pp. 11, 48; Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, p. 38.

[10] U.S. House, Foreign Affairs Committee, *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*, Congress and Foreign Policy Series, no. 3 (Washington: GPO, June 1981), p. 27 (this study is especially useful in illuminating the role played by Watergate and the Vietnam War); Harris, *The Troubled Alliance*, p. 208; Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, p. 46; Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank," p. 38. As one analyst has pointed out, the Turks saw as hypocritical the U.S. focus on the origins of the arms used by Turkey rather than on the rationale for their use (Butler, "Reassuring Turkey," p. 28). Selective application of U.S. arms transfers law (the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military

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Relations between Ankara and Moscow, meanwhile, continued to improve. By 1978, the Soviet Union was aiding forty-four different development projects in Turkey, and by the end of the decade Turkey received more Soviet economic assistance than any country in the Third World. If Prime Minister Ecevit could declare in May 1978 that Turkey felt "no threat" from the Soviet Union, however, that statement required qualification, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (which worried the Turks far more than the fall of the shah).[11] Additional cause for worry grew out of political and economic problems manifested by systemic complications and endemic violence. By September 1980, an average of over twenty politically motivated murders were being committed in Turkey every day, and over 13,000 people had been killed or wounded over the previous two years (numbers vary depending on one's definition of the motives involved). Two-fifths of Turkey's work force was unemployed, and the rate of inflation had reached 128 per cent.[12]

Political Explanations

Explanations for these developments vary. Some analysts have focused on the Constitution of 1961, drawn up by Turkey's leading intellectuals to correct the excesses of Prime Minister Menderes during the 1950s—and to address in particular his regime's failure to promote social justice. In seeking to prevent the previous regime's abuse of power, however, the intellectuals created a system of proportional representation that encouraged political fragmentation and inadvertently impeded the legitimate exercise of power by subsequent regimes. By the 1970s, in spite of threats by the military to intervene if reforms did not address rising domestic instability and strife, neither the Justice party nor the Republican People's party (which together were supported by 80 per cent of the electorate) was able to rule as a majority party. The parliamentary system could not—or would not—produce either the stable majorities or compromises necessary for effective political action. As a result, Turkey in the

Sales Act) against Turkish use of U.S. arms in Cyprus is highlighted by congressional failure to apply those laws with equal force to Israeli use of U.S. arms in Lebanon. The embargo was lifted on September 26, 1978; as a consequence, Turkey allowed the United States to resume operations at military facilities on October 9, 1978.

[11] George E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in the Alliance: U.S. Interests in the Middle East and the Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy," ORBIS Summer 1980, p. 371; the Soviet Union was also the most important source of assistance for Turkey's public-sector projects. Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, pp. 27, 40. See, also, Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," pp. 27-29, 33, 40-43; Bernard Gwertzman, *New York Times*, May 30, 1978; and Bulent Ecevit's address to the International Institute of Strategic Studies on May 15, 1978, *Survival*, vol. 20, no. 5, 1978, pp. 203-8.

[12] Nicholas S. Ludington and James W. Spain, "Dateline Turkey: The Case for Patience," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1983, pp. 154-56; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO: The Strained Alliance*, a staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: GPO, 1980), p. 22.

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1970s was governed by twelve minority or coalition governments. In this context, small factions were able to exploit religious or ethnic differences within Turkey, so exercising influence out of proportion to their numbers. Politics by coalition gradually degenerated into what one analyst has characterized as politics by deadlock.[13]

Whether the blame for Turkey's difficulties should be placed more on the constitution than on the politicians who operated under its laws is a moot point. Some Turkish professors and journalists stand by the Constitution of 1961 and find fault with Turkey's previous political leaders.[14] According to one observer of Turkey's political scene, Turkey's main political parties were networks of interests concerned with patronage; they were led by individuals who gave immediate satisfaction to material wants, thereby sacrificing short-term advantage for long-term improvement. As a result, they neither implemented needed structural reforms nor created the indigenous institutions required to regulate political freedom; because of their personal failings and lack of prudence, they magnified systemic problems.[15] In conjunction with terrorism, which began to ravage Turkey in the late 1970s, these systemic problems put the country on the verge of a civil war.

In 1976 Turkey had experienced 104 politically motivated killings. During the next twenty-two months the number rose to 2,400, and in 1979 and 1980 the number increased even more than it had during the previous twenty-two months, bringing the country to a virtual standstill. The cause of terrorism, aside from an environment that was conducive to it, is also the subject of debate. According to one perceptive analyst, the killings were attributable to at least three and possibly four different forms of violence: (1) assassinations by a small number of primarily student-led conspiratorial groups (e.g., the Action Unit of the Turkish People's Liberation Front) seeking to bring down the political order; (2) clashes on campus or during public demonstrations between rightist and leftist legal organizations (e.g., the Turkish Nationalist Movement party and the Progressive Youth Association of University Students) whose confrontations caused — often unintentionally — the deaths of students or innocent bystanders; (3) traditional feuds between newly urbanized groups whose origins in common villages or sections of Turkey,

[13] George Harris, "The Left in Turkey," *Problems in Communism*, July-August 1980, pp. 26-28; Paul Henze, "On the Rebound," *The Wilson Quarterly*, special issue, 1982, p. 120; *Terrorism: The Turkish Experience*, U.S. Senate, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary* (Washington: GPO, June 25, 1981), p. 18; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO: The Strained Alliance*, pp. 22-24; Maxwell O. Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *Air University Review*, January-February 1982, p. 57; Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," pp. 8, 20; and Şükrü Elekdağ, *Washington Post*, November 20, 1982.

[14] Conversations with Turkish professors and journalists in Istanbul and Ankara in April 1983.

[15] Andrew Mango, "Understanding Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, April 1982, pp. 201-2.

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subsequently colored by ideological overtones and reinforced by identification with Sunni conservative orthodoxy or Alevi (Shiite) heterodoxy, precipitated major clashes (e.g., at Kahramanmaraş in December 1978, where over 100 were killed); and (4) attacks against security forces by radical leftists and militants seeking autonomy for the Kurds (e.g., the Kawa society).[16]

If these sources of violence resulted in considerable part from internal factors, subsequent circumstantial evidence suggests that external factors also played an important role. Within ten months after the military takeover, the government confiscated 473,553 firearms; an additional 160,170 were delivered voluntarily for a total of 633,723. The breakdown included 472,114 pistols, 3,095 automatic pistols, 30,183 infantry rifles, 4,361 automatic rifles (including 1,371 Kalishnikovs), and 13,636 shotguns. Of these, 60 per cent appeared to be of Western origin, although many were counterfeit (manufactured under a false license in Bulgaria, for example). Others were manufactured in Argentina on an order from a Bulgarian state agency. Whatever the source of these weapons, Turkish authorities estimate their cost at $250 million and that of financing terrorist activity in the period 1977-80 at three times the cost of the weapons—another $750 million. One analyst, using these figures as a basis for judgment, argues that instead of seeking sociological explanations for terrorism in Turkey, one should look to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Whatever the extent and nature of Soviet support for terrorism in Turkey, he asserts, only a naive interpretation of the circumstantial evidence could justify a conclusion that there had been none.[17]

Economic Explanations

If some analysts of the crisis in Turkey underscore the role of political factors, others point to economic issues to explain Ankara's

[16] Harris, "The Left in Turkey," pp. 36-38. One aspect of terrorism not elaborated upon here concerns Turkey's Kurdish problem, which is shared by Iran and Iraq. While not publicized, the problem nonetheless surfaces from time to time (e.g., *International Herald Tribune*, May 28-29, June 3, 1983). For more detail, see Gérard Chaliand, ed., *People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan*, trans. Michael Pallis (London: Zed Press, 1980); Chris Kutschera, *Le Mouvement Nationale Kurde* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979); and Richard Sim, "Kurdistan: the Search for Recognition," *Conflict Studies*, no. 124 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1981). For a useful overview of the Armenian question, which is also not addressed here, see Norman Ravitch, "The Armenian Catastrophe: Of History, Murder, & Sin," *Encounter*, vol. 57, no. 6, 1981, pp. 69-84; for a Turkish view, see *The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers* (Ankara: The Foreign Policy Institute, June 1982).

[17] *Terrorism: The Turkish Experience*, pp. 5, 6, 27, 34-35; Paul Henze, *Goal: Destabilization, Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability and Terrorism in NATO South* (Marina del Rey, Calif.: European American Institute for Security Research, December 1981), pp. 15-47; see, also, Sam Cohen, *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, for discussion of arms smuggling from Bulgaria into Turkey. More recent estimates put the number of illegal weapons captured at over 800,000. See Ludington and Spain, "Dateline Turkey," p. 165.

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difficulties—particularly to the lack of developed indigenous energy resources and the costs of energy imports. These made Turkey particularly vulnerable to the enormous increase in oil prices in 1974, and again in 1978-79. Turkey's oil bill, which was only $124 million in 1972, rose to $1.2 billion in 1977 and to $3.86 billion in 1980. High oil bills and a recession in Europe (which in the mid 1970s resulted in the reduction of Turkey's important annual income from remittances) together were central to Turkey's difficulties; when these economic problems were compounded by bad management, inefficient government-run institutions, and lack of firm political leadership, they explain why Turkey's external debt rose from $2.8 billion in 1973 to $17 billion by 1979. The oil bill, which in 1980 was approximately equal to Turkey's $3.7 billion balance-of-payments deficit, ate up Turkey's foreign exchange earnings. Increasing deficits, financed initially by a draw down in reserves, after 1976 were financed almost entirely by building up the external debt.[18]

One analyst who acknowledges the difficulties associated with the cost of imported oil has looked hard at Turkey's internal economic problems and regards the difficulties examined here as stemming neither from a political crisis caused by an unworkable political system, nor from an economic crisis created by external factors (which are nonetheless important); rather, he sees them as "the culmination of a fundamentally flawed development strategy." The argument here is that the Kemalist experiment in étatism (state partnership, ownership, and planning of the economy) has become increasingly doctrinaire. Intended at first to initiate and develop projects in fields in which private capital was inadequate, étatism in fact has promoted monopoly, discouraged market competition, and in effect brought about a noncompetitive, closed economy, dominated by badly managed, inefficient state economic enterprises (SEEs) that have been losing some $2 billion a year. As a result, Turkey was unable to respond creatively to the economic crisis that it faced as the decade drew to a close.[19]

The Demirel government, sensitive to such arguments and increasingly responsive to recommendations advocated by OECD (Or-

[18] *Turkey,* Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Surveys (Paris: OECD, April 1982), pp. 7, 43; Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," p. 4; *Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank: A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations* (Washington: GPO, 1980), pp. 8-9; *Wall Street Journal,* September 17, 1982.

[19] Özay Mehmet, "Turkey in Crisis: Some Considerations in the Kemalist Development Strategy," *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* vol. 15, 1983, pp. 47-66. Mehmet argues that there may be good historical reasons for supporting étatism and the objective of self-reliance when the two are pursued separately, but that the two together reinforce the growth of a noncompetitive, closed economy. He acknowledges that unregulated market capitalism may generate large inequalities, but asserts that Turkey's previous economy is no guarantee against such a result; faced with a choice, the Turks would choose a more open, competitive, and decentralized economy.

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ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development), the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), on January 24, 1980 began to address some of Turkey's economic problems by introducing the first of a series of broad-based economic-stabilization measures that were to continue after the generals took over. Placing great reliance on market forces, the Turkish government eliminated subsidies to inefficient public-sector enterprises, curtailed imports, increased exports by devaluing the lira, cut oil consumption, introduced a tight monetary policy to limit inflation, and removed barriers to foreign investment.[20]

In time, these economic measures would turn around the economy of Turkey—a country which, experts agree, has the basis for a strong economy. The rate of oil consumption was reduced (oil imports, which cost $3.862 billion in 1980, peaked at $3.878 billion in 1981 and were reduced to $3.64 billion in 1982). Exports were increased from $2.9 billion in 1980 to $4.7 billion in 1981—when processed and manufactured products ($2.29 billion) exceeded agricultural products ($2.22 billion) for the first time—and to $5.75 billion in 1982. Inflation, at 94 per cent in 1980, was reduced markedly: to 38 per cent in 1981, to below 30 per cent in 1982, and currently to 25 per cent. At the time these reforms were instituted, however, social unrest was getting out of control. The dismal economic and political situation created an environment conducive to extremism and terror, and terrorism in turn served to undermine the government's initial attempts at economic reform.[21]

The "September 12 Action" and its Aftermath

In September 1980, as the economic and political situation worsened and the deaths attributed to terrorism reached 28 per day, General Kenan Evren, former commanding officer of the Turkish brigade that fought valiantly in Korea, and chief of staff of the armed forces, announced that the military leadership—acting in its traditional capacity as guardians of the state[22]—was taking over control of the government. The sense of relief with which Turks greeted the restoration of order was virtually unanimous. A year later, a reporter noted the opinion of a left-wing intellectual concerning the heavy hand that necessarily accom-

[20] Piero Benetazzo, *Christian Science Monitor*, November 23, 1982. Harris, "The View from Ankara," p. 134; *Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank*, p. 9; *New York Times*, November 21, 1982.

[21] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Survey, April 1982, p. 7; ibid., April 1983, pp. 26, 28, 29, 41; and *Terrorism: The Turkish Experience*, pp. 10, 24.

[22] Michael Turner, "Politics and the Future of Turkish Democracy," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, September 1981, pp. 1-4, and a conversation with a Turkish professor in Turkey, April 1983. For the traditional, historical role of the military in Turkish politics, see Maxwell O. Johnson, *Air University Review*, January-February 1982, pp. 49-63.

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panied the return to order: "The 26,000 prisoners? It is the price of our security. We sleep better now." Over a year after that, a noted Turkish professor observed that the Turkish government, while repressive, was what the Turks needed and wanted.[23]

The generals, meanwhile, admitting that they had waited too long to intervene, continued to take a series of bold and increasingly controversial initiatives. Following the military takeover and the restoration of order in Turkey, Evren struck a second blow at abuses that he believed to be at the source of Turkey's predicament. A new constitution, drafted to replace the "liberal" constitution of 1961, was submitted on November 7, 1982, to a national referendum. While more controversial than the September 12 action, the referendum nonetheless demonstrated that a vast majority (over 90 per cent) of the population supported both the new constitution and the automatic election of Evren as president. In supporting the referendum, the Turks granted Evren broad executive powers, restricted the powers of the legislature and the judiciary, accepted limitations on human rights and liberties, and in effect said no to terrorism and yes to authority. Many former leftists were torn between loyalty to their ideals and a recognition that public safety was a prerequisite to orderly government and the exercise of individual liberties. One student, who epitomized the ambivalence of many, opposed the authoritarian measures that the referendum would legitimate. He acknowledged, however, that he voted against the referendum only because he knew that the country as a whole would support it, and that he could indulge his conscience in the luxury of voting no. If he had had to cast the deciding vote, he admitted, he probably would have voted yes.[24]

By the spring of 1983, the generals had struck a third blow against key institutions, purging the universities, tightening their grip on the press, and cracking down on the labor unions.[25] While the government's actions clearly angered and concerned Turkey's professional elite and particularly its journalists (one of whom asserted that freedom is far

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[23] Paul Henze, "On the Rebound," p. 124; Jonathan Randal, *International Herald Tribune*, April 27, 1983. Chris Kutschera, "The Price of Security," *The Middle East*, September 1981, pp. 32-33.

[24] In spite of criticism that eligible voters, if they failed to register, would be subject to fines or jail; that voting was mandatory; that Evren ran unopposed; and that there were some instances of intimidation at the polls, most Turks from all walks of life agreed that the results were what the country wanted. The statistics themselves are overwhelming: of 20,690,914 registered voters, 18,885,488 (91.27 per cent) cast 18,841,990 valid votes at 82,913 polling stations. Of the valid votes, 17,215,559 (91.37 per cent) approved of the new constitution and 1,626,431 (8.63 per cent) did not. *The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey* (Ankara: Directorate General of Press and Information, 1982); Metin Munir, *Washington Post*, November 6 and 8, 1982; Sam Cohen, *Christian Science Monitor*, July 21, and November 9, 1982; Marvine Howe, *New York Times*, November 9, 1982; Altemur Kılıç, *New York Times*, November 12, 1982; Jonathan Randal, *International Herald Tribune*, April 27, 1983; and a conversation with a former student in Turkey, April 1983.

[25] *New York Times*, March 16, 1981; January 17, March 17, April 5, December 3 and 24, 1982, and January 6, 1983; *Washington Post*, April 25, 1983.

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more important than any other issue in Turkey today), they did not elicit the same reaction from the lower classes, the middle class, or from students and parents, who remembered the impossible problems of acquiring an education in the late 1970s.[26]

As the political environment stabilized under the rule of the generals, the overall economic situation improved, benefiting not only from political stability but also from a continuation of the economic reforms that had been initiated before the takeover. The arrest and imprisonment of thousands of suspected terrorists, however, accompanied as they were by violations of human rights, resulted in widespread international criticism of Turkish policies—criticism which, under the circumstances, most Turks considered misplaced. The Turks also resented calls for political and economic pressure on the government to be more responsive to democratic principles.[27]

The Turkish reaction was undoubtedly related to a sense that the international community was neither fully aware of Turkey's recent difficulties nor appreciative of the constructive role traditionally played by the military in Turkish politics. It may also have been conditioned by a sensitivity to criticism, illustrated in a story told by an official from the Foreign Ministry who was commenting on the phenomenon. Teams of authors from a number of European countries, the story goes, were assigned to write on the subject of elephants and labored for eighteen months on the project. The French team wrote a modest volume on the love life of elephants. The British team wrote a two-volume work on elephants and their role in the expansion and then the decline of the British Empire. The German team wrote ten ponderous volumes that served as only an introduction to the study of elephants. The Turkish team wrote a very thin volume that was entitled, simply, "Elephants: For or Against Turkey."

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[26] Conversations with students, professors, and journalists in Turkey, April 1983. See, also, the *Washington Post,* April 25, 1983.

[27] *New York Times,* January 16, April 15, May 24, 1981; January 14, February 10, and especially July 2 and 10, 1982. For Turkish resentment, see, for example, *New York Times,* May 5, 1981, and February 17, 1982. For a list of some of the journalists, writers, actors, and academics who were reported detained and sentenced by the Martial Law authorities, see Tosum Ersan, "Turkey's Battered Democracy," *Index on Censorship,* February 1982, pp. 11ff. In April 1983, published official statistics indicated that over the past few years, 29,940 persons have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from five years to life; and that 23 of 114 sentenced to death had been executed. Government figures also showed that in the two years since the coup, 605 complaints of torture have been investigated, with 177 dismissed as groundless, 368 still under investigation, 47 still in the courts, and 13 resolved. The Evren government has acknowledged 15 deaths by torture—making it the first administration to have done so since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. So far, the Turkish courts have convicted 12 persons of the crime. In June 1983, the generals approved the creation of civilian courts, staffed by civilian judges and prosecutors, to relieve the military tribunals of the more than 61,000 cases involving terrorists that have swamped the courts since the military crackdown on terrorism (close to 30,000 are awaiting trial). *Washington Post,* November 6, 1982, and April 25, 1983; *New York Times,* March 17 and May 15, 1982; *Christian Science Monitor,* April 5, 1983; *International Herald Tribune,* April 27 and June 18-19, 1983; and Ludington and Spain, "Dateline Turkey," p. 165.

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Whatever the psychological factors involved, one of the reactions of the Evren government to criticism by the West has been to look increasingly to its relationships with the Middle East. In May 1983, for example, General Evren was critical of what he referred to as "Byzantine intrigues" to expel Turkey from the Council of Europe, to restrict Turkish imports, and to criticize its human-rights record. Turkey could do without the West, he said, if the West continued to make things difficult.[28] Where could it turn? One direction had been indicated a year earlier when Evren declared that Turkey was a European country and, at the same time, a Middle Eastern country.[29] If the Turks' earlier desires to reject their Middle Eastern identity and be accepted as members of the European community were now being qualified, economic developments—far more than differences within the alliance and Turkish sensitivity to criticism—suggest why.

From 1980 to 1982, while the percentage of Turkey's exports that went to the EEC (European Economic Community) dropped from 42.7 per cent to 30.5 per cent of total exports, the percentage that went to the Middle East and North Africa more than doubled, rising from 22.3 per cent to 45.0 per cent of the total.[30] In 1982 alone, Turkey's construction contracts in the Middle East and North Africa amounted to over $15 billion—including about $8 billion with Libya, $5.1 billion with Saudi Arabia, and $1.15 billion with Iraq. By the end of 1982 approximately 250,000 Turkish workers were in the region—primarily in Libya (100,000) and Saudi Arabia (54,000).[31]

Turkey's relations with Iran are increasingly important. In early 1982, Iran and Turkey signed a major barter arrangement (agricultural products and manufactured goods in exchange for crude oil). By the end of 1982 Iran was Turkey's major export market. In April 1983, the two countries signed a protocol that called for an increase in the volume of trade from close to $1.6 billion in 1982 to $2.5 billion by the end of 1983.[32]

Turkey's relations with Iraq are also significant—particularly for Iraq. The 1,000 kilometer pipeline through Turkey, in operation since 1977, is Iraq's only means of exporting oil (the Shatt Al-Arab and the pipeline through Syria are both closed). The pipeline's 650,000-barrel

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[28] *International Herald Tribune*, May 16, 1983. For earlier indications of Turkey's desires to develop a "multidimensional, balanced foreign policy," see *New York Times*, November 28, 1982, and *Christian Science Monitor*, December 22, 1982.

[29] Henze, "On the Rebound," p. 125.

[30] *Turkey*, OECD Economic Survey, April 1983, p. 28.

[31] Mushtak Parker, "Turkey: Special Report," *Arabia: The Islamic World Review*, February 1983, pp. 37-42.

[32] The *Turkish Daily News*, April 22, 1983, and *Turkey*, OECD Economic Survey, April 1983, p. 28.

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capacity, increased 10 per cent by the use of chemicals, is in the process of being enlarged to 1 million barrels per day. One analyst has estimated that in 1982 approximately 6 million tons of goods crossed over from Turkey into Iraq (3 million tons) and Iran (another 3 million tons)—only 2 million tons less than all the lend-lease goods that went to the Soviet Union through the Persian Corridor between 1941 and 1945. The volume of Turkey's trade with Iraq, meanwhile, is second only to that with Germany.[33]

Turks who pride themselves on their country's European orientation and seek to foster in Turkey some of Europe's social democratic ideals have occasionally expressed concern over Turkey's increasingly close association with the Middle East and the greater visibility of Islam in Turkey. They worry about the implications of rural (i.e., religious) support for Evren, the son of a mosque imam, and are bitter about blue-collar support for him—when the government began to crack down on labor, many felt that the trade unions got what they deserved.[34]

An explanation for their reaction may be found in one analyst's observation that whenever the Turkish peasant population has expressed its will in direct and open democracy, the result has astonished the elite controlling the monocentric political system."[35] Another explanation for the reaction may be that some of Turkey's elite labor under a misconception of the role that Islam will play in Turkey's political future.

Several scholars have argued that one should not exaggerate religion's role in Turkish politics or overstate its potential for alienating Turkey from the West. It is not the *force* of religiosity (i.e., the intensification of belief) that has increased in Turkey, one argues, but the *scope* of religiosity (i.e., the range of social contexts within which religious considerations are relevant). The recent turmoil in Turkey, he believes, is not a sign of Islamic resurgence, but rather a spinoff of the polarization between leftist and rightist ideologies—alternatives to religious protest that were made possible by the successful institutionalization of political democracy. The most important dimension of Islam's recent visibility in Turkey, he adds, is that it meets an inner need for meaning not satisfied by the political culture; in this capacity, it serves as an important source of moral authority and cohesion for urban migrants and "transitionals." To the extent that President Evren encourages this role, while attempting to restore conditions for a viable democracy in Turkey, religion should be

[33] The *Wall Street Journal*, November 4, 1982; Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," p. 37; the *Kuwait Times*, March 7, 1983; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 5, 1983; Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 146.

[34] Conversations with journalists and professors in Turkey, April 1983.

[35] Mehmet, "Turkey in Crisis," pp. 59-60.

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seen neither as a substitute for nor as a threat to the nationalist-oriented, secular political order, but as a source of support for it. In this context, the anti-Western impulse in the revival of Islam, while it may reinforce Turkey's disenchantment with the West, does not necessarily dictate such a course.[36]

Turkey and NATO

Speculation about Turkey's political future raises questions about its military viability and its status in NATO. If Turkey and NATO both were important to each other in the 1950s, does that relationship still hold? Will it continue to be as important? Finally, what are the relationships between Turkey's European and Middle Eastern roles? Answers to these questions require that we examine the current military situation in some detail.

At present, in the event of an attack on NATO's Central Front, Turkey and Greece would tie down a considerable number of Warsaw Pact forces, some of which otherwise could be deployed on the Central Front. General Haig, in testimony before Congress, recently asserted that in a war, Turkey would tie up at least twenty Warsaw Pact divisions, and possibly as many as thirty more along a Balkan front. Turkey's 569,000 troops, second in number only to those of the United States among NATO forces, together with Greek troops comprise a total of twenty-five divisions that are designed primarily for defense. They face thirty-three modernized Warsaw Pact divisions in the Balkans, while Turkey confronts another fifteen or so divisions in the Transcaucasus. The Warsaw Pact forces, designed for in-depth shock attacks, possess a mechanized and armored capability which dominates that of the Greeks and Turks by a ratio of three to one.[37]

Warsaw Pact ground forces are supported by a Black Sea fleet of twenty-five submarines and between forty-five and seventy-five surface ships (as many as one-third of the Soviet Union's major surface combatants), and 600 fairly advanced attack and interceptor aircraft. Deploy-

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[36] Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective," *Middle East Journal*, Summer 1981, pp. 345-63; Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," pp. 9 and 42; Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey," in James Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 138-59. Andrew Mango, *Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally*, p. 63, has observed that within the common framework of national self-assertion, different groups within Turkey place different values on different foreign connections. The Center looks to the West, the Left to "socialist countries," and the extreme Right to the Muslim world. Mango notes that the key issue for Turkish opinion, however, is the willingness of foreign powers to accommodate Turkish national interests.

[37] Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank," pp. 14, 55; *Turkey's Problems and Prospects*, p. 14; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, pp. 7, 15; and discussions with officials in the Departments of State and Defense.

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ment of the Fifth Escadra in the Mediterranean (since the mid 1960s) gives the Soviet Union the capacity to balance the influence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet—whose ability to keep open the lines of communication is less certain—and intimidate regional states. The Soviets also have approximately twenty naval vessels in the Indian Ocean (as many as thirty during the Iranian crisis) where they serve a monitoring function—only a third of them are combatants.[38]

The Soviets see the Mediterranean as part of their own maritime defense perimeter; approximately 7,000 Soviet ships transited the Straits in 1978 (almost twenty per day), and the Soviets see the Straits as part of their lifeline. In the event of war, they would probably attempt to neutralize NATO's strategic position in Turkey, secure access to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (far more accessible after the opening of the Suez Canal in June 1975), and deny NATO's lines of communication in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (where Soviet air-, surface-, and submarine-launched cruise missiles pose a primary threat to all surface shipping). Because 90 per cent of NATO's wartime supply to Greece and Turkey would be by sea, and because the Mediterranean acts as a lifeline to NATO's southern flank, the lines of communication in the eastern Mediterranean are vital. Control of the Mediterranean also protects NATO's southern flank from attack. As General Lemnitzer noted some years ago, the importance of the Mediterranean to Allied Command Europe's southern region cannot be overstated.[39]

If the Warsaw Pact attacked Thrace (the southern flank's most vulnerable point) and/or the Straits, and gained control of the Aegean, it would acquire a significant surge capability. This potential capability, in conjunction with Soviet capacity to project military power by air, underscores the importance of Turkey's control over the Straits and Turkish airspace and, hence, Turkey's role as a deterrent to Soviet actions in the Middle East as a whole.[40]

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[38] *Turkey's Problems and Prospects*, p. 15; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, p. 7; Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," p. 15; *Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank*, pp. 2-3. Soviet out-of-area ship days (in which a navy is deployed beyond the naval operating and training areas of home waters) increased from 4,200 in 1965 to 16,500 in 1979 (approximately 45 ships in the area every day of the year); U.S. out-of-area ship days declined from 18,000 to 10,530 (approximately 29 ships in the area every day of the year). Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of Information, Department of the Navy, *Soviet Naval Developments*, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: The Nautical Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1981), pp. 16, 20. These statistics, however, account for neither the size nor the capability and function of different ships. A better index might be ton days or firepower capability per day.

[39] Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank," pp. 38ff., 42, 47, 48; Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, pp. 25-26, 51n, 55; Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," p. 53; Lyman L. Lemnitzer, "The Strategic Problems of NATO's Northern and Southern Flanks," ORBIS, Spring 1969, pp. 101, 105. Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank," p. 47, points out that "even the largest Soviet cruisers and the new Kuril [or Kiev] class ships are built with dimensions that enable them to pass through the Suez Canal."

[40] Lemnitzer, "The Strategic Problem of NATO's Northern and Southern Flanks," p. 103; Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank," pp. 13, 48; Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," p. 21.

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Major installations—whose value increased after the fall of the shah and the loss of monitoring stations in Iran—significantly enhance Turkey's value to the alliance: Incirlik provides forward basing for U.S. tactical fighter-bombers (F-4s deployed in rotation from Spain and Italy); Sinop, electromagnetic monitoring; Kargarburun, radio navigation; Belbasi, seismic data collection; Yumurtalik and Iskenderun, contingency storage of war reserve materials, ammunition, and fuel (20 per cent of the U.S. Sixth Fleet's Mediterranean-based fuel is stored there); and Pirinclik, radar warning and space monitoring.

Along with numerous secondary facilities, which include fourteen NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) early warning sites and twenty DCS (U.S. Defense Communication System) terminal sites, these installations and facilities provide 25 per cent of NATO's hard intelligence—some of which is not available from other sources—on such matters as Soviet strategic nuclear activities, military systems development, and force readiness and movement. Facilities in Turkey serve a host of additional military functions as well. Tracking Soviet air attacks in the eastern Mediterranean, to give but one example, would provide important protection for the Sixth Fleet, whose carrier battle forces are otherwise vulnerable to Crimean-based Backfire bombers armed with cruise missiles and guided by satellite.[41]

Turkey's role in deterring Soviet adventurism in the eastern Mediterranean and Iran and its potential role in protecting the West's access to oil in the Persian Gulf were highlighted in October 1982 by a U.S.-Turkish co-locator operating bases agreement.[42] If funding problems can be solved, this agreement will result in the modernization of ten Turkish airfields and the building of one or two new ones (Muş and Batman) in eastern Turkey. With a length and width sufficient to accommodate long-range bombers and cargo planes, these airfields would enhance Turkey's deterrent role and exercise a dissuasive influence on

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[41] *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, pp. 8-9; *Turkey's Problems and Prospects*, pp. 15-24; *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean*, a report prepared for the U.S. House, Committee on International Relations, by the Congressional Research Service (Washington: GPO, 1977), pp. 37-47; *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations*, a report prepared for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, by the Congressional Research Service (Washington: GPO, 1979), pp. 62-65; Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, p. 47; *Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank*, p. 10; and George Wilson, *Washington Post*, May 17, 1982. Because of the serious threat posed by Soviet aircraft based in the Crimea, U.S. naval plans, in the event of a serious contingency, call for the U.S. Sixth Fleet to withdraw from the eastern Mediterranean to the relative safety of Sicily and the Straits of Messina, where it could deal first with the subsurface threat and then work forward sequentially to deal with the surface and air threats in the eastern Mediterranean. Discussion with an official in the Department of Defense.

[42] Conversations with officials in the Departments of State and Defense; *Washington Post*, October 16, and November 1, 1982. Construction funds for the Muş and Batman bases—under the co-locator operating bases agreement—are not programmed until FY 1984; funding in that year is expected to be $69.2 million, of a programmed total of $135 million.

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aggressive Soviet intentions. They would put NATO fighter bombers within striking distance of the Transcaucasus, and the RDF (since January 1, 1983, the United States Central Command) within 700 miles of Abadan — far closer to the head of the Persian Gulf than any of the "facilities" to which the Central Command has access.

Even if these bases are primarily for NATO contingencies, and their use requires Turkish approval, their potential value in the event of a serious contingency means that whether or not they are actually used, they will serve as an important deterrent both to Soviet adventurism in Iran and to Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf.[43] Geoffrey Kemp, currently on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, has argued that NATO must redraw the maps of its strategic theaters to indicate the growing linkages between them, and that it must remove the artificial distinctions between NATO's borders and the Middle East for purposes of wartime contingencies.[44] That it will do so formally is unlikely. Germany and France consistently oppose such arrangements for constitutional and domestic political reasons. Informally, however, and for planning purposes, NATO has begun to examine out-of-area contingencies in order to overcome deficiencies in its capacity to react to emergencies in the Persian Gulf.[45]

If one had to rank the strategic importance of Turkey and Greece, geography and sheer numbers would give Turkey priority. This was true in the early 1950s, and it is even more true today. Arguments about the relative importance of either country, however, often ignore the great extent to which their strategic roles are complementary and interrelated: Turkey's role is to identify and counter a Soviet threat; in so doing, it helps to protect Greece. Greece supports operations in the Mediterranean, which back up Turkey.[46] In short, neither would do very well without the other, and their joint efforts are crucial to the alliance.

Turkey's defense policy is predicated on deterrence, which makes NATO's security commitment and the threat of either horizontal or

[43] For discussion of a somewhat analogous problem — Turkish willingness to support U.S. U-2 flights — see the testimony of Warren Christopher, *Supplemental Aid Requests for Fiscal Years 1979 and 1980 for Turkey and Oman: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs* (Washington: GPO, 1979); see, also, Harris, "The View from Ankara," p. 134; and Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank," p. 35.

[44] Geoffrey Kemp, "Defense Innovation and Geopolitics: From the Persian Gulf to Outer Space," in *National Security in the 1980's: From Weakness to Strength*, ed. W. Scott Thompson (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980), p. 72.

[45] Conversations with officials in the Departments of State and Defense. France has a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean of 12-18 ships, periodically reinforced by one or two aircraft carriers; it also has 4,500 men stationed at Djibouti. British task forces of six ships also deploy biannually in the Indian Ocean. U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *NATO After Afghanistan* (Washington: GPO, October 27, 1980), pp. 31ff. For U.S. desires to be free to conduct out-of-area operations in the Persian Gulf, see Richard Halloran, *New York Times*, May 16, 1982.

[46] *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, pp. 6, 9, 14. The U.S. military installation in Souda Bay in Crete can accommodate nearly the entire U.S. Sixth Fleet. *United States Military Installations and Objectives*, p. 32; *United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Installations*, p. 61; *Washington Post*, May 15, 1982.

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vertical escalation essential to Turkish security.[47] The Turks recognize, however, that their ability to resist intimidation must be grounded in their own internal resources; that in the early stages of a war, they would have to fight alone and could not count on early reinforcements. The necessity of self-reliance, therefore, dictates a large defense establishment. This establishment not only provides assurance against the lurking uncertainty that NATO would fail to give Turkey adequate support (in the event of a limited, conventional Soviet attack, for example), but also serves an important socialization function.[48]

While the Turkish army is large, however, its equipment is antiquated, and its control systems are inefficient. As a modern military force, it is viewed by some military analysts as a disaster.[49] Its tank force, for example, is over twenty years old; most of its air force is also over twenty years old; and its navy is over thirty years old. This state of affairs is only partially the result of the embargo, as is evidenced by the fact that the United States provided Turkey with considerable military assistance throughout the embargo years: $95 million in 1975 (the embargo was partially lifted on October 6, 1975, when arms worth $185 million and purchased before the embargo were released); $125 million in 1976; $125 million in 1977; and $175 million in 1978. More important to Turkey's deficiencies than a drop in military assistance was the fact that many second-generation weapons that otherwise would have been available to the Turks were devoured by the war in Vietnam. Compounding this development was a rapid inflation in the cost of modernized weaponry, and a U.S. shift worldwide from grant to loan assistance.[50]

Turkey's modernization needs, emphasized first by the Carter administration, have been re-emphasized by the Reagan administration. The Turks need everything but men to fulfill their NATO mission, including advanced fighter replacements for obsolete aircraft, an upgraded tank force, antitank and antiaircraft weaponry, and ASROC and Harpoon missiles.[51]

The Turkish air force's 325 combat aircraft include approximately 150 F-4s and F-5s, and slightly over 120 serviceable F-100s and F-104s. The F-100s are, and the F-104s soon will be, obsolete. Fewer than half of Turkey's planes are combat ready, spare parts inventories are low

[47] Taner Baytok, "Recent Developments in the Middle East and Southwest Asia: Impacts on Western Security," *NATO Review*, August 1981, pp. 10-13.

[48] Gürkan, "NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank," pp. 17, 43-44, 48-49, 52. See, also, Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," pp. 26-27, and 58n.

[49] Discussions with officials in the Departments of State and Defense.

[50] *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, pp. 16-17; *Congressional-Executive Relations*, p. 25.

[51] *Turkey's Problems and Prospects*, p. 20.

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or nonexistent, and many planes have been cannibalized for parts; pilot training, consequently, has been limited. Turkey needs an advanced fighter aircraft, and has sought a co-production agreement for 290 F-16s. U.S. government officials have suggested that a more reasonable number, given Turkey's needs, would be approximately 160; they believe that within a few years a ten-year program for co-production/co-assembly may be possible, although such a program would depend on arrangements to fund the approximately $3 billion cost.[52]

Turkey's 3,500 M-47 and M-48 A1 tank force is over twenty years old. These tanks are fueled by gasoline and limited to a 160-mile range; they also have worn 90-mm gun barrels that render them ineffective against modern tanks. They require tank kits that upgrade them to M-48 A5s—providing them with diesel engines, 105-mm guns, and improved fire control systems. Turkey's antitank weapons are also outdated, all but 1 per cent consisting of 3.5-mm rocket launchers and LAWs, with 500-meter and 250-meter ranges, respectively. The Turks need modern antitank weapons such as TOW missiles.[53]

Turkey's major naval combat vessels are all over thirty years old. The Turkish Navy has fifteen destroyers (mostly Gearing and Fletcher class), all commissioned before 1946. It has no modern air defense—89 per cent of Turkey's short-range air defense is of 1940 vintage or earlier, and most of it is unsupportable. All but three of its thirteen submarines (mostly Guppy class) are thirty-five years old.[54]

While the costs of upgrading Turkey's military forces have only recently been examined, preliminary estimates within the Pentagon of what it would cost merely to improve what Turkey had in 1980 approach $1 billion a year through 1985. In 1983 the Pentagon estimated that bringing Turkish forces up to minimum NATO standards would take $18 billion over thirteen years.[55] These estimates, of course, are subject to varying assumptions and are not free from manipulation.

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[52]Conversations with officials in the Departments of State and Defense; *Turkey's Problems and Prospects*, p. 20; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, p. 19. The International Institute of Strategic Studies in autumn 1982 put the number of Turkey's combat aircraft at 402. *The Military Balance, 1982-1983* (London: IISS, Autumn 1982), p. 44. A recent report predicts that Turkey will soon announce the largest defense contract in its history. The contract will provide for 160 aircraft (probably F-16s) at $13-15 million per aircraft and will be completed in the early 1990s. The package will probably include domestic production of sub-assembly parts such as radar equipment, firing control mechanisms, and range finders, and may include offset offers to sell Turkish export commodities through U.S. marketing channels. Ilner Çevik, *Turkish Daily News*, April 21, 1983.

[53]A Department of Defense source; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, p. 16. In June 1983, the Pentagon announced that it would sell 600 M-48 tank kits to Turkey for $155 million. *International Herald Tribune*, June 9, 1983.

[54]Ibid.

[55]A Department of Defense source; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, p. 18; *Turkey's Problems and Prospects*, p. 20; *Perspectives on NATO's Southern Flank*, p. 16.

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Turkey and the United States

Given these assessments of Turkey's strategic importance and military deficiencies, and honoring the "best effort" commitment undertaken by the United States in the important Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980,[56] the Reagan administration's FY (fiscal year) 1984 request for $930 million in military assistance to Turkey—$230 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants, $525 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, and $175 million Economic Support Funds (ESF)—appeared reasonable. Whether it will appear so to Congress is another story. The de facto 7:10 ratio between aid to Greece and Turkey, while never agreed to by the executive branch, and maintained with a certain sleight of hand (ESF and supplemental requests for off-budget FMS credits are not counted in the ratio), has served in recent years as a reference point for congressional approval of military assistance to Greece and Turkey.[57]

The FY 1984 $930-million request for Turkey, once $175 million in Economic Support Funds is discounted, initially consisted of $755 million in military assistance. This figure was knocked down to $715 million in the House and Senate, and the administration was forced to come up with a budget amendment that raised its request of $280 million in military assistance to Greece to $500 million—in effect restoring the 7:10 ratio.[58]

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[56] See *United States-Turkey Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, 1980: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs* (Washington: GPO, 1980), which includes a copy of the agreement. The DECA is a five-year executive agreement, renewable annually thereafter, that implements the NATO treaty. While the agreement provides for no specific amount, in it the United States undertakes to provide defense equipment, services, and training to the Turks; Turkey, in return, authorizes the United States to maintain forces and carry out military activities at specified installations in Turkey. A U.S.-Turkish Joint Commission was subsequently created as a mechanism for discussing how to use Turkey's available resources to meet its force goal objectives.

[57] Information obtained from the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Research Service.

[58] Information obtained from the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense, and the Congressional Research Service. See, also, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* June 18, 1983, pp. 1229-30. The FY 1983 request by the administration for aid to Turkey consisted of a military package of $465 million (a MAP grant of $300 million and an FMS credit of $165 million) and economic support funds (ESF) of $350 million (a grant of $250 million and a loan of $100 million). In a continuing resolution, Congress appropriated $400 million in military assistance to Turkey. An additional supplemental request of $120 million (an FMS credit of $65 million and an ESF loan of $55 million), which would have brought the military package up to $465 million, was denied. As a result, the $400 million in military aid to Turkey, coupled with $280 million in military aid to Greece, maintained the 7-to-10 ratio in aid to Greece and Turkey. These figures, one should note, do not account for other sources of U.S. aid to Turkey, which are considerable. In FY 1983 they included: $55 million in U.S. military construction funds; $34.6 million in navy ship transfers; $2.75 million IMET; $2.3 million in DIC industrial machinery; and the U.S. share of a number of international programs and loans; World Bank project loans (20 per cent of $700-800 million); the UN Development Program (25 per cent of $10 million); NATO Infrastructure (27.3 per cent of $47 million); and NATO AWACS (27.3 per cent of $1.3 million). In addition, Dependable Undertaking Funds totalling $244.77 million are available to the Turkish armed forces for

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The administration still intends to hold additional military assistance to Greece as a quid pro quo for a base agreement with the Papandreou government.[59] Although congressional authorizations and domestic politics have made such tactics more difficult, they have by no means eliminated them. The money for Greece has yet to be appropriated. When Congress does so, the president still has considerable room for maneuver. If funds are not earmarked, the appropriation could be deferred or reprogrammed; if funds are earmarked, on the other hand, the president could seek to get the earmark waived; he could also defer the appropriation, or even attempt to get it rescinded.[60] In the interim, the Turks will have to wait for congressional appropriations, while the administration will have to lobby on behalf of the Turks, hoping that neither delay in reaching a base agreement with Greece nor administration tactics in pursuit of such an agreement interferes with the level of appropriations to Turkey. The administration can also attempt to make up any shortfalls through supplemental legislation.[61]

What all of these difficulties underscore is the extent to which congressional politics poses problems — not only for the administration's policies but for the confidence of the Turkish government in the administration's capacity to sustain a program in Turkey that is not hostage to Greek-Turkish differences.[62]

In spite of these problems, however, U.S. government officials believe that the special relationship between Turkey and the United

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allocation in the current fiscal year. These funds are drawn by the Defense Security Assistance Agency from future year MAP and FMS allocations through a cash-flow financing procedure that is being used this year to write FMS cases for the navy frigate program and the army tank modernization effort (see n. 53). These figures put total U.S. aid to Turkey for FY 1983 at well over $1 billion — a total that is sometimes overlooked by elements within Turkey who are critical of U.S. policies toward Turkey.

[59] See "For the Record," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 22, 1983; and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, April 2, 1983, p. 669.

[60] Based on information obtained from the Office of Management and Budget.

[61] In the spring of 1983, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger pushed hard for a supplemental request of $120 million to Turkey ($65 million in military assistance and $55 million in economic assistance), calling it "one of our most urgent priorities." *Christian Science Monitor*, April 5, 1983. It was rejected by a House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and while its ultimate fate is unclear, it is not promising. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, May 7, 1983, p. 887.

[62] Greek-Turkish problems are far-reaching and profound, and periodically threaten to create serious problems for U.S.-Turkish relations. (See, for example, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, May 14, 1983, p. 939; June 18, 1983, pp. 1229-30; *International Herald Tribune*, May 12, 13, 14-15, 19, and 20, 1983.) They include differences over: control of airspace in the Aegean; delimitation of the continental shelf; the limits of territorial waters; and last, but not least, Cyprus. While these issues are much too complex to examine in any detail here, failure to do so is not intended to minimize their importance; rather, it reflects the fact that some excellent recent monographs have examined Greek-Turkish differences in detail and from several different points of view: Dennison J. Rusinow, "The Cyprus Deadlock: Forever or Another Day?" American University Field Staff Reports, 1981, no. 11, Europe (Hanover, N.H., 1981); Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, *Turkey's Security Policies*, Adelphi Paper no. 164, Spring 1981; Thanos Veremis, "Greek Security: Issues and Politics," Adelphi Paper no. 179, Winter 1982; and Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," Adelphi Paper no. 155, Winter 1979-80. These monographs provide useful bibliographical references for those interested in examining Greek-Turkish differences in more detail.

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States, while it is certain to lose some of its current euphoria, and while it will have its ups and downs, is on solid ground and will continue. One former U.S. ambassador to Turkey compared it to a marriage of over thirty years in which a husband and wife have their differences but remain committed to one another. From the Turkish side, Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen in the spring of 1982 expressed the opinion that U.S.-Turkish ties had not been so satisfactory for years. The Turks appreciate U.S. support for Turkey during their domestic difficulties and contrast U.S. support with European criticism, which caused the Turks to withdraw from the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in 1982.[63]

Turkey and the Future

In spite of Soviet moderation toward Turkey over the last seventeen years, traditional Turkish fears of the Soviet Union (periodically reinforced by Soviet actions — in Czechoslovakia in 1948, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and, most recently, in Afghanistan in 1979) are always present. As a result, alternatives to NATO (and the special relationship with the United States) are not promising — at least as long as the Soviet Union remains a potential threat. The nonaligned movement is too fragmented. Because of Cyprus, it is anti-Turkish; and it is unable to provide Turkey with the security commitment or the technical and military assistance that Turkey requires.[64]

Turkey sees its future in conjunction with the West. If, as one analyst has suggested, a country's security policies are in part conditioned by the model of economic development that it chooses, Turkey's current economic policies and its choice of a mixed-economy model clearly tie it to the West.[65] Differences with the West are problematic but should not be long-lasting; European concerns over civil-rights violations should

[63] Interview with a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey; Sam Cohen, *Christian Science Monitor*, May 13, 1983; Harris, "The View from Ankara," p. 126. For the United States' critical but nonetheless sympathetic view of Turkey's difficulties in effecting the transition back to democracy, see the text of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliot Abrams' testimony on April 14, 1983, before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. For a thoughtful assessment of the sensitive links between Turkey's political system and the U.S.-Turkish security relationship, see Ludington and Spain, "Dateline Turkey," p. 168.

[64] Conversation with Turkish academics and officials in the military and foreign ministry. For discussion of these issues, see also Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," p. 38; Harris, "The View from Ankara," p. 135; Gruen, "Ambivalence in the Alliance," p. 374; Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy*, pp. 40, 51, 146; Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," p. 25; the opinions of Mehmet Ali Birand and Zeki Kuneralp, cited in Mango, "Understanding Turkey," p. 208; Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosporus*, pp. 157-64; *Turkey, Greece, and NATO*, pp. 28-30. Sezer observes that while association with the U.S. entails risks, eliminating that association will not eliminate other risks and could increase them. The difficult choices confronting Turkey derive from the fact that, like most countries, it is neither totally secure nor totally threatened.

[65] Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," p. 39. For Turkey's recent plans to ban its old financial system of brokers and replace it with a regulated capital market, see Ragip Erten, *International Herald Tribune*, April 16-17, 1983.

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abate as the generals carry out their pledges. On November 7, 1982, a constitution was approved. On April 24, 1983, a ban on political activity was lifted: a law governing the formation of political parties was instituted, and May 16 was set as the date for resumption of applications for new political parties. By July, four parties were in existence.[66] While general elections are scheduled for November 6, 1983, Evren's difficulties in reforming the structure of Turkish politics have led him to warn the country that elections may be delayed unless the politicians abide by his rules.[67] By November 1983 — if all goes well — or by the spring of 1984 at the latest, an election should be held and Turkey's relations with Europe should be on the mend.

While the strategic environment in the region has been somewhat altered by a combination of increased Soviet strength and moderation (at least with respect to Turkey), as well as by a shift in the Middle East's economic influence in world affairs, and while the Turks have accommodated themselves to these developments, there are limits to accommodation, not least of which is provided by a sense of history that breeds caution. Russia, whether Christian or Communist, has demonstrated toward Turkey a relatively consistent attitude that is grounded in considerations of geopolitics.[68] Turkey's allies, too, have demonstrated a relatively consistent attitude that is grounded in the same considerations. Given the predispositions of the states that play a dominant role in the international balance of power, the NATO countries have needed Turkey and Turkey has needed them. Anti-imperialist rhetoric may confuse countries that do not border the Soviet Union; it does not confuse the Turks.

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[66] The political-parties law restricted participation — no old parties could be revived — and 480 former politicians were banned from political activity. By July 1983, five parties were actually founded, but one of them, the Grand Turk party, was immediately dissolved and 16 former prominent politicians were taken into custody because it apparently sought to reincarnate the Justice party — a development strongly opposed by Evren, who wants to wipe the slate clean and reform the structures of Turkish politics. The media were not allowed to debate or comment upon the ban. *Christian Science Monitor,* May 20, 1983; *International Herald Tribune,* June 1-3, 1983.

[67] *International Herald Tribune,* June 2, 1983.

[68] Another source of Soviet concern about Turkey may be found in the 1979 Soviet census, which revealed that 37.2 of 43.8 million Muslims in the Soviet Union were of Turkic origin. Cited in Henze, *Goal Destabilization,* p. 15. For more details of the problems posed for the Soviet Union by its national minorities, see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt,* trans. Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. La Farge (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979).

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
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THE ARMENIAN TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AGAINST TURKEY

by Michael M. Gunter

The growth of terrorism in the contemporary international system has been mirrored by a prodigious outpouring of literature on the subject.[1] Precious little, however, has appeared about the Armenian terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats and property,[2] a campaign recently termed by the United States Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle as "one of the most dangerous and most neglected of all terrorist movements."[3]

Outraged over the alleged genocide of some 1.5 million Armenians by the Turks during World War I[4] and the resulting loss of their ancestral homeland, Armenian terrorists have in the past decade murdered twenty-six Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families, including four in the United States. In addition, a number of other Turks and non-Turks have been murdered because they happened to be in the terrorists' line of fire. Embassies of Turkey in such disparate locations as Athens, Beirut, Bern, Brussels, Madrid, Paris, The Hague, and Vienna, as well as the Turkish delegation to OECD and the Turkish Center at the United Nations, also have come under attack. The Turkish consulate in Geneva has been bombed on two separate occasions; the ones in Los Angeles and Lyons, once; and the Paris consulate, seized and occupied.

The Turkish Airlines (THY) offices in Amsterdam, Copenha-

[1] The reader may gain some idea of the vast extent of this literature by referring to two bibliographic studies: August Norton and Martin Greenberg, *International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980); and Edward Mickolus, *The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980).

[2] See, however, the excellent recent survey by Andrew Corsun (Threat Analysis Group, Office of Security), "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, August 1982, pp. 31-35. Bonnie Cordes of the Rand Corporation is also studying the issue.

[3] "Testimony by the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee" (Washington: mimeographed, March 11, 1982), p. 6.

[4] The number of Armenians killed and the circumstances involved are in dispute. The Armenians claim that what happened was genocide willfully perpetrated by the Turkish government. The Turks, however, claim that a far smaller number of Armenians died as an unfortunate result of general wartime conditions and that hundreds of thousands of Turks were also killed at that time. For an analysis of the conflicting claims, see below.

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gen, Frankfurt, Geneva, London, Milan, Paris, and Rome have been bombed too, making good a terrorist threat against "any Turkish institution that lies within its striking limits." Foreign governments have been cautioned to "lift the protection thus far accorded" to Turks and Turkish property or else be "held responsible for the innocent victims within their own personnel [sic]," while travelers have been advised against using any form of Turkish transportation "because they might become the innocent victims of our rage."[5] Furthermore, non-Turkish airlines or their offices, such as Air France, Alitalia, British Airways, El Al, KLM, Lufthansa, Pan Am, Sabena, Swissair, and TWA, have been hit because of their commercial relations with Turkey.[6]

Indeed, even foreign governments, such as France, Switzerland, Italy, and Canada, have been threatened because they attempted to apprehend Armenian terrorists within their jurisdictions. After Kani Gungor, the Turkish commercial attaché in Ottawa, Canada, was seriously wounded, a message from ASALA (the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) menacingly declared: "We warn the Canadian authorities against all initiatives against our compatriots as well as the utilization of any kind of force or violence against them."[7] In another overt threat, this time to French authorities, ASALA warned that, unless political asylum were granted to four terrorists who seized and occupied the Turkish consulate in Paris, "there is no doubt there will be a confrontation between them and us."[8] ASALA also threatened to attack "all Swiss diplomats throughout the world"[9] unless that government released two Armenians held because a bomb they were preparing exploded prematurely in their hotel room in Geneva.

In the United States, the Turkish State Folk Dance Ensemble performances in California were canceled because of threats and a bomb-

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[5] Communiqué issued by the "General Revolutionary Command, Armenia of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)," one of the two main Armenian terrorist groups, as cited in Sulzberger, "Deadline for More Terror," *New York Times,* April 9, 1977.

[6] The above lists of Armenian terrorist targets were largely gleaned from Russell Howe, "Death in Westwood: One More Battle in a 67-Year-Old Armenian War," *Los Angeles Herald Examiner,* January 31, 1982. See, also, the lengthy communiqué issued by ASALA in the *New York Times,* March 1, 1980. See ibid., September 25 and September 27, 1981, for further claims concerning some 200 bombings, takeovers, assassinations, and other such acts perpetrated by Armenian terrorists.

[7] Cited in *New York Times,* April 10, 1982.

[8] Cited in John Kifner, "Armenians Assert Suicide Squads Are Ready," *New York Times,* September 27, 1981.

[9] Ibid., January 5, 1981. Indeed, some forty bombings were carried out against Swiss interests. See Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism," p. 34. Following its deadly raid on the Ankara (Esenboğa) airport on August 7, 1982 (see below), ASALA threatened a number of Western countries with new terrorist acts unless these countries released within seven days some Armenian terrorists they were currently holding in prison. See "ASALA Threatens U.S.A., France, Canada, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden," *NewSpot: Turkish Digest* (published on behalf of the Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara, Turkey), August 13, 1982, p. 1.

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ing, the Ataturk Centennial night organized by the American-Turkish Association of Houston was disrupted,[10] and in January 1982 Armenian extremists broke up a Turkish history class at UCLA being conducted by Stanford J. Shaw, a prominent professor of Ottoman studies.[11] In addition, Professor Shaw's home was bombed, his office at the university was broken into and ransacked, and frequent verbal and written threats of violence were hurled at him. Finally, he was forced to cancel his regularly scheduled classes and go into hiding. The apparent reason for this harassment was the pro-Turkish views he expressed in his *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (1977), a work considered to be one of the definitive studies in the area. Replying to an inquiry concerning this matter, William D. Schaefer, executive vice chancellor at UCLA, wrote: "Because an international terrorist organization is involved, the University's power to remedy the situation is limited."[12]

On August 7, 1982, striking for perhaps[13] the first time on Turkish soil itself, Armenian terrorists indiscriminately slew nine passengers at the Ankara (Esenboğa) International Airport, while wounding seventy-two others.[14] Illustrative of the hatred motivating them, Levon Ekmekjian, one of the terrorists captured during the Ankara raid, declared, "It wasn't enough," when police told him how many had been killed and wounded. In reference to the alleged Turkish massacre of Armenians in 1915, one of the gunmen yelled, as he fired at his victims, "More than a million of us died! What's the difference if 25 of you die?"[15]

Although their present terrorist activities began only in the 1970s, Armenian terrorism itself is nothing new. Neither is the strategy behind it nor even the international support it has elicited. To decipher the roots of the current Armenian terrorist movement, it is necessary to review briefly the origins of the Armenian nation itself.

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[10] "Introduction," *Setting the Record Straight on Armenian Propaganda Against Turkey* (booklet published by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, 1982), hereafter, "Setting the Record Straight."

[11] *ATA-USA: Bulletin of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations,* March 1982, p. 12.

[12] Letter to Professor William J. Griswold, Colorado State University, October 21, 1982.

[13] Shortly before the attack on the Ankara airport, the military commander of an ASALA base in Lebanon boasted: "I want to say that, over the years, we have carried out scores of military operations inside Turkey, including the assassination of some U.S. personnel." "Nadim Nasir Report: *Al-Majallah* Visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), September 1, 1982, p. G8, hereafter, "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA." ASALA claimed it killed twenty-five and wounded thirty-two others in an attack on Istanbul's famous Covered Bazaar in June 1983. See *The Armenian Reporter,* June 30, 1983, p. 1.

[14] For further details of this attack, see "Terrorism Claims New Victims: 9 Killed, 72 Wounded in Airport Attack," *Turkey Today,* August 1982, p. 1; and the press accounts in the *New York Times,* August 8, 1982; and *Washington Post,* August 8, 1982, and August 9, 1982. For additional details, see *NewSpot: Turkish Digest* (Ankara), August 13, 1982, p. 1, and September 10, 1982, p. 3.

[15] *Time,* August 23, 1982, p. 38.

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The Armenian Question

The origins of the Armenians are "obscure,"[16] although "many features of the [earlier] Uratian civilization . . . are perpetuated in ancient Armenian culture."[17] Since Herodotus[18] and Strabo[19] knew of the Armenians, it is clear, however, that they were living in eastern Anatolia more than 1500 years before the Turks first entered and conquered the area beginning in the eleventh century A.D.

It is also known that Armenia became the first state in the world to adopt Christianity as the official religion, traditionally doing so because of the efforts of Saint Gregory the Illuminator in A.D. 301, twelve years before Constantine the Great took this step in Rome. Christianity and the invention of the unique Armenian alphabet for their Indo-European language a century later have undoubtedly contributed greatly to the survival of the Armenians as a people because, throughout most of their history, they have played either the role of a buffer state or a subjected nation.

Into the early nineteenth century, the unique millet system of self-government for the non-Muslim minorities of the Ottoman Empire apparently satisfied the Armenians to the degree that they were known by the Turks as the *millet-i Sadıka* or "loyal nation."[20] The rise of nationalism and decline of the multinational Ottoman Empire, however, began to change this situation as the nineteenth century wore on. One by one the various Christian nations on the Ottoman frontiers in the west broke away, while in the east the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and the creation of a Russian Armenia on the Ottoman borders there acted as a further catalyst. Armenian nationalism began manifesting itself in the formation of the Marxist revolutionary Hunchaks (Bells) in 1887 and the more nationalistic Dashnaks (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) in 1890. Although rivals, the two groups both believed that only violent revolution could achieve their aim of independence for Turkish Armenia.

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[16] Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 3. See ibid., pp. 1-29, for a brief introductory outline of Armenian history, and p. 3 for a map of historical Armenia showing the three distinct areas into which it was divided: Greater Armenia, Lesser Armenia, and New (Cilician) Armenia.

[17] David Lang, *Armenia: Cradle of Civilization* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 112. For additional sources on Armenian history, see Lang's *The Armenians: A People in Exile* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981); and Arnold Toynbee, "A Summary of Armenian History Up To and Including the Year 1915," *Armenian Review* Summer 1959, pp. 78-97; Autumn 1959, pp. 59-74; Winter 1960, pp. 137-50.

[18] *Histories*, 7. 73.

[19] *Geography*, 11. 4. 8.

[20] On this point, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 356; and Avedis Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria Under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 274.

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Unlike their fellow Christian nations in the Balkans, however, the Armenians were concentrated in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire and, although the point is disputed,[21] probably constituted a minority in the very land they sought as their independent state. Thus, to the Turks, independence for the Armenians was a logical absurdity and a threat to their very existence. As Bernard Lewis concludes in *Emergence of Modern Turkey:* "Now a desperate struggle between them began—a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland."[22] Since they were the more vulnerable, the Armenians suffered the most, although Turks too died in the violence of the 1890s and succeeding years.

Whom to blame for these terrible killings has occupied the efforts of many. Liberal Europe damned "the unspeakable Turk" for what it termed massacres of innocent Armenians during the reign of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. Even the usually Turkophil Lord Kinross, author of the famous study of Ataturk, called what happened "an atrocious campaign of massacre, launched by the Sultan's orders."[23] David Lang concludes that "the total death toll [of Armenians] over the years from 1894 to 1896 was not less than 200,000—some estimates put it as high as a quarter of a million."[24]

Others see what occurred as a justified Turkish response to Armenian and foreign provocations. These scholars argue that, in a manner similar to that which the Armenian terrorists are attempting to do today, the Hunchaks and Dashnaks deliberately used terror against the Turks to incite Turkish reprisals and massacres that would then encourage broad Armenian support for revolution and finally great power intervention. "Europeans in Turkey were agreed that the immediate aim of the [Armenian] agitators was to incite disorders, bring about inhuman reprisals, and so provoke the intervention of the powers."[25] The Turks themselves argue: "Starting in the reign of Sultan Abdulhamit II . . . entire Muslim villages were wiped out, men and women alike were burned alive in mosques, and the worst sort of atrocities imaginable were committed in the name of Armenian independence." The purpose of this terrorism

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[21] See the differing interpretations of Richard Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 34ff; and Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,* vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1805-1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 240ff.

[22] Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey,* p. 356.

[23] Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1977), p. 557.

[24] Lang, *The Armenians,* p. 10.

[25] William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* (Boston: Knopf, 1951), p. 157. For similar analyses, see Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire,* pp. 202ff.; and Nalbandian, *Armenian Revolutionary Movement,* pp. 110ff.

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was "to bring about cycles of massacre and counter-massacre, which could only be ended by European intervention."[26]

World War I brought the intermittent carnage to its frightful conclusion, resulting in the extinction of Turkish Armenia in a series of massacres the Armenians and their supporters refer to as the twentieth century's first genocide. So much has been written on the subject that it is difficult to know where to start. In addition, the main purpose of this article is to analyze the contemporary Armenian terrorists. Nevertheless, to understand what motivates the terrorists today, it is necessary at least briefly to view what apparently happened,[27] though, given the contradictory and polemical nature of the evidence, only tentative impressions can be offered.

The Armenian contention is that the Ottoman government of the Committee of Union and Progress *(Ittihad ve Terakki)* meticulously planned and then executed a systematic genocide of some 1.5 million of its Armenian citizens both by outright massacres in situ and by forced marches into the Syrian deserts that resulted in massacres along the way and ultimate death by starvation for most of those who still survived.

Under the cover of wartime conditions and false charges of mass Armenian collaboration with the invading Russian enemy, the Turks believed that they could eliminate the Armenians who blocked their path to the east and their dreams of a greater Turan, or union of all Turkic peoples. Chief among the culprits are said to be Enver Pasha (minister of war), Talaat Pasha (minister of the interior), and Djemal Pasha (a military man who held a variety of posts). "That the killings were deliberate none but dedicated Turkists deny. The horror . . . was too similar in each locality for the killings to have been spontaneous manifestations."[28] What are alleged to be official Ottoman documents ordering the genocide have even been published by Armenian sources.[29]

Out of a plethora of pro-Armenian sources,[30] two in particular

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[26] "Setting the Record Straight," p. 4. See, also, B. Şimşir, *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1982); and *Documents* (Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Information, 1982).

[27] Replying to my request for information about the contemporary Armenian terrorists, for example, Martin H. Halabian, director of information, research, and publications of the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts, began by stating: "It is assumed that your research has included the Turkish genocide of the Armenians before, during, and after World War I." Letter dated October 5, 1982.

[28] Christopher Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 201. See ibid., pp. 197-240, for a fuller discussion.

[29] See Aram Andonian, ed., *The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians* (London, 1920, reprint, Newtown Square, Pa.: American Historical Review Association, 1964).

[30] In addition to the above, see the studies by Johannes Lepsius, who was president of the German-Armenian society and a close observer of the events: *Bericht über die Lage des Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei* (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1916); *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke* (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919); and *Der Todesgang des armenischen*

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stand in damning condemnation of the Turks: (1) the Bryce-Toynbee compilation of more than 600 pages of mostly eyewitness accounts[31]; and (2) the memoirs of Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey at that time.[32] In his preface, Lord Bryce states that "these accounts described what seemed to be an effort to exterminate a whole nation, without distinction of age or sex."[33] A few examples will illustrate his point:

> Harpout has become the cemetery of the Armenians; from all directions they have been brought to Harpout to be buried. There they lie, and the dogs and the vultures devour their bodies. Now and then some man throws some earth over the bodies. In Harpout and Mezré the people have had to endure terrible tortures. They have had their eye-brows plucked out, their breasts cut off, their nails torn off; their torturers hew off their feet or else hammer nails into them just as they do in shoeing horses. This is all done at night time, and in order that the people may not hear their screams and know of their agony, soldiers are stationed round the prisons, beating drums and blowing whistles. It is needless to relate that many died of these tortures. When they die, the soldiers cry: "Now let your Christ help you."[34]
>
> In the last week of June, several parties of Erzeroum Armenians were deported on successive days and most of them massacred on the way, either by shooting or drowning. One, Madame Zarouhi, an elderly lady of means, who was thrown into the Euphrates, saved herself by clinging to a boulder in the river. . . . She shuddered to recall how hundreds of children were bayoneted by the Turks and thrown into the Euphrates, and how men and women were stripped naked, tied together in hundreds, shot and then hurled into the river. In a loop of the river near Erzindjan, she said, the thousands of dead bodies created such a barrage that the Euphrates changed its course for about a hundred yards.[35]
>
> The whole Mohammedan population knew that these people were to be their prey from the beginning, and they were treated as criminals. In the first place, from the date of the proclamation, the 25th June, no Armenian was allowed to sell anything, and everybody was forbidden, under penalty, to buy anything from them. How, then, were they to provide funds for the journey? . . . Many persons who had goods which they could have sold if they had been allowed to do so, were obliged to start off on foot without funds and with what they could gather

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Volkes: Bericht über das Schicksal des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei während des Weltkrieges (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919). Other studies sympathetic to the Armenian position include: Herbert Gibbons, *The Blackest Page of Modern History: Events in Armenia in 1915* (New York and London: Putnam, 1916); Raphael de Nogales, *Four Years beneath the Crescent* (New York and London: Scribners, 1926); and Clarence Ussher, *An American Physician in Turkey* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1917). For a listing of numerous other studies, see Richard Hovannisian, *The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915-1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: Armenian Heritage Press, 1978).

[31] *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16*, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous no. 31 (London: Joseph Cavston, 1916), hereafter, *Treatment of Armenians*. The volume was edited by the distinguished senior British statesman Lord Bryce and the young, but later world-renowned, historian Arnold J. Toynbee. It was reprinted in Beirut in 1972 with a useful appendix giving the names of towns and people coded in the original.

[32] Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, 1919).

[33] *Treatment of Armenians*, p. xxi.

[34] Ibid., p. 90 (German eyewitness).

[35] Ibid., p. 239 (Armenian victim).

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up from their homes and carry on their backs. Such persons naturally soon became so weak that they fell behind and were bayoneted and thrown into the river.... By the 6th July . . . all the Armenian houses in Trebizond, about 1,000, had been emptied of their inhabitants and the people sent off. There was no inquiry as to who were guilty or who were innocent of any movement against the Government. If a person was an Armenian that was sufficient reason for his being treated as a criminal and deported. . . . A number of lighters have been loaded with people at different times and sent off towards . . . Samsoun. . . . It is generally believed that such persons were drowned.[36]

Ambassador Morgenthau's account is equally sickening.

It is absurd for the Turkish Government to assert that it ever seriously intended to "deport the Armenians to new homes"; the treatment which was given the convoys clearly shows that extermination was the real purpose of Enver and Talaat. How many exiled to the south under these revolting conditions ever reached their destinations? The experiences of a single caravan show how completely this plan of deportation developed into one of annihilation. The details in question were furnished me directly by the American Consul at Aleppo, and are now on file in the State Department at Washington. . . . All the way to Ras-ul-Ain, the first station on the Bagdad line, the existence of these wretched travellers was one prolonged horror. The gendarmes went ahead, informing the half-savage tribes of the mountains that several thousand Armenian women and girls were approaching. The Arabs and Kurds began to carry off the girls, the mountaineers fell upon them repeatedly, violating and killing the women, and the gendarmes themselves joined in the orgy. . . . Finally the gendarmes, having robbed and beaten and violated and killed their charges for thirteen days, abandoned them altogether. . . . For another five days they did not have a morsel of bread or a drop of water. "Hundreds fell dead on the way," the report reads, "their tongues were turned to charcoal. . . ." On the seventieth day a few creatures reached Aleppo. Out of the combined convoy of 18,000 souls just 150 women and children reached their destination.[37]

How accurate are such reports? There is no question that Lord Bryce, Arnold Toynbee, and Ambassador Morgenthau believed them. In analyzing their veracity, for example, Lord Bryce declared:

By far the larger part (almost all, indeed, of what is here published) does constitute historical evidence of the best kind, inasmuch as the statements come from those who saw the events they describe and recorded them in writing immediately afterwards. They corroborate one another, the narratives given by different observers showing a substantial agreement, which becomes conclusive when we find the salient facts repeated with no more variations in detail than the various opportunities of the independent observers made natural.[38]

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[36] Ibid., pp. 286-87 (foreign resident).

[37] Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, pp. 318-21.

[38] *Treatment of Armenians*, xxvii. In a later study, however, Toynbee, although not denying the accuracy of his earlier work, wrote that it had been "duly published and distributed as war-propaganda!" Arnold Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), p. 50. "In the redistribution of Near and Middle Eastern territories, the atrocities which have accompanied it from the beginning have been revealed in their true light, as crimes incidental to an abnormal process, which all parties have committed in turn, and not as the peculiar practice of one denomination or nationality." Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

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The Turks deny that they committed genocide, arguing that the Armenian claims are a "vindictive propaganda campaign against modern Turkey . . . [and] contain gross distortions and omissions of historical facts."[39] Rather, the Turks maintain that certain Armenians betrayed their country (the Ottoman Empire) during time of war by joining the invading Russian armies and carrying out guerrilla activities behind the Turkish lines. The "Ottoman Government had to secure its position by removing the Armenians from strategic points where they could assist the enemy."[40] However, "great care was taken by the Ottoman government to prevent the Armenians from being harmed during these deportations."[41] Since "the deportations took place at a time of severe shortages of vehicles, food, fuel, clothing, and other supplies in the entire Empire . . . some 100,000 Armenians . . . may have died between 1915 and 1918, but this was no greater a percentage than that of the Turks and other Muslims who died as a result of the same conditions in the same places at the same time."[42] Indeed, "far from encouraging the massacres that did take place as a result, the Ottoman Interior Minister Talaat Pasha sent repeated orders that all measures be taken to uncover and punish such acts." After the war, the British did detain several hundred Ottoman officials suspected of war crimes, but despite "large-scale searches . . . undertaken in the Ottoman archives to find proof of guilt . . . no evidence . . . was found to substantiate the accusations." In conclusion, argue the Turks: "There was no genocide committed against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before or during World War I."[43]

Can these two diametrically opposed interpretations be reconciled? Given the understandable passions they still evoke and the ossification of positions that has occurred, probably not.[44] As a recent, thoughtful

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[39] "Let Us Speak the Truth" (Statement published by the Federation of Turkish American Societies, Inc.), *New York Times*, May 18, 1975. For studies sympathetic to the Turkish point of view, see Leonard Hartill, *Men Are Like That* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928); A. Rowlinson, *Adventures in the Near East* (London: Dodd, Mead, 1923); Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919* (New York: George H. Doran, 1922); and Fervz Kademzah, *Struggle for Transcaucasia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951). In Turkish, see Sadi Koçaş, *Tarih Boyunca Ermeniler ve Türk-Ermeni Ilişkileri* [Armenians and Turkish-Armenian relations through history] (Ankara: Altinok Matbassi, 1967); Abdullah Yaman, *Ermeni Meselesi ve Türkiye* [Armenian problems and Turkey] (Istanbul: Otag Matbaasi, 1973); Bilal Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri* [Deportees of Malta] (Istanbul, 1976); Esat Uras, *Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi* [The Armenians and the Armenian question in history] (Istanbul: Belge Publications, 1976); Kamvran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası* [The Armenian files] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimeri, 1983); and the two articles by Salahi Sonyel, "Yeni Belgelerin Işığı Altında Ermeni Tehcirleri" [The Armenian deportations: a re-appraisal in the light of new documents], *Belleten*, vol. 36, 1972, pp. 31-69; and "Tehcir ve Kırımlar Konusunda Ermeni Propagandasi Hristiyanlık Dünyasını Nasil Aldatti" [How Armenian propaganda deceived the Christian world on deportations and massacres), *Belleten*, vol. 40, 1977, pp. 137-88.

[40] "Armenian Allegations and Some Facts," *ATA-USA: Bulletin of the Assembly of American Turkish Associations*, April 1980, p. 4.

[41] "Setting the Record Straight," p. 4.

[42] Ibid., p. 6.

[43] Ibid., pp. 6, 8, and 9.

[44] A recent analysis finds that neither Turkish nor Armenian historiography is able to be objective.

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study concludes: "The events of 1915 remain difficult to interpret and to resolve. . . . It is, in the last analysis, unprofitable to seek to decide whether the Armenian desire for freedom was the cause or the result of Turkish repression. It was probably both."[45] For the Westerner, who is usually exposed only to the Armenian position, however, it is necessary to be cognizant at least that there is a Turkish counterposition and that "because the historical record of the 1915 events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the [U.S.] Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish government committed a genocide against the Armenian people."[46] Even more important for the purposes of the present analysis, one must not lose sight of the current terrorist realities because of the controversial historical past.

Today's Armenian terrorist organizations had a shadowy predecessor. Shortly after World War I, a secret Dashnak network named "Nemesis" relentlessly pursued and murdered a number of leading Ottoman officials in Western Europe. Talaat Pasha was gunned down on a Berlin street on March 15, 1921, by a young Armenian student, Soghomon Tehlirian. The assassin, almost all of whose family had perished in Turkey, had stalked his victim for weeks. He was quickly acquitted by the German court, in part on the grounds that his experiences had made him insane. Illustrating the continuing depth of the Armenian hatred, years later the author of a *National Geographic* article on Armenians met an Armenian in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, who claimed that his father had killed Talaat. When the author asked what the Armenian thought about his father's actions, the simple reply was: "I am proud."[47]

Djemal Pasha was shot to death in front of the Cheka headquarters in Tiflis, Georgia, on July 25, 1922, by two Armenians. Said Halim, the former Ottoman grand vizier, was assassinated in Rome on December 5, 1921, by Arshavir Shirakian, an Armenian who also claimed to have murdered, along with an accomplice, two other Ottoman officials in Berlin, Behaeddin Shakir and Djemal Azmi.[48] Enver Pasha was killed while leading some Turkic rebels against the Red Army near

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See Gwynne Dyer, "Turkish 'Falsifiers' and Armenian 'Deceivers': Historiography and the Armenian Massacres," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 12, 1976, pp. 99-107. See, also, his letters to ibid., vol. 9, 1973, pp. 129-30, and pp. 377-85.

[45] Norman Ravitch, "The Armenian Catastrophe: Of History, Murder & Sin," *Encounter*, December 1981, pp. 72 and 77.

[46] Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism," p. 35.

[47] Robert Jordan, "The Proud Armenians," *National Geographic*, June 1978, p. 862. For further details of Talaat's murder, see Oliver Baldwin, *The Questing Beast* (London: Grayson & Grayson, 1932), pp. 201-4.

[48] Arshavir Shiragian, *The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot* (Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976), pp. 103-117 and 169-81. In 1919 the Dashnaks organized "the Office in Charge of Assassination" in the building of *Jagadamard*, an Armenian newspaper in Istanbul. Ibid., p. 37.

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Bukhara in central Asia on August 4, 1922. There is an unverified account that the Soviet soldier who fired the gun was an Armenian.[49]

Nemesis disappeared following these incidents in the early 1920s, although "there have existed for many decades those organizations internationally, like the ANC [Armenian National Committee], that are pursuing quite seriously the Armenian struggle for liberation in every peaceful method available. . . . This struggle will not be silenced."[50] The struggle also has not always been peaceful.

Dashnak violence has even been turned against fellow Armenians. While leading a Christmas Eve procession down the aisle of the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross in New York in 1933, Archbishop Ghevond Tourian was murdered by Dashnak "hit men" in the full presence of his congregation. The apparent reason was the Archbishop's support of Soviet Armenia, a concept the nationalistic Dashnaks did not accept.[51]

The Current Armenian Terrorist Campaign

Despite its hoary antecedents, the current Armenian terrorist campaign against Turkey began only in the past decade. In 1972, Jean-Marie Cazoni, son of an Armenian-French painter, gave a speech in Marseilles calling for coordinated acts against Turkey.[52] Then, in what was apparently an individual act of revenge not connected to any organized effort, an eighty four-year-old Californian of Armenian descent, Gourgen M. Yanakian, murdered Mehmet Baydar and Rahadır Demir, the Turkish consul general and vice consul, respectively, in Los Angeles on January 27, 1973.[53]

By the terrorists' own admission, the organized Armenian terrorist campaign began only in 1975. In an interview with the Arab-language periodical *Al-Majallah* in August 1982, an ASALA representative stated that his organization's first operation had been in 1975 against an office in Beirut "run by the World Council of Churches, for promoting

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[49] See Richard Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia, 1918-1919* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 420n.

[50] Los Angeles Armenian National Committee, letter to the editor published in *Christian Science Monitor*, April 3, 1981.

[51] See the discussion of this event in Walker, *Survival of a Nation*, p. 354. Dashnaks reportedly stabbed two ASALA sympathizers during a demonstration in Iran in April 1983. See *The Armenian Reporter*, June 23, 1983, p. 1. Also see, K. S. Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted* (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934).

[52] Sulzberger, "Deadline for More Terrorism," *New York Times*, April 9, 1977.

[53] For press accounts, see *New York Times*, January 28, 29, and 31, 1973. Yanakian was convicted for the crime. See ibid., July 3, 1973.

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the emigration of Armenians to the United States."[54] In a 1980 "communiqué" released to the press in Beirut, Lebanon, ASALA claimed that it was celebrating the fifth anniversary of its revolutionary movement "to liberate Armenia." Its terrorist campaign had begun in Vienna on October 22, 1975, when it murdered the Turkish ambassador to Austria, Daniş Tunaligil.[55] After one of its agents murdered Kemal Arıkan, the new Turkish consul general, in Los Angeles on January 28, 1982, the other major Armenian terrorist organization, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) claimed the deed in a recorded message over the telephone to the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press, adding that: "Our revolutionary struggle began in 1975."[56]

Why, some sixty years after the events of 1915, had this new wave of Armenian terrorism begun? Although the inherent nature of a terrorist movement demands secrecy and thus precludes precise analysis (the Armenian terrorists to date have been particularly impenetrable), it seems that the Lebanese Civil War of the mid 1970s acted as a catalyst. As a result of the events of 1915, Lebanon had come to serve as the host for the largest group of displaced Armenians in the Middle East,[57] and they soon numbered some 200,000 souls, or about 6 per cent of that country's population.

Since 1934 the Armenians have enjoyed representation in the Lebanese Parliament, which was organized along confessional lines. In 1960 they were granted ministries in the government. Despite many positive achievements in their adopted country, however, electoral frauds and cold war posturing rent their community as early as the 1940s. The Dashnaks took a pro-Western position, while the Hunchaks and Ramkavars (Democrat Liberals) combined in a policy that was termed "Bolshevik" by their opponents. Gradually, therefore, the Lebanese-Armenians fell into the internecine power struggles that were to shred Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s. Shortly after the 1958 Civil War, for example, there was a particularly bitter outbreak of violence in the Armenian community of Beirut that resulted in over fifty deaths.

By this time the Dashnaks had formed close alliances with the right-wing Christian Phalangists of Pierre Gemayel and the National Liberals of Camille Chamoun. Leftist Armenians such as the Hunchaks, on the other hand, drew close to Kemal Jumblatt's left-wing Progressive Socialist party, while the Ramkavars remained uncommitted.

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[54] "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA." Also see Terzian, "La Question Arménienne Aujourd'hui," *Critique Socialiste*, vol. 44, no. 4, 1982, pp. 51-58 and 62-65.

[55] *New York Times*, March 1, 1980.

[56] Cited in ibid., January 29, 1982. Hours after the killing, Hampig Sassounian, a nineteen-year-old Armenian immigrant from Lebanon, was arrested for the murder when the police traced a license number obtained from a witness. See ibid., January 29 and May 22, 1982.

[57] The following discussion is largely based on Walker, *Survival of a Nation*, pp. 363ff.

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The split between the Armenian groups apparently grew larger when the Phalangists began to use the Armenian section of East Beirut, known as Bourj Hammoud, to attack the contiguous Muslim section called Naba'a.[58] The right-wing, nationalist Dashnaks evidently felt that they should support their Christian brothers, the Phalangists, while the more leftist-leaning Armenians drew closer to their ideological brothers, the Palestinians, with whom they shared contacts through the universities and contiguous neighborhoods. Given the Palestinian successes achieved through terrorist activities, it was not surprising that these leftist Armenians began to form, with the aid of their Palestinian allies, such terrorist groups as ASALA. In reaction to these developments, the rightist Armenians created their own organization, JCAG.

Although the evidence for this terrorist lineage is not conclusive, several statements issued by the terrorists themselves seem to testify to the accuracy of its basic outlines. In their communiqué issued to the press in Beirut in 1980, for example, ASALA was openly critical of the older, conventional Armenian organizations, citing the Dashnaks in particular for their "political failure." Illustrating its leftist ideological propensities, ASALA claimed that the biggest mistake of the Dashnaks was to count on American support to liberate Armenia.[59]

When JCAG unsuccessfully attempted to murder the Turkish ambassador to the Vatican in early 1980, an ASALA spokesman declared: "The Tashnag [Dashnak] Party is trying to imitate us in order to regain lost ground. The 18 April [1980] attack in Rome against the Turkish Ambassador to the Holy See . . . was organized by Tashnag which used the name of a revolutionary group, 'Commando of the Avengers of Armenian Genocide.' "[60] Early in 1980, *Astag*, the Beirut newspaper of the Dashnaks, strongly hinted at a connection with JCAG when it proclaimed: "With the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, the whole of the Armenians are speaking because they know that injustice has been done to the Armenian nation and the Armenian nation waits for justice."[61] In New York, Edward Boghosian, editor of the *Armenian Reporter,* stated in an interview that he believed JCAG was an arm of certain dissatisfied Dashnaks. Indeed, an unsigned letter in the same American-Armenian newspaper hinted that JCAG was formed by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF or Dashnaks) to satisfy members who were frustrated with the

[58] The following analysis is based in part on the discussion in Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism," pp. 32ff; and Papazian, "Sept Années de Lutte Armée," *Hay Baykar* (published in Paris, France, by the Mouvement National Arménien Pour L'ASALA), December 22, 1982, pp. 8-9.

[59] *New York Times,* March 1, 1980.

[60] Cited in "Armenian Terrorist Leader Hagapian Interviewed: *Milan Panorama* in Italian, 1 Sep. 80, pp. 62-65," in *Joint Publications Research Service: Western Europe,* no. 1628, September 24, 1980, hereafter, "Panorama Interview."

[61] Cited in *New York Times,* March 1, 1980.

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insignificant results they had obtained through legal channels.[62] A recent Turkish report simply stated that JCAG is "an offshoot of the Armenian Tasnak party."[63]

Obviously, I am not arguing that the Dashnaks and Hunchaks condone terrorism. Rather, I am suggesting that the infectious violence of the multifaceted Lebanese Civil War[64] probably helped to motivate certain discontented elements of these two traditional Armenian groupings to form the nucleus of JCAG and ASALA respectively. Probably in neither case did the legal, "parent" organization officially approve of what was occurring.

According to the terrorists themselves, they have several goals, including: (1) revenge, and with it an admission by Turkey of the crimes committed against the Armenians, and (2) reparations in the form of money and territory for an Armenian homeland. "We will continue our attacks until the day when there is justice for the genocide that took place in 1915,"[65] an ASALA spokesperson proclaimed after an attack on the Turkish consulate in Lyons, France, had left four wounded. "We will lay down our arms only when the Turkish Government officially denounces the genocide perpetrated by Turkey in 1915 against the Armenian people and agrees to negotiate with Armenian representatives in order to reinstate justice,"[66] declared JCAG. "We demand that the Turkish government—which is occupying our country and is an extension of the Ottoman Empire—stand by its responsibilities and return the Armenian lands to their true owners,"[67] announced the "Avengers [Justice Commandos] of the Armenian Genocide" after it carried out a series of bombings in Paris during July 1979.

Although some measure of revenge may plausibly be said to be achieved by terrorist acts, the murder of Turks who were not even born in 1915 would seem, on closer scrutiny, ignorantly senseless. Certainly the chances of forcing Turkey to admit its guilt and then carve an indepen-

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[62] See *Christian Science Monitor,* November 18, 1980. On the other hand, Kevork Donabedian, editor of another American-Armenian newspaper, the *Armenian Weekly,* and a thirty-year member of the Dashnaks, retorted simply: "To my knowledge, that's not true." Ibid. Recently, however, Donabedian's newspaper published "An appeal to all Armenians," which declared: ". . . since 1975 underground groups have been formed to use effective forceful means to pursue the Armenian cause. Armenians have a moral responsibility to support these activities with all available means." Cited in the *Armenian Weekly,* July 2, 1983, p. 2.

[63] *NewSpot: Turkish Digest,* September 10, 1982, p. 2.

[64] In explaining the recent rise of Armenian terrorism in the United States, Martin Halabian, director of information for the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, stated: "Armenians recently arrived from Lebanon and other Mideast countries . . . are more used to militancy as a way of life." Karla Vallance and Maggie Lewis, "More Violence Against Turks in U.S.," *Christian Science Monitor,* May 6, 1982.

[65] Cited in *Christian Science Monitor,* August 6, 1980.

[66] Cited in Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism," pp. 33-34.

[67] Cited in Edward Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-79* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980), p. 856.

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dent Armenian homeland out of eastern Turkey at this late date would seem nil. One suspects, therefore, deeper roots to the present terrorist campaign.

"Who speaks today of the Armenians?" Hitler allegedly responded when his associates queried whether Germany's genocidal assault on the Jews might one day bring down retribution on them. Publicity for their cause and the desire to reawaken a sense of Armenian identity or nationalism, two felt needs based on frustration with their overall impotence, would seem to motivate many of the terrorists. As the "Avengers [Justice Commandos] of the Armenian Genocide" explained: "With these explosions we are keeping the world aware of the existence of the Armenian people."[68] "At the core of this . . . issue is the attitude of the present-day Turkish Government, which continues to deny or distort the well-known and extensively documented truth," states a letter from the nonviolent, but obviously frustrated, Armenian National Committee in Boston. As evidence of the continuing Turkish insensitivity, the Committee points out that there is "a major boulevard in the Turkish capital . . . named after Talaat Pasha, the chief architect of the mass slaughter, and Istanbul even boasts of a monument to the archcriminal. . . . Armenian frustration and indignation—especially in the face of Turkish distortions and denials—have led to renewed determination to struggle to regain Armenian territorial and national rights. . . . Some Armenians," it concludes, "have apparently lost faith in the willingness or capacity of the world's governments to listen to, or act on, peaceful appeals."[69]

The above statement from a legal Armenian organization formally on record as opposing violence and terrorism is indicative of what the Turkish government sees as one of the primary causes of the current terrorist movement: an all too tolerant attitude on the part of individuals, groups, and states around the world. Citing Greece and France, one Turkish official stated that authorities in both countries "have kept their eyes closed" to Armenian activities and even in some cases "publicly displayed sympathy" to the Armenian cause for domestic political reasons.[70] "We condemn you . . . the past President of France, Giscard d'Estaing. If you hadn't tolerated the actions of them [the Armenian terrorists and their sympathizers] in return for their votes, those murderers would not have lost their self-control, and acted like this

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[68] Cited in ibid. The publicity thus achieved, however, is "repulsive" to most Armenians, claimed Martin H. Halabian of the ARF. See *Christian Science Monitor*, May 6, 1982. "Even by current standards of political terror, the Armenian 'hits' were reprehensible," concluded the famous American-Armenian author Michael J. Arlen. Cited in *New York Times*, March 11, 1980.

[69] Cited in *New York Times*, May 30, 1977.

[70] "Turks Decry 'World's Apathy' on Armenian Terrorist Acts," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 11, 1980.

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today,"[71] wrote Artin Penik, a Turkisk citizen of Armenian descent, who recently committed suicide by setting himself on fire to protest against ASALA. "Hundreds of banners, reading 'Greeks, Kurds, Armenians fighting for the same cause' have been carried in open-air meetings in Paris, Athens, etc., as a protest against Turkey,"[72] Aydın Yalçin, a professor of economics at the University of Ankara, recently testified. The Turks have even criticized the United States for its "tolerant attitude," such as the lowering of U.S. flags on April 24 to commemorate what the Armenians term "Genocide Day," and have called on the United States "to take more effective measures."[73]

Discussing the murder of the Turkish consul general, Kemal Arıkan, in early 1982, Ergün Kirlikovalı, president of a newly formed group in California called "Turkish News and Views," charged: "Even the man who is in charge of justice in California, the attorney general, George Deukmejian—an Armenian himself—uses the same old cliche 'I am sorry but . . .'"[74] Kevork Donabedian, editor of the *Armenian Weekly* and a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks) for the past thirty years, both of which are legal organizations, provides another example of this tolerance. Mr. Donabedian recently admitted: "As an Armenian, I never condone terrorism, but there must be a reason behind this." He then tellingly added, "Maybe the terrorism will work. It worked for the Jews. They have Israel."[75]

"The development of a curriculum on the Armenian genocide by the Brookline (Mass.) school system for eighth graders"[76] is another case in point. "The result will be . . . that this forgotten Genocide of the Armenians will be once again remembered, and the conscience of the world awakened,"[77] concludes an Armenian sympathizer. Şükrü Elekdağ, the Turkish ambassador to the United States, criticized such activities by declaring, "The continued propagation of this [Armenian] distortion of

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[71] *NewSpot: Turkish Digest,* Supplement to issue of August 13, 1982, p. 1.

[72] *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate on Turkish Experience with Terrorism* (Serial No. J-97-43), 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, pp. 36-37, hereafter, *U.S. Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism.*

[73] *Christian Science Monitor,* May 7, 1982.

[74] "Give Peace a Chance" (statement made at the Los Angeles Press Club on February 1, 1982) in *ATA-USA: Bulletin of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations,* March 1982, p. 9. "Most Turks are convinced that the Armenian terrorists enjoy a measure of support from the Christian West," wrote David Barchard in Ankara. "Armenian Terror Locked in History," *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* August 15, 1982.

[75] Cited in *Christian Science Monitor,* November 18, 1980.

[76] See the article by Barbara Merguerian concerning the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, "On Its 25th Anniversary, NAASR Looks Ahead, Not Back," *The Armenian Mirror-Spectator,* April 14, 1979.

[77] "NAASR Marks 25th Anniversary; Genocide Curriculum Described," in ibid., April 7, 1979. A recent article in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* argues that Armenian hatred of Turks was being kept alive by "storytelling." See the issue of August 15, 1982. Old and easily malleable Armenians are even coached into telling atrocity stories, claims a Turkish source. See "Setting the Record Straight," p. 11.

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history breeds vengefulness from generation to generation and plays into the hands of Armenian terrorists."[78] The Turkish Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara concluded: "Inevitably this propaganda gave way to the creation of Armenian terrorism in the years following 1973."[79] Although it is difficult to judge precisely where legitimate historical research shades into inciting to violence, the Turks feel that such activities as those discussed above have crossed this thin line.

Modus Operandi

The modus operandi of the various Armenian terrorist groups is as follows:

(1) Usage of different names. Most reports about Armenian terrorists mention numerous different groups. Edward F. Mickolus, in his massive compilation, for example, lists some eleven different Armenian terrorist organizations.[80] A *New York Times* report on the attempted assassination in 1981 of Cavit Demur, the labor counselor at the Turkish Embassy in Copenhagen, stated that there were four different groups.[81] After JCAG assassinated the Turkish consul general Kemal Arikan in Los Angeles, the same newspaper declared that the perpetrators of the deed were "one of several Armenian terrorist groups."[82] Analyzing the overall situation, the *Boston Sunday Globe* stated that there were "at least six Armenian terrorist groups."[83] A publication of the Turkish government itself refers to "several clandestine Armenian 'liberation' movements."[84]

Despite a veritable plethora of organizational titles,[85] there appear to be only two main Armenian terrorist groups: ASALA and JCAG. In most cases the other different names were either used by ASALA for various reasons or clearly refer to JCAG. By using so many different names, ASALA probably hopes to give a bandwagon impression of a wide range of involvement within the international Armenian community to impress both the general international public and also their Armenian compatriots. The employment of so many names is also undoubtedly intended to sow confusion in the minds of security forces attempting to counter their actions.

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[78] "Elekdağ Eulogizes Arıkan; Condemns Terrorism," *Turkey Today*, February 1982, p. 3.

[79] *The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers*, Foreword (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1982).

[80] Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism*, p. 918.

[81] *New York Times*, April 4, 1981.

[82] Ibid., January 29, 1982.

[83] *Boston Sunday Globe*, May 30, 1982. For the same figure, see the *Los Angeles Herald Examiner*, January 31, 1982.

[84] See *Turkey Today*, January 1981, p. 3.

[85] Corsun states that "Armenian extremists have carried out attacks under 19 operational names." See his "Armenian Terrorism," p. 33.

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(2) JCAG. As analyzed above, the policies of this murderous terrorist group appear to be right-wing and nationalistic. Since JCAG and ASALA have tried to take credit for each other's deeds, while, by definition, acting sub rosa, it is not always possible to distinguish precisely between the two. With the all-important exception of its usage of terrorism, however, JCAG would appear to be more strongly aligned with the traditional policies of the anti-Soviet Dashnaks. These goals are to reestablish an independent Armenia as specified in the defunct Treaty of Sevres and to seek recompense from Turkey for the alleged crimes it committed against the Armenian people.

JCAG apparently shuns other international terrorist connections and strikes only at Turkish targets. After it murdered the Turkish consul general in Los Angeles in 1982, for example, JCAG announced, in part: "Our sole targets are Turkish diplomats and Turkish institutions."[86] Compared to ASALA, which has held several press conferences, JCAG appears to lead a more shadowy and secretive, although no less deadly, existence.

(3) ASALA. This equally murderous, but leftist, group sees the Armenian cause through Marxist-Leninist lenses, viewing the Soviet Union, as well as other "progressive" groups,[87] as allies. Unlike JCAG, therefore, ASALA appears to have benefited from some international connections. (See the discussion below.) Again unlike JCAG, ASALA's rhetoric and actions have been not only anti-Turkish but also anti-Western or "anti-imperialist."

Unlike JCAG, which has struck only at Turkish targets, preferring to wage its struggle alone, ASALA has lashed out not only at its primary enemy, Turkey, but also at many other states or organizations that have relations with Turkey or that have sought to inhibit ASALA's activities. While taking credit for the murder of the Turkish ambassador in Athens in 1980, for example, ASALA declared: "Our enemy is the Turkish regime, NATO, and the reactionary Armenian forces."[88] Although both ASALA and JCAG appear to be headquartered in Lebanon and operate around the world, the former seems to concentrate its activities in Europe; the latter, in North America.

In the early 1980s Switzerland became a leading target of ASALA because two of its members, Alexander Yenikomechian and Suzy Mahseredjian, were arrested after a bomb they were making prematurely

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[86] *New York Times,* January 29, 1982. On this point, see also ibid., March 1, 1980.

[87] Therefore, ironically enough given their murderous role against the Armenians in the past, the Kurds are perceived as friends. See, for example, ibid., August 1, 1980; *Christian Science Monitor,* August 11, 1980; and Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), pp. 243-44.

[88] Cited in *New York Times,* August 1, 1980.

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detonated in their Geneva hotel room. Under the name "October 3 Organization," ASALA waged a bombing campaign against Swiss interests throughout the world. The two ASALA agents finally received eighteen-month suspended sentences and were prohibited from entering Switzerland for fifteen years. In September 1981 Yenikomechian turned up again as the translator at an ASALA news conference in West Beirut.[89] Using the name "June 9 Organization," ASALA launched another bombing campaign against Switzerland when that state captured one of its agents, Mardiros Jamgotchian, who had murdered Mehmet Yergüz, an official at the Turkish consulate general in Bern.

(4) Personal characteristics. Although there are more than 6,000,000 Armenians around the world today, the terrorists themselves are young (in most cases in their twenties),[90] probably number less than 1,000,[91] and are either recent immigrants or living in areas, such as Lebanon, where violence is a way of life.[92] Although often tacitly sympathetic,[93] older Armenians, who are more established in their adopted countries, are not normally directly involved. Indeed, one of the ultimate keys to ending the terrorism probably lies in the moderate, worldwide Armenian community's unequivocably disowning and isolating the terrorists.

Levon Ekmekjian, the ASALA terrorist captured by the Turks during the attack on the Ankara airport in August 1982, was a Lebanese national born in 1958.[94] During his trial in Turkey, he stated that he had joined ASALA because of pressures put on him by two other Armenians, whom he identified as Mahram Arabian and Minnas Simonian. Once he joined, Ekmekjian was taken to a camp near Beirut, where he received political and military training. The political portion consisted of allegations that the Turks had killed 1.5 million Armenians in 1915, deported the rest, and thus deprived them of their homeland.

Steven John Dadaian, an alleged member of JCAG arrested by the FBI along with four other accomplices for possessing and transferring

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[89] Ibid., September 27, 1981.

[90] *Cleveland Plain Dealer,* August 15, 1982; *New York Times,* September 25, 1981; and *Boston Sunday Globe,* May 30, 1982. Four of the five alleged members of JCAG arrested on October 23, 1982, and charged under federal statutes with conspiracy, unlawful possession of unregistered firearms or destructive devices, and interstate transportation of explosives were in their twenties. The fifth was only nineteen. See Jones and Johnston, "5 L.A.-Area Armenians Arrested As Terrorists," *Los Angeles Times,* October 23, 1982.

[91] *Time,* August 23, 1982, p. 38. See, also, *Los Angeles Herald Examiner,* January 31, 1982.

[92] *Christian Science Monitor,* November 18, 1980. Hampig Sassounian, the accused killer of the Turkish consul general in Los Angeles, was a nineteen-year-old recent Lebanese immigrant. See *New York Times,* May 22, 1982.

[93] See the accounts in *New York Times,* April 24, 1975; March 1, 1980; and April 24, 1980; and in virtually every issue of the *Armenian Weekly,* the American Dashnak publication out of Boston.

[94] The following discussion is based on an article that appeared in *NewSpot: Turkish Digest,* September 10, 1982, p. 3. Turkey executed Ekmekjian early in 1983.

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explosives, was described by a next-door neighbor in Canoga Park, California, as "a nice guy. I just can't believe it. If someone walked up to me and said he'd done something the FBI would arrest him for, I'd deny it." The neighbor added that Dadaian attended junior college in the San Fernando Valley. Another of the suspected JCAG members who was arrested at the same time, Dirkan Sarkis Berberian, twenty-nine, of Glendale, California, was described by a person who claimed to know him as "a very wary and cautious, frightened man."[95]

Despite their small numbers and Beirut headquarters, the Armenian terrorists have carried out operations on four different continents (see below). Outside of Lebanon, however, they apparently operate in small cells the members of which in most cases recognize each other only on a need-to-know basis to lessen the chances of police detection and infiltration.

Very few terrorists have ever been apprehended, and those who were have usually been treated rather leniently. Mardiros Jamgotchian was sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison for killing a Turkish diplomat, Mehmet Yergüz, outside the Turkish consulate in Geneva, Switzerland. Max Kilnajian was freed soon after he was sentenced to a two-year prison term for attempting to murder the Turkish ambassador to Switzerland in 1980, because of the amount of time he had already spent in jail awaiting trial. Harout Sassounian, the twenty-one-year-old elder brother of Hampig (the accused assassin of the Turkish consul general in Los Angeles in January 1982), won a mistrial on charges that he had firebombed Arıkan's Bel Air home in 1980. Publicity about the slaying of another Turkish diplomat in Boston was ruled to be affecting jury deliberations in Harout's case. Hampig's alleged accomplice, Krikor (Koko) Saliba, vanished and was believed to have fled to London.[96] A recent resolution adopted by the Turkish Consultative Assembly summed up the attitude of many Turks by declaring: "The fact that only six suspects were caught in 128 assassination attempts is proof of this tolerance."[97]

One may catch further glimpses of the ASALA terrorists from interviews they gave in Lebanon in September 1981 and August 1982.[98] During both interviews, most of the terrorists wore either black hoods or masks that covered their faces except for their eyes. In the earlier interview, the main ASALA representative was introduced as "Hagop Hagopian," which was probably a *nom de guerre* roughly equivalent to "John

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[95] *Los Angeles Times*, October 23, 1982.
[96] *New York Times*, January 21 and 25, 1982.
[97] Cited in *Turkey Today*, July 1982, p. 3.
[98] Reported in *New York Times*, September 27, 1981; and "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA" respectively. The following discussion is based on these two sources.

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Jones" in the United States. Hagopian wore a checkered shirt and blue jeans. He appeared intense, smoking a cigarette through a slit in his hood. His hooded comrades stood behind him, holding machine guns or clipboards. His Armenian was translated by the previously mentioned Alexander Yenikomechian from Switzerland.

The room in which Hagopian spoke was located in the basement of a building in West Beirut that housed the Voice of the Arab Revolution radio station and the Workers News Agency, both affiliates of the Lebanese Arab Army, a leftist militia receiving support from Libya. It was festooned with portraits of nineteenth-century-type Armenian heroes sprouting handlebar mustaches, crisscrossed bandoliers of ammunition, and turbans or rounded fur hats. Halfway through the conference, photographs of present-day terrorists were shown. One was of a young man dressed in a surfer's T-shirt embellished by the soles of two feet and the slogan "Hang Ten."

During the *Al-Majallah* interview, the ASALA representative also spoke in Armenian with a few Turkish words interspersed. An unmasked ASALA official using the code name "Abu Mujahid" translated. (The only ASALA members known by their correct names are the few who have been captured.) "Mujahid" earlier had led the representative of *Al-Majallah* to the two-room, primitively constructed ASALA base in a mountainous location in Lebanon set within and concealed by trees. At one time during the interview some of the masked ASALA men began shooting off their weapons in an apparent attempt to impress their visitor.

(5) Operations. Since 1975, the Armenian terrorists have claimed responsibility for over 200 incidents,[99] including the murder of twenty-six Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families. Thus, while murders have gained them their main notoriety, the majority of their operations have been bombings. Although it is difficult to be precise, since both have claimed the same operation on occasion, it appears that ASALA has been much more active than the JCAG. As for finances, one terrorist leader declared: "Our strength is the Armenian people; that is where we get our support from. And from robberies."[100] Other reports, however, have indicated that the terrorists have extorted funds from fellow, nonviolent Armenians.[101]

According to a U.S. State Department analysis, the "Armenian terrorists have been partial to a Czechoslovakian-manufactured plastic called Semtex-H." This is said to be a device that is "simple in construc-

[99] The precise figure varies according to the accounts read. For the above number, see *New York Times*, September 27, 1981.

[100] Cited in "Panorama Interview."

[101] "UnArmenian Activities," *The Economist*, February 6, 1982, p. 20.

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tion and design." The analysis concluded that "operationally Armenian terrorists must be viewed as unsophisticated in comparison with other groups. . . . Their bombings and assassinations required the minimum of logistical planning."[102]

Many[103] of the diplomatic assassinations occurred when the victim was in his car, which was parked or slowing down for a traffic light or an intersection. In addition, eight out of ten of the attempted diplomatic assassinations occurred under similar circumstances. At such moments the occupant of a car is particularly helpless before gunfire.

In virtually all the actual or attempted killings, the diplomats or their companions were not armed, while their assailants usually had 9-mm automatic weapons. On nine occurrences the "hits" were made by a single gunman; in the majority of other cases they were carried out by two assailants, with a third waiting in a getaway car.

Geographically, the terrorist operations have occurred on four different continents, with the majority being in Western Europe. France (33), Switzerland (25), Italy (20), and Spain (11) have witnessed the greatest number of incidents as of the end of July 1982. In the Middle East, Lebanon (16) and Turkey (12) have been the main sites. The United States (15) and Canada (4) have been victimized in North America, while the one incident in Australia resulted in the murder of two Turkish diplomats. Other states where operations have occurred are: Iran (5), England (5), Denmark (4), Belgium (3), Greece (3), West Germany (3), the Netherlands (2), Austria (1), Iraq (1), Portugal (1), the Soviet Union (1), Bulgaria (1), and Yugoslavia (1).

By year, the number of incidents has been increasing from single-digit figures through 1978 to 29 in 1979, 38 in 1980, 47 in 1981, and 22 as of July 26, 1982. Several more diplomatic assassinations since then, as well as the deadly bomb explosion at the Orly airport in Paris on July 15, 1983, and an apparently even more deadly attack on the Covered Bazaar in Istanbul on June 16, 1983, indicate that the terrorist campaign is not abating. The Armenian press has reported a serious crisis among the terrorists concerning the continuance of indiscriminate terrorism and the resulting bad publicity. Groups in North America and Europe now favor action only in Turkey or just against specific Turkish targets, while terrorists operating out of the Middle East maintain the need for continuing strikes at broader targets.[104]

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[102] Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism," p. 32.

[103] The following discussion and figures (which I have only slightly updated) are based on ibid., pp. 32-33.

[104] See *The Armenian Reporter,* June 16, 1983, p. 1; and June 30, 1983, p. 1.

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Connections with Other Groups

Most Turks, including their government, feel that the Armenian terrorists have been receiving aid from various groups and states around the world. Indeed, there is a tendency to blame anyone who might favor a weakened Turkey. "Armenian terrorism . . . has been part of a larger picture of international terrorism instigated and heavily supported by the countries of Eastern Europe," declared one Turkish scholar.[105] Although it is very difficult, by definition, to delineate international terrorist connections,[106] ASALA itself has confirmed such links: "We sympathize and exchange assistance and services with the Baader-Meinhof group. We have relations with all the European revolutionary movements except the Basques of Spain [ETA], and do not ask me why."[107]

(1) The Palestinians. I argued above that the Lebanese Civil War of the mid 1970s acted as a catalyst for Armenian terrorism. Behind the lawlessness rampant in that unfortunate country, ASALA was able to draw physical and spiritual succor from a Palestinian ally with whom it shared such common attributes as a lost homeland and a large diaspora.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—a small, radical terrorist group led by George Habash—has almost certainly provided training and logistical support for ASALA. "An observer would notice the similarity in the tactics of the Armenian Secret Army [ASALA] and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] with which it has close ties," began a recent interview with ASALA leaders. "ASALA is more secretive in that no one knows its headquarters, address or telephone number. However, after arduous efforts and investigation in a tense, secretive and dangerous world, our correspondent has managed, after giving a pledge of secrecy, to get hold of the main thread. He found himself in an ASALA base in a mountainous area somewhere in Lebanon."[108] Testifying before a U.S. Senate subcommittee dealing with terrorism in Turkey, Professor Aydin Yalçin stated that Turkish terrorists "are generally trained in either *Al Saika* camps in Syria or G. Habash's PFLP camps in Lebanon. . . . Armenian terrorists specializing in . . . advanced electronic bombs courses"[109] were also trained in these camps.

According to Claire Sterling, "Habash had been training his

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[105] Professor Aydin Yalçin, cited in *U.S. Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism*, p. 6.

[106] The recent journalistic analysis by Claire Sterling, entitled *The Terror Network* (1981), is one of the few attempts. She gives great prominence to the role of the Soviet Union and devotes an entire chapter to Turkish terrorism's international links.

[107] ASALA spokesman cited in "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA."

[108] Ibid.

[109] Cited in *U.S. Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism*, p. 36. Professor Yalçin's information came from "[Turkish] government sources." Ibid.

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Armenian wards in Lebanon and South Yemen for years."[110] On April 8, 1980, Habash's PFLP held a press conference for ASALA and a "Kurdistan Workers' Party" at a hideout in the ancient Casbah of Sidon, Lebanon. The twelve men and two women representing ASALA, all of whom wore black hoods with slits for eyes, were protected by Palestinian gunmen armed with Kalashnikovs. During the conference, the Armenian terrorists "emphasized their links with Marxist Palestinian formations."[111] During another interview, an ASALA spokesman declared: "Many Armenians since 1966 participated in the Palestinian Arab struggle from which they learned many things."[112]

Despite this evidence, ASALA recently denied a Palestinian connection. Although its spokesman said that his organization "considers the Palestine cause to be its own cause," the relationship was one of "comradeship, not organizational." Then he elaborated: "But we have no links whatsoever with the PLO." He even obliquely suggested the possibility of a falling out with his reputed allies by adding: "In fact we have some observations regarding the statements issued by its [the PLO's] office in Cairo after our operations against Turkish targets abroad."[113]

Most incredibly, the ASALA spokesman also declined to confirm that his organization was headquartered in Lebanon: "We have no fixed headquarters. We move from place to place and from airport to airport. We are present wherever there are Armenians. The training bases where our members undergo preparation for armed struggle are everywhere. A base may be a small room in a poor area, a villa in an affluent area, a farm in the country in some other state, or a hut in a forest."[114]

ASALA's seeming contradiction of the evidence would appear to be an attempt to confuse and thus preclude close scrutiny. The claims to have organizational relations with all the European revolutionary movements (except ETA) and to possess peripatetic headquarters also would appear to be an attempt to exaggerate their influence around the world. Deception is a necessary tool of the weak. While the Armenian terrorists obviously operate out of many different locations, the Lebanese and Palestinian connections cannot be denied. Indeed, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and the resulting

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[110] Sterling, *Terror Network,* p. 244. See, also, *Christian Science Monitor,* May 7, 1982; Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism," p. 35; *ATA-USA: Bulletin of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations,* March 1982, p. 29; and *The Economist,* October 3, 1981, p. 51.

[111] Sterling, *Terror Network,* p. 243.

[112] Cited in "Panorama Interview."

[113] "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA."

[114] Ibid. Later in the interview, the same spokesman virtually admitted the obvious Lebanese connection (the interview after all was taking place in an ASALA base camp located in Lebanon) when he admitted: "The changed situation in Lebanon after the Israeli aggression and the emergence of the Phalangist Party as a major force in the country might in the long run affect ASALA's activities." Ibid.

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expulsion of the PLO from Beirut and southern Lebanon, ASALA took pains to announce that it remained headquartered in Beirut.[115]

Now that the internal situation in Lebanon has been so drastically altered, it remains to be seen how long this will remain true. "What would naturally be expected of the Lebanese state, in case it manages to establish stability and authority in the country after the presidential election, is to prevent the terrorism and murder organization ASALA from continuing its activities on Lebanese soil,"[116] declared the Turkish government.

If ASALA is forced to move its headquarters, the Turks have speculated that it might relocate in France or the Greek portion of Cyprus. "The antiterrorist atmosphere recently taking shape in France, and the series of measures launched by President Mitterrand on a governmental level [however] may cause ASALA to seek other alternatives [than France]." The Turkish foreign minister Ilter Türkmen cautioned, however: "It will be the gravest mistake the Greek Cypriots will have made to allow ASALA to settle in the south of Cyprus under the obvious protection of the Greek Cypriot administration."[117]

The fact that ASALA has been able to carry out operations since the Israeli invasion might indicate that, for the moment at least, the terrorist organization remains in Lebanon. The election of a Phalangist as the new Lebanese president, however, may help alter this situation. In the past, ASALA has been at loggerheads with the Phalangists, although, according to one ASALA representative: "There is a semitruce between them now." ASALA will renew its operations against the Phalangists, however, "in the event of Phalangist aggression against our army."[118] Recent reports indicate that ASALA's leadership has now left Lebanon, leaving some of the membership behind.[119]

(2) The Soviets. The Russians and the Turks have been enemies for centuries. Over the past 200 years, no country has benefited more than Russia from the decline of what Tsar Nicholas I once termed "the sick man of Europe." Indeed, the Russians have waged several successful wars to gain Turkish territories. Throughout much of this period, the Russian Empire attempted to use the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire as a fifth column with varying degrees of success. Indeed, the alleged genocide of Armenians occurred against the reputed background of Turkish Armenian support for the invading Russian armies in World War I.

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[115] "Ο 'ΑΣΑΛΑ' ΝΑΡΑΜΕΝΕΙ ΣΤΗ ΒΗΡΥΡΤΟ" (ASALA Stays in Beirut), ΧΑΡΑΥΓΗ [*Dawn*] (Cyprus), November 8, 1982, p. 1.

[116] "New Balances of Power in the Middle East," *NewSpot: Turkish Digest*, September 3, 1982, p. 2.

[117] Ibid.

[118] "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA."

[119] See *The Armenian Reporter*, June 23, 1983, p. 3; and *New York Times*, April 17, 1983.

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After that struggle, the new Soviet regime established, as one of its constituent federal entities, an Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic on the Turkish border. In time this new Soviet Armenia ironically enough became a magnet for Armenian support throughout the world because the Soviet authorities allowed the native Armenian genius an amazing amount of free expression and development. The result has been "perhaps the most thriving, vigorous and open society anywhere in the Communist world. . . . Its economic performance can today compare with that of advanced industrialised nations of similar size." [120] Many Armenians have played leading roles in Soviet society, operating as dentists, doctors, engineers, generals, and scientists throughout the country. The former president of the Soviet Union and a leading member of the Communist party's Politburo, Anastas Mikoyan, was probably the best known.

The Soviet authorities have also permitted Armenian national feelings to manifest themselves by allowing Mount Ararat, a symbol of Armenian nationalism now located just across the border in Turkey, to be represented on the insignia of the Armenian SSR. On the outskirts of Yerevan, a somber, impressive monument to the Armenian victims of 1915 testifies to the Soviet support of a cause often forgotten by others. Not surprisingly, Armenians around the world tend to have a positive and even grateful feeling toward the Soviet Union and can therefore be used by that state to whip up support or at least win favorable acquiescence forcertain types of policies.

Immediately after World War II, for example, the Soviet Union made territorial demands on portions of eastern Turkey that had been held by Russia from 1878 until the end of World War I. Since these lands were part of the Armenian irredenta, Armenian communities around the world threw their support to the Soviet cause. Only the beginnings of the Cold War and the support given Turkey by the United States under the Truman Doctrine probably prevented the enlargement of Soviet Armenia at the expense of Turkey.

Now that Turkey is a member of NATO, that alliance guarantees the existing border. Any Soviet attempt to encroach on it, therefore, has to be more subtle. Many Turks feel that in ASALA the Soviets have found a "proxy" to accomplish just this purpose. "The same territorial demands are repeated this time by the Soviet-supported terrorists. . . . I refer to the Armenian terrorists, Asala, who said this openly." [121] Since it

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[120] Walker, *Survival of a Nation*, p. 371. See, also, in general, Mary Matossian, *The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962); and Lang, *The Armenians*, pp. 108ff.

[121] See Professor Aydin Yalçin's statement in *U.S. Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism*, p. 5. Paul Henze argues that "to exacerbate Turkey's relations with her [NATO] alliance partners" is one of the real aims of ASALA. "We see this happening over and over again as each Armenian assassination of a Turkish diplomat generates strain in Turkish relations with the country where it has occurred." Henze, "Coping

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is an avowedly Marxist group that feels, in its own words, that "Soviet Armenia should be to us, what Hanoi was for the Vietnamese during their liberation war," [122] ASALA would indeed make a natural proxy for Soviet ambitions toward Turkey. As the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle recently noted: "If it [ASALA] were to be successful in its aims it would lead directly to the expansion of the Soviet Union." [123]

Dismantling the southeastern anchor of NATO, as important as it would be, is not the only benefit the Soviets would receive if ASALA's territorial aims were satisfied. A truncated Turkey would eliminate it as an attractive model for the Turkic and Islamic populations of the Soviet Union, which now constitute 27 per cent of the entire Soviet population.[124]

In her study of international terrorist connections, Claire Sterling devotes an entire chapter to the extent of Soviet attempts to destabilize Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s.[125] Paul Henze, a member of the National Security Council during the Carter administration, also sees the Soviets as playing a major role here, arguing that "information coming to light recently on the scope and cost of Turkish terrorism may justify the conclusion that the Soviet Union has invested more in destabilizing Turkey through terrorism and subversion than it has spent on any single country since Vietnam." Henze mentions Armenian terrorism as one specific example of the Soviet role.[126] After the military government of General Kenan Evren came to power in Turkey in September 1980 and cracked down on domestic terrorism, huge amounts of weapons were seized. The general consensus as to their origin was the Soviet Union.[127] Levon Manasserian, vice-chairman of the commission of foreign affairs of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR, recently indicated tacit Soviet sympathy for Armenian terrorist activities by stating: "These actions are

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with Terrorism: What Do We Know? What Can Be Done?" (discussion paper with particular reference to Turkey prepared for the Conference of the Political & Social Studies Foundation held at Istanbul, Turkey, October 3-6, 1982), p. 16.

[122] "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA."

[123] *Testimony by the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee* (Washington: mimeographed, March 11, 1982), p. 6.

[124] See Professor Yalçin's testimony in *U.S. Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism*, p. 13, for this argument.

[125] See Sterling, *Terror Network*, pp. 228-46.

[126] Henze, "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey," *Atlantic Community, Quarterly*, vol. 19, 1981/82, pp. 469, 471. Elsewhere, Henze asks: "Are these Armenians likely to have developed their deadly professional skill without benefit of training by seasoned professionals? Where else, except through the KGB, can such training be readily arranged—whether given under PLO or other auspices?" Henze, "Coping with Terrorism," pp. 16-17. In a letter to me, dated January 9, 1983, Mr. Henze states: "I am inclined to think that ASALA is not only a primary operating instrument but also a 'clearing house' through which the Russians let aid flow to all Armenians inclined toward violence and extremism."

[127] See *U.S. Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism*, pp. 34ff; and Henze, "Effort to Destabilize Turkey," pp. 472-73.

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wrong and ineffective, but we can understand the frustrations and conditions which motivate them."[128]

Thus, it is possible to make a strong circumstantial case for Soviet support of ASALA. Tangible proof, however, is difficult to achieve. What is most likely is that the Soviets have simply been playing their usual game of trying to destabilize their potential foes—actions not foreign to American behavior, it should be noted. ASALA is probably one of just many terrorist groups attempting to strike at Turkish stability that has received some covert Soviet aid.

As one of the two superpowers in world politics today, however, the Soviet Union often has an inherent vested interest in *not* promoting instability. Levon Manasserian and Vardan Voskanyan, two Soviet Armenian foreign affairs officials, recently declared, for example: "[Soviet] foreign policy must be made in Moscow, not in Armenia. Steps against Turkey, a NATO member, would involve our overall relations with NATO, and the need to maintain world peace."[129] In addition, overt Soviet support for the Armenians might cause ill will among the Turkic and Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union, who vastly outnumber the Soviet Armenian population.[130]

That there is less to the Soviet role in Armenian terrorism than some have concluded is possibly verified by ASALA itself. In the *Al-Majallah* interview, an ASALA representative declared: "It [Soviet Armenia] should be a springboard for liberation, but this is not happening, apparently because they [the Soviets] believe only in what they call 'democratic struggle' as far as Turkey is concerned."[131]

(3) Cyprus. Sporadic intercommunal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, punctuated by much heavier outbursts in 1964, 1967, and again in 1974, led in 1974 to a Turkish invasion of the island and the establishment of a de facto Turkish Cypriot state in the north to balance the continuing de jure (Greek) Cypriot state in the south.

Many Turks feel that the Greek Cypriots support the Armenian terrorists in revenge for this Turkish invasion.[132] The largely circumstantial argument has been stated by a respected leftist university professor and columnist, Mümtaz Soysal: "Why has this [Armenian] violence been revived suddenly after a pause of half a century[?] . . . The re-starting date of this organized violence coincides with the date of the 1974 Turkish

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[128] Cited in Frederic Moritz, "The 'Armenian Question': Yet Another Pressure Point for the East-West Struggle?" *Christian Science Monitor*, December 28, 1982.

[129] Cited in ibid.

[130] For this argument, see ibid.

[131] "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA."

[132] See Marvine Howe, "Turks Blame Cypriots for Attacks in Name of Armenians," *New York Times*, February 28, 1980; March 1, 1980, and March 13, 1980; and "The 'Armenian Connection' in Bombings," *The Guardian*, December 19, 1979, p. 2.

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landing in Cyprus. . . . To be more specific, the Armenian cause has been included in the 'long-term struggle policy' of the Greek Cypriots, to 'save Cyprus.'" [133]

Turkish officials have compiled a large file concerning this alleged Greek Cypriot connection. Leaflets and press clippings with statements made by Armenians and Greek Cypriots supposedly verify the accusation. Archbishop Makarios, for example, promised the Armenian Patriarch Koren in August 1977 that "we will give every material and moral support to the Armenians in a bid to internationalise the Armenian question." The new Greek Cypriot president Spyros Kyprianou "has been the recipient of the biggest Armenian award by the hand of Koren for his 'services to the Armenian cause.'" Kyprianou also received an award from the Armenian National Council in New York "for the continued support of the Armenian cause." [134]

More to the point, the Turks have charged that "the Armenian Institute, founded by the Melkonian Brothers in Nicosia under the name 'Melkonian Institute,' is training elements for the Armenian terrorist organisation." More general claims are made that "there is concrete evidence in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot administration that supporters of the 'Armenian cause' and the members of the Armenian organisation are being sheltered in the Greek Cypriot sector." [135] "Armenian terrorists are known to have already gathered in the Greek part of Cyprus where they have been engaged in certain activities for some time," [136] added another Turkish report. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, recently brought up the subject of Armenian terrorist camps when he met with the commander of the UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus.[137] *Hürriyet*, the largest selling daily in Turkey, gave a detailed report on what it claimed was a camp near Nicosia of "Armenian murder gangs" training and planning sabotage.[138]

Although there undoubtedly is sympathy among Greek Cypriots for the Armenian terrorists, the Greek Cypriot government has denied the accusation, and independent investigations in Cyprus have yielded no evidence to substantiate it.[139] Indeed, Greek Cypriot support for the Armenian terrorists probably would be insanely suicidal given the present political, geographical, and military facts of life. What is more, for what

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[133] Mümtaz Soysal, "The Trigger and the Finger" (translated and reprinted from the Turkish daily, *Milliyet*), *Turkish News*, April 1980, pp. 20-21.

[134] Ibid., p. 21.

[135] Ibid.

[136] *NewSpot: Turkish Digest*, September 3, 1982, p. 2.

[137] "Denktaş Asks about the Armenian Plots," in ibid., September 10, 1982, p. 6.

[138] See the accounts in *New York Times*, February 28, 1980; and Barchard, "Greek-Armenian," *Special News Bulletin*, August 23, 1980, p. 2.

[139] See *New York Times*, February 28 and March 1, 1980.

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it is worth, ASALA itself has denied the charge as "lies"[140] and "an attempt to divert attention from the Turkish-Armenian conflict."[141] Nevertheless, Turkish belief in the reputed connection persists and was given new possible substance when PLO evacuees from Beirut transited through Cyprus in August 1982. At that time Turkish newspapers claimed that between 250 and 1,200 Armenian guerrillas had surreptitiously entered Cyprus along with their PLO allies evacuating Beirut.[142]

Over the years Armenian terrorism has been a phenomenon that has grown out of the failure of the Armenians involved to develop sufficient political and military strength to present their case in a more conventional manner. The inability of those affected to stem it to date, on the other hand, has been owing largely to what the well-known cliché explains as: "One man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." Too many states and individuals have been too lenient on the matter, condemning the terror in one breath, but in the next apologizing for it by saying "but we have to understand the motives."

Whether or not the Turks committed genocide against the Armenians, however, the point is that today's victims were not even born when the alleged crimes for which they are being attacked were supposedly committed. This is an important point distinguishing today's Armenian terrorists from their predecessors of the 1920s. After he assassinated several leading Ottoman officials in Western Europe, for example, the Dashnak agent Arshavir Shiragian wrote: "I never thought once of using my gun against innocent people . . . not even Turkish ones. . . . Many persons, informed of the details of my work and behavior, have asked why I did not kill Azmi [the bodyguard of one of his victims] or others. I thought the answer obvious: Azmi had no responsibility for the planning or the execution of the massacres of the Armenian people. . . . We were meting out punishment to persons who had been tried in absentia and who had been found guilty of mass murder."[143]

In addition, even if the Ottomans were guilty as charged (a point that has *not* been granted here), as another well-known saw puts it: "The rights of everybody are wrapped up with those of the most hated." States and individuals who condone terrorism in one case will certainly see the precedent come back to haunt them.

Indeed, after the deadly Orly airport bombing on July 15, 1983, Turkish foreign minister Ilter Türkmen pointedly criticized the French government when he declared that "especially those who support

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[140] *XAPAYTH* (Cyprus), November 8, 1982, p. 1.

[141] *New York Times*, March 13, 1980.

[142] See the press account in *New York Times*, August 29, 1982; and *NewSpot: Turkish Digest*, September 10, 1982, p. 2.

[143] Shiragian, *The Legacy*, pp. 135-36.

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or tolerate terrorism should now realize that terrorist acts can also cause serious damage for themselves."[144] Until the international community, and especially the vast majority of law-abiding Armenians around the world, recognize these elementary facts, it is doubtful that Armenian terrorism can be halted in the near future.

Culpable too is the press and the publicity it has unwittingly given the terrorists. As the very U.S. State Department study condemning the terror admits: "By resorting to terrorism, Armenian extremists were able to accomplish in 7 years what legitimate Armenian organizations have been trying to do for almost 70 years—internationalize the Armenian cause."[145] How it would be possible to deny the terrorists their lifeblood of publicity without strangling the very freedoms we are trying to protect, however, is not easy to explain.

Certainly the Turks, embittered by the terror already committed, are not going to reopen a Pandora's box of trouble for themselves by granting the Armenian terrorists their demands. Furthermore, since the Turks, unlike the Nazis in World War II, argue that they too suffered unjustly, a West German solution of reparations for the Armenians is also unlikely. For their part, the Armenian terrorists have manifested over the years a stubborn ability to continue bearing their animus. The prognostication, therefore, is not favorable for an early end of terrorist activity. In the long run, however, the Armenian terrorists are simply a nuisance. Their paltry numbers (perhaps 1,000 terrorists) and anachronistic claims (the 60,000-odd Armenians who remain in Turkey apparently accept their present situation)[146] present no threat to the territorial integrity or survival of Turkey.

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[144] Cited in *New York Times*, July 16, 1983. The fact that the French police were able to apprehend prime suspects so quickly after the Orly bombing may indicate that the police have known who the Armenian extremists were, but hesitated to crack down on them until the carnage at Orly finally forced them to act. Indeed, a secret deal between the French government and ASALA supposedly permitted the terrorists the free use of the French airports in return for no further actions on French soil. See *Armenian Weekly*, July 23, 1983, p. 1.

[145] Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism," p. 31.

[146] See the descriptions in *Turkey Today*, February 1981, p. 4; August 1982, p. 4; and especially January 1983, p. 1. On the other hand, see Robert Jordan, "The Proud Armenians," *National Geographic*, June 1978, pp. 847, 851; and Michael Arlen, *Passage to Ararat* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1975), pp. 285, 287.

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review essays

THE DECLINE OF BRITISH SEA POWER

Britain's Naval Future. By James Cable. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 220 pp. $24.95.

JOHN H. MAURER
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"England is sad—to me very sad," Brooks Adams wrote to his friend Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in 1900. "Like you I hope she may revive, but I admit my hope is faint. The current is flowing away from her." Adams continued in this vein: "I do not apprehend any sudden . . . change, but I fancy England will grow gradually more and more sluggish, until, at length, after our day, she will drop out of the strenuous competition of the new world which is forming."[1]

From a vantage point of some eight decades after Adams' time, we can survey the decline of Britain's status as a Great Power that he glimpsed and foretold. What is now clear is that Britain lacked the power to uphold its world position in the face of increasing competition from economic and military rivals. For unlike the nineteenth century, the age of the *Pax Britannica*, when the cost of governing and defending a sprawling empire stretching around the globe did not pose an insupportable economic burden, the intense international rivalries of this century proved to be a greater strain than Britain's economy could afford to bear. Britain could not expect to maintain her position of naval supremacy, for example, in the face of the determined expansion of the navies of the United States, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union that occurred during this century. As early as 1901, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, observed: "It has not dawned on our countrymen yet . . . that, if the Americans choose to pay for what they can easily afford, they can build up a navy fully as large and then larger than ours, and I am not sure they

[1] Quoted in Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (New York: Collier, 1973), p. 384.

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will not do it."[2] As Britain's defense efforts came to reflect more closely its economic position and as international competition from rivals became more intense, British statesmen and defense planners could no longer bring into balance their country's commitments with its resources. The imbalance between ends and means has become a leitmotif in the history of the decline of British power.

At each stage in this decline, British leaders debated among themselves how best to uphold Britain's status as a Great Power. Often these debates took on an acrimonious character, with key ministers threatening to resign or being sacked by their superiors as a result of sharp differences over defense policy. One such episode occurred in 1925 when Winston Churchill, then serving as chancellor of the exchequer, sought to reduce naval estimates by trimming the Admiralty's program of cruiser construction. Led by the dynamic first sea lord, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, the Admiralty fought to save their cruiser building program. At one point in this budget crisis, Beatty wrote to his wife:

> That extraordinary fellow Winston has gone mad. Economically mad, and no sacrifice is too great to achieve what in his short-sightedness is the panacea for all evils—to take 1s off the Income Tax. Nobody outside a lunatic asylum expects a shilling off the Income Tax this Budget. But he has made up his mind that it is the only thing he can do to justify his appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer. The result will be a split in the Conservative Party and nothing else. . . . Poor old Bridgeman our 1st Lord [of the Admiralty] takes a very gloomy view and sees his job fading away from him. But I have heartened him up a lot and I think he will stand firm. It's then a case of Winston coming off his perch or a split in the Govt, followed by the resignation of the Board of Admiralty.[3]

The threat of mass resignations had the desired effect when Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin arranged a compromise between Churchill and Beatty that gave the Admiralty its principal objective of building seven new cruisers, but sought to control naval estimates by slowing down their rate of construction.[4] On other occasions, however, such debates did not end on a note of compromise. In 1966, for instance, the minister of defence for the Navy, Christopher Mayhew, and the first sea lord, Admiral Sir David Luce, resigned after the Labour government decided to cancel the program to construct a modern force of fleet carriers; and, in 1981, Keith Speed, parliamentary undersecretary of defence for the Royal Navy, was

[2] George Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1963), p. 72, n. 1.

[3] Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. 5: *The Prophet of Truth, 1922-1939* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 84.

[4] On this naval-estimates crisis, see Gilbert, *Churchill*, pp. 82-91, 101-5, 127-28; and Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, vol. 1: *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929* (London: Collins, 1968), pp. 444-48.

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sacked by the Thatcher government because of his opposition to the proposed reductions in surface naval forces.[5]

As in the past, the current debate on British defense policy—which began in 1981 and is by no means over yet—is not only about a particular weapons system, or the composition of an individual service, or the amount of appropriations in the budget, but also about Britian's role in world politics. By slowing the tempo of cruiser construction and retarding the growth of the Singapore naval base in the 1920s, Churchill was tacitly admitting that Britain no longer possessed the resources to fight single-handed against Japan in the Far East. Similarly, the contemporary defense debate raises larger questions about Britain's foreign policy.

In *Britain's Naval Future*, Sir James Cable has made a contribution to this debate by arguing for a drastic reorientation of Britain's defense priorities and political commitments. The steps advocated by Cable, the author of the highly regarded *Gunboat Diplomacy*,[6] entail the Royal Navy's being accorded a higher priority in British defense planning than has been the case in recent years. His idea of defense policy, if followed, would have an enormous impact on the structure of the Atlantic Alliance and would bring about a major change in the international political system. While his proposals are controversial and quite different from those espoused by the Thatcher government, they deserve to be examined because they could well presage future developments in Britain's defense and foreign policies. Although Cable is concerned only with the case of Britain, his discussion also raises a number of intriguing questions about the role of sea power in contemporary international politics—especially as it relates to medium-sized powers—that are of interest to historians, policy analysts, and defense planners. Finally, the defense debate in Britain is in many ways similar to the one that is currently taking place in the United States. As the budget deficit looms large before the Congress, there will be pressure to postpone or cancel important parts of the Reagan administration's defense program. In particular, the goal of a 600-ship fleet advocated by John Lehman is likely to suffer from budgetary constraints imposed by the Congress, just as the Royal Navy shouldered the heaviest burden of the cuts proposed for Britain's services. Will the cost of naval superiority come to be seen as more than the United States can afford to pay, as it did for an earlier generation of Britons? If so, Britain's example may provide an insight into America's naval future.

[5] On these resignations, see Desmond Wettern, *The Decline of British Seapower* (London: Jane's, 1982), pp. 264-66, and "Marshal Thatcher Believes in Discipline, even if the Admirals Don't," *The Economist*, May 23, 1981, pp. 55-56.

[6] James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*, rev. ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1981).

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The Declining Standard of Britain's Naval Strength

The decline of Britain's power during this century is perhaps most readily apparent in the steady erosion of its naval position. At the beginning of the century Britain maintained her fleet at a "two-power standard"; that is, the number of battleships and armored cruisers in the Royal Navy matched the combined total of those possessed by any two other navies. As the Fashoda Crisis, the Boer War, and the Dogger Bank episode demonstrated, this measure of superiority at sea conferred important strategic advantages on British statesmen for handling an international crisis.[7] With the growth of the German battle fleet during the decade before the First World War, British shipbuilding programs were increasingly dictated by the need to meet Germany's naval challenge, loudly proclaimed by Kaiser Wilhelm II when he declared: "The Trident must be in our fist." Although the attention of British naval policymakers and planners was focused on the threat across the North Sea, the Royal Navy nevertheless did not drop below the two-power standard in the period between 1905 and 1918, since its capital ship strength continued to equal that of the navies of both Germany and the United States. In fact, with the surrender of the German battle fleet at the end of the First World War, Britain had more dreadnought capital ships in commission than the combined total of *all* other major naval powers, namely the United States, Japan, France, and Italy.[8] Despite the Kaiser's bombast, Britannia emerged from the First World War with the trident firmly held in her hands.

Within three years of the armistice, however, Britain's overwhelming naval superiority diminished rapidly after its statesmen agreed at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 to the insistent U.S. demand that the battle fleets of the two countries be of equal strength.[9] By granting the United States parity in capital ships—the central strategic system of their day—British political leaders hoped to forestall a naval race that, in their opinion, Britain did not have the resources to win. After the Great War, Britain's weakened economic condition seemed to preclude the possibility that it could maintain its naval superiority in the face of competition from the United States and Japan. Far better to share the trident

[7] For a brief history of the two-power standard, see E. L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1935), pp. 455-73, and, on the role of the Royal Navy in the various international crises in this era, see Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905* (New York: Knopf, 1940).

[8] The capital ship strength of the leading naval powers in November 1918 were as follows: Britain possessed 42 battleships and battle cruisers, the United States 16, Japan 9, France 7, and Italy 5.

[9] It is fascinating to note that, at the conclusion of the First World War, Admiralty planners continued to think in terms of a two-power standard, with the Royal Navy's strength maintained at a level matching the battle fleets of the United States and France. On this, see the memorandum by Oswyn Murray, Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty, to the First Lord of the Admiralty, November 21, 1918, Admiralty Paper 116/1605: 31282, Public Record Office.

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than to lose it.[10] The Great Depression only further accelerated the decrease in Britain's ability to withstand the strains of international competition in naval armaments during the interwar period. The severe budgetary limitations confronting Admiralty planners in the early 1930s led one exasperated first sea lord, Sir Ernle Chatfield, to exclaim: "We literally have not got the income to keep up a first class Navy."[11] Throughout the 1930s Admiralty plans for naval expansion were retarded or curtailed because of Britain's economic weakness. As a consequence, at the outbreak of the Second World War, the Royal Navy clearly was inadequate to protect the Empire from the combination of threats posed by the German, Italian, and Japanese navies. Moreover, with the rapid and massive growth of U.S. naval power during the Second World War, Britain lost even its claim to naval parity with the United States. While the Royal Navy still boasted an impressive fleet strength in 1945, Britain clearly had slipped into the position of a second-class naval power.

The decline of British naval power became even more precipitous in the postwar era as successive governments—both Conservative and Labour—accorded the Royal Navy a less important role in Britain's defense efforts. The signing of the NATO treaty in 1949, for instance, indicated that the "continental commitment" of ground and air forces for the defense of Western Europe had been given a higher priority than the Royal Navy. In a similar fashion, the famous Duncan Sandys white paper, which candidly stated that in the case of a nuclear exchange "the role of naval forces is somewhat uncertain," made clear that by 1957 the development of an independent nuclear deterrent had acquired a higher priority as well. On account of the Royal Navy's "somewhat uncertain" role in Britain's defense, it was perhaps inevitable that drastic reductions would be made in British naval capabilities. The most important of these occurred in 1966, when Denis Healey moved "to make significant savings in money" by canceling plans to build the CVA-01 fleet carriers.[12] Already surpassed by the Soviet Union in number of warships and combat tonnage, Britain was reduced at a stroke to the position of a third-rate naval power by the decision not to modernize the Royal Navy's fleet

[10] On the Washington Conference, see Roger Dingman, *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

[11] Paul Haggie, *Britannia at Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931-1941* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), p. 50.

[12] It is doubtful if Britain actually achieved the "significant savings" envisioned by Mr. Healey by the cancellation of the CVA-01 carriers. The cost of building a single CVA-01 carrier during the late 1960s and early 1970s has been variously estimated at between £70 million and £200 million. A modern carrier force of three CVA-01s thus would have been an expensive undertaking. Yet, the escalating cost of building the Invincible-class carriers—estimated in 1980 at over £200 million each—and the expensive modernizations of older carriers, like the H.M.S. *Ark Royal*, resulted in Britain spending large sums anyway on its carrier forces. Instead of having a modern carrier force unmatched by any other navy except that of the United States, the Royal Navy has purchased a much more limited air capability at sea.

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carrier force. Rather than give their tacit support to Mr. Healey's decision by remaining in office, both the civilian and uniformed heads of the Royal Navy resigned, and it was only with great difficulty that the rest of the Admiralty Board could be persuaded to remain at their posts. This episode, perhaps better than any other, demonstrates the waning political influence of the Admiralty in determining government policy on Britain's defense. Gone forever, so it seems, are the days when a prominent minister could complain, as Gladstone did upon his forced retirement from political life in 1893, about an issue of naval policy: "It is the Admirals who have got their knife into me."[13]

Yet the admirals were to be faced with the prospect of even deeper cuts in 1981 when Defence Secretary John Nott proposed, in his controversial white paper, *The United Kingdom Defence Programme — The Way Forward*, to reduce the number of surface combatants in the fleet. As originally proposed, these cuts would have included the sale of the aircraft carrier H.M.S. *Invincible* to Australia, the scrapping of the carrier H.M.S. *Hermes* and the assault ships H.M.S. *Fearless* and H.M.S. *Intrepid*, and a reduction of perhaps as many as twenty surface escorts.[14] The savings accrued in defense expenditures by these cuts in the strength of the surface fleet and in dockyard capacity could then be used by the Thatcher government to help defray the cost of modernizing Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.[15] If Nott's suggested reductions had taken place as scheduled, the Royal Navy could well have fallen to a position behind that of even the French fleet. The irony of "Nott's axe" was that the Royal Navy's strength was to be drastically reduced in order to pay for a system called Trident.

While the proposed reductions resulted in an outcry of protest from navalists — one retired admiral described them as "savage" and "as a highly dangerous gamble with our national security"[16] — it is difficult to see what other course of action was open to the Thatcher government. Pledged to increases in defense spending, the Conservatives had boosted the defense budget in real terms by approximately 8 per cent during their first two years in office, and planned further increases at a rate of 3 per cent a year through 1985-86. Despite these increases, there nonetheless remained a wide gap between the anticipated cost of defense programs

[13] Marder, *Anatomy of British Sea Power*, p. 202.

[14] *The United Kingdom Defence Programme — The Way Forward*, Cmd. 8288, para. 23, states: "For the future the most cost-effective maritime mix — the best balanced operational contribution for our situation will be one which continues to enhance our maritime air and submarine effort, but accepts a reduction below current plans in the size of our surface fleet."

[15] Lawrence Freedman, "Britain: The First Ex-Nuclear Power?" *International Security*, Fall 1981, pp. 80-104.

[16] Lord Hill-Norton, speech to the House of Lords, July 20, 1981, cited in Lord Hill-Norton and John Dekker, *Sea Power* (London: Faber, 1982), pp. 182-88.

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and the ceiling set by the budget. Of course, the Thatcher government could have tried to bridge this gap by increasing defense spending above the planned annual growth rate of 3 per cent, but this approach was widely viewed as fiscally irresponsible: after all, Britain was already spending more on defense in absolute terms than the Federal Republic of Germany, which possessed a significantly larger and stronger economy. By limiting the annual growth of defense spending to 3 per cent, the Thatcher government had little recourse but to undertake substantial economies in defense programs. These economies could only be achieved, however, at the expense of either the modernization of the nuclear deterrent, the British ground and air forces on the Central Front, or the number of surface ships in the fleet. When faced with these choices, the decision of the Thatcher government is hardly surprising. The political repercussions that surely would follow from the cancellation of the Trident program or a major withdrawal of forces from Germany were certainly of overwhelming importance in making the decision to reduce the number of surface combatants in the Royal Navy. Only the outbreak of fighting over the Falkland Islands—by making possible higher levels in defense spending and by upsetting John Nott's program of cuts—saved the Royal Navy from the sharp reductions that were intended by the Thatcher government. While the Falklands conflict granted a reprieve, the Royal Navy still faces the prospect of no longer playing a central role in Britain's defense planning or foreign policy.

Continental Commitment or Maritime Strategy

Since any attempt to increase the Royal Navy's strength can only be achieved at the expense of other defense programs, a policy of expanding British naval capabilities must also take into account the political problems that would follow from the cancellation of the Trident program or the reduction of Britain's "continental commitment" to NATO's Central Front. Thus, to argue for naval expansion is to argue for a dramatic shift in Britain's foreign policy as well, which is precisely what Cable does in *Britain's Naval Future*.

In Cable's view, British security is excessively tied to the "special relationship" with the United States[17] and to the continental

[17] Recent historical studies exploring the origins and early development of the "special relationship" have increasingly focused on its competitive aspects and on the divergent interests of the United States and Britain. See, for example, James R. Leutze, *Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), Wm. Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and Robert M. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

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commitment on the Central Front. The result of these two "entangling alliances" has been to deprive British statesmen of the flexibility that is required to protect Britain's interests. Cable sees, for instance, the installation of U.S. cruise missiles on British soil as "scarcely desirable for Britain. . . . Even assuming the utmost Anglo-American identity of purpose and harmony in decision-making—and it is only fair to say that Americans are probably much less inclined to use any kind of nuclear weapon than is often supposed—the mere presence of these missiles must increase the risks to Britain and limit her freedom of manoeuvre." (p. 74.) Similarly, the commitment of British ground and air forces to Germany has placed Britain in a position where its options would be drastically curtailed in a crisis. Cable succinctly states his principal objection to Britain's continental commitment in the axiom: "The potential influence of a military force is proportional to its freedom of manoeuvre and declines, rather than increases, when that force is committed to positional defense. What Britain can grant or withold [*sic*] is more reliably productive of reward than what she has already given away." (p. 184.)

In order to restore Britain's "freedom of manoeuvre" in world politics, Cable would like to see British leaders follow more closely a Gaullist model for foreign and defense policies. He writes approvingly of France's approach to providing for its security:[18]

> France has accepted the NATO choice of threat—assault on the Central Front—and has welcomed the efforts of her allies to meet it, yet without committing her own forces to consequential action. She supports the installation of American theatre nuclear weapons—outside France. She has kept her options open: to reinforce her allies or to reserve her strength for the defence of the homeland or even to react to a different threat. She can suit her response to the unfolding of events and is free to reach a national judgment of the predicted terminal situation. (pp. 106-7.)

Cable thus would like to see Britain pursue a more independent approach to its security while remaining within the protective shield of NATO and the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

Emulation of the French model requires that the nuclear deterrent be modernized, because without it, Cable believes, "the British people would be too exclusively at the mercy of every American missile on British soil." (p. 72.) In order to avoid being reduced to the status of "Airstrip One," Britain should therefore go ahead with the development of the Trident system: "It is a limited deterrent, but probably better than

[18] Britain has not been alone, of course, in facing difficult choices in defense spending. France has also found that the cost of its various nuclear weapons programs necessitates drastic cuts in the strength of its army. The irony of this is that the island nation possessing strong naval traditions, decided to reduce its navy, while the continental state, priding itself on past martial glories, took steps to cut its army. Nuclear weapons and alliance politics have, in the case of Britain and France, altered to a considerable extent traditional approaches to security.

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none." (p. 85.) In addition, while he does not dispute the importance of NATO military preparations on the Central Front designed to deter a Soviet offensive, he does not necessarily see this theater as an area where Britain need provide a large-scale commitment of air and ground forces. "What, after all," Cable asks, "is the point of an alliance if it does not permit the application of that principle so dear to Soviet economists: the division of labour? Those predominantly naval tasks of most direct concern to Britain and best adapted to her resources and traditions should fall to her share; the defense of the Central Front, for equivalent reasons, to that of her continental Allies." (p. 181.) Here, then, is a modern-day advocacy of the so-called British way of warfare, which seeks to limit Britain's contribution of ground forces on the continent.[19]

By grasping what B. H. Liddell Hart once called "the glittering sword of Continental manufacture,"[20] Britain has neglected its naval forces. For Cable, the primacy that has been accorded to the continental commitment in British defense planning "is becoming an anachronism and the principal impediment to Britain's naval future." (p. 187.) Instead of this expensive commitment of ground and air forces to NATO's Central Front, which accounted for approximately 42 per cent of Britain's defense expenditure in 1981, Cable would like to see the strengthening of the Royal Navy. Unlike the continental commitment, naval power would increase the flexibility of British statesmen to respond to the particular exigencies of the moment: "Soldiers abroad are hostages to the Alliance in a way that ships at sea are not." (p. 185.) The primary purpose, then, of Cable's suggested reorientation of British defense policy from the North German Plain to the Narrow Seas is political: "A predominantly maritime strategy would give a British government more control over their own forces and thus more political freedom of manoeuvre in a crisis." (pp. 186-87.)

The strengthening of the Royal Navy no doubt would be welcomed by defense planners in other countries of the alliance so long as it was not done at the expense of Britain's continental commitment. If the price of British naval expansion is a sharp reduction in Britain's ground and air forces in Germany, however, there would be little support for such a move. While the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) consists of only three divisions and suffers from equipment shortages, it is of high quality and is located at a crucial position along the frontier. Like the British Expeditionary Force in 1914, the BAOR could play a decisive role in staving off an allied defeat during the initial period of operations. If Britain were to

[19] The evolution of the continental commitment against Germany has been chronicled by Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (London: Temple Smith, 1972).

[20] B. H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber, 1932), p. 41.

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abandon its continental commitment, as Cable suggests, the practical result would be that the front-line strength of NATO's forward defense must consist almost entirely of German and U.S. forces, since it is unlikely that other continental states, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, or France, would fill the gap left by the BAOR. In an important respect, then, the Atlantic Alliance would be transformed into a "Dual Alliance" between Bonn and Washington. Even more frightening, however, is that a British withdrawal from the Central Front could be the catalyst for large cuts in the commitment of U.S. ground forces to Europe. After all, are not the arguments marshaled by Cable for massive troop withdrawals from the continent as applicable to the United States as they are to Britain? Isolationism and "Mansfieldism" are at least as powerful forces in U.S. domestic politics as they are in Britain. Even Cable admits that a British "withdrawal from Germany, however partial, gradual and skilfully [*sic*] presented, would exacerbate existing strains and stresses within the Alliance." (p. 187.) The withdrawal of Britain's "legions" from Germany could therefore result in the fragmentation of the alliance, and, as a consequence, the security and independence of Britain would be less, and not more, than it is now. While this is an unpalatable fact for many Britons, the security of the British Isles is inextricably bound to the military balance in Germany and the political cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. Britain no longer has the wealth or the power to revert to a policy of "splended isolation."

A British "Risk Fleet"?

Cable sees the Kremlin's primary objective over the past thirty years as not "to destroy Western Europe, not to conquer it, but to divide it from the United States and thereby to subject it to Soviet influence." With this objective in mind, Soviet naval power might be a "better military expedient" for dividing the United States from its European allies in a crisis than threatening to attack the Central Front. (p. 95.) A rapid Soviet victory at sea could be a devastating blow to alliance solidarity, while at the same time minimizing the dangers of nuclear escalation that would accompany an assault on NATO's positions on the Central Front. Focusing too narrowly on the Central Front is to invite disaster in other areas where NATO and the Warsaw Pact might become entangled in conflict. NATO's ability to deter attack from the Soviet Union depends on warships in the North Atlantic as well as divisions in Germany. As Cable puts it, there is a "need for navies to ensure that the Central Front cannot simply be by-passed." (p. 109.) By highlighting the importance of naval power, Cable has provided a useful corrective to those who define alliance strat-

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egy exclusively in terms of the number of divisions each side has in place in Central Europe.

If Britain is to put more emphasis on naval forces in its defense efforts, however, what then should be the size, composition, and doctrine of the Royal Navy? Of course, defining a standard of strength for the Royal Navy is a complex question: there is no longer, for example, a handy formula—like the two-power standard or parity in terms of capital ships with the United States—that commands the respect of political leaders, defense planners, and the public. Without such a standard, however, the political and strategic consensus that is a prerequisite for undertaking major increases in Britain's naval power will be lacking.

Beyond noting that the level of Britain's naval strength should be higher than it is at present, Cable makes no concrete recommendations about the types and numbers of ships and aircraft that would provide British statesmen with the flexibility to deal with an international crisis or to carry out critical wartime operations if deterrence should fail. While he does not provide specific examples of the programs that he thinks would increase Britain's naval power, Cable does suggest a reorientation of British naval forces from antisubmarine warfare in the Eastern Atlantic toward "greater concern for the Northern Flank, for amphibious operations, for defence against air attack and even for the possibility of confrontation with surface ships." (p. 185.) Since the Norwegian Sea is to be the Royal Navy's battleground, the Soviet Northern Fleet, operating out of its bases on the Kola Peninsula, should be used as a rough guide for the development of Britain's naval capabilities. Cable argues that, since the United States Navy is deployed around the globe, the Royal Navy cannot expect significant reinforcements from its allies during an international crisis. In a situation in which United States carrier battle groups are not immediately available, the Royal Navy should be of sufficient strength "to create for the [Soviet] Northern Fleet, a risk that would provide a useful deterrent, perhaps even an effective counter, to certain classes of operation and of threat." (p. 164.) It is not necessary, Cable asserts, for the Royal Navy to be able to defeat the Soviet Northern Fleet in order to deter a major naval offensive, only that British naval forces "make the price of their destruction so high that a prudent Soviet admiral, conscious that he has still to encounter the United States Navy, will not attempt it." (pp. 162-63.) As Cable rightly observes: "The role of the Royal Navy, at least in the special circumstances envisaged . . . , has come to resemble that devised for his own use by their most dangerous enemy, Gross Admiral von Tirpitz: that of the Risikflotte." (p. 163.)

While the concept of a Risk Fleet is appealing in theory, it is likely to be difficult to achieve in practice. The type of balanced fleet that

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Britain would require to carry out intensive naval operations in the Norwegian Sea against Soviet forces cannot be built on the cheap. The threat posed by Soviet surface forces, attack submarines, and land-based strike bombers is formidable. If the Royal Navy is to have any chance against these forces in the absence of significant United States naval assistance, it would have to undertake a major program of expansion. Moreover, British losses in the Falklands conflict suggest that an increase in numbers would not be enough; qualitative improvements in the Royal Navy's materiel would be necessary as well.[21] Unaided by U.S. naval forces, the Royal Navy, as it is currently composed, would suffer severe losses in a "battle of the first salvo" against the Soviet Northern Fleet. The Royal Navy is at present neither doctrinally prepared nor materially equipped to handle a massed Soviet combined-arms attack in the Norwegian Sea. Like Admiral Cradock at the Coronel and Admiral Phillips off Malaya, the Royal Navy would simply be overwhelmed at the outbreak of war if it sought battle—this time, however, in home waters.

Even a cursory examination of the problems associated with carrying out a program of naval expansion, whether in Britain, the United States, or the Soviet Union, reveals that building and maintaining a great-power navy requires an enormous commitment of resources. For a British Risk Fleet, one of the most effective weapons it could deploy in the Norwegian Sea would be a large force of nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of tracking and destroying Soviet surface and submarine forces. Yet, with the cost of a single Trafalgar-class submarine fast approaching £200 million, there seems little likelihood of significant increases in Britain's force of nuclear-powered attack submarines beyond the seventeen boats currently in commission, under construction, or projected. It certainly will not even come close to matching in numbers the more than sixty nuclear-powered attack submarines in the Soviet Northern Fleet.

A British Risk Fleet would also benefit from an enlarged force of land-based aircraft for the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm. Like the German Navy, which plans to buy 112 Tornado aircraft, a Fleet Air Arm made up of high-performance strike aircraft would pose a serious threat to Soviet naval forces. The acquisition of such a large force of Tornados would be expensive, however—their escalating cost is already straining the British defense budget. In addition to the cost, a program to acquire Tornados for the Fleet Air Arm would no doubt set off a bitter interservice dispute between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force over which of them is

[21] See Norman Friedman, "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Mislearned," ORBIS, Winter 1983, pp. 907-40.

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to have operational control of these land-based aircraft. Thus, even if the attempt to build a British Risk Fleet were limited to increasing the Royal Navy's submarine force and the Fleet Air Arm, the cost of naval expansion remains staggering.

Of course, if Britain attempted to rebuild its surface fleet, the cost of naval expansion would be enormous. Since surface warships could not be expected to operate in the Norwegian Sea without the protection of sea-based aircraft, the 1966 decision canceling the construction of modern fleet aircraft carriers would have to be reversed. While there are too many variables to permit a precise estimation of the cost of a modern British carrier battle group, a conventionally powered fleet carrier, with the dimensions and displacement of the canceled CVA-01 or the more recent CVV designed for the United States Navy, would certainly cost over $2 billion.[22] This figure does not include, of course, the cost of aircraft and escorts. Moreover, one carrier battle group would not be enough: a force of at least three carriers would be needed to ensure the operational readiness of one carrier battle group and the capability to deploy a second during a period of crisis. The cost, then, of building a balanced fleet possessing a larger number of nuclear-powered attack submarines than the Royal Navy currently has and a modern fleet carrier force, supported by land-based antisubmarine and strike aircraft, could not be met by cutting the Trident program alone, but only by major reductions in Britain's military contribution to NATO's Central Front.

Even if significant savings were achieved by drastically reducing the continental commitment, there is no indication of the strong domestic political consensus that would be needed to embark on a long-term naval building program requiring the expenditure of huge sums of money. Cable is fully aware of this limitation on the expansion of British naval capabilities: "It would be wishful thinking to hope for more than the maintenance of existing naval strength, with a gradually increasing share of the defence budget to meet the ever-growing costs of keeping naval equipment up to date." (p. 185.) Indeed, a program to enlarge the submarine force, acquire land-based strike aircraft under Royal Navy control, and rebuild the surface fleet is inconceivable in modern-day Britain. The contemporary debate is not concerned with expanding Britain's naval power, but with holding on to the Royal Navy's current level of strength. Quite obviously, when the question is whether one of the Invincible-class carriers should be sold to Australia and the other two placed in reserve, as was suggested by John Nott, there seems little likelihood that substantial numbers of expensive ships and aircraft will be added to the Royal

[22] On the CVV design, see Norman Friedman, *U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 323-33.

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Navy. Nor would an appeal for naval expansion, reminiscent of the famous slogan of 1909, "We want eight, and we won't wait," strike a responsive chord in modern Britain. No British government will be thrown out of office on the issue of naval defense. The naval decline of Britain has reached the point that rebuilding the Royal Navy—even with the intention of achieving no more than deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet—is simply no longer a practical proposition. Of course, if defense expenditure was permitted to rise to the level it achieved at the time of the Korean War—amounting to almost 10 per cent of Britain's gross national product—British defense planners could begin to think in terms of building a Risk Fleet against the Soviet Union while at the same time meeting their country's other security commitments. This level of expenditure would place such a strain on Britain's economy, however, that it would only be politically possible in a period of great national emergency. At that point, however, it would then be too late to begin rebuilding the Royal Navy. As First Lord L. S. Amery warned the House of Commons in 1923: "A great Navy, once let down, cannot be improvised in an emergency."[23]

Heseltine's Holding Operation

Britain's difficulties in finding the financial resources to pay for its defense programs have been put aside for the present. Michael Heseltine's first white paper, released on July 6, does not confront the issue by convincingly stating how the government proposed to balance political commitments and defense programs against the budgetary constraints that are bound to reappear. Beyond reaffirming the government's commitment to the acquisition of Trident and to the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles, the white paper is unclear on Britain's naval future. In an editorial published the day after the white paper's release, *The Times* described it as "a sensible holding operation." *The Times* also sounded a warning, however, that there "may not be much time, in view of the great urgency to control the rate of increase in public spending," to develop "a coherent set of strategic principles" to guide defense planning.[24] There can be little doubt, however, that the debate on defense will re-emerge as soon as the government does define its defense priorities. When this happens, Michael Heseltine will be caught in the whirlwind of interservice rivalries, interdepartmental feuding, and political pressures that made the shaping of British defense policy so difficult an undertaking for his predecessors, Francis Pym and John Nott. At bottom, there can be no easy solution for

[23] Roskill, *Naval Policy*, p. 400.
[24] *The Times* (London), July 7, 1983.

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Britain (unless an economic miracle occurs), and the uneasy consensus that now exists among the Cabinet, party, and services on defense is bound to break down when confronted, once again, by harsh economic realities. When this consensus does break down, the choices might well become even more difficult than they were before the Falklands conflict. The steady decline of Britain's economic position has entailed a corresponding reduction in defense capabilities. The connection between economic strength and defense capabilities has certainly been evident in the decline of Britain's naval power, as Paul Kennedy has observed: "Britain's naval rise and fall has been so closely bound up with her economic rise and fall that it is impossible to understand the former without a close examination of the latter."[25] At present, by spending more on defense than either the Federal Republic of Germany or France, Britain is maintaining her place in world politics, but the long-term problem of commitments outrunning resources will continue to plague British statesmen and defense planners. The choices they make will determine whether Britain remains in the "strenuous competition" of modern-day great-power rivalries.

[25] Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), p. xv.

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities. By Mancur Olson. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982. 273 pp. No price given. An attempt to go beyond explanations of societal vitality based on peculiarities of national personality or fortuitous happenstance to a broader and more encompassing theory. Building on his previous work, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965, 1971), Olson argues that the first law of political economy is its asymmetrical organization: some groups will wield more power than others. As societies age, groups with political power are increasingly able to divert a larger share of the economic pie to their constituencies, in most cases at the expense of the society as a whole. Much of Olson's presentation is designed to show to what extent and under what conditions these social rigidities form. On the basis of this discussion, the author attempts to shed light on a large variety of socio-political phenomena: the advent of stagflation, the "British disease," the evolution of the Indian caste system, unemployment and business cycles in advanced industrial economies, and more. Though objections may be raised to certain "leaps of induction" the author makes, and perhaps to certain omitted questions as well, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* seems to have one thing in common with other books that have become classics: it attempts to systematize and really think through a pervasive common wisdom. In any case, Olson has already provoked a small tempest with this book, making it must reading for all serious students of political economy, sociology, and organization theory.

The Science Race: Training and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers, US and USSR. By Catherine P. Ailes and Francis W. Rushing. New York: Crane, Russak, 1982. 280 pp. $22.50. A comparison of the systems of training and utilizing scientists and engineers in the United States and the Soviet Union, prepared at the request of the U.S. members of the Joint Subgroup on Training and Utilization of the Policy Working Group under the U.S.-USSR Science and Technology Exchange Program. The Subgroup provided much of the data, U.S. and Soviet, that the study employs —data not available elsewhere. Part of this book, a product of the Strate-

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gic Studies Center of SRI International, was submitted to the National Science Foundation as a paper for the White House report, *Science and Engineering Education in the 1980s and Beyond*. The analysis presented in this book, though highly technical, is important for all those interested in the social bases of military power in the nuclear age, as well as for those concerned with the comparative sociology of science. This book is likely to gain a great deal of attention, since it appears at a time of growing alarm over the inadequacies of the U.S. system of education in science, technology, and mathematics and the burgeoning teacher shortages in these areas on almost every level.

Technology and Soviet Energy Availability. By the Office of Technology Assessment. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 406 pp. $25.00. A congressionally prompted study of the Soviet oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and electric power industries, including chapters on Soviet energy relations with Eastern Europe, Japan, and Western Europe. A concluding chapter analyzes U.S. policy options with respect to assisting (or complicating) the Soviet Union's efforts to increase its energy production.

Foreign Policy and the World-System. Edited by Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983. 283 pp. No price given. Some of the essays in this collection are excellent—lucid, interesting, and relevant. Some are, quite frankly, not worthwhile. Most lie somewhere in between, of some interest but poorly written, or of vague purpose. Unfortunately, nearly all tend to be so closely based upon the intricacies of Wallerstein's theories of a "Modern World-System" that they are practically useless to anyone who is not interested in that particular area, or equipped with a copy of the original text for frequent reference.

MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND ARMS CONTROL

Space War: The Fascinating and Alarming History of the Military Uses of Outer Space. By David Ritchie. New York: Atheneum, 1982. 224 pp. $14.95. Yet another contribution to the genre of popular books on the military uses (and abuses) of space. There is some historical depth here—Goddard, for example, is given some space—but the book breaks no new ground either historically or otherwise. Moreover, though there is little, if any, policy-oriented *analysis* here, there is nevertheless a policy-oriented *conclusion:* that the militarization of space is intrinsically bad. A popular account with greater historical depth—and more crisply written, as well—is James Canan's *War in Space* (Harper & Row, 1982).

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Seeds of Promise: The First Real Hearings on the Nuclear Arms Freeze. By Randall Forsberg, Richard L. Garwin, Paul C. Warnke, and Robert W. Dean. Andover, Mass.: Brickhouse Publishing Company, 1983. 213 pp. $9.95 (paper). In September 1982, the Federation on American Scientists sponsored the first in a series of "hearings" on the nuclear-freeze proposal; this book is the edited transcript of the first round. In addition to the authors, participants in the hearings included Alton Frye, Director of the Washington Office of the Council on Foreign Relations, Carl Duckett, former Deputy Director for Science and Technology at the CIA, Frank von Hippel, of the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton, and Dmitri Simes of the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. The extreme difficulty in translating Randall Forsberg's original "Call a Halt to the Nuclear Arms Race" into a substantive arms-control proposal is here illuminated. While honest people can disagree about details, *this* discussion of the nuclear freeze is light years away from what the originators of the freeze movement had in mind when they urged public activism, and equally distant from the level of substantive understanding of most freeze sympathizers. Though the volume as a whole favors the freeze, it does not do so mindlessly. Those who sympathize with the movement should master this material; those who do not should take heed that the freeze is no longer the simple-minded slogan of three years past.

Limited Nuclear War: Political Theory and War Conventions. By Ian Clark. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. 266 pp. $22.50. Clark traces the development of limited war in international legal theory and political philosophy from Roman times to the present. Varieties of war limitation are presented and examined with a view to finding applications for current dilemmas. For the political philosopher, this book will be welcome, for it is an erudite and well-reasoned treatise; for the decision-maker and policy analyst, however, the book is somewhat disappointing, for the author concludes with something we already know: "In the last analysis, political philosophy provides no adequate chart for selecting a course between the Scylla of limited war and the Charybdis of nuclear holocaust."

A General's Life: An Autobiography. By General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. 752 pp. $19.95. Really a biography by Blair, with assistance from Bradley until his death two years before its publication. This book supersedes Bradley's earlier *A Soldier's Story* by making more use of declassified information, updating his career through the Korean War, and adding more candor than he could in the first book (written while he was still in office).

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Includes various nuggets such as a revision of Truman's account of Bradley's and Marshall's position on the relief of MacArthur.

Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook. Edited by Gregory R. Copley. Washington: Defense & Foreign Affairs, 1983. 943 pp. $117.00. This annual reference is similar to, though more detailed than, the IISS's *The Military Balance*. Each country-by-country section includes a brief historical review; political and economic data; information on the news media; army, navy, and air force orders of battle; defense production; and names and addresses of major embassies. Other sections include information on defense industries, tables showing major arms deals, and a "who's who" in world politics and defense. Like other similar works, it focuses on quantifiable data and offers no qualitative observations. Finally, the cost is prohibitive when compared with the prices of other standard references.

Spy/Counterspy: An Encyclopedia of Espionage. By Vincent and Nan Buranelli. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982. 361 pp. $24.95. The only up-to-date encyclopedia of its kind in print, this intriguing book contains detailed information about individuals involved in espionage, noteworthy incidents in the history of spying (beginning with the Elizabethan era), organizations such as the KGB, CIA, and FBI, and the use of cryptograms, codes, ciphers, agents, moles, and spy satellites. Alphabetically arranged, the encyclopedia covers topics ranging from the Profumo affair that rocked the British government in the early 1960s to the Lavon scandal that resulted from a bungled operation in Egypt and remains a very controversial subject in Israel. The authors of *Spy/Counterspy* have provided an ideal study for spy buffs, historians, intelligence professionals, and others. Recommendations for further reading follow each entry.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

KGB Today: The Hidden Hand. By John Barron. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983. 489 pp. $19.95. Based on exclusive interviews with former KGB officers, this is an update of Barron's previous work on the subject. Special emphasis is given to the KGB use of agents of influence within Free World institutions, including fascinating descriptions of KGB methods of suborning and controlling useful foreign nationals in its highly refined efforts at disinformation. There is much that is new and disturbing here; the section describing a KGB colonel being feted and praised on Capitol Hill by U.S. congressmen is especially appalling. Also described

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are Soviet efforts (many successful) to steal advanced technology, the presence of KGB personnel in critical agencies of the United Nations, the case of long-term penetration by the spy Rudolph Hermann (who bequeathed his role to his American-born son), and the story of the Canadian spy Hugh Hambleton. The book is enhanced by two appendices, one listing Soviet officials expelled or withdrawn because of KGB activity, the other detailing what is currently known of the KGB's administrative structure.

The Andropov File: The Life and Ideas of Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR. By Martin Ebon. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983, 284 pp. $16.95. Ebon's book is hampered, like most contemporary studies of the Soviet leadership, by the nearly hermetic secrecy with which the Soviets shroud all but the bare bones of the history and character of their leading personalities. Western analysts are therefore forced into weaving fact together with rumor, extrapolation, and speculation. This book provides all the available information about Andropov's career and personality, and deals temperately with the recurring tales of Andropov the closet liberal, connoisseur of jazz, and his preference for Johnny Walker (or is it Jack Daniels?). While the ambiguities become a bit maddening, there is much useful information in the book, notably the compendium of Andropov's public statements, the official biography, and Chernenko's bland nominating address to the Central Committee, all to be found in the extensive appendix.

Inside the Soviet Army. By Viktor Suvorov. New York: Macmillan, 1982. 296 pp. $15.95. The author, a defector who spent fifteen years in the Soviet Army, including a stint as commander of a motor rifle company during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, provides a cynical (i.e., realistic) insider's view of one of the pillars of Soviet power. Chapters examine the upper levels of military leadership, types of armed services, combat organizations, mobilization, strategy and tactics, equipment, the nitty-gritty of the soldier's life, and the career of the officer. Includes a sardonic account of how to avoid being called up.

The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. By Andrew Cockburn. New York: Random House, 1983. 338 pp. $16.95. This highly readable and informative book is a successful attempt to examine the Soviet armed forces not as they are presented in Soviet propaganda, the Red Square parades, or even Western publications. The book is based primarily on interviews with Soviet émigrés who have served in the Soviet armed forces or defense establishment. As is often the case for those who are intimately familiar with an organization, its reality is quite different from the image

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it projects to the outside world. It appears that the "awesome" Soviet military machine is much less efficient than is usually assumed. Direct and indirect involvement in politics, inefficient organization, chronic manpower and materiel deficiencies are serious problems for the Soviet armed forces for which they have no easy solutions. The book demonstrates that the Soviet Union has opted for quantity over quality. The danger of the book is that it leads one to forget that even if confronted by severe problems, the Soviet Army is still second to none, and that decisions to pursue aggressive policies are rarely based on the quality of the military organization. The book must therefore be read with caution, but is highly recommended to those interested in military affairs, East-West relations, and in the Soviet Union.

After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s. Edited by Robert F. Byrnes. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 457 pp. $25.00 ($12.50, paper). An eighteen-month project conducted by the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, this volume takes a comprehensive approach to the subject. Authors include Seweryn Bialer on the political system, Robert W. Campbell on the economy, and Adam Ulam on Soviet foreign policy. Each of the eight authors assesses the implications of domestic trends for Soviet foreign policy. A landmark study.

Soviet Local Politics and Government. Edited by Everett M. Jacobs. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1983. 225 pp. $28.50. A bedbug's-eye view of Soviet "politics" at the district and village level. The party exercises "petty tutelage" over the Soviets in Orekhovo-Zuevo as in Moscow.

Poland: Genesis of a Revolution. Edited by Abraham Brumberg. New York: Random House, 1983. 324 pp. $19.95 ($7.95, paper). Essays by Western and Polish-born analysts are supplemented by excerpts from Polish books, newspapers, and official documents. As the editor notes, "mounting evidence of huge economic and social benefits for a small elite, in a country fed on a diet of 'socialist egalitarianism,' was surely one of the major causes of the outbreak of public wrath that shook Poland in 1980 and ushered in the Solidarity movement." A major work of interpretation.

WESTERN EUROPE

Helmut Schmidt: Perspectives on Politics. Edited by Wolfram F. Hanrieder. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 247 pp. $27.00. The

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essays, speeches, and interviews that make up this volume are certainly interesting in themselves, but it is as a collection that they really succeed. Ranging over Schmidt's career from 1974 to 1981, they address nearly all of Germany's most pressing concerns during that period (reunification, the EEC and the Common Market, U.S.-German responsibilities and obligations, nuclear/conventional arms reductions) without becoming repetitious or boring, and within the compact scope of just over two hundred pages.

The Impasse of European Communism. By Carl Boggs. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 181 pp. $23.50 ($10.75, paper). Boggs is only partially successful in this volume. He does explain the "impasse" of the title in terms of the ideological and historical contradictions inherent in applying Marxism to West European political systems. He does not really address European Communism as a whole, however; as he himself confesses, he focuses almost exclusively on Italian Communism. If he had limited himself to the development of goals and strategies within the PCI, he might have avoided some of the book's confusion. As it is, the combination of excessive explanations and a somewhat dense style makes this book rather difficult to read. Nevertheless, Boggs does know a great deal about the PCI, and his epilogue on Gramsci and Eurocommunism is interestingly "unorthodox."

Socialism of a Different Kind: Reshaping the Left in France. By Bernard E. Brown. Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 201 pp. $29.95. In an interesting and well-written book, Brown traces the evolution of the French Socialist and Communist parties from the signing of the Common Program in 1972 to their accession to power in 1981. The crucial decade of the 1970s saw the reshaping of the Left within this unlikely and rather uneasy alliance through the concept of "autogestion." Brown's analysis not only gives a clear understanding of the importance of that alliance and its underlying contradictions, but also places this phase of French politics in the context of its past (notably the events of May 1968) and gives insight into its future possibilities. A timely and enjoyable work.

Communism and Political Change in Spain. By Eusebio Mujal-León. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 274 pp. $22.50. A thorough and systematic analysis of the development of the Spanish Communist party (PCE). The author combines a broad historical perspective with an examination of the contemporary issues affecting the PCE's role in Spanish politics and in the world communist movement. The domestic and international factors that have resulted in the PCE's adoption of a democratically oriented "Eurocommunist" ideology are described in

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depth. The central focus of the book is on the PCE in the context of post-Franco parliamentary democracy. Specifically, Mujal-León examines the historical and political reasons for the electoral weakness of the PCE, as compared with the success of the Spanish Socialist party (PSOE). Of both specialized and general interest.

Institutions and Policies of the European Community. Edited by Juliet Lodge. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 264 pp. $32.50. An anthology divided into three sections. The first part analyzes institutional structures and decisionmaking processes in the EC. Part II deals with specific internal policies of the Community. Of particular interest are articles on agricultural, labor, and monetary policies. The final section examines the EC in the international arena, discussing its relations with various countries, regions, and multinational institutions. An important theme is developed throughout the book in the analysis of the broader questions about the EC: what its role was and was not intended to be, what it can and cannot accomplish. A well-structured collection providing both general and detailed information.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Israel in the Begin Era. Edited by Robert O. Freedman. New York: Praeger, 1982. 278 pp. No price given. Eight essays on aspects of Israeli politics in the Begin era, 1977-1982, all written before the Israeli assault on the PLO in Lebanon in June 1982. What is perhaps unusual, and meritorious, about this collection is the overwhelming emphasis on the details of trends in Israeli *domestic* politics. Essays on the Likud itself (one by Efraim Torgovnik, another by David Pollack), on changes in domestic policies, 1977-1981 (by Ira Sharkansky and Alex Radian), on the Labor party in opposition (by Myron J. Aronoff), on the religious parties in the Begin era (by Daniel J. Elazar), and on Israel's Arab minority (by Ian Lustick) provide a refreshing and scholarly departure from the usual emotion-laden theorizing about eternal peace and predatory superpowers. There is one essay on the superpowers in the region, especially Soviet policy, by the editor, but it seems cut off from the rest of the volume. Even more so is a final brief essay, "Autonomy, the Palestinians, and International Law," by Robert A. Friedlander. Despite its organizational problems, the book is certainly worth reading for the rare, incisive glimpses of the Israeli political arena that make Israeli foreign policy more intelligible.

Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking. By Melvin A. Friedlander. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 338 pp. $25.00

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(paper). This book, concentrating on the ultimately overcome domestic constraints on Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat during the crucial 1977-1979 period, is the published version of the author's doctoral dissertation. As such, it offers predictable benefits and liabilities. The benefits derive from the fact that for many scholars, the dissertation represents the only project that can be undertaken without excessive professional distraction. This book, as a consequence perhaps, is meticulously researched and richly detailed, more so than any other study of this period available in English. The liabilities are threefold: a tendency to be somewhat uncritical of elder sources, a preference for description over analysis, and an occasional lapse of interpretive coherence (as, for example, on page 33, where the author's summary of the Jordanian Civil War and its aftermath misses the mark). There are also trivial annoyances, such as the misspelling of Brzezinski ("Brezinski") throughout the volume. On balance, however, this volume is quite useful as a reference for serious students of this period, even if the author's analytic sophistication has yet to reach full prowess.

Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory. By Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983. 192 pp. $17.50. An unusual interpretive essay on what is perhaps best called the philosophy and psychology of Jewish history and historiography. As this somewhat cumbersome description implies, this book is difficult to fit into a neat academic niche, for it is both about Jewish history itself and about the writing of that history. It provides both an introspective look at the historian and his craft and a philosophical perspective on the meaning and uses of history itself. Yerushalmi organizes his essay into four sections: Biblical and Rabbinic Foundations, the Middle Ages, In the Wake of the Spanish Expulsion, and Modern Dilemmas. The last section, in particular, has more than passing relevance for understanding contemporary Jewish thinking as well as aspects of the underlying world view embodied in Israeli politics today. While this book is certain to be of interest to Jews and those immersed in Jewish history, it can without hesitation be recommended to anyone who appreciates fine scholarship, graceful expression, and a creative mind.

The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War. By David Pollock. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 311 pp. $35.00. An attempt to examine systematically the ways the United States has attempted to use its arms-supply relationship with Israel for political purposes. The author argues that this tendency has been in evidence throughout the period under study, and that patterns have emerged over time. In order to explain this relationship and to examine these patterns, the author relates them to the broader political context.

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While this was undoubtedly necessary to some degree in order to provide a context for the analysis, it involves the reader in long recapitulations of already well-known and well-worn chronicles of recent diplomatic history. The book concludes with certain recommendations for the United States about how to use wisely the leverage provided by its role as arms supplier to Israel.

President Kennedy's Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel. By Mordechai Gazit. Tel-Aviv: Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1983. 133 pp. No price given. A sixty-one page essay written in straightforward style about a much neglected period in U.S. policy toward the Middle East makes up the first part of this volume. Gazit examines the Kennedy administration's policy both toward the Arab world and toward Israel. His discussion of the Arab world concentrates on U.S.-Egyptian relations and the Yemeni Civil War of 1962. His treatment of the Israelis discusses a series of discreet issues: the Hawk missile sale, talks on the military balance, a U.S. security guarantee, the Jordan Water Project, U.S. efforts to curb the Middle East arms race, and the Dimona reactor. A second, equally long section of the book is a compendium of twenty-two documents from the period that have since been declassified and are not readily available elsewhere. They make fascinating reading and throw light on other matters that remain of interest in our own times. Taken together, the essay and the documents are a welcome contribution to the history of U.S.–Middle East policy, even if the definitive work on this period has yet to be written.

Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories. By Gershon R. Kieval. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. 228 pp. $35.00. The thesis of this book is that factionalism within the Israeli Labor party coalition and the Likud coalition has constrained Israel's policy options with respect to the territories occupied after the 1967 war. The value of the book is that it traces in detail just how this has been the case since 1967, remains so today, and is likely to persist in the future. Kieval also manages with some skill to weave in enough of the broader international developments affecting Israel to give the narrative a proper balance. Taken together, the relevant sections of the Freedman and Friedlander books noted above and this volume provide a modest education in Israeli domestic politics, without which a good understanding of Israeli foreign policy is impossible.

Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and the War in Lebanon. By Jonathan C. Randal. New York: The Viking Press, 1983. 304 pp. $16.75. The personalistic impressions of a *Washington Post*

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correspondent about the war in Lebanon. There is perhaps something to be learned from this book, particularly about feuds between prominent Maronite and Druze factions, but most of the information is commonly known and not presented here with any analytic rigor. When Randal discusses Israel, he simply cannot manage to contain his malice. He writes, for example, that "a generation of American indulgence of willfull Israeli policies—and, since 1975, massive infusions of money and arms to secure Israel's agreement to the Sinai disengagement and the Camp David Peace process that ensued—had encouraged Israeli militarists to dream." Discussing the Israeli shelling of West Beirut in August 1982, Randal writes: "I was furious with the Israelis, and even angrier with the U.S. government, which knowingly allowed its Israeli clients to get away with large-scale murder. . . . I was sick at heart, ashamed of being an American." The book has at least one clear use: if a reader wishes to see an example of the left/liberal pro-PLO mythology, relatively unvarnished by the strictures of journalistic responsibility, this is it.

The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy. By David C. Gordon. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 171 pp. $18.50. Another in Westview's continuing and very useful series of basic primers on the nations of the Middle East. (For notes about the previous two efforts, on Jordan and Syria, see ORBIS, Spring 1983, p. 235.) Writing a work on Lebanon would be a daunting task under the best of circumstances, since Lebanon has never been a "normal" state. Indeed, the Lebanese national consensus consisted of an agreement not to have such a consensus at all! But writing such a work amid civil war and multiple foreign occupations must have been especially trying. Nevertheless, the author does a commendable job of setting forth the basic materials. Only as the book's narrative approaches more recent events does the knowledgeable reader's inclination to quibble and dissent arise. But this goes with the territory. Finally, one hopes that Westview will consider paperback editions of this series, lest university undergraduates be forced to rely on older and inferior texts.

The PLO and the Politics of Survival. By Aaron David Miller. New York: Praeger, 1983, published in conjunction with the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington Paper no. 99. 132 pp. $6.95 (paper). Rarely do short reviews of monographs appear in these pages, but for this work we make an exception—its quality exceeds by far its brevity. This little volume is a historical and analytic summary of the Palestine Liberation Organization written in clear, dispassionate language commending itself to beginning and more advanced students alike. Chapters consider, in turn, the history of the movement through 1979, the PLO's various factions and subfactions, the PLO in the inter-Arab system,

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and the PLO and Israel. Having set the stage, the author picks up his chronological treatment with the period between the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and the Israeli invasion of PLO bases in Lebanon. The last sixteen pages outline the current choices and problems confronting the PLO. Miller's view is that if the PLO fails to find a way to work with Jordan or to enter political negotiations by some other means, "its future will be grim."

Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. By Anthony Arnold. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 242 pp. $10.95 (paper). The unresolved conflict between the pro-Moscow Parcham and the more national Khalq factions of the Afghanistan Communist party may hold the key to Soviet prospects in Afghanistan. With commendable clarity, this monograph explores the background and status of these two Communist factions and speculates about their pattern of infighting and evolution. The result is a valuable contribution to an understanding of Afghan domestic politics.

Atlas of the Arab World. Compiled by Michael Dempsey. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1983. 120 pp. $16.95. A slick compendium of thirty-eight graphs on aspects of the Arab world, together with brief, two-page summaries of each Arab state. All the graphs are maps, over which are superimposed various symbols in many bright colors. Israel is never mentioned, but the country descriptions include an entry for "Palestine." There are no page numbers. Serious scholars would find more basic information on the Arab world in Europa Publication's *The Middle East and North Africa* annual volumes or other established reference works.

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

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

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